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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the nature and causes of wage 
differentials in Indonesian manufacturing. It is mainly 
concerned with the impact of recent 'modern' sector growth 
on the wage structure. It especially concentrates on the 
influence of new technology and foreign ownership on wage 
differentials. Several hypotheses are investigated. These 
attempt to evaluate the effect of internal labour markets, 
human capital and institutional influences (government and 
trade union) on wage differentials according to capital 
intensity.
The empirical analysis is based on an examination of 
secondary data and more general influences on the wage 
structure, and a field survey of three industries - weaving, 
kretek and cigarettes - in Java. Three major conclusions 
emerge from the study. First, the labour market in Indonesia 
appears to be quite highly segmented. Labour market 
segmentation was reflected in large wage differentials, 
different worker characteristics and low levels of mobility 
between various segments of the labour market. These were 
closely related to capital intensity and foreign ownership. 
Second, variations in wages according to capital intensity 
and foreign ownership in the three industries were a consequence 
mainly of the influence of internal labour markets and human 
capital factors. These two groups of factors were closely 
interrelated in their effect on wages. It may not be 
meaningful to pose the question whether human capital or 
internal labour market factors mainly contribute to wage 
differentials because of these interrelationships. Third, 
the study suggests that institutional influences may have been 
given too much attention in the literature on wage differentials 
in less developed countries. These differentials may be 
inherent in patterns of economic development in which rapid 
technological change and foreign ownership play a central 
role.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade Indonesia has experienced rapid 
growth in manufacturing output associated with rapid inflow 
of modern technology and foreign capital. This study examines 
the effects of this new investment and growth on the wage 
structure. It focuses on the dimensions and causes of 
interfirm wage differentials that have emerged since 1967.
The study was stimulated by indications that new foreign 
investment was beginning to create a labour elite that was 
not apparent in Indonesia before 1967. The initial objective 
of the thesis was to investigate the extent and causes of 
wage differentials associated with foreign investment. However, 
as the study progressed it became clear that foreign investment 
was only one of several elements causing changes in the wage 
structure in Indonesia. In particular, it appeared that 
modern technology (with which foreign investment is closely 
associated) has probably played a central role in determining 
wage differentials in the manufacturing sector. Thus it was 
necessary to examine wage differentials in a broader framework 
which emphasised the relationship between technology and the 
wage structure.
Two main factors influenced the approach of this study.^ 
The first is the extensive literature on the causes of wage 
differentials in manufacturing in Japan during its phase of 
rapid industrial development in the first decade of this 
century. This literature stresses the emergence and 
persistence of large wage differentials which have been 
associated mainly with the size of firm. Wage differentials 
became significant in Japan in an economic environment quite
1 The major elements of both are summarised briefly here. They 
are discussed in greater detail in Chapters Two and Three.
2different from that of Indonesia today. Foreign investment 
played no role in Japanese manufacturing development, and there 
was virtually no organised labour or government intervention in 
the labour market in the early years of Japanese development.
In order to explain wage differentials in Japan one must look 
beyond these two explanations (foreign investment and external 
institutional intervention in the labour market) which have 
received so much attention in the literature on wages in less 
developed countries (LDCs).
However there are also similarities in the experience 
of Japan and Indonesia. In particular the rapid rate of 
technological change which took place in Japan, and the wide 
range in size of firm and technology in manufacturing, are 
features of the industrial sector growth which has occurred 
in Indonesia since 1967. These factors have been given 
considerable attention in the discussion of causes of wage 
differentials in Japan. They are also likely to be of 
importance in Indonesia.
The causes of interscale wage differentials have been 
hotly debated in Japan. One aspect of this controversy is 
particularly relevant to the approach taken in this study.
There has been much debate over whether high wages in 
large scale firms are mainly a consequence of social and 
cultural patterns peculiar to the Japanese environment. Or 
can they be attributed to human capital factors and specific 
labour management policies adopted by large scale firms. This 
study examines the extent to which various 'institutional' 
forces rather than economic considerations have influenced 
interfirm wage differentials in Indonesia.
The second set of factors that has influenced this study 
are the theories of internal labour markets and labour market 
segmentation. These have been developed mainly to explain wage 
differentials under quite different labour market conditions 
in North America. The theory of internal labour markets 
provides an integrated explanation of wage differentials
3mainly related to the nature of skill acquisition in modern 
industrial environments. The theory suggests that decisions 
concerning wages and the allocation of labour may, to a 
considerable extent be taken independently of the external 
labour market forces. The theory of labour market segmentation 
was developed to explain the existence of strong internal 
labour markets in certain segments of the economy; it also 
emphasises how these markets effectively exclude certain 
socio-economic groups from relatively stable, high wage jobs.
The theory of internal labour markets is valuable to this 
study because it provides a more integrated explanation of 
wage differentials than is given in much of the literature 
on Japan. In particular, it combines elements of human capital 
and institutional theories, and links them to firm-specific 
skills and technology. The theory of labour market segmentation 
provides a framework for examining wage differentials in the 
context of technological dualism, a prominant theme in the 
literature on economic development.
The major issues investigated in this thesis are closely 
linked to some of the issues taken up in the empirical studies 
of Japan and the theories of labour markets mentioned above.
We suggest that wage differentials are closely related to
capital intensity and foreign capital in Indonesia. It is
hypothesised that three broad sets of factors help explain
these wage differentials associated with capital intensity
and ownership. These are (a) internal labour market considerations,
(b) human capital and personal characteristics of workers, and
(c) institutional factors. The thesis examines the extent to 
which each influences wage differentials and stresses the 
interrelationships between the three.^
The study has important implications for more general 
issues of economic development in which wages play a central
1 See Chapter Three for a fuller discussion of these issues.
4role. It suggests that urban and industrial labour markets
are more heterogeneous than has generally been assumed in much
of the literature on wage determination and labour allocation
(especially rural urban migration) in LDCs.^ Indeed, the
implications of the study are that variations between different
kinds of firm in wage rates, systems of remuneration, stability
of employment and ease of entry are so great that an aggregate
view of urban, manufacturing or 'formal' sector behaviour may
be of limited analytical value. Owing to the heterogeneity
of wages in the manufacturing sector, models which specify
behavioural relationships based on average wages in urban areas
(or for the industrial sector as a whole), may add little to
our knowledge of factors which determine the rate and nature
2of labour allocation in LDCs.
Given the heterogeneity of wages in manufacturing in LDCs,
the assumption of a uniform manufacturing wage rate may not be
valid when applied to these countries. It may not be meaningful,
for example, to question the effect of economic policy changes
such as devaluation on the manufacturing wage rate. The changes
in wages in large scale modern sector firms in response to such
policy adjustments may differ considerably from those which occur
in medium and small scale enterprises. For example, employees
in the latter may not be in a position to demand higher wages in3response to increased prices resulting from devaluation. At
These comments are made primarily with reference to the case 
of the labour abundant LDCs of much of Asia. They may be less 
relevant to labour scarce economies (especially in Africa and 
the Pacific) where several of the theories of migration were 
formulated.
Although there has been some attempt to (take account of) some 
of these complexities in more recent models, studies of rural 
urban migrations which use the basic framework developed by 
Harris and Todaro (1970) are examples of such misplaced 
aggregation. See Chapter Two for a fuller discussion of some 
of the shortcomings of these models.
The recent strikes and wage demands following the November 1978 
devaluation in Indonesia are a case in point. These appear to 
have been made mainly by employees in large scale, modern 
sector firms.
5the very least, a dualistic framework may be required for a 
realistic analysis of the overall effects of such policy changes.
The study also seeks to contribute to the understanding of 
the process of wage determination in the LDCs. The influence of 
’institutional' forces (especially government minimun wage laws, 
trade unions and the inherited colonial salary structure) on 
urban and modern sector wages has frequently been mentioned as 
the major cause of rural urban or formal-informal wage 
differentials in LDCs. However we suggest there are also 
rational economic reasons for quite large variations in wage 
rates within the manufacturing sector. Relatively high wages 
are partly the result of the strong influence of internal labour 
market forces in capital intensive and foreign firms; they are 
the consequence of contrasting wage and labour management 
policies adopted to maximise labour productivity. They may also 
be associated with greater skill and education of workers in 
capital intensive and foreign firms. These factors help 
explain high average urban and manufacturing sector wages.
If human capital and imported labour management systems 
associated with the new technology do result in higher wages 
in capital intensive and foreign firms, interfirm wage 
differentials are likely to result from the particular pattern 
of industrial development chosen by many LDCs. Viewed in this 
light capital intensive techniques may be both a cause and a 
consequence of high 'modern' sector wages. A relatively unequal 
distribution of income between blue collar wage earners is 
also likely to be a major feature of highly differentiated, 
capitalist industrial structures.
Such a conclusion has important policy as well as 
theoretical implications. It indicates that insofar as overall 
disequilibrium in labour markets in LDCs is the result of wage 
differentials (as the recent migration models suggest) labour 
market disequilibrium is an inevitable consequence of an economic 
strategy that encourages the inflow of modern technology and
6foreign investment. It may not be appropriate to blame 
governments or trade unions for improper intervention in the 
pricing of labour. Rural-urban migration, urban unemployment and 
underemployment which occur partly in response to high wage 
pockets in the urban manufacturing sector, will not be remedied 
merely by the removal of minimum wage legislation and control 
over the activities of trade unions. The emphasis by some 
economists on removal of factor price distortions in labour 
markets may, to some extent, be misplaced. Interfirm wage 
differentials and their broader effects on the labour market 
are a structural problem associated with the pattern of 
development chosen by many LDCs.
The thesis is divided into three major parts. The first 
part (Chapters Two and Three) reviews the literature on theories 
and empirical studies of wage differentials and provides a 
framework of analysis. The second part consists of Chapters 
Four to Six. Chapters Four and Five review secondary data on 
the wage structure, general labour market conditions and 
institutional forces affecting wages and the labour market in 
Indonesia. Chapter Six discusses the industrial structure and 
wages in the three industries selected for the field survey.
The third part, Chapters Seven to Ten, provides an analysis of 
data collected in the field survey. Chapter Seven examines 
several hypotheses concerning the determinants of wage 
differentials in the three industries. This chapter analyses 
the extent to which wage differentials are associated with 
several firm characteristics (mainly capital intensity and foreign 
ownership), various worker characteristics and institutional 
forces. Chapter Eight looks at fringe benefits and the form of 
wage payment. In Chapter Nine we investigate the contrasts in 
the characteristics of workers in firms with varying levels of 
capital intensity and ownership patterns. Chapter Ten examines 
the influence of various firm and worker characteristics on rates 
of labour turnover and absenteeism. It also discusses some 
institutional influences on wages in capital intensive and foreign 
firms.
CHAPTER TWO
THE DETERMINATION OF WAGE AND STRUCTURE OF LABOUR MARKETS 
IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The level of wages and intersectoral wage differentials 
play a central role in several theories of economic development 
in LDCs. In particular they play a major role in theories of 
rural urban migration and intersectoral labour flows. A major 
shortcoming of these theories (mentioned in the introduction 
to this study) is that they have tended to oversimplify the 
wage structure and nature of labour flows within the urban and 
industrial sectors, and between these sectors and agriculture.
In this chapter we will examine briefly the role given to wages 
in some of these earlier studies. Some attention 
will be given to explanations for high urban and modern 
sector wages that have been a focus of much of the literature 
on labour markets in LDCs. Studies of this subject are relevant 
to the thesis because they place the examination of the causes 
of wage differentials in manufacturing in a broader framework 
of intersectoral labour allocation in LDCs.
There is quite a diverse literature on various aspects of 
wage differentials in LDCs that are relevant to this study.
These include:
(i) models of surplus labour, migration and rural urban 
wage differentials,
(ii) studies highlighting the historical, institutional 
and political factors affecting wage differentials 
in LDCs,
(iii) econometric studies mainly of the determinants of 
interindustry wage differentials, and
(iv) an extensive literature on the determinants of 
interscale wage differentials (wage differentials 
according to size of firm) in Japan.
All make an important contribution to an understanding of the 
causes of wage differentials and processes of labour allocation 
in LDCs. In this chapter we will examine each of
8these subjects and indicate their contribution to development 
of the major questions to be raised in the thesis.
1. The Lewis Model of Labour Surplus and Constant Wage Rates
Lewis's surplus labour model is the starting point for our 
discussion of theories of wage determination in LDCs (Lewis,
1954, 1958; Fei and Ranis, 1964). Two key points in the Lewis 
model are of relevance to the present study. First, abundant 
labour in agriculture provides a surplus resource which enables 
manufacturing development to proceed at a constant real wage. 
Second, the transfer of labour from agriculture to industry 
continues (in the simple two sector case) until all 'surplus' 
labour is withdrawn from the agricultural sector. Further, 
movement from agriculture can only be achieved by increasing 
wage rates.
The process is demonstrated in Figure 2.1. Surplus labour 
in agriculture enables the manufacturing sector to absorb 
increasing amounts of labour at a constant wage rate (w-^) until 
ON^ amounts of labour are employed. Beyond this point new 
labour can only be transferred out of agriculture at rising 
real wage rates (w^  and w^). The 'turning point' in economic 
development is marked by rising wages in both agriculture 
and industry as the economy is transformed from labour surplus 
to labour scarcity (Lewis, 1958:19-26; Fei and Ranis, 1964: 
260-6; Minami, 1973).
There has been considerable debate concerning the nature 
of surplus labour in agriculture and the actual process of wage 
determination in rural areas.^ Nevertheless, Lewis's assumption 
of constant wages in agriculture has been a major element of 
other models of wage determination in LDCs, and appears to 
accord broadly with the experience of most labour surplus LDCs. 
But the usefulness of the model has been questioned for its 
failure to explain quite large differences between urban and
In particular there- has been much discussion in the 
literature on whether in practice the marginal product of 
underemployed labour in agriculture is likely to equal zero.
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rural wages and rising real wage rates in urban areas despite 
conditions of labour surplus in agriculture.^ Since these 
intersectoral wage differentials have received such a central 
place in the discussion of labour allocation in LDCs, it will 
be useful to summarise briefly the major explanations that have 
been suggested for their origins and persistence.
2. The Causes of Intersectoral Wage Differentials in LDCs
Much of the literature on the subject of wage differentials 
in LDCs has been concerned to explain why urban or modern 
sector wages have risen significantly above agricultural wages 
despite conditions of labour surplus. High urban sector wages 
have been explained by the interaction of inherited, colonial 
wage policy and systems and institutional forces, and the 
effect of high wages in leading export sectors. We will look 
briefly at arguments explaining the importance of each of 
these.^
The present wage structure in many LDCs has its origin 
in wage policies adopted during the colonial period. European 
mining and plantation enterprises which spread in LDCs in the 
latter half of the 19th Century and early half of the 20th 
Century tended to adopt low wage policies for the employment 
mainly of casual labour (Myint, 1973:41-8). in Africa the
1 (continued)
See Myint (1973:68-74) and Corden (1974:126-9) for a 
discussion of these issues.
See Lipton (1977:Ch.5) for data on urban rural wage 
differentials in LDCs and Turner and Jackson (1970) for 
an empirical investigation of trends in real wage rates in 
LDC s •
2 This section summarises some of the key points made in 
numerous explanations of wage differentials in LDCs. Some 
of these explanations will be more important in some 
countries or groups of countries than others. However most 
of them have probably been influential in quite a large 
number of countries. See especially Arrighi (1970), Weeks 
(1971), Hunter (1969), Berg (1966, 1969), Baldwin (1962), 
Seers (1964), Myint (1973, 1971) Morris (1960, 1965), Boeke 
(1953:Ch.13 and 14), Meier (1970:432- 7).
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predominant pattern was employment of temporary, migrant labour
from rural areas. In many parts of Asia (and in some parts of
the Pacific) immigrant labour was brought under contract from
overpopulated areas of India, China and Java.^ Even in India
where manufacturing development had advanced faster than in
many countries by the early part of the 20th Century, employees
in the Bombay textile industry were highly mobile between
alternative manufacturing employments in reaction to variable
wages and a "ramshackle system of labour use and discipline"
(Morris, 1965:203-4). Long hours of work, instability in output
and employment were the major explanations for poor labour
2performance in this industry in India.
Owing to these policies, there was little attempt during 
the colonial period to invest in the skills of the labour force. 
This reinforced the tendency towards temporary supply response. 
In many countries a high proportion of more stable and highly 
paid skilled, administrative and commercial positions were held 
by Europeans or by Chinese or Indian immigrants (Furnivall, 
1947:116-23, 308-12). The different levels of wages and 
incomes of various races was a central aspect of the 'plural3society' that developed in many colonised countries.
Independence appears to have greatly affected the structure 
of wages in many LDCs. Nationals replaced foreigners in both 
the civil service and as skilled and professional employees in
However the African pattern of temporary migrant labour was 
also common in some Asian countries. One example is the 
employment of casual workers on estates in Java which, 
according to Boeke, typified dual labour markets (Boeke,
1953 :139-47) .
Mazumdar (1973) in an analysis of labour supply response 
among textile workers in Bombay suggests that a clear, 
distinction should be drawn between temporary (badli) employees, 
unmarried employees and more stable employees that migrated 
with their families from rural areas.
Indonesia was one country in which labour market segmentation 
by race (European, Chinese and Indonesia) was a major 
objective of colonial policy (Furnival, 1939; Kahin, 1952:
29-36).
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private companies. In many countries the replacement of 
expatriates contributed to the formation of a 'labour elite' 
in both the public and private sectors. Both the scarcity of 
skilled and educated manpower, and adoption of civil service 
and professional salary scales (which were used for expatriates 
during the colonial period) contributed to the high wage of 
this labour elite (Arrighi, 1970:233-4; Berg, 1966:207; Hunter, 
1969:131-2).1
The upward push on urban skilled and administrative wages
set in motion by both decolonisation and replacement of
expatriate personnel, was supported by two other influences
emanating from the private sector. These were partly motivated
by profit maximisation objectives, partly by political
considerations. The first involved a change in attitude on
the part of foreign companies towards the capacity of indigenous
peoples to accumulate skills and provide a stable, disciplined
work force. New investments in relatively capital intensive
industry by both foreign and domestic entrepreneurs were
accompanied by new personnel policies. These paid more
attention to high wages in order to create a higher quality,
more stable work force. Moreover it has been argued that
large scale firms in the 'modern' sector were more likely to
2benefit from a policy of high wages.
This change from a cheap labour policy appears to have 
been most marked in parts of Africa where employers had 
complained for some time of the migrant labour problem
Not only were wage differentials between unskilled workers 
and administrative personnel very large but they were also 
perverse in many countries. The inherited salary system 
favoured clerical and administrative officers rather than 
much scarcer skilled mechanical and technical employees 
(Jolly, 1969).
Myint argues that the gains in productivity may more than 
pay for the wage bill, especially since 'modern' sector firms 
may not be able to adapt to the use of casual labour (Myint, 
(1970:143). And Mazumdar suggests that the "functional 
relationship between wages and efficiency will generally 
be more important for firms with modern technology employing 
a large number of workers" (Mazumdar, 197 6: 656) .
13
(Weeks, 1971). But Morris (1960) also notes the very different 
system of labour management developed to stabilise the work force 
at Tata Steel Mills, Ahmedabad. Willner (1961:Ch.3) mentions 
that, compared with the situation during the colonial period, 
there was a considerable decline in labour turnover and 
absenteeism in an East Javanese textile mill in the 1950s. In 
addition to these rather narrow profit maximisation reasons for 
higher wages, foreign firms were also motivated by a need to 
retain goodwill with host countries and to avoid nationalist 
criticism (Turner, 1965:20-1).
Another influence on wages has come from enclave investors 
in minerals and petroleum industries (Seers, 1964; Baldwin,
1962; Berg, 1969:296-8). Firms in these sectors often earned 
high profits (especially when export prices were high) and 
labour costs were a small proportion of total costs. Consequently 
it is argued that management was less resistant to wage claims 
than in more competitive industries. Besides, the employment 
of a relatively large number of highly paid foreign personnel, 
and foreign ownership of these enclave operations, increased 
the pressure for high wages in such firms which tended to be 
vulnerable to nationalist pressure.
It appears that both the lop-sided, inherited salary 
structure and high wages paid to unskilled workers in pockets of 
the private sector, fueled increasingly organised trade union 
pressure for minimum wages in many countries (Arrighi, 1970:237). 
Minimum wages were not introduced in all LDCs (indeed they 
appear to have been much more important in Africa than in Asia) 
and often they affected a small segment of the 'protected' 
urban work force (Watanabe, 1976; Harberger, 1971)^.Nevertheless 
undoubtedly they contributed to widening urban rural wage 
differentials in many countries. The adoption of quite 
comprehensive labour protection codes (often partly in
1 Watanabe (1976) notes the wide range in the influence and 
scope of minimum wages in various LDCs.
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response to pressure from international bodies such as ILO)^ 
which were implemented only in urban areas or among large 
enclave investors, further contributed to a widening of these 
differentials.
This brief survey of various explanations for high urban 
and modern sector wages indicates the great importance which 
various writers have attached to historical and institutional 
factors. Although some writers have suggested that profit 
maximising objectives played a vital role, the influence 
of colonial wage structures, government and trade union 
intervention have been given the most attention. In 
later sections of this chapter it will be suggested that, at 
least within the manufacturing sector, profit maximisation 
objectives have played a much more important part than many 
of these studies suggest. For example, a wide range of 
interfirm wage differentials existed in Japan for over half 
a century despite a minimal amount of government or trade 
union intervention and without the influence of high wage 
foreign and enclave investments.
All these influences on urban and modern sector wages 
in LDCs had two major effects. First, employers economised 
on the use of unskilled labour in some societies and this 
contributed to urban unemployment (Hunter, 1969:125-6;
Weeks, 1971; Baldwin, 1964:79-82). Second, rising urban 
wages and increased urban rural wage differentials provided 
an increased incentive for rural urban migration. This further 
swelled the ranks of the urban unemployed and underemployed 
(Todaro, 1973). The second effect and its relationship to 
urban wages and existing unemployment has received much 
attention in more recent literature on labour markets in LDCs. 
We will look briefly at the major features of these models 
in which urban rural wage differentials play a central role.
Turner (1965:25) states that the ILO probably has been 
the "biggest single influence upon formal or official wage 
and labour policy in underdeveloped countries."
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The discussion will indicate some shortcomings of the models 
that are relevant to this study and lead us into an examination 
of some more general theories concerning the operation of urban 
labour markets.
3. The Harris-Todaro Model and the Structure of Urban Labour
Markets
The Harris-Todaro model of rural urban migration attempts 
to explain continuing high rates of rural urban migration in 
many LDCs despite considerable unemployment and underemployment 
in urban areas.
The model includes both urban rural wage differentials and 
the rate of urban unemployment as key variables (Harris and 
Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1969). It focuses on a measure 
of expected wage differentials (including both actual urban 
rural income differentials and the level of urban unemployment) 
rather than actual differentials as the major factor 
influencing the potential migrant's decision to move. It 
predicts that rural people will continue to move to urban 
areas as long as the expected urban wage exceeds the rural 
wage. Temporary unemployment is tolerated because migrants 
are prepared to sacrifice present earnings (in agriculture) 
for the chance of obtaining a high wage urban job. High levels 
of urban unemployment are explained by the migrant's desire 
to maximise lifetime rather than current earnings.
The general Harris-Todaro framework has been broadened 
by the addition of several variables including labour turnover, 
temporary employment in the low wage, informal ('murky') sector, 
and variations in the quality of labour inputs (see especially 
Fields, 1975; Johnson, 1971; Barnum and Sabot, 1976). The 
relationship between expected income differentials and rates 
of rural urban migration have been confirmed by quite a large 
number of empirical studies in a wide variety of countries.'*'
1 See Todaro (1976a: 67-74) and Yap (1975)for a summary of 
the major findings of these studies.
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Nevertheless some writers have drawn attention to shortcomings 
of the model and of empirical studies used to test its validity. 
It will be useful to mention some of these criticisms since 
they are pertinent to some of the major aspects of wage 
determination raised in this study.^
One criticism that may be made of the Harris-Todaro model 
is that it oversimplifies both intra urban and urban rural 
labour market relationships, and thereby fails to identify the 
nature of labour market flows with sufficient precision. In 
Chapter One we mentioned the difficulties of obtaining 
meaningful measures of aggregate urban wage rates (and other 
urban labour market performance variables) because of the
2heterogeneity of employment situations in many LDC cities. 
Although the model predicts that migrants move from poorer to 
richer areas, it is not clear what is the main motivation for 
movement. Most of the econometric studies (which are mainly 
based on secondary data sources) have not been able to 
measure the key independent variables. For example per capita 
income, average wage rates or average industrial earnings are 
usually used to approximate urban wage rates (Yap, 1975:244). 
Thus even studies which appear to confirm the model leave 
several key questions unanswered. Do migrants gamble on finding 
employment in high wage, modern sector jobs? Or are they 
excluded from this kind of job and seek lower paying, less 
stable employment in medium sized or small firms? Or perhaps, 
faced with rural poverty and unemployment, they move to urban 
areas to obtain any job or income. Where there is a 
heterogeneous structure of urban labour markets, any of these
Although several criticisms of the model are given here, it 
should be noted that we are not denying the important 
contribution that the Harris-Todaro model (and subsequent 
refinements to this model) has made to the understanding 
of the operation of labour markets in LDCs.
It should be noted that the model may have greater 
relevance to labour market situations in Africa (where it 
was originally conceived) than to densely populated Asia.
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alternatives may be consistent with the findings of some of 
these empirical studies that rely on aggregate measures of 
urban wage rates and labour allocation. Introduction of the 
informal sector into these models is a major step forward 
in the theoretical specification of the migration process.
But there remain some major difficulties in testing the models 
empirically, especially from secondary data.'*'
Numerous studies now suggest that many of these 
questions may only be answered satisfactorily by taking 
account of the heterogeneous nature of urban labour markets 
in LDCs. Several writers have drawn attention to the 
distinction between the 'labour aristocracy' employed in the 
modern urban sector and the large mass of 'lumpenproletariat' 
in low wage, unstable employment in urban areas in LDCs (Arrighi 
and Saul, 1968:147-50; Arrighi, 1970:231-44; Amin, 1977). 
Conditions of employment and wage rates (and also class 
orientation) are likely to differ markedly between the two 
groups. As a consequence, these writers suggest that it makes 
little sense to lump them together to describe the urban 
labour force. Other writers have suggested that 
an even more complex structure of employment exists in the
Barnum and Sabot have attempted to disaggregate 
the labour market further according to various 
skill categories and by distinguishing between 
educated and uneducated workers. They analyse 
the effects that excess supply of educated 
employees have on rates of migration and the 
urban labour market. For example, they have 
developed a model for Tanzania which tests the 
extent to which educated workers displace the 
uneducated,first in relatively skilled jobs, and 
later in unskilled urban jobs, as excess labour 
supply (especially of educated workers) begins 
to develop (Barnum and Sabot, 1976).
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urban areas of many LDCs (Friedmann and Sullivan, 1974;
Breman, 197 6)
All these studies suggest that there is a need for a more 
disaggregated approach to the investigation of labour markets 
which takes account of some of the major divisions within labour 
markets in LDCs. Several studies of wages suggest that a more 
differentiated wage structure than is implied in the basic 
labour surplus and migration models does exist within the 
industrial sector of many LDCs. In the next section we 
summarise the major findings of several of these studies.
4. Empirical Studies of Industrial Wage Differentials in LDCs
Several empirical studies of wages have pointed to the
great variation in wage rates between firms and industries in
LDCs (Eriksson, 1966:35-46; Berg, 1969:296-8; Papola and Bharadwaj, 
21970). The dispersion has tended to be much greater in LDCs 
than in developed countries (Papola and Bharadwaj, 1970). These 
findings are confirmed by some studies of inter industry wage 
structure in specific countries (Akrasanee and Chutikul,
1977:5-10; Guisinger and Irfan, 1974:276-8). Although the
For example, on the basis of research in Southern India Breman 
(1976:1939-43) suggests a fourfold classification of urban 
labour markets into the labour elite, petit bourgeoisie, 
sub-proletariat and paupers. In this scheme the large majority 
of the wage earning population falls into the sub-proletariat 
and a minority are part of the labour elite. In his study 
of an urban community in Gujerat, methods of recruitment, 
stability of employment and the level of labour earnings all 
differed markedly between various segments of the urban 
population (Breman, 1977). Mazumdar (1973) notes a similar 
contrast in level of wages and stability of employment between 
casual badli workers and more permanent employees in the 
Bombay textile industry.
In this study we are concerned mainly with interfirm wage 
differentials. Occupational differentials have received 
considerable attention in the literature on wages in LDCs but 
these are not central to the major issues raised in this 
thesis. See Eriksson (1966), Taira (1966) and Turner (1965) 
for general surveys of occupational differentials in LDCs.
19
search for an explanation for these differentials has by no 
means produced a uniform picture, certain characteristics of 
industrial development appear to have affected interindustry 
(and interfirm) wage differentials.
Findings of six studies conducted in Pakistan, Columbia, 
Kenya, Singapore, Thailand and India are summarised in Table 
2.1.^ In almost all countries in which foreign investment was 
specified as an explanatory variable, industries (or firms) 
with a high proportion of foreign capital tended to pay higher 
than average wage rates. In addition, two other studies that 
have concentrated specifically on foreign-domestic wage 
differentials support these findings (Lim, 1977; Isarangkun and 
Taira, 1976). In four countries (Pakistan, Columbia, India 
and, to a lesser extent, Thailand), capital intensity was 
found to be a major determinant of wage differentials. Size 
of the firm (or measures of concentration based on firm size) 
was found to be significant in three cases (Thailand, India 
and Kenya) but insignificant in two others (Pakistan and 
Singapore). A variety of other factors (region, unionisation, 
average product or value added per worker, proportion of 
government employees in the industry, sex and other personal 
characteristics of workers) were found to be significant in 
one or more studies.
Most of the studies did not take the investigation of the 
causes of interindustry or interfirm wage differentials beyond
 ^ All these studies used multiple regression analysis to
examine the relationship between measures of interindustry 
wage differentials and various explanatory variables.
The one study which found that foreign investment was not a 
significant determinant of wage differentials explains this 
result by poor specification of the foreign capital variable 
Akrasanee and Chutikul, 1977).
Lim (1976) concludes that capital intensity was also a 
major factor contributing to foreign-domestic wage 
differentials in Malaysian manufacturing.
3
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TABLE 2.1 Summary of the findings of several studies of 
interindustry wage differentials in LDCs
Author(s) Country
Variables with a 
significant 
influence on 
wages
Variables with 
no significant 
influence on 
wages
1. Guisinger 
and Irfan 
(1974)
Pakistan Capital intensity, 
region (very 
important) foreign 
capital,unionisation
Skill, size 
of firm
2. Fields and 
de Marulanda 
(1976)
Columbia Value added per 
worker, capital 
intensity, foreign 
capital, skill
3. House and 
Rempel 
(1976)
Kenya Average product 
per worker (highly 
significant), size 
of firm) (index 
of concentration), 
proportion of 
employment in 
government 
enterprises.
4. Pang Eng 
Fongl
(1974)
Singapore Foreign capital, 
various personal 
characteristics 
of workers 
(education 
language, 
experience)
Size of firm, 
race
5. Akrasanee 
and Chutikul 
(1977)
Thailand Sex, size of 
firm (important) 
capacity to pay 
capital intensity 
(less important)
Foreign cap­
ital, export 
orientation, 
market power, 
labour turn­
over ,
unionisation
6. Horowitz 
(1973)
India Capital intensity, 
size of the firm
-
1
2
Interfirm study of wage differentials.
All significant only for skilled workers.
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a rather simple search for correlates. Several suggest that
the association between wages and certain explanatory variables
indicated that the rather vaguely defined 'non-market' forces were
a major determinant of wage differentials.^ For example,
Akrasanee and Chutikul (1976:63-4) conclude that 'non-market'
forces (chiefly sex and size of firm) were the major cause
2of interindustry wage differentials in Thailand. The 
influence of trade unions and foreign investment on wages, and 
the share of wages in total production costs were all also seen 
as significant 'non-market' forces in this and other studies.
On the other hand, Fields and de Marulanda (1976:9) suggest 
that the association between capital intensity and wage 
differentials demonstrates the importance of 'market' forces 
because of the need to minimise labour turnover in capital 
intensive firms. The importance of 'market' forces in wage 
determination is also stressed by Horowitz (1973:672) in a study 
of interindustry wages in India. She concludes that although 
government policy "plays some part in influencing wages...
'Non-market' forces were not defined uniformly by different 
writers. Guisinger and Irfan (1974:275) suggest that 'non- 
market' forces are any intervention to disturb the 'perfectly 
competitive determination of wages'. The influence of skill 
on wages is seen as a market factor but capital intensity may 
be a market or non-market factor. According to these writers, 
capital intensity is an indication of market forces to the 
extent that it reflects skill differences; but it is non- 
market to the extent that it reflects market power and the 
redistribution of monopoly profits to workers, or the presence 
of foreign investment. Fields and de Marulanda (1976:6) give 
a broader definition of market forces than is provided in 
standard competitive theory to include "other market 
motivations of firms (such as paying higher wages in order to 
reduce labour turnover costs or improving worker efficiency".
Although these authors do not provide further evidence to 
support their conclusions, they surmise that sex differences 
are evidence of discrimination rather than productivity 
differentials between males and females. Also they suggest 
that wage differentials owing to firm size are greater than 
may be the result of differences in productivity between 
firms.
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economic considerations played the greatest role". This rather 
bold statement is based on the strong relationship between wages 
and both capital intensity and size of the firm. Although she 
provides little evidence to support the assertion, the author 
attributes these relationships to insurance against strikes, and 
wage incentives. She suggests that wage incentives contribute 
to better health and greater work effort in larger and more 
capital intensive firms. The studies of Pakistan and Columbia 
come to a similar conclusion that both 'market' and 'non-market' 
forces are important (Fields and de Marulanda, 1976:23; Guisinger 
and Irfan, 1975:287).^
A more comprehensive study has been undertaken by Heady 
(1976a, 1976b). He suggests two theories of wage determination 
in LDCs and tests them with Columbian data. The first 
theory, labelled a cost minimisation theory draws on the 
theoretical works of Stiglitz who has suggested two models 
('efficiency wage' and 'labour turnover') to explain interfirm
Many of these studies of LDCs appear to have been 
inspired by earlier studies of developed countries and 
the approach and findings are similar. Slichter 
(1950) noted a negative relationship between wages 
and the size of payroll as a proportion of sales; 
other research has pointed to the relationship between 
wages and both size of firm and interindustry 
differences in concentration ratios (Lester, 1967; 
Masters, 1969; Weiss, 1971). These differentials 
have been attributed to greater unionisation, higher 
than average profits and a greater willingness on 
the part of management to pass on some of the 
excess profits to workers in certain industries. 
However Weiss (1971:351-9) suggests that the 
relationship between concentration and earnings 
may be almost entirely attributed to differences 
in personal characteristics of workers - chiefly 
age, race, education and experience. Similarly,
Rees and Schultz (1970) found no relationship 
between size of firm and wages once personal 
characteristics were taken into account. They 
also found that individual worker attributes 
were closely associated with wage differentials 
in Chicago.
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wage differentials in LDCs.^ The second theory suggests that 
trade unions or other institutional forces encourage firms to 
share their profits with workers. Both theories predict that 
more capital intensive firms are likely to pay higher wages. 
Although a more significant result was found for the second 
theory, both were supported by the empirical investigation 
(Heady, 1976b:Ch.5).
The findings of most of these studies on the determinants
of wage differentials in LDCs must be considered very preliminary.
They do question the conventional view that wage differentials
in LDCs are primarily the result of 'non-economic', institutional
influences owing to government and trade union intervention.
Although certain firm (or worker) characteristics are invoked
to support 'non-market' or 'market' interpretations of wage
differentials, very little evidence is presented to support these
relationships. For example the studies do not examine labour
turnover or measures of labour efficiency (for example
absenteeism). Few have investigated the influence of human
capital factors on wage differentials. Only Pang Eng Fong's (1976)
study of Singapore examines a wide range of personal and human
capital variables and disaggregates the analysis for a variety of
2occupational groups. Thus research which has been carried out on 
the wage structure in LDCs while suggesting several interesting 
hypotheses, does not add greatly to our knowledge of the causes of 
wage differentials within the manufacturing sector. It does 
suggest that capital intensity, size of the firm and foreign 
ownership and a large number of worker characteristics may
The former develops on the earlier work of Leibenstein 
(1957) and draws attention to the relationship between 
higher wages and labour productivity (the 'economy' of 
high wages), and the latter to the effect of high 
wages on labour turnover. See Stiglitz (1973, 1974).
Pang Eng Fong (1976:41) finds that both education and age 
are major determinants of earnings and concludes that human 
capital "is a powerful indicator of earnings" in Singapore. 
His findings are supported by two other human capital 
studies in Thailand (Blaug, 1974) and Morocco 
(Psacharopoulos, 1977).
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all influence the wage structure. But most do not offer an 
integrated explanation of why certain firms should pay higher 
wages. Even the studies that explain the differences 
in terms of human capital differences do not indicate why some 
firms employ workers with higher levels of education, more 
experience or other attributes. Few studies suggest (as we 
will later in this study) that there may be an association 
between certain firm characteristics, labour management 
policies and the quality of the work force employed.
One major shortcoming of the research on interindustry 
wage differentials in LDCs has been the failure to examine 
these differentials in the context of more general theories 
of labour market behaviour and development. How are 'market' 
and 'non-market' influences on interindustry wages related 
to the more general problems of labour market imbalance 
discussed above? How do they contribute to a better 
understanding of the processes of rural urban migration and 
problems of urban unemployment and underemployment in LDCs.
And, more generally, can these studies be integrated with 
broader theories of technological dualism in LDCs? One 
objective of this study will be to attempt to place the 
examination of manufacturing wage differentials in a broader 
framework of labour market relationships.
Nelson, Schultz and Slighton's (1970) examination of structural 
change in Columbia is one study that does attempt to relate 
wage differentials in manufacturing to the structure of 
industrial development. They distinguish between small scale
Two exceptions were Fields and de Marulanda (1976:9) and 
Heady (1976b) who argue that the high wages in capital 
intensive firms are related to a desire to minimise turnover 
because of the need of such firms to retain scarce, skilled 
personnel. Fields and de Marulanda (1976:24) also stress the 
importance of examining the 'indirect' effects on wages of 
employment of more skilled workers in more capital intensive 
firms. But they leave this task to future research.
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'craft' and large scale 'modern' enterprises which differ 
in wage rates, value added per worker and employment within 
major industries. Wage differentials are attributed to modern 
sector firms' accommodation to "well organised wage bargaining 
and (in certain cases) to gratify the paternalistic urge to do 
well by its workers". The result is that wages of unskilled 
labour in the modern sector "contain an important element of 
monopoly rent. For such workers the job is a valuable 
property right".'*'
Studies of the labour market during various phases of 
industrialisation in Japan also suggest that dualism within 
the manufacturing sector is reflected in wage rates and 
systems of labour management. Large firms employed higher 
quality workers and adopted certain labour management policies 
(including the payment of high wages) to maintain a more 
stable work force. In addition, much of the literature on 
interfirm wage differentials in Japan has given some attention 
to the influence of wages (and earnings) in the rural and self 
employed sectors on patterns of employment and wage differentials 
in manufacturing. We will briefly summarise some of the major 
findings of these studies on labour markets in Japan. They 
provide a valuable empirical base for the development of the 
framework of analysis adopted in this thesis.
5. Dual Labour Markets in Japan
A considerable amount of research has been carried out 
on the nature and causes of interfirm wage differentials in
The last sentence in this quotation implies a low 
rate of labour turnover in these modern firms but 
the authors do not examine rates of turnover in 
various kinds of firm. In a long footnote they 
suggest that education and on-the-job training may 
have also contributed to high wages in the modern 
sector. Unfortunately the study does not investigate 
these possibilities further. (Nelson et al., 1970:155-6).
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the early years of industrialisation in Japan.^ Students of
the Japanese economy have attempted to explain the quite
significant wage differentials that are closely correlated
with size of the firm and capital intensity within the
manufacturing sector. A quite differentiated structure of
Japanese manufacturing began to develop with the growth of
relatively large, capital intensive firms at the beginning
2of this century (Ohkawa, 1972:Ch.2). Considerable interscale 
wage differentials developed in the manufacturing sector. These 
were associated with the emergence of a wide range of 
technologies and size of firm marked at the extremes by large 
scale, capital intensive enterprises on the one hand and small, 
highly labour intensive operators on the other. These wage 
differentials prevailed throughout this century until the 
transition from labour surplus to a labour scarce economy 
in the 1960s after which they have narrowed considerably 
(Minami, 1970; Odaka, 1967).
There have been two largely conflicting explanations 
offered for the emergence and persistence of dual labour 
markets in Japan (Crawcour, 1978). The first, which stresses 
'cultural' factors, suggests that lifetime employment and a 
tradition of long and loyal service were peculiarly Japanese 
institutions with their origins in Japanese culture. Interfirm 
wage differentials were mainly the result of the adoption of these 
systems in large scale firms. The second explanation mainly 
attributes the emergence of permanent employment systems 
and high wages in large scale firms to the influence
Paine (1971) and Crawcour (1978) summarise the major issues 
and findings of different scholars. See also Odaka (1967, 
1973), Shinohara (1968), (Dore, 1973), Yasuba (1976), and 
Ohkawa (1972:Ch.2 and Ch.3).
Ohkawa describes the Japanese manufacturing sector as a 
'differentiated' structure (Ohkawa, 1970:61).
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of 'economic' factors.^ According to the latter view large 
firms introduced the system of lifetime employment in response 
to shortages of skilled labour which emerged in the early part 
of the 20th Century. (Taira, 1970:Ch.5). Their major goal was 
to ensure a stable labour force. They recruited and trained 
young, male, educated (but unskilled) workers. To minimise 
turnover, especially of skilled labour, employees were 
recruited for life and guaranteed annual increases with age 
and seniority. Moreover it appears that through the offer of 
higher starting salaries large firms were able to skim the 
cream off the labour market (Odaka, 1967:56-7).
From the beginning of this century to about the 1960s, 
labour markets for small scale firms in Japan appear to have 
worked quite differently to those in which large, capital 
intensive firms operated. The sector was characterised by 
strong competition and individual firms suffered frequent, 
quite large fluctuations in output and employment. Since wages 
were low, unskilled workers profited from movements between 
industry, the urban self-employed sector and agriculture as 
economic conditions dictated (Shinohara, 1968; Taira, 1970: 
Ch.3). But although wages and opportunities for employment 
fluctuated in accordance with economic conditions, in the 
longer term they were held low by the surplus of labour in 
the agricultural sector. Owing to the instability of output, 
employers were encouraged to maintain labour intensive 
techniques and had little inducement (and indeed they mostly 
did not have the resources) to invest in the quality of their 
work force. The work force usually recorded high rates of
This polarisation of the two explanations of wage 
differentials is, of course, an oversimplification. As 
Dore (1973:Ch.l4) points out, there was a dynamic 
interaction between traditional values, the economic 
demands of modernisation and forms of employment 
relationship.
The (English language) literature on permanent employment 
systems in Japan is not always clear whether the system only 
applied to skilled workers. However it is generally presumed 
(see for example Crawcour, 1978:234-5) that it applied 
mainly to skilled workers.
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turnover. Skilled labour was either trained by an 
apprenticeship system (and hence paid for by the worker 
himself) or obtained from the (few) dropouts trained in the 
large scale sector.
A large proportion of the labour force in 
Japan remained in this small scale sector until quite recently 
despite the substantial shift in employment out of agriculture. 
Thus, for example, in the 1950s over half the Japanese labour 
force in manufacturing was employed in small firms with less 
than 50 employees; almost sixty percent of the labour force 
was classified as self-employed or family workers (Ohkawa, 
1972:44-5).
In one important respect this contrast between two extremes 
of the dual structure requires modification. A significant 
proportion of employees in large firms was temporary and did 
not receive annual wage increases with seniority: temporary 
'regular' workers received no seniority benefits and a further 
category of temporary workers was reported to receive less 
than half the wages paid to regular employees; both these 
categories of labour were likely to be laid off if economic 
conditions deteriorated (Tsuda, 1965; Paine, 1971). In 
addition, large scale firms sub-contracted a significant 
proportion of jobs to small and medium firms.^ The employment 
of temporary labour and sub-contracting allowed large firms 
flexibility in adjusting to fluctuations in economic conditions. 
It also explains how they were able to guarantee a high degree 
of stability of employment to permanent workers.
It should also be noted that not all industries demonstrated 
large interfirm wage differentials in Japan. Studies of the 
textile industry provide a very different picture to the patterns 
of employment in large firms described above. Firms mainly
Watanabe (1974) reports that as late as 1966, 43.6 
percent of all medium and small enterprises were 
sub-contractors and accounted for more than 25 
percent of total manufacturing employment.
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employed young female labour at low wage rates, under very poor 
working conditions and with high rates of labour turnover.
(Koh, 1966:Ch.2). Saxonhouse (1976) has explained the lack 
of interfirm differentials in the cotton spinning industry in 
terms of relatively homogeneous technology and open 
communication about technical matters between competitors. In 
this industry it appears that firm-specific training was not 
nearly as important as in industries with a more complex and 
differentiated technology.
One other qualification to the dualistic model should be 
borne in mind. The kind of employment and wage policies 
followed by large firms in a labour surplus economy are likely 
to differ substantially from those in a labour scarce one. In 
Japan, pricing and labour allocation policies used by large 
firms combined certain sets of 'internal' maximising policies 
with others which were designed to take advantage of external 
market conditions.^ The wide use of sub-contracting and the 
employment of temporary labour are both examples of how large 
firms took advantage of the labour surplus situation in Japan. 
Moreover, the combination of various systems of labour 
management both to accommodate the demands of modern technology 
and also to benefit from labour market conditions, suggests 
that the conventional concept of dualism may be inappropriate 
for describing systems of labour pricing and allocation used 
by different firms. The notion of dualism has also been 
questioned by Ohkawa. Although it may simplify analysis to 
describe only the two extremes, in practice a continuum is a 
much better description of reality. In Ohkawa's (1972:60) words:
The productivity of labour engaged in various industries, 
including family enterprises, shows a wide range of 
continuous differentials (even within the same industry) 
and the wage rates or incomes of working people also have
1 This distinction between internal and external labour 
market forces will be discussed in the next chapter.
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wide differentials .... the situation has not
changed over a long period and can be understood 
to be at a sort of equilibrium. It is difficult 
to analyse such phenomena in terms of concepts 
which have drawn out from the experience of the 
economies of homogeneous structure.
There have been several interpretations of the persistence 
of interfirm wage differentials in Japan. It has been suggested 
that larger firms offered higher wages and fringe benefits to 
compensate for the loss of paternalistic benefits which were 
available only to workers of small firms (Yasuba, 1976:285-8). 
Another viewpoint argues that monopoly profits earned by 
large firms were distributed in the form of higher wages because 
of labour market imperfections (Shinohara, 1968:8-22). Greatly 
reduced interfirm mobility which resulted from the lifetime 
employment system in larger firms, limited the influence of the 
external labour market. But some commentators have questioned 
the view that interfirm wage differentials are an indication of 
market imperfections. They have suggested that these 
differentials may be explained almost entirely by differences 
in the quality of labour inputs (chiefly age, sex, education 
and experience) (Stoikov, 1973; Blumenthal, 1966).^
Tan (1978) develops the human capital interpretation 
by linking firm specific training to the rate of 
technological change. It should be noted that 
Stoikov's (1973:1103) conclusion that "there is no 
evidence that larger firms pay higher wages than 
smaller ones for the same quality of labour input" 
(1973a, 1103), had been strongly criticised by 
Yasuba (1976:252). Yasuba claims that Stoikov 
neglects two of the major variables (annual bonuses 
and the category of employees with 30 or more 
years experience) that have contributed to 
interfirm wage differentials in Japan.
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As we have mentioned already, these studies of Japan 
provide greater insights into the causes of wage differentials 
than most of the interindustry studies of LDCs referred to 
above. They view wage differentials in manufacturing in a 
broader framework of intersectoral labour allocation and also 
in the more general context of dualistic development. Emphasis 
on the different yet equally rational responses of large and 
small firms to different sets of economic circumstances is an 
important contribution to the study of wage differentials.
It suggests that explanations of wage differentials need to go 
beyond rather simplistic interpretations which emphasise the 
role of 'market' and 'non market' forces or 'institutional' 
pressures.
There are several problems in much of the 
literature on explanation of interfirm wage differentials in 
Japan. First, many of the studies tend to neglect the 
possibility that the relationship between scale of firm and 
wages may be primarily the result of the influence of other 
firm characteristics closely correlated with size of firm.
In the previous section we saw that several studies of 
interindustry wage differentials have suggested that capital 
intensity appears to have a greater influence on wage 
differentials than size of firm. It was also noted that the 
relationship between capital intensity and wages can be 
explained in terms of quite rational maximising decisions 
taken in more capital intensive firms. Since size of firm 
is likely to be closely correlated with capital intensity, 
it is quite plausible that the relationship between size of 
firm and wage differentials is the result of the influence 
of capital intensity on wages. It may be more fruitful to 
concentrate on factors contributing to wage differentials 
between firms of different technology than on factors associated 
with interscale wage differentials.
Second, explanations of the economic cause of interscale 
wage differentials in Japan are often rather vague. Most 
writers have identified lack of skilled manpower and internal 
training programs undertaken by large scale firms as major
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factors contributing to wage differentials between large and 
small firms. But few have linked this to economic theories 
of how training may affect wage differentials. Few 
studies (Saxonhouse (1976) and Tan (1978) are 
two exceptions) attempt to distinguish the extent which 
training is firm-specific rather than general in large scale 
firms. Human capital theory tells us that it is only the 
former which is consistent with interfirm wage differentials 
in a competitive environment (Becker, 1964). A neoclassical 
interpretation of the effect of training on interscale wage 
differentials rests heavily on the assumption that skills 
learnt are firm-specific; seniority payments are in this case 
a reflection of firm-specific accumulated experience (the 
costs and benefits of which are shared by the firm and the 
individual). Indeed the great emphasis on loyalty and being 
a 'company man' in large scale firms implies that the entire 
work effort is to a considerable extent firm-specific.
The great concern of employers in Japan to reduce 
labour turnover also indicates that not all training and skills 
learnt in large scale firms have been firm—specific. It appears 
that the relatively high wages, seniority benefits, generous 
bonuses and firm financed social welfare schemes were partly 
introduced to prevent firms from losing labour whose skills 
were, to some extent, general to the industry as a whole. 
Agreements between employers against poaching were also common 
in several industries and further contributed to low turnover 
(Saxonhouse, 1976:120-1? Crawcour, 1978:231-3). Instead 
of bidding for these general skills on the external market, 
firms preferred to generate them internally and then to take 
steps to ensure minimum rates of labour turnover.
Two factors appear to have contributed to this peculiarly 
Japanese response to a shortage of general skills. First, the 
growth in demand was very rapid and there was a continuing 
shortage of skilled labour in the modern sector (which 
continued largely unabated up to the 1960s. ) Second,
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the relatively oligopolistic structure of the modern segment 
of most industries enabled firms to collude to prevent labour 
piracy. These characteristics of labour demand, together with 
the firm-specific nature of skills and attitudes, produced 
a highly stable work force committed to employment in particular 
modern sector firms."*"
We have raised these general problems encountered in 
identifying the causes and significances of interfirm wage 
differentials in Japan because all are directly relevant to 
the questions raised and the interpretation of empirical data 
presented in this thesis. The issues will be
clarified from an examination of some of the recent literature 
on internal labour markets and labour market segmentation.
The relevant aspects of this literature will be discussed in 
the next chapter.
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have examined several theories of wage 
determination and empirical evidence about the extent and causes 
of wage differentials in LDCs. It was suggested that labour 
markets are far less homogeneous than is assumed in some of 
the better-known models in which wages, especially urban wage 
rates, are a central component. The notion that these 
differentials arise primarily because of market imperfections 
or institutional causes (which are highlighted in much of the 
literature on LDCs) is not confirmed by empirical studies of 
LDCs or by research on labour market development in Japan.
Indeed the usefulness of the approach of assuming a homogeneous 
industrial labour market in LDCs and analysing its efficiency 
in terms of the influence of 'market','non-market' forces has 
also been questioned.
1 I am particularly grateful to Professor Crawcour for 
helping clarify some of these points concerning the 
operation of labour markets in Japan.
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The experience of Japan suggests that large and small 
scale firms adopt wage levels and systems of labour management 
that are so different as to require a separate analysis of 
managerial decision-making and of the forces affecting wage 
determination. A particular pattern of dualistic labour markets 
emerged in Japan mainly in response to excess labour demand 
created by rapid technological change and modern sector growth 
in an economy still marked by overall conditions of labour 
surplus. Despite the great interfirm differences in actual wages 
(though much less in efficiency wages), and in labour management 
policies and labour performance, most firms in Japan nevertheless 
appear to follow quite rational economic policies with respect 
to the pricing and allocation of labour.
In Chapter Three a more systematic justification for these 
conclusions will be suggested through an examination of various 
theories of labour market behaviour. The recent theories 
of internal labour markets and labour market segmentation 
provide a theoretical framework for analysing the causes 
of wage differentials in a dualistic manufacturing sector.
They also assist the development of the major hypotheses to be 
tested later in the thesis.
CHAPTER THREE
THEORIES OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS, INTERNAL LABOUR MARKETS 
AND LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Large wage differentials between rural and urban areas, and 
within urban areas and the manufacturing sectors are common in 
many LDCs. Some writers have attributed these wage 
differentials primarily to the interaction of historical, 
institutional and political factors. Others have seen them as 
following from the pursuit of profit maximisation objectives. 
Several studies have suggested that within the manufacturing 
sector the factors which determine wage differentials can be 
divided into rather vaguely defined 'market' and 'non-market' 
forces. As noted in Chapter Two writers dealing with interfirm 
wage differentials in Japan have suggested a more integrated 
explanation in terms of contrasting responses to labour market 
conditions in large and small scale firms.
The purpose of this chapter is to place these explanations
of interfirm wage differentials in the manufacturing sector in
LDCs and in Japan into a broader theoretical framework. This
framework provides the basis for the empirical analysis in
later chapters. The framework outlined in this chapter has
drawn on ideas developed in the theories of internal labour
markets.^ It is suggested that the theory of internal labour
markets makes an important contribution to understanding the
causes of wage differentials in LDCs. It is argued that wage
differentials are likely to be closely associated with certain
internal market considerations, human capital and
2institutional influences. All three groups of influences
The theory of internal labour markets stresses intrafirm 
considerations associated primarily with firm-specific 
human capital which insulates the firm from external labour 
market pressures.
The term 'human capital' theory is used broadly here to 
cover those theories of labour markets which emphasise the 
influence of personal characteristics of workers as the 
major factors contributing to wage differentials. 
Similarly, we use the term 'institutional' theories to
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(internal market considerations, human capital and 
institutional factors) are likely to be related to specific 
patterns of labour demand in LDCs. A major objective of the 
thesis is to examine the extent to which interfirm wage 
differentials are the result of each of these influences and 
to investigate the interrelationships between these variables.^
To simplify the analysis, it will be useful to examine
wage differentials in a dualistic framework. It is
hypothesised that dualism in wage rates is closely related to
2technological dualism in LDCs (Higgins, 1959:274-93). Internal 
labour market forces and institutional pressures would be 
expected to be stronger in capital intensive firms, and these 
firms are also likely to employ higher quality workers than 
labour intensive firms. In this simple framework we might 
think of labour markets as being divided into two segments 
containing capital and labour intensive firms.
It is argued that the relationship between technology 
and wage differentials highlights the different
2 (continued)
describe those theories which have stressed the importance 
of 'non-market' factors (especially the government and 
trade unions) in wage determination.
 ^ In this discussion we distinguish between internal labour 
market and institutional influences on wages.
Institutional pressures (especially from enterprise unions) 
are considered an integral part of some internal market 
theories (Doeringer and Piore, 1971:35-6). However, since 
some institutional pressures (for example minimum wage 
legislation) are external to the firms, in order to avoid 
confusion we shall define all institutional factors as a 
separate category of influences on wages. But we shall take 
note of the interaction between these factors and other 
internal labour market forces.
2 It should be noted that although the discussion adopts a 
dualistic framework, in practice we may expect a range in 
technology associated with technological diffusion in 
LDCs (see Nelson et al., 1970). It is reasonable also to 
expect a range in wage rates and labour management 
practices related to different technologies.
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labour management policies adopted by capital and labour 
intensive firms to maximise labour productivity. On the other 
hand, institutional influences on wages are more likely to be 
associated with foreign ownership of firms in LDCs. Higher 
wages offered in foreign firms may be partly the result of the 
greater capital intensity of foreign compared with domestic 
firms. But institutional pressures from trade unions and 
government also are likely to have a major influence on the 
wages of foreign firms.
The chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first 
we review briefly the major theories of wage differentials that 
are relevant to the subsequent argument. We note how these 
theories contribute to an understanding of wage differentials 
in LDCs. In the second part of the chapter we make use of some 
of the major elements of these theories to construct an 
analytical framework for examining wage differentials in labour 
surplus LDCs. A simple framework of dualistic labour demand and 
dualistic supply conditions is presented to demonstrate the 
major factors likely to influence wage differentials in labour 
surplus LDCs. This general framework enables us to derive and 
test some specific hypotheses concerning the causes of interfirm 
wage differentials in later chapters of the thesis.
I. Theories of Interfirm Wage Differentials
Several major bodies of theory have been developed to 
explain interfirm and interindustry wage differentials. These 
include the basic neoclassical explanation of wage differentials, 
both institutional and human capital theories and, more recently, 
the theory of internal labour markets and the theory of labour 
market segmentation. The major elements of each of these 
theories that are relevant to this study will be examined in 
this part of the chapter.
1. Neoclassical Theory, Human Capital and Institutional Wage 
Theories
A major task of theory and empirical investigation of 
labour markets has been to explain quite large and often
38
persistent differences in interfirm wage levels for comparable 
jobs even within the same labour market areas (Lester, 1946; 
Slichter, 1950). In traditional neoclassical theory these wage 
differentials have tended to be attributed to short run 
rigidities on both the demand and supply sides of the labour 
market. It is suggested that employers adjust slowly to market 
conditions and it is only in the longer run that deviations from 
from marginal product "slowly bend wages to meet the new 
situation" (Hicks, 1932:86). In the short run, wage and 
employment policies of particular firms depend on varying 
estimates of the effect of wage adjustments on future labour 
supply. They also depend upon differences in expectations as 
to whether changes in commodity demand and employment are 
temporary or permanent.
In addition, labour markets are never likely to achieve 
equilibrium because of the dynamic nature of the economic 
system. Some firms and industries are always growing faster 
than others and other firms are declining, and these trends 
are reflected in the labour market and in wage rates (Reynolds 
and Taft, 1954:Ch. 13). The supply of labour adjusts slowly 
to these changes in labour demand, especially where new skills 
are demanded in expanding industries and skills become 
redundant in declining industries.
The basic neoclassical framework with its emphasis on 
marginal productivity theory has been extended in more recent 
theories of human capital. Although traditional neoclassical 
theory placed some emphasis on the influence of the quality of 
labour inputs on wage differentials (Marshall, 1920:454-7), 
these factors have been given greater attention in theories of 
human capital. Experience and schooling of the work force, 
and the relationship between these two variables, are two major 
human capital factors which have been shown to have a major 
influence on income differentials (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). 
In addition some empirical studies have suggested that personal 
characteristics of the work force may be the major determinants 
of wage differentials (for example, Weiss, 1966). These human
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capital variables have also been given some attention in the 
examination of wage and income differentials in LDCs (see 
Chapter Two).
Neoclassical and human capital theories of earnings
differentials have received considerable criticism in recent
years. Some of these criticisms are relevant to this study.^
Various writers have resurrected interest in the demand
determinants of wage differentials (chiefly sectoral and
occupational differences in jobs) as a criticism of overemphasis
on the supply side and personal characteristics of workers in
2human capital theory. They have shifted the emphasis in 
explanations of wage differentials to characteristics of jobs 
rather than workers (Thurow, 1972). According to this 
interpretation workers are allocated to various jobs according 
to their position in the labour queue. Thus characteristics 
such as education act chiefly as signalling devices to 
facilitate screening of new workers (Spence, 1973). It is 
suggested that wage differentials by education mainly reflect 
differences in the productivity of jobs obtained by various 
educational groups rather than productivity differences which 
may be directly attributed to education (Wachtel and Betsey, 
1972). This 'structural' model questions the great emphasis 
on education and training schemes as a means of overcoming 
unequal wage and income distributions, and stresses the 
importance of changing the structure of employment to help 
solve many of these problems.
See especially Cain (1976) for a summary of the major 
criticisms of human capital theory.
The early postwar literature concentrated on several of 
these demand characteristics (mainly differences in 
concentration, profits and unionisation between industries) 
to explain wage differentials. This focus of the literature 
gave way in the 1960s to human capital explanations of wage 
and earnings differentials. Wachtel and Betsey (1972:121-2) 
refer to the first as the 'structural' approach and the 
second as the 'personal characteristics' approach.
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Other theorists, have since the 1950s been concerned to 
emphasise various institutional determinants of wage 
differentials that have been neglected by neoclassical 
economists.^ Cain (1976:1227) summarises the major beliefs of 
these groups:
They [the neo-institutionalists] believed that the 
complexity of the modern economy, the growing role 
of governmental regulation, and the growth of other 
anticompetitive institutions, such as bureaucratic 
corporations and unions, all served to undercut 
whatever basis previously existed for the application 
of neoclassical models.
These institutional theories have encouraged a more radical
departure from the neoclassical theory of labour markets
through their contribution to the development of the theory of
2internal labour markets and labour market segmentation. Since 
several of the major issues raised in this thesis are taken 
from the theory of internal labour markets, we will look at this 
theory in some detail.
2. Internal Labour Markets
The theory of internal labour markets provides a set of 
explanations for quite large wage differentials in a 
competitive economic environment. The theory emphasises 
internal managerial decisions concerning wages and labour 
allocation and suggests that these decisions may be taken to 
a considerable extent independently of external market forces.
The most important of these (government intervention in 
labour markets and in wage determination, and the influence 
of trade unions on wages) have been noted in the discussion 
of wage differentials in LDCs in Chapter One.
In particular two concepts of this group of economists have 
contributed to the development of theories of internal 
labour markets and labour market segmentation. First, a 
distinction was drawn between forces of the internal (intra­
firm) and external labour markets in the pricing and 
allocation of labour (Dunlop, 1957). Second, Kerr drew 
attention to the 'balkanisation' of labour markets into 
various segments - notably 'guilds', 'manorial' markets 
(private enterprise markets in which internal markets are of 
considerable importance) and 'unstructured' markets - 
characterised by low wages and high mobility (Kerr, 1954).
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According to this theory, employer decision-making is influenced 
by both economic and administrative (and bargaining) 
considerations. We will briefly summarise its major 
characteristics and its implications for wages, labour 
mobility and competition for jobs.^
In this body of theory strong internal labour markets are 
characterised by a wider range of interfirm wage differentials 
and lower labour turnover than is predicted in conventional 
neoclassical analysis. These large wage differentials and low 
rates of labour turnover are partly explained by the generation 
of firm-specific skills. Both firms and employees pay for 
firm-specific skills and wages are partly determined by bilateral 
monopoly bargaining over the returns to these skills (Becker, 
1964:22-4; Oi, 1962). Owing to the specific nature of skills, 
both employees and employers are likely to sustain losses from 
labour turnover and both are likely to encourage a more 
permanent employment relationship.
In addition, firms also find it more efficient (because of 
lower transactions costs) to recruit, screen and train existing 
employees rather than unknown applicants for new jobs. Custom 
and enterprise rules are likely to increase the tendency for 
appointment from within. Thus, there is much greater vertical 
mobility on the basis of experience, ability and seniority, and 
more skilled jobs are filled internally than in a model where 
external labour market conditions play a more important role. 
Competition from the external market is reduced by the limited 
number of 'ports of entry' at which job applicants can compete 
with existing employees; recruitment from the external market 
is restricted mainly to unskilled employees.
All of these factors tend to exert an upward push on wage 
rates compared with those that employees could earn in the
1 This summary of the main features of internal labour markets 
draws heavily on Doeringer and Piore (1971).
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external market. Firm-specific training and skill transmission 
ensures that wage rates are higher than those offered on the 
external market. Greater stability of employment (which 
further increases the tendency to greater skill acquisition 
purely as a result of experience) and seniority payments tend 
to increase further the differential in earnings above what 
employees could earn in similar jobs elsewhere. Employers are 
constrained in wage adjustments to external conditions by the 
prevailing structure of jobs and wages.'*"
Interpretation of the economic significance of wage
differentials is more difficult once one accepts the
2importance of internal markets. The tools provided by
neoclassical theory are not always useful for evaluating the
performance of internal markets. The external labour market
in the theory of internal markets approximates the competitive
market in traditional theory. But quite a wide range of profit
maximising decisions may be made with respect to the pricing
and allocation of labour which are only indirectly related to
external labour market conditions. A wide range in wage rates
between firms is not necessarily evidence of the varying
influence of external institutional factors or of imperfect labour
3supply response. They cannot be explained simply in terms of
In addition, it is suggested that custom and union pressure 
are likely to make it more difficult to make adjustments 
to wage relativities than when the labour market is more 
fluid. Adjustment of wage rates for one job may induce 
adjustment of other rates as employees, sensitive to 
relative wage rates within the firm, seek to preserve 
existing relativities.
Empirical testing of the theory of internal labour markets 
is still in its infancy. However at least one major 
empirical study tends to confirm the importance of these 
markets. Mackay et al. (1971:esp. 95-7) note a wide range
in wage rates between engineering firms in Glasgow and 
Birmingham which could not be explained by human capital 
differences in employees or by different rates of expansion 
of various firms. At least in part high wages were paid 
with the aim of minimising labour turnover and increasing 
labour productivity.
Nevertheless, although significant wage differentials are 
likely to occur and persist within a particular labour 
market, Doeringer and Piore (1971) suggest that firms will 
not be able to»sustain substantial deviations from external
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'market' or 'non market' forces or short run problems of 
adjustment.
The theory of internal labour markets has been integrated 
with theories of dualistic or segmented labour markets.
Although the concept of labour market segmentation has been 
used mainly to describe labour markets in the United States, it 
will be argued that it has considerable relevance to the study 
of labour markets in LDCs. In the next section we provide a 
brief summary of the main features of segmented labour markets.
3. Segmented Labour Markets
Labour market segmentation is usually defined as the
division of the labour market into two groups. Doeringer and
Piore (1971) describe those industries and occupations where
internal labour markets are weak as 'secondary' (unstructured)
labour markets and those where internal markets are strong as
2'primary' (structured) labour markets. Table 3.1 summarises 
differences between the two kinds of labour market with 
respect to various characteristics of wages, employment and
3 (continued)
market conditions for long. In the short run they may 
adjust to market conditions by manipulating 'less 
constrained' instruments - overtime, hiring standards, 
screening and training programs. But in the long run 
they will be forced to adjust wages and the allocation 
of labour in accordance with pressures from the external 
market.
 ^ See especially Doeringer and Piore (1971:163-88) for a 
discussion of the characteristics of segmented labour 
markets. Other interpretations are given by Cain (1976), 
Reich, et al. (1973), Vietorisz and Harrison (1973).
2 Owing to the confusing nature of the terminology used to 
distinguish between these markets (the terms primary and 
secondary are commonly used to describe the agricultural and 
industrial sectors), the terms structured and 
markets will be used to differentiate between the two kinds 
of labour market. Doeringer and Piore note that 
unstructured labour markets in the United States cover 
casual labouring in construction industries, domestic work, 
blue collar jobs in foundries, menial jobs in hospitals and 
similar low wage, unstable occupations. The majority of 
private firms operate in structured labour markets but even 
here there is considerable variation in the strength of 
internal labour markets.
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Table 3.1: Major characteristics of structured
and unstructured labour markets
Characteristic Structured Labour 
Markets
Unstructured 
Labour Markets
Conditions of 
employment
Relatively stable Unstable
Wages Relatively high, generous 
fringe benefits
Low and unstable; 
few fringe 
benefits
Wage
determination
Heavily influenced by 
internal labour market 
considerations
Strongly 
influenced by 
external wage 
and employment 
conditions
Administration 
of wages and 
labour
Promotion, wage increases 
and conditions of 
employment set by rules 
and influenced by custom 
and activities of trade 
unions
Ad hoc
administration 
according to 
prevailing 
market conditions 
tions; weak 
unions
Training On-the-job and formal 
training increases the 
possibility of 
advancement and higher 
earnings
No formal 
training and 
little on-the- 
job training
Vertical
mobility
Considerable opportunity 
for advancement with 
years of experience and 
acquisition of new skills
Very little 
skill differen­
tiation and few 
chances for 
advancement
Labour
performance
Low turnover, low 
absenteeism, a high 
degree of commitment to 
the firm; rules 
enforcing a high level 
of discipline and 
penalising poor 
performance
High turnover 
and
absenteeism, 
low level of 
work discipline
Source: Condensed from Doeringer and Piore (1971:165-77).
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labour management. In structured markets there tends to be 
stable employment and relatively high wages, internal factors 
play a major role in wage administration, and there are 
considerable opportunities for advancement and on-the-job 
training. Unstructured labour markets share few of these 
attributes.
These examples provide two extremes. The dichotomy is in 
practice unlikely to be so sharp. Many firms and occupations 
may share a mix of structured and unstructured labour market 
characteristics (Doeringer and Piore, 1971:169). The extent 
of the dichotomy will moreover depend upon general labour 
demand and employment conditions and also upon longer run 
forces (particularly education) influencing the supply of 
certain kinds of labour input. Nevertheless there are also 
likely to be strong forces that help maintain and even 
strengthen the division. Characteristics of employees from low 
income groups and with low wage, unstable jobs (high rates of 
turnover and absenteeism, low levels of precision and lack of 
factory discipline) are reinforced by their low income work 
and home environments. These influences hinder a permanent 
movement into more structured labour markets. Doeringer and 
Piore (1971:173) also suggest that the attractiveness of 
subcontracting to large firms (who subcontract to workers in 
unstructured markets) helps perpetuate the existence of 
unstructured markets. In addition, the influence both of 
unions and government legislation (which mainly protect 
employment and incomes in structured markets) also tends to 
strengthen the division between the two markets.
The causes of labour market segmentation are not given a 
great deal of attention by Doeringer and Piore (1971:37) in 
their major work on this subject. However they do note that:
There are indications that internal labour markets, 
at least in the United States, have evolved in the 
course of economic development from a far more open, 
fluid and competitive economy in the nineteenth 
century.
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Other, more radical labour segmentation theorists have traced 
labour market segmentation from the emergence of monopoly 
capitalism in the United States at the end of the 19th Century 
(Reich et al. 1973). Their perpetuation has also been 
explained in this broader framework in terms of destabilising, 
'divergent development'. Technical progress and a tendency 
towards increased wages and accumulated skills in structured 
labour markets are contrasted with unchanged technology and 
constant or falling wages in unstructured labour markets 
(Vietorisz and Harrison, 1973) .
Attempts to apply segmented labour market theories to the 
United States have been subject to considerable criticism.^ 
However several factors suggest that it may be relevant to 
studies of LDCs. We shall examine some of these factors in 
the next section of the chapter.
4. Segmented Labour Markets in LDCs
The notion of segmented labour markets is not new to the
study of LDCs. Indeed dualistic labour markets were an
important element in Boeke's theory of dualism which was
developed to describe Indonesia's economy in the colonial
2period (Boeke, 1953:138-48). There has been considerable 
controversy over Boeke's general theory of dualism but little 
attention has been given to a systematic examination of
Cain (1976:1231-2) summarises the findings of several studies 
which suggest that two major hypotheses derived from theories 
of labour market segmentation - a bimodal structure of 
earnings and lack of mobility between structured and 
unstructured employments - are not confirmed by empirical 
data (see also Wächter, 1974:650-60). It appears that 
dualism in wages and working conditions may not be nearly as 
strong as implied by the theory.
According to Boeke,labour markets (and other markets) in 
Indonesia were divided into 'eastern' and 'western' segments; 
each segment of the labour market had separate patterns of 
wage determination and labour allocation; 'dualistic' labour 
markets marked a meeting of eastern and western systems.
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dualism in labour markets in LDCs. The discussion of the causes 
of interfirm wage differentials in Japan and in LDCs (see 
Chapter Two) suggests that these may be interpreted in a general 
framework of segmented labour markets.
The notion of a division of labour markets into structured 
and unstructured segments has many similarities with the 
distinction between large and small scale firms in the pricing 
and allocation of labour in Japan.'*' Relatively high wages, low 
labour turnover and emphasis on seniority and skill acquisition 
in large firms in Japan are all attributes of structured labour 
markets. On the other hand low and unstable wages, unstable 
employment and low level of skill in small scale firms have 
much in common with unstructured labour markets.
The distinction between structured and unstructured markets
may also be applicable to the study of wage differentials in
LDCs. Quite large wage differentials associated with a range of
technology and ownership patterns in LDCs (see Chapter Two)
suggests that the notion of labour market segmentation might
be meaningfully applied to the study of labour markets in these
countries. It will be useful to examine the extent to which
high wages in capital intensive and foreign firms are associated
with certain internal labour market phenomena (for example firm
specific training, emphasis on promotion from within based on
seniority, wage payment systems which encourage stability of
employment, strong enterprise unions, etc.). One might also ask
to what extent wage policies are adopted specifically to
minimise turnover costs and to encourage intensity of effort in
2capital intensive firms in LDCs. Conversely, it will be useful 
to examine the extent to which the low wages offered by labour 
intensive establishments are merely one aspect of labour market 
behaviour of firms operating in unstructured labour markets.
The low unstable earnings and unstable employment and hours of
1
2
This parallel has also been noted by Tan (1979:17-9).
See especially the studies of Stiglitz (1973, 1974) and 
Heady (1976b) discussed in Chapter Two.
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work that are a feature of 'informal' sector activities (see, 
for example, Hart, 1973; ILO, 1974:6-7) are also likely to be 
common in many small scale manufacturing establishments.
However it should be noted that the division of the labour 
market into two segments in LDCs is adopted mainly as an 
analytical device. As in the developed countries and in Japan, 
labour markets in LDCs are unlikely to be divided neatly into 
structured and unstructured markets. It is reasonable to expect 
the diffusion of technology to result in a range of capital 
intensity, wage rates and labour management patterns.'*'
Dualistic models of the labour market should be thought of as 
a simplification of a more complex structure. In practice 
continuous differentials in technology and wages are likely to 
be associated with the nature and speed of technological 
diffusion.
However the emphasis in a study of labour segmentation 
in LDCs is likely to differ significantly from studies in 
developed countries. In developed countries the emphasis has 
been on the existence and perpetuation of low wage employment 
(low wage 'islands') among minority and disadvantaged groups.
In contrast, in LDCs unstructured labour markets are likely to 
cover a high proportion of the total wage earning population.
We noted earlier that until quite recently a high proportion of 
the total wage earning work force in Japan was in small scale 
enterprise.
A similar situation is prevalent in many LDCs, especially 
in Asia (Baer and Herve, 1966; Morawetz, 1974). Understandably, 
the literature on wage differentials in LDCs has been more 
concerned to explain the existence of high wage 'islands' than 
low wage employment which is much more common in these 
countries.
In this study the focus is on the reasons for the 
persistence of a high wage sector under conditions of labour
See Ohkawa (1972) and Nelson et al. (1970) for a description 
of models of technological diffusion applied to the analysis 
of labour markets in Japan and Columbia respectively.
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surplus. Thus the major theoretical issue is not merely the 
causes of large interfirm wage differentials. Rather it is to 
discover why wages (even of unskilled labour) are much higher 
than average in large, capital intensive and foreign firms 
under conditions of labour surplus.
To sum up, this first part of the chapter has reviewed 
several theories of labour markets and has noted their relevance 
to the study of labour markets in LDCs. Several criticisms of 
the simple neoclassical and human capital theories of wage 
differentials may justify a different approach to the 
examination of wage differentials in LDCs. The theories of 
internal labour markets and labour market segmentation provide 
such an alternative.
However it should be stressed that human capital factors 
may play an important role in the determination of wage 
differentials in LDCs. Following some of the criticisms of 
the application of human capital theory, we argue that human 
capital factors should be examined in the context of certain 
patterns of labour demand. Specifically, it is useful to 
investigate the relationships between technology, human capital 
characteristics of the work force and wages than merely to 
concentrate on human capital influences on wages. For example, 
the question may be asked: To what extent are wage
differentials between capital and labour intensive firms a 
consequence of differences in human capital attributes of 
employees rather than the result of internal labour market or 
institutional forces?
Throughout this part of the chapter it has been stressed 
that technological differences are likely to be the major 
factors contributing to wage differentials in LDCs. In the 
second part of the chapter we provide an analytical framework 
which allows examination of why wages are likely to be higher 
in capital compared with labour intensive firms in labour 
surplus LDCs. This analysis will also examine the likely 
nature of human capital and institutional influences on wage 
differentials between capital and labour intensive firms.
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II. A Framework for Analysis of Interfirm Wage Differentials
In the first part of this chapter we reviewed several 
theories of wage differentials and concluded that theories of 
internal labour markets and labour market segmentation could 
assist an understanding of the causes of wage differentials in 
LDCs. It was suggested that these theories might aid the 
examination of the cause of wage differentials associated with 
a range of technology which exists in many labour surplus 
LDCs. In this part of the chapter we present an analytical 
framework which describes how internal market considerations, 
human capital and institutional factors are likely to influence 
wage differentials in manufacturing in these countries. A 
framework of analysis is developed which stresses the 
interrelationships between these three groups of influences.
To simplify the analysis, we assume a bifurcation of 
labour demand and supply patterns. Firms are divided into 
capital and labour intensive types and labour supply is divided 
into categories of 'educated' and 'non educated' workers. The 
argument is developed in three stages: (i) homogeneous labour
demand and supply, (ii) dualistic labour demand and homogeneous 
supply and (iii) dualistic labour demand and supply. The first 
stage is similar to the familiar Lewis model of wage 
determination in a labour surplus economy. In the second we 
examine how internal and external labour market factors and 
institutional forces are likely to influence wages in capital 
and labour intensive firms. The third stage investigates the 
influence of human capital on the pattern of wage differentials 
between capital and labour intensive firms.
The discussion focusses on the causes of interfirm wage 
differentials among unskilled (or semiskilled w o r k e r s ) T h u s
However we will also indicate the extent to which the 
analysis might also be applicable to various groups of 
skilled workers.
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we are not concerned directly with occupational wage 
differentials or interindustry wage differentials which have 
received so much attention in the literature on wage 
differentials in LDCs;^ rather this study deals with the 
causes of interfirm wage differentials of employees in similar 
occupations.
However, although the analysis concentrates on a general
category of unskilled (or semi-skilled) workers, it does assume
that employees require some skills to perform their tasks.
Further, we assume that these jobs are likely to be technology
specific. It is expected that the workers (for example, machine
operators) do have some direct effect on the quantity and
2quality of production. It also assumes that there is a surplus
supply of unskilled labour on the external market which is
capable of filling vacancies. Unskilled labour is made
available from the agricultural sector or from among the urban
3unemployed at a constant real wage rate.
Finally, throughout we adopt the assumptions of perfect 
competition in product markets and perfect knowledge.
These two assumptions simplify the analysis and enable us to 
concentrate on the effect of internal labour market, 
institutional and human capital factors independently of 
other influences on wages.
But the study does contribute to an understanding of the 
causes of interindustry wage differentials in LDCs which were 
examined in several of the empirical investigations discussed 
in Chapter Two.
We are not primarily interested in the demand for completely 
unskilled jobs (for example floor sweepers) since there are 
likely to be only a small proportion of total employment in 
most manufacturing firms. These jobs are unlikely to be 
specific to particular technologies and performance of 
completely unskilled jobs is also unlikely to directly affect 
the firm's production.
The minimum supply price of labour to manufacturing may be 
determined by average product pricing rules (as in the Lewis 
model) or may simply be determined by some conventional 
minimum level of subsistence (see especially Wharton, 1963). 
Throughout this section we will assume that there is a 
conventional minimum subsistence which provides a floor to 
wages.
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1. Homogeneous Demand and Supply Schedules
The analysis of wage differentials under conditions of 
homogeneous labour demand and supply is well known in the 
literature and requires only brief mention here.'*' Each firm 
demands the same quality of labour inputs and wages are set at 
a minimum subsistence level by surplus labour. This simple 
equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Different firms 
demand varying quantities of homogeneous labour (D^D^,D2D2, 
etc.) at a constant wage rate w^. An expansion of demand for 
labour of the firm (or indeed an industry, or even the 
manufacturing sector as a whole) will have no permanent effect 
on wage rates of unskilled labour as long as a surplus is
2available to fill the new jobs at a constant real wage rate.
2. Dualistic Labour Demand, Homogeneous Labour Supply
We now introduce a dualistic pattern of labour demand 
which is distinguished by a division of firms into capital and 
labour intensive (modern and traditional) segments. It is 
argued that capital intensive firms are likely to pay higher 
average wages for several reasons associated with (i) wage 
productivity effects; (ii) the effects of training and scarcity 
of modern sector skills; and (iii) various institutional 
forces. Wage productivity effects, labour shortages and 
institutional forces all affect wages through a combination of 
internal and external labour market influences. We examine 
each of these factors in turn.
(i) Wage productivity effects. We have already noted 
the views of several writers who claim that capital intensive
For example, see our brief description of the Lewis model 
in Chapter Two.
There will of course be short run fluctuations in wages in 
response to demand pressures and short run rigidities in 
supply, but in the long run wages will return to an 
equilibrium level set by the wages of surplus labour. See, 
for example, Taira (1970) for a discussion of short run and 
long run trends in wages in Japan from 1880-1950.
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Wages
Employment
Figure 3.1: Expansion of labour demand and
wage rates under conditions of 
labour surplus
Wages and marginal 
productivity of labour
Work units
Figure 3.2: Wage productivity effects:
increased wages and labour 
productivity
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firms in LDCs may experience higher turnover costs, and higher 
costs resulting from lower intensity of work than labour 
intensive firms (See Chapter Two). These problems faced by 
capital intensive firms are attributed to greater costs 
associated with underutilistion or misuse of expensive capital 
equipment. According to this argument capital intensive firms 
are likely to offer higher wages to stabilise their work force, 
and to encourage more intensive effort. Higher wages will 
contribute directly to greater labour productivity. Thus capital 
intensive firms are likely to choose wage levels according to 
their own estimation of the effect of wages on labour 
productivity. These wage levels are likely to be to some 
extent divorced from external labour market conditions.
We might expect the effect of wages on labour productivity 
to follow the pattern depicted in Figure 3.2. The marginal 
productivity curve would shift outwards from to M in 
response to an increase in wages above minimum subsistence from 
w^ to w2* The number of work units (measured on the horizontal 
axis) increases from ON^ to ON^ as a result of higher labour 
productivity. Provided that the increased value of marginal 
product resulting from the wage increase is greater than the 
addition to firms, wage costs, it will pay the firm to increase 
its wages to w^•
Of course, higher wages will not always be the major way 
in which firms seek to stabilise their work force. As we have 
seen in the case of Japan, wage increments based on seniority, 
and certain fringe benefits may be introduced to minimise labour 
turnover. Starting rates may be similar in relatively capital 
and labour intensive firms but owing to seniority increments, 
wages could be expected to rise more steeply with years of 
service in capital intensive firms.
The profit maximising firm will increase wages to the point 
where the increased value of marginal product caused by wage 
increases is equal to the increased wages, that is to the 
point where AVMP2 = ÄW2(where AVMP2 = the increase in the 
value of marginal product as a result of the wage increase, 
and AV?2 = the amount of the wage increase) .
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It should be noted that higher wages may not only effect
productivity by reducing the costs of turnover and
underutilisation. They may also have a positive effect on
productivity through their influence on the health and
physical well being of workers. Such effects are likely to
be particularly important in low wage LDCs.1 The longer run
effect on wages is likely to be perceived and taken advantage
of more by capital intensive firms. It will provide an
additional reason for higher wages in these firms compared
2with labour intensive establishments.
(ii) Demand for modern sector skills. In order to isolate 
the effects on wages of modern sector skills which are required 
in capital intensive firms, it is useful to envisage a 
situation in which capital intensive firms enter an economy 
where labour intensive firms are well established. It is 
assumed that capital intensive firms require (even from 
unskilled workers) certain specific skills and work habits 
(which will be termed 'modern sector skills') that cannot be 
provided by employees in the labour intensive sector. It
The influence of certain forms of wage payment on the 
physical wellbeing and productivity of workers in Indonesia 
is examined in Chapter Eight.
Efforts to reduce turnover costs and encourage a more 
stable work force are likely to make these longer term 
investments in the physical productivity of employees more 
attractive to capital intensive firms. Moreover, because 
wage costs are likely to be a smaller proportion of total 
costs in capital intensive firms, they may be more willing 
than labour intensive firms to undertake this investment.
Modern sector skills may be thought of as a general type of 
firm-specific skills or industry-specific skills. They 
consist of two major components. First, technical knowledge 
and skills required to operate particular machinery. For 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour these are likely to be 
industry-specific and to some extent they may also be firm- 
specific. The second component of modern sector skills is 
work habits and behaviour associated with the operation of 
relatively capital intensive machinery. Modern sector work 
habits and behaviour would include adherence to a rigorous 
code of factory discipline (including high levels of 
punctuality and cleanliness, intensive effort over short 
time periods and prompt action in response to the employer's 
requests). These habits would tend to be general to all
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will be further assumed that there is an abundance of 
'traditional' sector skills associated with labour intensive 
technology and also an abundance of relatively unskilled labour 
prepared to learn modern sector skills.
Initially, because modern sector skills are unavailable on 
the external market, they will have to be generated internally 
and will be firm-specific to the first capital intensive 
investor in the modern sector. Employees in this firm (and 
indeed in other early modern sector firms) will earn higher 
wages than employees in labour intensive firms because of the 
relative scarcity of modern sector skills. This situation is 
depicted in Figure 3.3. Capital intensive firms pay their 
scarce unskilled employees w^. The supply function is given by 
the relatively inelastic line s^3 *Si* Wages in this capital 
intensive firm contrast with the much lower wages paid in 
labour intensive firms (w^  in Figure 3.4) which face a perfectly 
elastic supply curve of labour.
As the capital intensive sector expands, modern sector
skills are likely to be increasingly abundant on the external
market. Thus we could expect the supply curve to become
increasingly elastic. The supply curve in Figure 3.3 will
move from S-.S-. to S~S„ and then to and S.S., and wages1 1  2 2  3 3  4 4  ^
will eventually fall from their initial high level w^ to w^.
In the longer term, we might expect labour supply pressures 
to push wages towards equality in capital intensive and labour 
intensive firms. Modern sector skills are likely to be 
generated internally but gradually an external market for 
modern sector skills develops.
Higher rates of growth in the modern sector may however 
prevent the development of an external market in which modern
3 (continued)
capital intensive firms which require a certain minimum level 
of labour performance in the operation of modern technology.
It is important to note that there is no presumption that 
employees in the modern sector necessarily have a higher 
level of skills than in the traditional sector but only that 
they have different skills.
1
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C A P I T A L  I N T E N S I V E  FIRM
Wages
Employment
Figure 3.3: Increasing supplies of modern
sector skills and wage rates 
in capital intensive firms
L A B O U R  I N T E N S I V E  FIRM
Wages
Employment
Figure 3.4: Expansion and decline of labour
demand in labour intensive firms
58
sector skills are abundant. Under such circumstances there is 
unlikely to be a significant narrowing of differentials 
between capital and labour intensive firms.'*"
Rapid rates of growth in the capital intensive sector 
might be expected to have one of two effects on the demand for 
labour in the labour intensive sector. Modern sector growth 
may stimulate growth in labour intensive activities and result 
in increased labour demand in this sector. Alternatively, 
modern sector firms may compete with labour intensive 
establishments and cause a fall in the demand for traditional 
skills in the labour intensive sector. However given that 
wages are determined exogenously in the labour intensive 
sector, neither the expansion of labour demand nor its 
contraction will influence wage rates in this sector as long as 
surplus labour supply conditions continue to prevail. The 
demand curve for labour in the labour intensive sector may move 
out to D2D0 or back to but the level of wages will remain
unchanged at minimum subsistence at w^ (Figure 3.4).
Two additional points should be made concerning the 
contribution of differences in the supply of skills to interfirm 
wage differentials. First more rapid technological change and 
the greater complexity of capital equipment in the capital 
intensive sector may contribute to a greater concentration of 
firm-specific skills in capital intensive firms than in labour 
intensive firms. A higher proportion of firm-specific skills 
associated with capital intensity is likely to result in
The influence on wages of excess demand for this labour may 
occur in various ways. Under conditions of perfect 
competition one would expect there to be constant pressure 
on external wage rates as employees compete for scarce 
labour, quit rates would be high and labour 'piracy' a 
common feature of labour demand patterns. Or, alternatively 
(as in the case of Japan) where conditions of oligopoly and 
oligopsomy exist, firms may collude to prevent labour piracy, 
and wage and other labour management systems be directed 
towards minimising labour turnover.
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greater interfirm wage differentials within the modern sector 
and also between the modern sector and traditional sector. 
Second, scarcity of modern sector skills may be even more 
marked for skilled labour than for unskilled labour, especially 
in the early stages of industrialisation. We might expect 
there to be an even greater range in interfirm wages for 
skilled workers than for unskilled or semi-skilled employees.^
(iii) Institutional factors. A third group of factors
contributing to wage differentials between capital and labour
intensive firms are what we have termed institutional
factors. These include minimum wages and other government
policies which affect wages, and trade union influences on 
2wages. It is reasonable to expect that trade unions will be
more active and government implementation of labour legislation
more strict in capital intensive rather than labour intensive 
3firms. Several factors are likely to contribute to the greater 
importance of institutional factors in capital intensive firms. 
First, wage costs are likely to be a small proportion of total 
costs. As a consequence capital intensive firms may be more
However there may also be factors tending to reduce the 
differentials in wages of skilled workers in capital 
intensive compared with labour intensive establishments. 
These include relative scarcity of skilled labour in labour 
intensive firms and the greater likelihood that the skills 
of skilled employees are more firm-specific to labour 
intensive firms than those of unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers. Thus wage differentials for skilled workers are 
likely to be less predictable than those associated with 
unskilled workers in labour intensive establishments.
Throughout the thesis the term 'institutional' factors will 
be used to refer to government and trade union policies and 
actions which directly or indirectly affect wages.
Several studies of developed economies have found that trade 
union pressure is a major factor contributing to higher 
wages in larger more capital intensive firms and in more 
concentrated industries (see for example Masters,1969;
Weiss, 1966).
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willing to grant wage increases as a result of union demands 
or other institutional pressures. Labour demand schedules 
will be less elastic in these firms than in more labour 
intensive firms.^
Second, lower labour turnover and a more stable employment 
relationship in capital intensive firms may encourage trade 
unions to press for wage systems with greater emphasis on 
seniority and wage payments (for example insurance and pension 
schemes) which have little direct effect on labour productivity. 
Institutional factors are clearly closely interrelated with 
other internal labour market forces. Finally, capital intensive 
firms are likely to be larger and more visible than labour 
intensive establishments and to be scrutinised more closely by 
government and trade union representatives. Better records will 
enable more intensive control over wages and working conditions.
It might also be expected that there would be a close 
association between capital intensity and the foreign 
ownership of firms. Since most foreign firms are also likely 
to be capital intensive, the arguments for high wages in capital 
intensive firms also apply to foreign enterprises. However 
several influences may tend to push wages higher in foreign 
capital intensive firms compared with domestic capital 
intensive firms. First, foreign firms may place greater 
emphasis on manpower planning and pay more attention to wage 
productivity effects than domestic firms. Second, since there 
may be greater government and trade union pressures on foreign 
firms to avoid dismissals, these firms may incur higher 
recruiting and screening costs to ensure that they obtain
Marshall (1920:319) mentions the proportion of wage costs 
to total costs as one factor contributing to elasticity 
of labour demand.
It should also be noted that to the extent that capital 
intensive firms tend to experience higher rates of profit 
(because of monopolistic or oligopolistic practices of these 
firms or preferential access to capital and other input 
markets), they may be more willing to pass on part of their 
profits to employees in the form of higher wages.
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workers of the desired quality. They will have an additional 
reason for adopting policies to minimise turnover.
A third factor likely to contribute to higher wages in 
foreign firms is the snecificitv of skills and work habits to 
the foreign sector. Foreign firms may demand certain skills 
and work habits (language, knowledge of foreign business 
practises and modes of behaviour) in addition to general 
modern sector skills associated with capital intensity.^
Finally, as we have noted from several of the studies
reviewed in Chapter Two, institutional pressures are likely to
have a greater influence on wages in foreign firms. The
foreign sector is likely to be much more vulnerable to
nationalist criticism and payment of relatively high wages. In
addition, humanitarian considerations inducing payment of
wages, above market rates may also be more important among 
2foreign firms.
Thus we may envisage a continuum in labour demand and 
supply schedules from, at one extreme, the relatively inelastic 
foreign sector demand for and supply of scarce foreign sector 
specific skills. At the other extreme there is an elastic 
demand for and supply of relatively abundant traditional 
sector-specific skills. The three demand and supply curves are 
depicted in Figure 3.5. D__,D_ and S^ S-, are the demand and supplyr r r r
curves for unskilled or semi-skilled labour in foreign firms,
D D and D D and S S and W S demand and supply curves in the L-U L L U U  L L
domestic, capital intensive firms and labour intensive firms 
respectively. Wages are highest in the foreign sector and 
lowest in the domestic labour intensive sector.
Of course these specific foreign sector skills will not 
necessarily be the same for investors from different 
countries. They may be particularly important for 
investors from some countries (for example Japanese) with 
more rigid codes of behaviour than in other foreign firms 
which place more emphasis on adaptation of their labour 
management systems to the local environment.
Both institutional forces and humanitarian considerations 
may have a greater influence in foreign firms in which wage 
costs are a small proportion of total costs and profits 
are high.
2
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Wages
Employment
Figure 3.5: Demand and supply schedules in
foreign, capital intensive and 
labour intensive firms
Wages
Employment
Figure 3.6: Employment of educated workers
at various wage rates in labour 
intensive firms
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In brief, a variety of both internal and external market 
influences are likely to contribute to wage differentials 
between capital and labour intensive firms and also (partly 
because foreign ownership tends to be associated with capital 
intensity) between foreign and domestic firms. Internal 
labour market influences include wage productivity effects, 
and the effect on wages of firm-specific training. However 
more general labour market influences associated with all 
modern sector firms also contribute to interfirm wage 
differentials. A scarcity of modern sector specific skills 
may increase wage differentials between capital intensive and 
labour intensive firms. On the other hand, increasing 
abundance of these skills tends to reduce the differentials. 
Finally more general institutional influences may also 
contribute to high modern sector wages and especially to 
wage differentials between foreign domestic firms.
Throughout this discussion of the influence of dualistic 
demand patterns on wages we have assumed a homogeneous supply 
of unskilled labour available on the external labour market. 
Clearly this is an unrealistic assumption. The supply of 
labour willing to work in most unskilled jobs is likely to 
possess a range of personal and other labour supply 
characteristics. We now turn to examine how differentiated 
supply patterns will influence the extent of wage differentials 
in a dualistic manufacturing sector.
3. Dual Labour Market Demand and Dual Labour Supply
We now introduce the notion of dualistic labour supply. To 
simplify the analysis it is assumed that there are only two 
groups of workers which we will term 'educated' and 'non 
educated'. It is assumed also that these two groups are 
distinguished mainly according to years of schooling1 and
In reality labour supply is likely to differ in a variety of 
respects, the most important of which are sex, race, age, 
schooling and experience. In practice we might also expect 
more educated workers to be younger males living in urban 
areas.
64
that both groups of educated and non educated workers are
initially in surplus supply.^ How is the division of labour
supply into educated and non educated groups likely to affect
wage differentials of unskilled workers in capital intensive
2compared with labour intensive firms?
First let us assume that there is no dualism in labour 
demand and focus briefly on the effects of dualism in supply on 
the external labour market. Given conditions of labour surplus 
of both educated and non educated, there is no reason to expect 
higher wages among educated compared with non educated workers 
employed in unskilled jobs. Surplus supply of labour is likely 
to drive wages down to minimum levels among both educated and 
non educated workers.
However two external market effects may affect wage 
differentials between educated and uneducated workers. First, 
owing to preferential hiring of educated workers on the external 
market, the supply of these workers may become scarce. There 
will be upward pressure on wages of educated workers and their 
wages will increase above those of non educated workers.
Second, educated workers may demand a minimum wage (consistent 
with their social position and wage expectations) which is 
above the price of surplus labour on the external market. This 
will be labeled a 'social' minimum wage (SMW) set by educated 
labour (the SMW should be distinguished from the minimum 
subsistence wage of uneducated workers). This second effect 
will be important if the educated have expectations of 
employment in high wage, skilled and administrative jobs.
This is consistent with the empirical data from most LDCs 
which shows high rates of unemployment among the secondary 
educated as well as those in primary schools and the 
uneducated (see especially Turnham, 1971). High levels of 
unemployment among the secondary educated is also a major 
feature of labour surplus in Indonesia (See Chapter Four).
It should be noted that the analysis in this section has 
much in common with Fields (1974) and Barnum and Sabot (1976) 
who examine the distribution of educated and uneducated 
between skilled and unskilled jobs, and agricultural 
employment in the overall context of rural urban migration.
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Where there is a social minimum wage for educated labour, 
the proportion of educated employees in unskilled jobs depends 
on two main factors. On the demand side it depends on whether 
their marginal productivity in unskilled jobs exceeds the SMW.
If their marginal productivity in such jobs is less than the 
SMW, employers will prefer non educated labour. On the supply 
side, the educated will take into account the effect that 
employment in an unskilled job will have on their chances of 
obtaining a higher paid skilled job. If their chances of 
obtaining a skilled job are affected adversely by the 
acceptance of an unskilled job, educated workers may prefer to 
remain unemployed than take on unskilled jobs.^
Now let us assume that there is both dualistic demand and 
dualistic supply. First, it is necessary to note the different 
effects that educated workers are likely to have on productivity 
in capital compared with labour intensive firms. It is 
reasonable to assume that schooling has a greater effect on 
productivity in capital intensive firms: education is likely
to make a greater contribution to the understanding of 
sophisticated equipment in capital intensive firms, and since 
there is likely to be a greater emphasis on formal training 
in these firms, can be expected to contribute to skill 
acquisition. Thus it will be necessary to examine two cases:
(i) a situation in which education has no effect on productivity 
in the labour intensive sector; and (ii) a situation in which 
education has some effect on productivity in the labour 
intensive sector, but less than in the capital intensive sector. 
In addition it is useful to distinguish between a situation in 
which there is a SMW from one with no SMW for educated workers. 
Each of these cases is discussed in turn.
(i) Education has no effect on productivity in the labour 
intensive sector.
(a) No social minimum wage. Under such conditions we 
might expect labour intensive firms to be indifferent as to
1 See, for example, Fields, (1974).
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whether they employ educated or uneducated workers. The wages 
of educated workers who accept low wage jobs in labour 
intensive firms will be the same as uneducated. However 
capital intensive firms will only hire educated workers. 
Although the external market wage of educated labour may be the 
same as uneducated labour, it is reasonable to expect the 
various labour demand influences (wage productivity effects, 
shortages of modern sector manpower and institutional forces) 
to result in higher wages for educated workers employed in 
modern sector firms.
(b) A social minimum wage. Under these conditions 
no labour intensive firms will employ educated employees. 
Capital intensive firms will employ educated labour to the 
point where its marginal productivity is equal to the SMW. 
Provided that the SMW of educated workers is lower than that 
which (for internal market and other reasons) capital intensive 
firms are prepared to pay, employment of educated in capital 
intensive firms will be the same as in (a) above. But if it is 
higher, overall employment of educated employees will fall. 
Indeed (depending on the extent to which uneducated labour can 
be substituted for educated labour in capital intensive firms,) 
we may find that these firms employ a high proportion of 
uneducated workers as a result of excessively high SMW 
demanded by educated workers.
(ii) Education has some effect of labour productivity in
labour intensive firms.
(a) No social minimum wage. Under these conditions 
labour intensive firms will no longer be indifferent to whether 
they employ educated or uneducated workers. They will prefer 
to employ higher quality educated workers. Initially one may 
envisage a situation in which educated labour is employed only 
in the high wage modern sector. However as educated labour 
becomes more abundant the supply of educated workers will 
outstrip job opportunities in capital intensive firms. 
Initially, for as long as the probability of obtaining a modern 
sector job is still high,the educated will prefer to remain
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unemployed (and hence still able to search for modern sector 
jobs) rather accept low wage jobs in labour intensive firms 
(see Barnum and Sabot, 1976:36). But as the supply of educated 
unemployed rises and the probability of employment in the 
modern sector falls, the educated are likely to turn 
increasingly to jobs in labour intensive establishments. They 
will begin to displace less productive, non educated labour.^
The extent to which the non educated are 'squeezed out' 
of labour intensive firms will depend partly on the rate of 
growth of demand for educated labour (especially in the modern 
sector) relative to the supply of educated labour. A rapid 
increase in growth rates in the modern sector may actually 
reverse the situation described above. The wages of educated 
labour will rise and labour intensive firms switch back to non 
educated labour. As the probability of employment in the 
modern sector increases, educated employees would be expected 
to leave labour intensive firms in search of modern sector 
j obs.
(b) A social minimum wage. In this case labour 
demand in capital intensive firms will be the same as 
described in (i) (b) above. However labour intensive firms
may continue to employ educated labour despite a minimum 
subsistence wage. Owing to the higher productivity of these 
workers, labour intensive firms may be willing to pay higher
In practice the extent to which educated workers are 
given jobs in labour intensive firms will be influenced 
partly by the attitude of employers to the 
employment of educated workers. It is possible that 
labour intensive firms might find employment of educated 
workers undesirable. They may prefer not to employ 
educated workers in unskilled jobs because the unwillingness 
of the educated to perform more arduous manual tasks 
required in labour intensive firms. Fields (1974:915-6) 
identifies two cases of labour market segmentation in 
which either employers are unwilling to take on educated 
workers for unskilled jobs or employees are not prepared 
to accept such jobs.
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than subsistence wages to retain educated workers. However 
above a certain social minimum set by educated workers they 
will employ only non educated workers. For example, in 
Figure 3.6 ON^ units of educated labour will be employed by 
labour intensive firms at the minimum subsistence wage of w^,
If we assume that educated workers demand a SMW of w  ^, 
employment of educated labour will only fall to ON^. But above 
this wage the demand curve is perfectly elastic as labour 
intensive firms switch to the employment of non educated 
workers only.
In sum, provided there is a surplus supply of both non 
educated and educated workers, division of labour supply into 
these two groups is unlikely to have a marked influence on the 
pattern of interfirm wage differentials arising from dualistic 
labour demand patterns. If we assume that educated labour does 
not contribute to higher productivity in labour intensive 
firms, wages will be higher in capital intensive firms for the 
various reasons associated with labour demand patterns 
described in section two. In labour intensive firms, wages 
will be equal to the minimum subsistence wage regardless of 
whether educated or non educated labour are employed in this 
sector. If however, we assume that educated labour does have 
some effect on labour productivity in the labour intensive 
firms, it is possible that a shortage of educated workers (or 
a social minimum wage demanded by educated workers) may provide 
some pressure for a reduction of wage differentials of 
unskilled labour between the two sectors. Wages for educated 
labour employed in labour intensive firms will be higher than 
minimum subsistence levels paid to non educated labour in this 
sector. There may be a reduction in the wage differentials 
between capital and labour intensive firms.^
It should be noted that in practice there is unlikely to be 
a homogeneous supply response from educated labour. Some 
may accept minimum wages in labour intensive firms. Others 
may only work in this sector at higher wages. A third group 
may prefer unemployment and a chance of higher wage job 
later to employment in labour intensive firms.
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So far we have been mainly concerned with identifying 
certain factors which might influence interfirm wage 
differentials. To place the discussion in a broader 
perspective, it will be useful to ask what extent the patterns 
of behaviour described above contribute to labour market 
segmentation.
In the first part of this chapter labour market 
segmentation was described as the division of the labour 
market into structured and unstructured components. The 
different segments are likely to contrast in wage rates, 
processes of wage determination and labour allocation. They 
may also contrast in the importance of internal and external 
market forces. For the purpose of this study we may define 
segmented labour markets in terms of three major characteristics. 
Highly segmented labour markets will be distinguished by 
(i) large and persistent interfirm wage differentials 
associated mainly with differences in technology;^" (ii) low 
levels of mobility between capital and labour intensive firms; 
and (iii) the association of high wages in capital intensive 
firms with certain human capital and personal characteristics 
of workers. According to the first two of these criteria the 
labour market described in section three above is likely to be 
highly segmented. The third is likely to be less segmented.
Each characteristic will be considered in more detail.
First, under conditions of surplus educated and non 
educated labour, there are unlikely to be forces which would 
cause a narrowing of wage differentials. We have suggested 
that labour demand patterns in labour intensive firms are not 
likely to influence wages in the capital intensive sector. 
Increased labour demand in the labour intensive sector will be 
met mainly by increased supply of unemployed urban workers or 
surplus labour from agriculture. Similarly, increased demand 
for educated workers by capital intensive firms has no 
effect on wages in the labour intensive sector. One would
1 These differentials apply to workers in the same general 
occupational categories.
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e x p e c t  wage  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  t o  narrow  o n l y  a s  u n e d u c a t e d  l a b o u r  
becom es  s c a r c e  and wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a re  p u s h e d  up i n  t h e  
l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  s e c t o r .  The ' t u r n i n g  p o i n t '  i n  e c o n o m ic  
d e v e l o p m e n t  i s  l i k e l y  n o t  o n l y  t o  r e d u c e  wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s  
b e t w e e n  urban and r u r a l  a r e a s  b u t  a l s o  b e t w e e n  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  
i n t e n s i v e  and l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  f i r m s  i n  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
s e c t o r .
A s c a r c i t y  o f  e d u c a t e d  w o r k e r s  m ig h t  a l s o  l e a d  t o  a 
n a r r o w i n g  o f  wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  Labour  i n t e n s i v e  f i r m s  may 
p r e f e r  t o  em p loy  e d u c a t e d  w o r k e rs  a t  w ages  above  t h e  minimum 
wage th a n  em ploy  non e d u c a t e d  w o r k e r s .  Wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s  
w o u ld  n arrow  as  l o n g  as l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  f i r m s  c o n t i n u e  t o
2
em ploy  e d u c a t e d  manpower a t  wage r a t e s  above  t h e  minimum w a g e .  
But i f  s c a r c i t y  o f  e d u c a t e d  l a b o u r  l e a d s  t o  s u b s t a n t i a l  wage  
i n c r e a s e s ,  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  f i r m s  w i l l  p r e f e r  
t o  em p loy  o n l y  non e d u c a t e d  w o r k e r s  a t  s u b s i s t e n c e  w a g e s .
A s e c o n d  m a jo r  f e a t u r e  o f  s e g m e n t e d  l a b o u r  m a r k e t s  i s  a 
l a c k  o f  m o b i l i t y  b e tw e en  s e c t o r s .  I t  h a s  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  above  
t h a t  s k i l l s  and work h a b i t s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be  s p e c i f i c  t o  
c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  f i r m s .  E m p loyees  from l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  f i r m s  
c a n n o t  l e a r n  new s k i l l s  (or  u n l e a r n  t h e i r  o l d  work h a b i t s )  
e a s i l y  and l a b o u r  from t h i s  s e c t o r  may not be  e a s i l y  e m p lo y e d  i n  
t h e  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  s e c t o r .  We may e x p e c t  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  
f i r m s  n o t  o n l y  t o  r e c r u i t  more e d u c a t e d  l a b o u r  b u t  a l s o  y o u n g e r  
e m p l o y e e s  w i t h  l i t t l e  work e x p e r i e n c e  who w i l l  be c a p a b l e  o f  
l e a r n i n g  new s k i l l s  r e l a t i v e l y  q u i c k l y .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand low  
r a t e s  o f  l a b o u r  t u r n o v e r  in  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  f i r m s  p r e c l u d e s  
t h e  movement o f  a s i g n i f i c a n t  number o f  w o r k e r s  from t h e s e
 ^ T h i s  was t h e  c a s e  in  Japan as  l a b o u r  s c a r c i t y  d e v e l o p e d  
d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 6 0 s .  See Odaka (1967)  Yamamura ( 1 9 6 5 ) .
S i n c e  w ages  i n  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  f i r m s  a r e  a l r e a d y  l i k e l y  t o  
be above  t h e  minimum wage b e c a u s e  o f  wage p r o d u c t i v i t y  and 
o t h e r  i n f l u e n c e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  l a b o u r  demand, an i n c r e a s e  
i n  t h e  s u p p l y  p r i c e  o f  e d u c a t e d  l a b o u r  above  minimum wage i s  
u n l i k e l y  t o  a f f e c t  wages  i n  t h e s e  f i r m s .
2
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enterprises to the labour intensive sector. Moreover even if 
employees leave capital intensive firms, they may not have 
the appropriate skills or be willing (for social reasons or 
because they prefer to seek new jobs in other capital intensive 
firms) to undertake similar jobs in labour intensive 
establishments.
A third feature of labour market segmentation which is 
relevant to this study is the employment of workers with 
different human capital and personal characteristics in 
different kinds of firm.1 According to this criteria, the 
labour market discussed in section three above may not be 
highly segmented. It has been suggested that surplus educated 
labour may be employed in both capital and labour intensive 
firms. On the demand side, the number of educated workers 
employed in labour intensive firms will depend on whether 
labour intensive firms prefer to employ educated workers and, 
if these workers demand a social minimum wage, the extent to 
which labour intensive firms are prepared to pay higher wages 
for these workers. On the supply side it will depend on the 
willingness of educated workers to accept low wage and low 
prestige jobs.
Overall, assuming labour surplus of both educated and 
uneducated workers, the above discussion of dual labour markets 
suggests (at least for the first two reasons given above) 
that there will be high levels of labour market segmentation. 
However three qualifications may be advanced concerning the 
pattern of labour market segmentation implied in the framework 
presented above. First, although labour market segmentation may 
be associated with technological dualism, the extent of 
segmentation will depend on the particular historical phase 
of manufacturing development experienced by a country. Rapid
A major theme of literature on labour market segmentation in 
advanced capitalist countries has been the division of the 
labour market according to certain supply characteristics 
of workers (for example according to race, sex, education 
and other socio-economic characteristics of workers).
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growth of a relatively small capital intensive sector may cause 
large wage differentials in the early stages of manufacturing 
development.'*' But these differentials and labour market 
segmentation is likely to be much less important for an economy 
with a large less rapidly growing modern sector. The relative 
rates of growth and size of the two sectors, and the extent 
of differences in technology will all influence the extent of 
labour market segmentation.
Second, although we have adopted a simplified dualistic 
framework, in practice we would expect a range of wage rates 
to be associated with continuous differentials in technology in 
most LDCs. Thus the contrast between high wages and stable 
employment in capital intensive firms and low wage labour 
intensive firms may be tempered by the addition of firms with 
intermediate levels of capital intensity. It is reasonable to 
expect greater mobility between these firms and both capital 
and labour intensive sectors, than directly between the 
capital and labour intensive sectors. It is likely also that 
changes in labour demand in the medium technology sector would 
also have a greater effect on wages in both of the other 
sectors.
Third, one other important qualification to the strict 
dualistic model of labour market segmentation is the addition 
of foreign firms. Higher capital intensity and labour 
management patterns specific to foreign firms (see above) are 
likely to contribute to even greater wage differentials with 
labour intensive firms than between domestic capital and 
labour intensive firms alone.
Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we have developed a framework for the 
analysis of wage differentials in labour surplus LDCs. The 
chapter applies some of the theories of labour markets in
Indonesia is one example of a country which has experienced 
rapid growth in relatively capital intensive technology 
since 1967 in a small modern sector which contrasts with a 
relatively large labour intensive traditional sector.
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developed capitalist countries to the analysis of wage 
differentials in dualistic manufacturing in LDCs. In 
particular, it is argued that theories of internal labour 
markets and labour market segmentation are of some relevance 
to the study of wage differentials in LDCs.
The second part of the chapter provides a conceptual 
framework for the empirical examination of wage differentials 
to be undertaken in the remaining chapters of the thesis. The 
analysis stresses the demand determinants of wage differentials. 
It suggests that interfirm wage differentials are likely to be 
caused mainly by patterns of labour demand associated with 
technology and foreign ownership. Specifically, internal 
decisions concerning the relationship between wages and labour 
productivity, the internal generation of modern sector skills, 
and an external shortage of these skills may all contribute to 
high wages in capital intensive firms.
Certain human capital and personal characteristics of 
workers, and institutional forces also could be expected to be 
associated with substantial wage differentials between capital 
and labour intensive firms. Since most foreign firms also 
tend to be capital intensive, these factors are also likely to 
reflect wage differentials between foreign and domestic 
firms. However it was noted that institutional forces may also 
have considerable effect on wage differentials between foreign 
and domestic firms.
It will be useful to summarise these various influences 
on wages in capital intensive firms diagrammatically. Factors 
contributing to high wages and the consequences of high wages 
in these firms are illustrated in a flow chart in Figure 3.7.
The figure demonstrates the nature of causality and several of 
the relationships between variables. Three sets of factors 
contribute to high wages in capital intensive firms: high
costs associated with underutilisation of expensive capital 
equipment and high turnover costs, a demand for scarce modern 
sector skills and low wage costs (or high profits). Trade union 
pressures are likely to result in higher wages in capital
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intensive firms where wage costs are a small proportion of 
total wage costs or where profits are small. On-the-job and 
formal training organised by the firm contributes to both 
general, modern sector and firm-specific skills. In addition, 
capital intensive firms are likely to seek more educated 
and more able workers who can operate the new technology and 
who have the potential for upward mobility. Scarcity of these 
workers (or a social minimum wage) will induce capital intensive 
firms to offer them higher wages than those paid by labour 
intensive firms. However employment of educated workers may 
also be a consequence of the high wages paid in capital 
intensive firms. Educated and more able workers will tend to 
be selected first from long labour queues.
Most of these factors contributing to high wages in 
capital intensive firms will have a similar effect on foreign 
firms. But, as we have already noted, the figure shows two 
additional factors contributing to high wages in foreign 
firms. These were the demand for skills that are specific to 
the foreign sector and institutional pressures on wages in 
foreign firms.
A major task of the thesis is to test some of these broad 
propositions. We examine the extent to which interfirm wage 
differentials are associated with technology and foreign 
ownership and seek explanations for these differentials.
Further, an attempt is made to discover the extent to which 
these wage differentials are associated with certain internal 
market factors, institutional and human capital factors. One 
important task of the empirical analysis is to examine the 
extent to which all three of these sets of variables are 
interrelated in their effect on wages.
In practice, because of data deficiencies and the 
complexity of some of the interrelationships between 
explanatory variables, rigorous tests could not be undertaken. 
But it is possible to examine the extent to which the pattern 
of wage differentials and various factors contributing to wage 
differentials are consistent with the general propositions 
advanced in this chapter.
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The empirical examination of wage differentials in 
Indonesia is undertaken at two levels. Chapters Four to Six 
provide an overview of labour supply conditions, wage 
differentials and general institutional and historical 
influences on the wage structure in Indonesia. The survey 
conducted in these chapters examines at a very general level 
some of the propositions raised in this chapter. It also 
identifies several characteristics of Indonesian labour 
markets and wage systems - especially the influence of public 
sector wage systems, regional and male-female wage 
differentials and general institutional forces - which need to 
be taken into account in our more rigorous analysis of survey 
data in later chapters.
In Chapter Seven several specific hypotheses 
concerning the causes of wage differentials in the three 
industries are tested. Specifically we test (i) the extent 
to which wage differentials are associated with capital 
intensity and foreign ownership, (ii) the influence of human 
capital and some institutional variables on wages and (iii) 
the extent of the interrelationships between all these 
variables. The hypotheses are derived from the framework 
developed in this chapter and also take into account some of 
the specific characteristics of Indonesian labour markets 
discussed in Chapters Four to Six. The propositions are 
tested with survey data collected from three industries - 
weaving, machine made cigarettes and hand made kretek 
cigarettes - in Java.
Chapters Nine and Ten examine the relationships between 
several of these explanatory variables and their combined 
influence on wages in greater depth. Chapter Ten also 
investigates the extent to which high wages in capital 
intensive and foreign firms are associated with low rates of 
turnover and absenteeism. A concluding chapter discusses the 
major findings of the empirical analysis. It links this to both 
broader labour market patterns in Indonesia and to some of the 
major propositions raised in this chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR
AN OVERVIEW OF LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS AND WAGE 
DIFFERENTIALS IN INDONESIA
Chapters Two and Three examined a variety of influences 
that have contributed to interfirm wage differentials in 
manufacturing in LDCs. We also suggested a framework of 
analysis for examining the influence of these factors on 
wage differentials.
This chapter raises some of the general issues 
discussed in the previous two chapters. It analyses 
secondary wage data collected in surveys and censuses in 
Indonesia. The chapter examines intersectoral, and 
interindustry and interfirm wage differentials and their 
association with new patterns of 'modern' sector growth 
and foreign investment. It deals with both the level 
and form of wage payment. The analysis is set in the 
context of an overall surplus supply of unskilled 
labour and a shortage of skilled labour in Indonesia 
and especially on Java. It also takes into account 
the influence of recent patterns of labour demand on 
manufacturing wage differentials.
Our survey of secondary data on wage differentials 
in Indonesia indicates that it is not possible to 
answer some of the major questions raised in Chapter 
Three from secondary data alone. A more rigorous 
testing of some of these ideas must await an examination 
of the findings of our field survey.
This chapter also provides a review of some of the 
major sources of wage data in Indonesia. There is no
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such review of various surveys of wages in the literature 
on labour markets in Indonesia. Such a review is necessary 
both because of the wide range of source of data on wages 
and also the low quality of much of this data (see below). 
Although this survey in no way purports to cover all major 
sources of wage data,'*' it aims to provide a balanced 
summary of the major survey data pertinent to the questions 
raised in this thesis.
The chapter is divided into five major parts. The 
first two parts describe current labour supply and labour 
demand patterns with particular reference to Java. In the 
third part some major sources of intersectoral, interindustry 
and interfirm wage differentials are examined. In the 
fourth we look at interfirm differences in the form of 
wage payment. The final part investigates some labour 
supply influences (especially regional factors and male 
female differences) on wage differentials.
2I. Labour Supply Conditions with Special Reference to Java
Java is in many respects a classic example of a labour 
surplus economy. A high proportion of its population is 
employed in low productivity activities in agriculture and
Since we are primarily concerned with interfirm wage 
structure, two major subjects in the field of wages - 
occupational wage differentials and changes in the 
level of wages over time - are given scant attention 
in this survey chapter.
Because our micro-study deals with wages in two 
industries in Java, this chapter will focus primarily 
on labour demand and supply patterns on Java.
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non-agricultural activities in rural areas. The manufacturing 
sector is still relatively small and mainly encompasses small 
scale, labour-intensive activities in rural areas. Compared 
with many other LDCs, in the past 15 years urban growth has 
been relatively slow except for a few large centres of 
administration and trade. The major urban areas are 
characterised by much higher rates of unemployment than is 
recorded for rural areas. A plethora of low income 'informal' 
sector activities abound in Java's major cities. However, 
despite overall conditions of labour surplus, there continues 
to be a shortage of skilled and professional manpower.
Since approximately two-thirds of Indonesia's population is 
concentrated on Java, these patterns of labour surplus also 
apply to the majority of the Indonesian people. But the less 
sparsely settled outer islands differ significantly from Java 
in employment structure and in overall levels of rural and 
urban poverty. In this part we summarise the main features 
of labour surplus in Java: the concentration of employment
in the agricultural sector and in low productivity 
activities in rural areas; high levels of seasonal demand for 
labour; and underutilisation of labour in both rural and urban 
areas. In addition we discuss briefly the problems of 
scarcity of skilled and professional manpower. A survey of 
these underlying patterns is essential for an understanding 
of the operation of labour markets and the determination of 
wages in the manufacturing sector.
1. Conditions of Labour Surplus and the Sectoral Distribution 
of the Labour Force
Surplus labour had already emerged as a major problem in 
Indonesia and especially on Java as early as the beginning of 
the 19th Century. Even at this time the small island of Java 
appears to have supported a population of 6-10 million with 
population density of 45-75 persons per square kilometre 
(McNicoll and Mamas, 1973:4; Pelzer, 1963:114-5). In the 
following century and a half Java's population increased at 
least sevenfold to reach 76 million in 1971 with an overall 
population density of more than 500 persons per square kilometre.
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The very high levels of population density on Java are an 
important indicator of the low level of economic development 
mainly because a high proportion of the population is still 
engaged in the agricultural sector. The process of adaptation 
and overcrowding in agriculture on Java is well portrayed by 
Geertz in the term 'agricultural involution' which describes 
the development of increasingly labour-intensive and intricate 
methods of cultivation on 'lilliputan' Javanese farms (Geertz, 
1963a). Throughout the colonial period a small proportion of the 
population left the agricultural sector in Java for high 
productivity activities especially in manufacturing or 
transmigrated to the outer islands. The proportion of the 
labour force in manufacturing in Indonesia (most of which is 
concentrated in Java) may have actually fallen between 1930 and 
1961 and it has increased only slowly over the past 15 years. In 
September-December 1976 this sector still accounted for less 
than 10 percent of the employed population (Table 4.1).^ It is 
not possible to give an accurate figure on the changes in the 
proportion of the labour force employed in agricuture over the
This proportion is slightly lower than the proportion of the 
labour force in manufacturing in neighbouring South-east 
Asian countries with large agricultural export sectors. For 
example, the proportion of the labour force in manufacturing 
in the Philippines was 11-12 percent (1971-72) and Thailand 
11.0 percent (1976) (ILO, 1974:395-6). Although the broad 
dimensions of the distribution of the labour force between 
sectors and regions in Indonesia are fairly clear, consistent 
quantification of these magnitudes is complicated enormously 
by changes in definitions of the labour force, enumeration 
conducted at different stages of the agricultural cycle and 
different methods of coding data in successive censuses since 
1931 (see Jones, 1966, 1974, 1978). The problem of 
seasonality is particularly important for the SUPAS 
(intercensal) labour force data which was collected in the 
busy agricultural period of March compared with the 1961 and 
1971 Censuses and the national labour force data (SAKERNAS) 
which were all collected in the relatively slack period 
September-December.
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Table 4.1: Proportion of employed population
by sector, 1971-767
Sector Java Outer Islands Indonesia
1971 1976 1971 1976 1971 1976
Agriculture 62 58 76 68 67 62
Trade 13 16 7 11 11 14
Services 11 11 9 10 10 11
Manufacturing 8 9 4 7 7 8
Other 6 6 4 4 5 5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
N (million) 24.7 31.9 12.9 15.4 37.6 47.3
2 Cases in which sectors were unknown allocated pro rata
between all sectors. Data for 1976 excludes parts of
West Timor, Maluku and Irian Jay a .
Source: Indonesia, Population Census 1971, Series E;
SAKERNAS (1978):Table 14
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intercensal period 1961-71.^ But it is clear that the absolute
number of people employed in agriculture has continued to rise
2in both Indonesia as a whole and Java. However, probably as a 
result of relatively rapid rates of economic growth, the 
proportion of the employed population in agriculture appears 
to have begun to decline quite significantly over the past 5
3years (see Table 4.1).
2. Distribution of Employment Between Urban and Rural Areas
The high concentration of non-agricultural employment in 
rural areas in Java may be viewed as one indication of how the
The figures are unreliable mainly because of changes in the 
census definitions of employment. The 1961 census defined 
employment as those currently working or having worked 2 out 
of the past six months. In 1971 the definition of working 
was changed to include only those working two days or more in 
the week prior to the census; in addition a question was 
asked to take account of agricultural seasonality by asking 
the respondents whether they worked in agriculture (at all) 
in the last season. Comparison of the 1961 agricultural 
employment figure (which takes seasonal employment in 
agriculture into account) and the 1971 one week reference 
period figure suggests that the population engaged in 
agriculture fell by as much as 7.5 percent over the ten year 
intercensal period for Indonesia as a whole (and by 5.8 
percent for Java). However an adjusted figure estimated by 
Jones (1978:19, 24) which also takes into account seasonal 
employment in agriculture in 1971, suggests that the 
proportion of the work force in agriculture was virtually 
unchanged at 73 percent over the 1961-71 period.
The most conservative estimate of all Indonesian employment 
in agriculture in 1971 (according to the one week reference 
period) records an increase of the agricultural work force 
of 1.2 million compared with 1961. Over the following five 
years the agricultural work force is estimated to have risen 
a further 4 million to reach 29.1 million in September- 
December 1976 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1978b:Table 14).
Table 4.1 also shows that a relatively high proportion of 
non-agricultural employment was in trade and services. These 
proportions were larger for Java than the outer islands and 
probably reflect both the concentration of modern sector 
activity in Java and also the spillover of surplus population 
into relatively low income informal sector activities.
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population has responded to increasing population pressure and,
until very recently, relatively slow rates of economic growth.^
In 1976 just over two-thirds of Java's population employed in
activities outside agriculture lived in rural areas. The
proportion was highest for manufacturing (77 percent) and trade
(73 percent) (Table 4.2). A higher proportion of non
agricultural employees living in rural areas suggests greater
population pressure on agricultural resources in Java compared
with the outer islands. The contrast between Java and the outer
2islands was especially marked in the quite large trade sector.
There are other indicators which suggest that urban 
employment has played a relatively unimportant role in labour 
absorption in Java over the past 15 years. Despite the rapid 
growth of a few centres - primarily Jakarta and Surabaya - urban 
growth in Java appears to have been slow compared with other 
regions of Indonesia and many other LDCs. Over the entire 
intercensal period 1961-71 the proportion of the Indonesian 
population in cities with populations of 100,000 or more 
increased only slightly (9.9 to 11.4 percent). Much of this 
growth was due to quite rapid expansion of several outer 
island cities and a few major cities in Java. On the other 
hand, quite a large number of cities in Java recorded rates of 
population growth of less than the overall Java average 
(approximately two percent) for the 1961-71 period (McNicoll 
and Mamas, 1973:29-32, 47).^
Of course the relatively high percentage of the non- 
agricultural labour force living in rural areas is 
partly the result of a large proportion of the total 
labour force living in rural areas.
However the differences between the provinces of Java were 
not large. The data appears to suggest that to the extent 
that the concentration of non-agricultural employment in 
rural areas is a reaction to conditions of rural poverty, 
this response has been relatively uniform throughout Java.
Only three of 14 outer island cities with populations of 
100,000 or more recorded growth rates of two percent or less 
and just on half achieved growth rates of three percent or 
more. This contrasts with 11 of the 15 Javanese cities which
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Table 4.2: Percentage of non-agricultural employment
in rural areas, 1976
Major sectors All non-
Region Manufac­
turing
Trade Trans­
port
Services agriculturalemployment^
Percentage of all non -agricultural employment
situated in rural areas
Central Java 88 81 74 68 80
Yogyakarta 88 67 47 65 74
West Java 81 84 66 69 78
East Java 73 80 59 62 72
All Java2 77 73 55 56 68
Outer Islands 80 62 52 54 62
Indonesia 77 70 54 56 66
Excludes 'other' 
Includes Jakarta
Source: SAKERNAS (1978):Tables 14.6-14.9
35
G i v e n  t h e  s lo w  r a t e  o f  g r o w t h  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  u r b a n
a r e a s  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  1 5 6 1 - 7 1 ,  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  e x p e c t  t h a t
e m p l o y m e n t  i n  u r b a n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  g row n v e r y
r a p i d l y  o v e r  t h i s  p e r i o d .  I n d e e d  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  r e c e n t  g r o w t h
i n  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  u r b a n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  h a s  h a d  l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on
t h e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  non  a g r i c u l t u r a l  w o rk  f o r c e  l i v i n g  i n  u r b a n  
1a r e a s .
3. S e a s o n a l i t y
S e a s o n a l  c h a n g e s  i n  e m p lo y m e n t  a n d  h o u r s  o f  w ork  a r e  a n o t h e r
2i m p o r t a n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  l a b o u r  m a r k e t s  i n  I n d o n e s i a .
3 ( c o n t i n u e d )
r e c o r d e d  g r o w t h  r a t e s  o f  tw o  p e r c e n t  o r  l e s s  an d  o n l y  tw o  
c i t i e s  ( J a k a r t a  and  S u r a b a y a )  w h i c h  r e g i s t e r e d  g r o w t h  r a t e s  
o f  t h r e e  p e r c e n t  o r  more ( M c N i c o l l  a n d  Mamas, 1 9 7 3 : 4 7 )  .
S u r p r i s i n g l y ,  t h e  1971 C e n s u s  r e c o r d e d  a d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  
a b s o l u t e  s i z e  o f  t h e  u r b a n  work  f o r c e  e m p l o y e d  i n  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g .  A l t h o u g h  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  u r b a n  
a r e a s  h a s  p r o b a b l y  grown q u i t e  s l o w l y ,  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  
i t  d e c l i n e d  o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 6 1 - 7 1 .  S e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  h e l p  
a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  u n e x p e c t e d  d e c l i n e  r e c o r d e d  i n  t h e  o f f i c i a l  
f i g u r e s .  C h an g e s  i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  e m p l o y m e n t  an d  i n  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s  i n  1971 c o u l d  h a v e  l e d  t o  
u n d e r s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  t h e  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  w ork  f o r c e  i n  b o t h  u r b a n  a n d  r u r a l  a r e a s  i n  
1 9 7 1 .  S undrum  (1975) h a s  a l s o  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  ' s p i l l o v e r '  o f  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  e m p lo y m e n t  i n t o  r u r a l  a r e a s  may h e l p  e x p l a i n  
t h e  p a t t e r n .  A n o t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n  may b e  f o u n d  i n  Hugo ( 1 9 7 8 :  
9 8 - 1 1 5 )  who s t r e s s e s  t h e  r o l e  o f  c o m m u t in g  a n d  c i r c u l a r  
m i g r a t i o n  i n  u r b a n  e m p lo y m e n t  p a t t e r n s  i n  W es t  J a v a .  I t  i s  
q u i t e  l i k e l y  t h a t ,  p a r t l y  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  t r a n s p c  
f a c i l i t i e s ,  t h e s e  p a t t e r n s  o f  e m p l o y m e n t  h a v e  i n c r e a s e d  
c o n s i d e r a b l y  s i n c e  1961 a n d  t h a t  many c o m m u te r s  a n d  c i r c u l a r  
m i g r a n t s  w e r e  e n u m e r a t e d  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s  ( o r  w e r e  a s s i g n e d  
b a c k  t o  r u r a l  a r e a s  b e c a u s e  o f  a s i x  m o n th  r u l e  o f  r e s i d e n c e ) .
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The o v e r a l l  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  s e a s o n a l i t y  on e m p l o y m e n t  p a t t e r n s  
may b e  s e e n  f r o m  (1) c o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  1971  C e n s u s  d a t a  on 
e m p lo y m e n t  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  i n  t h e  l a s t  week w i t h  e m p l o y m e n t  
r e c o r d e d  f o r  t h e  l a s t  s e a s o n ,  a n d  (2) c o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  
M arch  1976 SUPAS (busy  s e a s o n )  d a t a  on t h e  t o t a l  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p o p u l a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  S e p t e m b e r - D e c e m b e r  SAKERNAS ( s l a c k  
s e a s o n )  f i n d i n g s .  A l t h o u g h  c o m p a r i s o n s  o f  t h e s e  s o u r c e s  
s u f f e r  f r o m  s e v e r a l  d r a w b a c k s  b e c a u s e  o f  d a t a  p r o b l e m s  ( s e e  
a b o v e ) , t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  s e a s o n a l  c h a n g e s  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
e m p lo y m e n t  w h i c h  t h e y  r e c o r d  a r e  s o  l a r g e  t h a t  t h e y  l e a v e  no  
d o u b t  a s  t o  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  s e a s o n a l  l a b o u r  demand p a t t e r n s  
on e m p lo y m e n t  s t r u c t u r e  i n  I n d o n e s i a .
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The 1971 C e n s u s  q u e s t i o n  on w h e t h e r  r e s p o n d e n t s  h a d  w o r k e d  i n
a g r i c u l t u r e  i n  t h e  p a s t  s e a s o n  p r o v i d e s  t h e  b r o a d e s t  p o s s i b l e
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e m p l o y m e n t ;  r e s p o n s e s  t o  t h i s
q u e s t i o n  r e c o r d e d  a d r a m a t i c  50 p e r c e n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  work  f o r c e  i n  J a v a  c o m p a r e d  w i t h
t h e  n u m b e r  e m p l o y e d  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  one  week
r e f e r e n c e  p e r i o d . ' * '  The d a t a  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  s e a s o n a l i t y  i n
a g r i c u l t u r a l  e m p lo y m e n t  i s  much h i g h e r  i n  J a v a  t h a n  i n  t h e  
2
o u t e r  i s l a n d s .  T h i s  p r o b a b l y  r e f l e c t s  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  
s m a l l h o l d e r ,  a n n u a l  c r o p s  (w h ic h  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  s u f f e r  more  f r o m  
s e a s o n a l  p a t t e r n s  t h a n  e s t a t e  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  p e r e n n i a l s )  a n d  
a l s o  a much m ore  f l u i d  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  i n  J a v a .
S e v e r a l  p o i n t s  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e s e  s e a s o n a l  
p a t t e r n s .  F i r s t ,  a  l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  s e a s o n a l  
e m p lo y m e n t  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  c o n s i s t e d  o f  women. I n  a l l  c a s e s  
women a c c o u n t e d  f o r  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  6 0 - 7 0  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  
i n c r e a s e  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e m p lo y m e n t  ( y e t  women c o m p r i s e d  o n l y  
3 0 -4 0  p e r c e n t  o f  t o t a l  e m p lo y m e n t  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  i n  r e l a t i v e l y  
s l a c k  p e r i o d s ) . S e c o n d ,  i n  1971 n e a r l y  80 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
i n c r e a s e  i n  e m p lo y m e n t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  ' l a s t  s e a s o n '  q u e s t i o n  
w e re  n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  l a b o u r  f o r c e  a t  a l l  f o r  t h e  on e  week  
r e f e r e n c e  p e r i o d ;  t h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a h i g h  p r o p o r t i o n  w e r e  
p r o b a b l y  h o u s e w i v e s  and  t o  a l e s s  e x t e n t  s t u d e n t s  o r  w e r e  
c l a s s i f i e d  a s  ' o t h e r ' .  They w e re  n o t  e m p l o y e e s  p r e v i o u s l y
The d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  s l a c k  s e a s o n  S e p t e m b e r - D e c e m b e r  
an d  t h e  b u s y  s e a s o n  March 1976 e n u m e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  w o rk  f o r c e  was much s m a l l e r .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
t h e y  s u g g e s t  h i g h e r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  J a v a  o f  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  24 p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  b u s y  p e r i o d  M arch  ( 2 3 . 2  
m i l l i o n )  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  S e p t e m b e r  ( 1 8 . 6  m i l l i o n ) .
The p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  l a b o u r  f o r c e  r e c o r d e d  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  
i n  J a v a  i n  t h e  l a s t  s e a s o n  was f i f t y  p e r c e n t  h i g h e r  t h a n  
t h a t  r e c o r d e d  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  d u r i n g  t h e  one  week r e f e r e n c e  
p e r i o d .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  i n  t h e  o u t e r  i s l a n d s  t h e  r e c o r d e d  
i n c r e a s e  f o r  t h e  l a s t  s e a s o n  q u e s t i o n  was  l e s s  t h a n  25 
p e r c e n t  h i g h e r  t h a n  f o r  t h e  one  week r e f e r e n c e  p e r i o d .
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working in other sectors (Jones, 1978:20-2) . Finally, a high 
percentage of seasonal employees in agriculture appear to be 
unpaid family workers. Contrary to what one might assume, 
increased labour demand at certain periods in the agricultural 
cycle is not dominated by a marked increase in demand for wage 
labourers relative to other kinds of agricultural labour.^
One other important aspect of seasonality in labour demand 
in agriculture is the relative underutilisation of labour in 
slack periods. The contrast in hours worked in agriculture in 
the busy period in March 1976 compared to September-December 
1976 illustrates this point. In the relatively busy period of 
labour demand in March 1976 less than six percent of all 
agricultural workers were recorded as working less than 10 hours 
a week and 27 percent worked less than 25 hours; in September- 
December the proportion working less than 10 hours had almost 
tripled and almost 40 percent worked less than 25 hours 
(Indonesia, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1978a:Table 16;
1978b:Tables 5.7-5.9) .
4. Underutilisation of Urban and Rural Labour
Underutilisation of labour is one salient feature of 
labour markets in LDCs and particularly in overpopulated, 
labour surplus economies. In many LDCs there is a familiar 
pattern of relatively high rates of open unemployment in urban 
areas and underemployment in rural areas (Turnham, 1971) . This 
pattern is also found in Indonesia and particularly in Java.
Here we will examine some dimensions of these problems with 
special reference to conditions in Java.
Open unemployment is considerably higher in urban than in 
rural areas in Indonesia as a whole and also in Java. In 1976
Although as we shall see in later chapters, seasonal demand 
for labour in agriculture had quite a marked effect on the 
supply of labour available for employment in segments of the 
weaving and kretek industries.
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overall unemployment in urban areas was recorded at 5-6 percent
with males registering rates of unemployment closer to 7
percent and females much lower rates. Although
these unemployment rates were well above those recorded for
2rural areas, they were not high by LDC standards. The rather
modest levels of unemployment in urban areas especially in Java
may in part be the result of the very generous definition of
3employment used in both 1976 surveys. But they may reflect 
also a wider range of 'informal' sector earning opportunities 
in Java's cities compared with many other Third World cities 
especially in Africa and the Pacific Islands.
Unemployment was not distributed evenly within the 
provinces of Java. Paradoxically, higher rates tended to 
prevail in the more rapidly growing regions of Jakarta, 4West Java and East Java than in Central Java and Yogyakarta.
The urban unemployment rates recorded in the 1976 intercensal 
survey in the relatively busy season (March) were slightly 
lower (5.5 percent for both sexes for all Indonesia) than 
recorded in the relatively slack months of September- 
December but the difference was small.
Owing to differences in definitions and in the months and 
years of coverage, international comparisons of unemployment 
are likely to be of limited usefulness. Nevertheless, 
bearing these shortcomings in mind, we mention data from 
several countries to place the Indonesian figures in some 
international perspective. Several countries (India, 
Thailand, Taiwan) have recorded urban unemployment rates of 
less than five percent but in several others rates of 10-15 
percent are more common in urban areas. For example, the 
Philippines recorded rates of 10.8 percent (including 12.4 
percent for males) in 1972, Malaysian unemployment was 11.6 
in metropolitan towns (1967) and Sri Lanka recorded rates 
of as high as 15 percent for all urban areas (1969) (ILO, 
1974:6; Turnham, 1971:49, 57).
Respondents were enumerated as unemployed if they worked at 
least one hour in the reference week.
In September-December 1976 urban areas in West Java recorded 
the highest rates (6.7 percent) followed by East Java (6.4 
percent) and Jakarta (6.1 percent); these regions contrasted 
with the lower rates for Central Java (4.5 percent) and 
Yogyakarta (3.7 percent). The 1972 labour force survey found 
considerably higher' unemployment rates in the three major 
cities of Java (Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya) than recorded 
for urban areas in any province of Java in 1976. According
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The difference between various urban areas of Java may partly 
be explained by the higher proportion of more educated people 
in these cities (unemployment rates tended to be higher among 
the more educated, see below). But it probably also reflects 
the greater willingness of the urban population (and rural 
urban migrants) to endure open unemployment in the hope of 
obtaining a high paying urban job sometime in the future. Thus 
a very superficial overview would tend to suggest that the 
Harris-Todaro model of rural urban migration may help to explain 
differential rates of unemployment in urban areas in Java.
Underemployment (measured by hours of work) does not appear
to have been a major problem in Java's cities. In September -
December 1976 only 7.6 percent of the urban workforce were
employed for less than 25 hours a week. Indeed long hours of
work were recorded by a much higher percentage of urban
employees: nearly 30 percent of Java's urban employees worked
60 hours or more during the reference week (Table 4.3).^ This
pattern of long hours of work was much more marked in Java than
in the outer islands. In Java there are probably greater
opportunities than in most outer island provinces for relatively
2low paid jobs with long hours of work in the informal sector.
1 (continued)
to this survey, unemployment rates were 14 percent in Bandung, 
12 percent in Jakarta and 9 percent in Surabaya (Lembaga 
Demografi, Universitas Indonesia, 1974:16). The large 
difference with the 1976 figures is partly accounted for by 
the broader definition of employment used in 1972 which 
covered a minimum of two days work in the reference week.
Although there were not marked differences in hours worked in 
towns in the various provinces of Java, the capital Jakarta 
recorded slightly lower underemployment and also a slightly 
smaller percentage of persons working long hours. As might 
be expected, the relatively poor region of Central Java 
recorded the highest proportion (31 percent) of employees 
working 60 hours or more a week.
2 The 1972 survey of Java's three major cities supports these 
findings of long hours of work in Java's urban areas. It 
found that 29 percent of the employed work force in Jakarta 
and Bandung and 23 .percent of Surabaya's urban employed worked 
more than 60 hours a week (Lembaga Demografi, Universitas 
Indonesia, 1974:33). In all three cities the highest
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Table 4.3: Hours of work a week in urban areas, Java and
the Outer Islands, Sept.-Dec.1976
Hours 
of work
Male Female Both sexes
Percentages
Java
< 25 5.4 12.6 7.6
25-34 7.0 10.4 8.0
35-59 62 . 3 44.9 56.9
60 + 25.3 32.1 27.5
Total 100 100 100
Outer Islands
< 25 6.6 17.8 9.3
25-34 9.2 18.6 11.5
35-39 63.6 48.8 59.9
60 + 20.6 15.0 19.3
Total 100 100 100
All Indonesia
< 25 5.8 14.0 8.3
25-34 7.8 12.8 9.2
35-39 62.8 46.1 57.9
60 + 23.6 27.1 24.6
Total 100 100 100
Source: SAKERNAS (1978) :Tables 15.1-15.9
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The characteristics of the urban unemployed in Indonesia 
were also similar to those reported in other countries (Turnham, 
1971:47-56). A high percentage of all unemployment occurs in 
the 10-24 and to a lesser extent the 25-29 age groups. In 
these two age groups unemployment was much higher for both 
males and females than for any other age group. In September- 
December 1976 the age group 15-24 accounted for approximately 
75 percent of all unemployment in urban areas (Indonesia,
Central Bureau of Statistics 1978b:Table 6.1). Unemployment 
rates were also much higher for the secondary educated in 
urban areas than for those with primary or less than primary 
education.^ Poorer, uneducated and older workers with 
families cannot afford the luxury of unemployment in most 
LDCs •
Several other dimensions of the problem of surplus 
labour in Java's cities cannot easily be quantified.
Several writers have drawn attention to the importance of 
rural urban links for many employees living in both urban 
and rural areas. (See especially Hugo, 1977, 1978; Papanek, 
1974; Temple, 1975; Jellinek, 1978a.) It appears that employment 
through commuting and circular migration is a major source of 
income especially of people living in villages close to the 
major cities or for others who are prepared (or forced) 
to leave their villages in search of jobs. Incomes earned
2 (continued)
proportion of employees working long hours was recorded 
among own account workers and unpaid family workers. These 
groups are most likely to be found in informal sector 
activities.
1 Jones has observed that the cut off point tends to
come at the level of completed primary education above 
which unemployment rates rise considerably, especially 
for the lower and upper secondary educated (Jones, 1978: 
23-4).
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by these urban workers appear to make a major contribution to 
the welfare of their families living in rural areas.^ Improved 
transport facilities have probably increased the possibility 
of rural people earning incomes in larger cities. Nevertheless 
the majority of rural households has probably been little 
affected by new income earning activities in urban areas.
As has been mentioned above, patterns of rural 
underutilisation of labour differ considerably from those 
in urban areas. Rates of rural unemployment recorded in 
SAKERNAS in 1976 were only one-two percent in both Java and 
the outer islands. However approximately 20-22 percent of 
the rural employed worked less than 25 hours a week and 
36-40 percent worked less than 35 hours. A much smaller 
percentage of the employed in rural areas worked long hours 
compared with hours of work recorded in urban areas.
Overall it appears that underutilisation of manpower was
a much more serious problem in rural than in urban areas.
In Table 4.4 we have computed a summary measure of rural
2underutilisation. Overall rates of underutilisation were 22 
percent for males and a much higher 37 percent for females if
Hugo (1978:264-76) found that 30 percent of all income 
earned by circular migrants in West Java was spent on 
remittances to their families in rural areas and that 
these payments contributed approximately half of all 
household income in the recipient households. The 
contribution of permanent migrants to their families 
who remained in the village was smaller (though still 
quite substantial) and that of commuters understandably 
slightly higher. See also Papanek (1974:17- 8) and 
Jellinek (1978a:152).
In addition to the unemployed and underemployed, data 
on the proportion of the work force recorded as temporarily 
not working are also included in Table 4.4. In rural 
areas this figure probably includes many of the 
seasonally unemployed.2 The proportion of the workforce 
temporarily unemployed is very much higher than the percentage 
recorded as unemployed but much smaller than the percentage of
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Table 4.4: Unemployment; temporary unemployment and
underemployment in rural areas in Java, 
Sept.-Dec. 1976
Unemploymen t/unde remploymen t Male Female Both sexes
Percentage of labour force
Unemployment 1.6 1.0 1.3
2Temporarily unemployed 6.1 8.3 6.9
Underemployed:
< 25 hours work 14.3 27.8 20.8
Sub total I 22.0 37.1 29.0
Underemployed:
25 - < 35 hours 12.6 17.7 15.7
Sub total II 34.6 54.8 44.7
Normally employed persons temporarily not working because 
of leave, sickness, temporary closure of enterprise etc.
Source: SAKERNAS (1978) :Tables 11.1-11.9, 15.1-15.9
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less than 25 hours is used as the measure of underemployment; 
it was substantially higher if all those working less than 35 
hours were recorded as underemployed. ^
In this section we have attempted to describe the major 
characteristics of labour surplus in Indonesia and especially 
in densely populated Java. Such a task has been made more 
difficult both by the inadequacies of macro labour force data in 
Indonesia and, more importantly, by the shortcomings of macro
odata in adequately describing patterns of labour underutilisation.
Despite these shortcomings, we can conclude 
that all major indicators - population density, the sectoral 
pattern of employment, rates of unemployment and underemployment - 
point to a relative abundance of unskilled labour especially in 
Java.
2 (continued)
the rural labour force working low hours. It should also be 
noted that the percentage of the labour force recorded as 
temporarily out of work was much smaller in urban areas. Given 
the more formal nature of many employment relationships in 
urban areas it is likely that this figure includes quite a 
high proportion of persons on leave (either annual leave, 
special leave or leave owing to sickness) in urban areas.
Data from the LEKNAS 1976 survey of labour utilisation in 
three urban and rural locations in Java support these overall 
findings. Over half the surveyed males and over 70 percent of t. 
females in rural areas were recorded as underutilised 
according to at least one of three criteria of labour 
underutilisation (unemployment, insufficient hours of work 
and insufficient income) used in the study (Redmana et_al., 1977 
104-5). Whereas relatively high rates of open unemployment 
were a major factor contributing to underutilisation in urban 
areas, low hours of work had a much greater influence on overall 
rates of underutilisation in rural areas; over 20 percent of 
underutilisation of males and females in rural areas occurred 
because of low hours of work alone.
The problems of comparability of data between countries and 
reliability of data on labour force and unemployment are 
discussed in Turnham (1971:25-7, 41-7).
2
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In addition we have identified three major divisions 
within the labour market which are likely to be particularly 
relevant to this study of labour markets and wages. There were 
sharp differences especially in labour utilisation (1) between 
rural and urban areas (2) between various regions in Indonesia 
and within Java and (3) between males and females. The 
differences between rural and urban areas were particularly 
marked. Temporary unemployment and seasonal variation in hours 
of work and incomes, underemployment and even low incomes are 
all much more severe problems for the rural population than for 
urban dwellers. Although this study is principally concerned 
with the wage structure of urban workers, the rural sector is a 
major influence on the supply price of labour in urban areas and 
provides the Pressure for urban and manufacturing jobs.^ In 
the last section of this chapter we will look specifically at 
the nature of urban rural, interregional and male female wage 
differentials associated with the contrasting patterns of 
labour utilisation described in this section.
5. Shortage of Skilled and Professional Manpower
The relative scarcity of skilled and professional 
manpower is particularly relevant to the existence of wage 
differentials within the manufacturing sector. It was largely 
the result of policies adopted by the colonial government but 
has been greatly exacerbated by recent rapid economic growth 
and the inflow of new technology into Indonesia.
Because of data deficiencies it is difficult to document 
the extent to which there are shortages of skilled and 
professional manpower in Indonesia. This problem has been
a continuing theme in studies of the Indonesian labour market 
since independence. The situation has probably worsened in a 
number of 'modern' sector occupations since 1967. We will 
briefly note the dimensions of this problem.
1 See the discussion of the Lewis model in Chapter Two.
96
The shortage of skilled manpower was exacerbated in the 
colonial period by policies followed by the Dutch government. 
Employment in skilled and professional jobs in the private 
sector were monopolised by Europeans (or Eurasians) until the 
end of the colonial era in Indonesia. Less than 20 percent of 
all upper level jobs (earning more than 100 guilders a month) 
were held by Indonesians and only 6 percent of the most senior 
jobs were held by Indonesians in the late 1920s (Kahin, 1952:30,35) 
Expansion of Western education opportunities increased the 
proportion of Indonesians in the public service especially in 
the 1930s* But at middle and upper levels they were unable to 
compete with Europeans (and Eurasians) who held almost 
60 percent of middle level positions and over 90 percent of 
higher positions in 1938. On the estates Indonesians held 
lower administrative positions, learned trades as carpenters, 
mechanics and stonemasons. Some were appointed as foremen 
but very few Indonesians performed professional, supervisory 
or managerial jobs (Wertheim, 1956:209-10). The Dutch did 
attempt to expand technical training opportunities for 
Indonesians in the final years of colonial rule. But there were 
few opportunities for employment of graduates Furnival points 
out that such attempts were doomed to failure because of the 
failure of the Dutch government to promote modern sector 
development on a scale to absorb new graduates (Furnival, 1939: 
372-4).1
Large wage differentials by skill level in some 
sectors give some indication of the relative scarcity of 
skilled manpower in Java. On estates the differential was 
only 2.0-2.5:1.0 between skilled and supervisory manpower and 
unskilled labour (Coolie Budget Commission, 1956:68-9). But 
in Batavia skilled manpower earned approximately three times
Despite quite a marked expansion of modern sector employment 
opportunities after 1935, skilled Indonesians still had to 
compete with Dutch, Eurasian and Chinese employees;
Europeans were preferred by employers both in the private 
and public sectors (Kahin, 1952:33).
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the wages of unskilled workers, and in Madura the differential 
was as large as 5:1 for some categories of skilled worker 
(NEI Central Bureau of Statistics, 1958:92-3; Pillai, 1947:
180-1) . These differentials were similar to (or even a little 
larger than) differentials in other LDCs (Taira, 1966:286-7; 
Turner, 1965:16).
The exodus of Dutch and Eurasian employees, government 
spending on public works and construction, and efforts to 
stimulate Indonesian businesses all must have put upward 
pressure on the wages of skilled employees in the early 
independence period. Hawkins records skill differentials in 
various sectors of the economy of 3-4:1 in the 1950s (Hawkins, 
1962:109-10). The expansion of schooling, especially of 
technical schooling and tertiary education, may have tended 
to counter forces which widened differentials in the 1950s.
But the nationalisation of Dutch businesses and later of other 
foreign interests in Indonesia exacerbated the problem of 
shortages of skilled manpower. Both Lim (1962) and Hasibuan 
(1962:38) report that shortages of skilled manpower, especially 
of supervisory and managerial staff with appropriate experience 
and education, were a major problem on East Sumatran estates 
after nationalisation in 1957. Glassburner (1965:189) has noted 
the small proportion of the population that had received 
tertiary education in Indonesia by the early 1960s compared with 
several other LDCs. Government attempts to reduce skill 
differentials, the decline of real wages during hyperinflation 
and the increased welfare orientation of the wage system (which 
also tended to reduce differentials) must have all tended to 
further contribute to shortages of skilled labour during the 
late 1950s and early 1960s.^
1 The 1959 salary regulations covering all estate workers 
aimed at reducing skill differentials (Lim, 1962:12-3).
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Since 1965 it is likely that differentials for skill, at 
least in the modern sector, have tended to widen. New investment 
in a wide variety of fields has brought a rapid increase in the 
demand for skilled labour. Scanty information from a variety of 
sources suggest that skill differentials continue to be 3-4:1 
in the private sector of the economy. Acute shortages of 
highly skilled manpower - accountants, secretaries, specialist 
engineers - has probably contributed to greater inequalities 
between various groups of wage earners.^ Difficulties in the 
recruitment of employees by large scale firms appear to have 
been most acute for technical, managerial and professional 
employees (ILO and Indonesia. Dept, of Manpower, 1975:36-7).
A conference on problems of manpower in Indonesia in 1972 
reported a shortage of a wide range of semi skilled and skilled 
manpower (carpenters, bricklayers, mechanics, draughtsmen) and 
professionals (surveyers, designers, architects, civil engineers). 
(Dinar Harapan, 27/7/72:14).^ The problem is of both 
a qualitative and quantitative nature. The 1972 ARTEP report 
notes that low qualifications and the low quality of training 
received by skilled workers further contributes to the shortage 
(ARTEP, 1972:37-8). This helps explain the very high premium 
captured by skilled employees or professionals trained abroad 
or with international experience.
II. Changes in Labour Demand Patterns since 1965
The wage structure in Indonesia has been greatly influenced 
by the nature of labour demand patterns that have emerged since
A recent government report (1977) quotes from a Business 
International report that qualified managers, entrepreneurs 
and secretarial and accounting personnel are all in short 
supply. As a result wages of skilled staff are, according to 
the report, 'surprisingly high, even by international standards
The conference recommended training of vocational graduates 
in firms, more vocational courses for SLA and SD graduates 
and the establishment of a vocational training institute.
2
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1965. Since these labour demand patterns play a central role 
in the analysis of wage differentials in this thesis, it is 
necessary to summarise the main dimensions of recent economic 
change and to set them in the context of the existing economic 
structure especially in the manufacturing sector.
The major dimensions of Indonesia's economic recovery and 
growth since 1965 need be only briefly mentioned here.^ Following 
a period of falling incomes and output in the period 1950-1965, 
national income rose by 6-8 percent (all rates in real terms) 
annually in the following decade. Manufacturing output, mainly 
directed towards import substitution, increased by approximately 
eight percent a year in the 1965-70 period and a much higher 15 
percent in the following five years. Mining output rose even 
faster and increased from less than 3 percent in GDP in 1968 to 
nearly 20 percent in the mid-1970s; the latter was achieved 
partly by large increases in production and exports of oil and 
other major minerals but it was also partly the result of the 
boom in oil prices in the early 1970s.
These very rapid rates of growth compared with previous 
periods were associated with a dramatic increase in the share of 
investment as a proportion of GDP from approximately 5 to 20 
percent. The rise in the investment/GDP ratio has partly been 
the result of rapid inflow of foreign private investment since 
1967; these flows have been particularly significant in 
manufacturing (especially textiles and chemicals), minerals and 
forestry (McCawley, 1979:11). But relatively stable prices, 
easier credit and protection have also stimulated domestic 
investment which has grown rapidly in modern manufacturing since 
the domestic investment law came into force in 1968.
It is important to note, especially for the study of 
labour markets, that the new investment has been highly 
concentrated geographically. Jakarta has been the major
The details of economic changes in the New Order period have 
been summarised by McCawley (1978) and in various surveys of 
recent developments in the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies.
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recipient of new foreign and domestic investment; just under 
one-third of foreign investment projects and 27 percent of 
domestic investment under the domestic investment law have been 
located in the capital (McCawley and Manning, 1976:36).^ Jakarta 
and West Java together received approximately 50 percent of all 
these new investment projects, a further 20 percent going to 
the other two provinces of Java and approximately 30 percent 
going to the Outer Islands of Indonesia. Jakarta and Java's 
share of manufacturing investment is even higher as almost all 
new investments in mining and forestry are located in the 
Outer Islands and there has been little new manufacturing 
investment in most of these regions. The Java-Outer Islands 
contrast in manufacturing development is both a reflection of 
concentration of consumer demand and better infrastructure, and 
also a relative labour surplus in Java. In all three major 
categories of industrial workers - large and medium, small and 
cottage industries - Java has considerably more employees in 
manufacturing relative to its population than any of the major 
Outer Islands (McCawley, 1979:20-1.)^ McCawley (1979:19) 
concludes that in most provinces in the outer islands 'there 
is hardly any modern industrialisation to speak of at all'.
Not only has the modern sector grown considerably since 
1965 but the character of dualism has changed. Paauw's 
description of the modern sector mainly consisting of plantation 
agriculture and mining is no longer apt (Paauw, 1963:172). 
Enclave investment in oil, mining and timber has become much 
more important to the economy than in the 1950s and 1960s. But 
foreign investment now also plays a major role in banking and 
in the services sector. More relevant to this study, foreign
It should be noted that all figures on foreign investment 
exclude the important oil and banking sectors.
Even in the large and medium category the proportion of the 
population engaged in manufacturing compared with total 
population was over six times higher in Java than in Sumatra 
and Kalimantan, and 17 times higher in Java than in Sulawesi 
(McCawley, 1979:22).
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investment and technology now play an important role in 
manufacturing especially in the major cities in Java. The 
new investment has brought modern technology into established 
sectors such as weaving, batik (printing) and rubber (crumb 
rubber), and has also flowed into a wide range of newer, 
relatively capital intensive (by Indonesian standards) 
activities.
Despite these differential rates of growth between 
relatively modern and more traditional industries, a high 
proportion of the manufacturing work force continues to be 
employed in the more traditional and agricultural based 
industries. In the large and medium scale sector, the seven 
traditional and agricultural industries mentioned above 
(including more capital intensive investment in weaving, batik 
and rubber) accounted for just under half of all employment 
in Indonesia and 55 percent of employment in Java in 1974-75 
(McCawley, 1979:26).
The importance of traditional labour-intensive activities
in the manufacturing sector is apparent from the very high
proportion of the manufacturing work force concentrated in
cottage industries. In 1974-75 the various industrial surveys
found that just under 80 percent of the manufacturing work force
was in cottage industries, seven percent in small scale
establishments and only 13.5 percent in large and medium
2establishments. Cottage industry was heavily concentrated
The direction of the investment may be seen by the quite 
dramatic increase in production of selected industrial 
products in metals and machinery (especially batteries, light 
bulbs and assembly of cars, motor cycles, and TV sets), 20-30 
percent annual growth rates of major chemicals (fertiliser, 
cement, paper, tyres) and quite rapid increases in yarn and 
cloth production (McCawley, 1979:8). However growth has been 
much slower in traditional industries such as kretek, batik 
and small mechanised or non-mechanised weaving, and in the 
agricultural based industries - tobacco, rubber and tea.
The official definitions are as follows: large and medium cover 
firms with 20 or more employees, small covers those with 5-19 
employees and cottage industries include firms with less than 
five employees.
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in Java where just over two-thirds of the work force was 
employed in three industries - bamboo and rattan, coconut 
sugar and tahu and tempe (soya bean cakes) (McCawley, 1979:
25-8).^ These figures are consistent with concentration of 
the manufacturing labour force in rural areas and the relatively 
high proportion of females employed in rural manufacturing. 
According to the intercensal labour force survey over 80 percent 
of the manufacturing labour force was concentrated in rural 
areas and slightly over half of these were female.
Thus modern manufacturing has been grafted onto a largely 
traditional, labour-intensive and low productivity manufacturing 
sector. The much larger modern manufacturing sector and the 
greater range in technology in manufacturing has contributed to 
a more dualistic structure compared with before 1965. However 
even with the reasonably rapid growth rates of modern manufacturing 
employment, the size of the work force in modern industries will 
continue to be much smaller than employment in traditional 
activities for many years. Moreover the impact of modern sector 
manufacturing development on overall employment structure and 
conditions of labour surplus especially on Java has not been 
large. As we have seen in the first part of this chapter, 
absolute employment has continued to rise in the overcrowded 
agricultural sector and the proportion of the labour force in 
total manufacturing has risen only slightly over the past decade.
The labour demand and supply patterns described above and 
in Section I of this chapter would be expected to exert opposing 
influences on the level and structure of wages. Rapid increases 
in labour demand in certain sectors and locations would be 
expected, at least in the short run, to widen interfirm wage 
differentials. On the other hand continuing labour surplus
These three industries alone account for just on half 
of total manufacturing employment in Indonesia and 
probably a slightly higher proportion of Java's work 
force.
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is likely to provide a dampening effect on any wage increases, 
especially of unskilled labour. The extent to which the latter 
is effective in reducing interregional, intersectoral and 
interindustry differentials will depend, of course, on mobility 
within the labour market, and the extent to which labour demand 
patterns respond to labour market conditions.
In the following sections of this chapter we make use of 
secondary wage data to indicate the relative influence of some 
of these forces of supply and demand on the overall wage 
structure. In the next section intersectoral, interindustry 
and interfirm wage structure will be examined. We will then 
look briefly at forms of wage payment and in the final section 
at the influence of location and sex on wage structure.
Ill. The Structure of Wages
Several sources suggest that there is a wide range in wages 
between various sectors and between industries in the 
manufacturing sector in Indonesia. In the literature on wage 
differentials in Indonesia and in LDCs three major explanations 
are usually given for these large and often bewildering 
differentials. First, they are attributed to imperfections 
in the labour market, chiefly to slow and imperfect supply 
response owing to poor communications, imperfect knowledge and 
relative immobility of sections of the work force. The latter 
in particular may be influenced by familial, ethnic and other 
social forces influencing recruitment and labour allocation 
(Leiserson, 1974:349). Second, they are explained by the 
different rates of growth and differences in the nature of 
labour demand in various sectors of the economy and in different 
types of firm. Finally, some of the large variations have been 
accounted for by the low quality of data and research in the 
field of wages. In most countries accurate wage data are 
extremely difficult to obtain. In Indonesia this problem is
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compounded by the plethora of allowances and fringe benefits made 
available to workers, and the poor quality of much of the research 
that has been carried out in this field.^
In this section we examine the degree to which different 
demand patterns by sector and industry play a role in determining 
wage differentials. There is some evidence that imperfections 
and social constraints on the supply of labour have affected the 
wage structure. But overall it appears that labour supply is 
responsive to wage differentials and job opportunities. 
Unfortunately most studies of wages do not provide sufficient 
information on the skills of employees and other characteristics 
of firms which might enable an examination of the importance of 
demand factors. Some data on wage differentials by ownership 
group suggest that foreign investment does have a major influence
Secondary wage data present two major problems. First, the 
coverage of various allowances, payments in kind, bonuses, 
overtime and the value of facilities provided by firms varies 
considerably from one source of data to the next; even for the 
same survey the anomalies in data suggest that in many cases 
individual firms have reported these items differently. The 
problem is likely to be greater for large scale surveys and 
for those that collect data on a wide range of occupational 
differentials. Given the great variation between firms in 
the proportion of total wages paid in the form of basic rates, 
allowances and other fringe benefits (see below), differentials 
within and between samples need to be interpreted with 
considerable care. Second, data collected regularly by the 
Department of Manpower and in various surveys are often based 
on quite different samples and tend to exhibit certain biases 
in the samples chosen. Wage data collected regularly by the 
Department of Manpower provincial offices and compiled in 
Jakarta appear to vary greatly in their coverage - some include 
only domestic owned firms, others include a high proportion of 
foreign enterprises. Almost all surveys tend to be biased 
towards larger firms in urban areas and few make their 
sampling methods explicit. An appendix to this chapter gives 
details of the various sources of wage data used and the 
shortcomings of each.
This task was made difficult by the poor quality of much of 
the secondary data on wages. We attempted to guard against 
inconsistancies in the data and the biased or inadequate 
coverage of wage surveys by looking at all possible sources 
on a particular subject.
105
on wage structure but we are unable to take the analysis much 
further than this. This task will be taken up in the analysis 
of micro data in later chapters.
1. Intersectoral Wage Differentials
There are quite large intersectoral wage differentials 
in Indonesia. Several sources indicate that wages in 
agriculture are considerably lower than in other sectors 
of the economy. On the other hand, wages in mining and, 
to a lesser extent, in banking and finance are much higher 
than in other sectors. The differentials generally conform 
with the experience of other countries (Berg, 1969) and with 
what might be expected from the discussion of rural urban 
differences in employment patterns in the first section of 
this chapter.
In Table 4.5 we present minimum wage data from a sample of 
large scale, 'modern' sector firms which indicate the extent 
of these intersectoral wage differentials for 1970/71 and 
1975/76.^ By far the highest minimum wage for the two periods 
in question was recorded in the mining sector. The lowest was 
recorded in the agricultural estates sector. The differentials 
between agriculture and several other sectors (trade and banking, 
communications, services, manufacturing and construction) were 
lower than for mining but still ranged from 2-4:1 in the two 
periods.^
The data are collected by the Dept, of Manpower from a 
small sample of large scale firms (many of which were 
foreign owned) with the intention of showing short run 
changes in wages over time. They give some indication 
of modern sector wages but are not representative of the 
economy as a whole.
As might be expected, differentials in minimum wages 
within sectors were quite large even for this group of 
modern sector firms. Unpublished data collected by the 
Dept, of Manpower from a similar sample of firms 
recorded intrasectoral differentials in minimum wages 
of over 3:1 in banking, approximately 2:1 in mining, 
manufacturing, services and communications, and lower 
differentials in other sectors.
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The Table suggests that there have been some major changes
in the intersectoral wage structure over the five year period.^
With the exception of the mining sector, differentials between
estates and all other sectors widened considerably over this 
2period. These changes in intersectoral wage differentials 
accord with our general knowledge of changes in the economy 
over this period. New foreign and domestic investment 
especially in banking, manufacturing and services have probably 
greatly contributed to widening wage differentials relative to 
agriculture. Very large increases in the cash components of 
civil service salaries (these increased almost tenfold over the 
period 1969-75 for lowest paid civil servants) explain the great 
improvement in the relative wage position of civil servants 
(Booth and Glassburner, 1975:19).
The contrast between the wages of agricultural
employees and those engaged in other sectors is quite marked
even when data are broken down by rural and urban locations.
Data on incomes of male employees in Table 4.6 show that a much
higher proportion of agricultural workers earn low incomes
3than rural workers in other sectors. Over 40 percent of 
agricultural workers earned Rp 5,000 or less compared with 
21 percent in rural trade, 17 percent in rural manufacturing 
and closer to 10 percent in rural construction and transport.
The period 1970/71-1975/76 is particularly important in 
terms of expansion of labour demand in the modern sector 
of the economy; many of the new foreign and domestic 
investment projects began operation during this period.
In the case of communications, services and manufacturing, 
differentials appear to have widened by nearly 50 percent: 
from just over 2:1 to approximately 3:1. The largest 
increases in these differentials relative to the estate 
sector were recorded in trade and banking and in the civil 
services. In both these latter sectors money wages had 
increased by approximately 250 percent over the five year 
period.
Data for males only are presented in the table in order to 
eliminate the influence of a high incidence of part-time 
and low hours of work among females, especially in rural 
areas.
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The table also shows that a much smaller percentage of 
agricultural workers earned high incomes. Only 13 percent 
of agricultural workers earned more than Rp 10,000 compared 
with a range of approximately 36-50 percent in these other 
sectors.^
Overall, the picture that emerges from the data on 
intersectoral wage differentials broadly conforms with what 
we might expect. Wages were high in the relatively capital- 
intensive minerals industry, roughly in the middle of the range 
(although with considerable variation between firms) in 
manufacturing and much lower in agriculture. Skill differentials 
probably have a considerable influence on these differences.
But it is also likely labour supply conditions are much more 
important in determining wages of unskilled labour in 
agriculture than in the other sectors. In the next section 
we shall see that much lower wages are recorded in certain 
agricultural based industries than in the manufacturing sector 
as a whole. This is an indication of the relatively unskilled 
nature of many of these operations and their integration with the 
'mass' labour market particularly on Java.
2. Manufacturing Sector Wages
Given both the overwhelming concentration of the labour 
force in traditional manufacturing industries and the recent 
rapid growth in production in several modern sector activities, 
it is reasonable to expect a relatively wide dispersion of wages 
in manufacturing industries in Indonesia. This is broadly 
confirmed by wage data collected in the Census of Manufacturing 
Establishments of 1974-75. The differential between the highest 
(beverages) and lowest (tobacco) wage industries was just under 
5:1 (Table 4.7). High wages were recorded in several industries 
that have been major targets for new foreign and domestic
It could be suggested that these differentials might be 
exaggerated because of seasonal patterns of underemployment 
in agriculture. However, since the intercensal survey was 
carried out in May (which is a major rice harvesting month in 
in Java) it is unlikely that the differentials are overstated 
because of seasonality factors.
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Table 4.7: Average monthly wages of large and medium 
establishments in major industries, 
Indonesia, 1974-7 5^
No. of 
establish­
ments
No. of 
employ­
ees (000)
Average 
monthly 
Wage (RpOOO)
Index 
(Beverages 
= 100)
Beverages 60 4.7 22.1 100
Footwear 31 5.0 17.3 78
Transport machinery 112 14.5 17.3 78
Electrical machinery 66 12.2 16.4 74
Other chemicals 228 24.0 15.3 69
Cement and lime 216 11.3 14.4 65
Glass 50 5.1 13.5 61
Wood & wood 
products 322 18.9 12.7 57
Furniture 85 3.3 12.3 56
Paper & paper 
products 60 7.2 12.2 55
Machinery 68 7.3 12.2 55
Metal products 259 23.2 11.8 53
Industrial chemicals 66 4.7 11.0 50
Rubber & rubber 
products 468 45.7 10.2 46
Printing 229 14.6 9.1 41
Foodstuffs 1,538 136.0 8.1 37
Plastics 137 9.2 7.0 36
Wearing apparel 72 2.5 7.5 34
Leather 27 1.5 7.5 34
Ceramics 20 1.0 7.4 34
Textiles 1,936 162.4 7.2 32
Struct.clay products 194 6.7 6.0 27
Tobacco products 769 127.6 4.8 22
All industries 7,091 655,821 8.92 40
SD 4.3
 ^ Includes payments 
pension and other
in kind but excludes 
contributions.
overtime, annual bonuses
2 Unweighted mean Rp 11,484.
Source: Indonesia, Industrial Census, 1974-75.
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investment. These include beverages, transport and electrical 
machinery, other chemicals (pharmaceuticals, cosmetics), cement 
and glass.'*' At the other extreme, wages were relatively low 
in two of the large traditional industries - tobacco and 
textiles - which account for over 40 percent of all employees 
in large and medium manufacturing.
It is also reasonable to expect that the dispersion of
the wage structure may have increased compared with the pre-1965
period. Although data for the 1963 Industrial Census are not
directly comparable with the 1974-75 data, we have made a rough
2comparison of the structure of wages recorded in both. The 
data suggest that there probably was an increase in the 
variability in interindustry wages over the period. The 
coefficient of variation increased from 0.30 to 0.36 (Table
34.8). Several industries (beverages, transport machinery, 
electrical machinery, foodstuffs, tobacco and textiles) retained 
their rank as relatively high or low wage industries. However 
there was an improvement in relative position of several 
industries (for example chemicals) which have grown considerably 
over the period. Several other industries (textiles, wearing 
apparel, non metallic minerals, transport and electrical 
machinery) recorded above average wage increases over the period 
1963-1974. On the other hand several industries (printing, 
leather goods and tobacco) that do not appear to have been 
greatly affected by the new investment, fell in relative
1 However relatively high wage industries covered only a small 
proportion of the large and medium sector work force. Less 
than 10 percent of employees were in the top five industries 
with average monthly wages of Rp 15,000 or more and less than 
20 percent were in the top 11 (just under half of all 
industries) with average wages of over Rp 12,000.
 ^ The definition of large and medium size firms was narrowed in 
1974-75 to include only firms with 20 or more employees. 
Previously this group had included non-mechanised firms with 
10 or more employees and mechanised firms with five or more 
workers.
3 Given that the 1974-75 data covered a smaller range in terms of 
size of firm (owing to changes in the definition of large and 
medium), these figures probably understate the increases in 
dispersion over the period..
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Table 4.8: Average monthly wages in major manufacturing
Industries, 1963-1974/75 (RpOOO)7
19632 1974-75
Monthly
wages
Monthly
wages
Rank
Machinery 5.7 12.2 10
Beverages 5.2 22.1 1
Printing 4.5 9.1 14
Transport machinery 4.3 17.3 3
Leather goods 4.1 7.5 16
Electrical machinery 3.7 16.4 4
Wood & wood products 3.6 12.7 7
Rubber 5.6 10.2 13
Paper 3.6 12.2 9
Metals 3.6 11.8 11
Chemicals 3.4 14.6 5
Furniture 3.0 12.3 8
Foodstuffs 3.0 8.1 15
Wearing apparel 2.9 14.0 6
'Other' industries 2.7 19.1 2
Non-metallic minerals 2.4 11.6 12
Tobacco 1.8 4.8 18
Textiles 1.7 7.2 17
Mean (unweighted) 3.5 12.4 '5
Mean (weighted)^ 2.6 8.9
SD 1.0 4.4
Coefficient of
variation 0.30 0.36
Includes goods in cash and kind
Old rupiah (Rp 1,000 = Rp 1 new rupiahs)
The difference between the unweighted mean recorded here and 
that recorded in Table 4.7 (Rp 11,484) may be explained by 
the exclusion from this Table of several industries included 
in Table 4.7 (these industries were not recorded separately 
or did not exist in 1963).
Weighted by number of employees
Source: Indonesia, Industrial Censuses 1963, 1974-75
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importance (or wages in these industries increased considerably 
less than the average for all industries over the 1963-1974 
period.)
Are these quite large interindustry wage differentials
associated with marked differences in the skill of employees,
average size of firm, capital-intensity or varying ownership
patterns in different industries? Such comparisons are
hazardous because of the marked dualistic structure of some
industries. To minimise these problems we have chosen several
industries in Java classified at the four and five digit level,
and compared some rough indices of size, skill composition and
2capital-intensity in each. A high, medium and low wage group 
of major industries was chosen.
Data presented in Table 4.9 indicates that the group of 
high wage industries differed from the other two groups in 
the percentage of workers not directly engaged in production 
(a proxy for skill), in two of the measures of capital intensity 
(average expenditure on spare parts and percentage of firms3mechanised) and in value added per employee. Average number 
of workers per firm was also much higher in this group than in
However, some changes - the fall in the relative importance 
of machinery and the rise in the importance of the category 
'other industries' (including sporting goods, toys, 
stationary and jewellery) - cannot be easily explained by 
recent changes in industrial structure.
Even when data are broken down by four and five digit 
industrial classifications, there are still some marked 
contrasts in the size and technology used by firms within 
several industries. The contrast between size and technology 
used by modern sector weaving establishments and hand loom 
operations is one outstanding example; the division of the 
batik industry into three distinct segments (batik tulis, 
batik cap and printing) is another.
See also Appendix Table 4.1. Owing to the rather crude nature 
of the explanatory variables especially for capital intensity 
(electricity consumed per employee, expenditure on spare 
parts) we did not attempt any regression analysis of these 
relationships.
3
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the medium wage group but (owing to the large average size 
of kretek firms) not greatly different from the low wage group 
of firms. Electricity consumed per employee varied considerably 
between all groups. Overall, the Table suggests that wage levels 
are related to capital intensity and the skill of employees 
but not to size of firm. A more definite conclusion requires 
breaking the data down to establishment level and the use of 
more reliable indicators of the key explanatory variables.
This will be one of the major tasks of the micro-level analysis 
carried out in later chapters.
Unfortunately the industrial census wage data are not broken 
down by industry and type of ownership; it was therefore 
impossible to test the extent to which interindustry wage 
differentials may be associated with foreign investment.
However, average wage cost data recorded in the census for 
all large and medium firms in the industrial sector do suggest 
that foreign firms pay substantially higher wages than either 
government owned or domestic, private owned firms.^
Thus the 1974/75 Industrial Census indicates quite large 
differences in wages between industries and suggests that factors 
associated with labour demand (capital intensity and ownership) 
may play an important role in determining these. But the data 
may be questioned on the grounds that they cover average wages 
only and thus ignore the influence that differences in skill (and 
in the interindustry occupational structure) may have on wage 
differentials. Nevertheless, the findings on ownership
Overall, wages in foreign firms were more than twice as high 
as those for all firms. As might be expected, the wages of 
government enterprises were also considerably higher than in 
domestic private firms. The very much smaller size of 
domestic, private firms compared with foreign and government 
enterprises may partly account for these differences.
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T a b l e  4 . 9 :  V a r i o u s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  s e l e c t e d  g r o u p s
o f  l o w ,  medium a n d  h i g h  wage i n d u s t r i e s / 
J a v a  1 9 7 4 - 7 5
Low^
Wage
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
2
Medium H i g h 3
Wages (Rp 0 0 0 ) ^
mean
r a n g e
4 . 5
3 . 3 - 5 . 8
7 . 4
6 . 3 - 8 . 9
1 6 . 7
1 1 . 9 - 2 5 . 7
No. o f  e m p l o y e e s
mean
r a n g e
232
7 0 - 5 1 5
98
3 7 - 2 0 6
250
1 0 6 - 4 6 0
I n d i c a t o r  o f  s k i l l 0 
( P e r c e n t ,  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  w o r k e r s )  
mean p e r c e n t a g e  
r a n g e
87
7 3 - 9 4
88
7 9 - 9 6
79
7 2 - 8 3
I n d i c a t o r s  o f  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  
i )  E l e c t r i c i t y  c on su me d  
p e r  y e a r  p e r  w o r k e r  
(000 KHW) 0 . 3 1 . 4 5 . 9
i i )  Av.  a n n u a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  
on s p a r e  p a r t s  p e r  
e m p l o y e e  (Rp ' 0 0 0 ) 2 . 0 2 . 7 9 . 2
i i i )  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  f i r m s  
m e c h a n i s e d
mean
r a n g e
44
1 1 - 6 8
58
1 5 - 8 8
87
5 5 - 9 9
V a l u e  a d d e d  p e r  w o r k e r  (Rp)
mean
r a n g e
477
1 5 3 - 6 8 9
360
2 2 0 - 4 6 6
8616
6 1 7 - 1 3 4 1
I n c l u d e s  t e a - p r o c e s s i n g ,  k r e t e k ,  t o b a c c o  d r y i n g / p r o c e s s i n g .
2
I n c l u d e s  p r i n t i n g ,  p l a s t i c s ,  w e a v i n g ,  b a t i k .
3 I n c l u d e s  c i g a r e t t e s ,  f o o t w e a r ,  s t r u c t u r a l  m e t a l s ,  m a c h i n e r y ,  
s p i n n i n g .
4
Wages a n d  s a l a r i e s  i n  c a s h  a n d  k i n d .
3 P r o d u c t i o n  w o r k e r s  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  a l l  e m p l o y e e s .
ß
E x c l u d e s  e x t r e m e  v a l u e  (Rp 8067)  f o r  c i g a r e t t e s .
S o u r c e : I n d o n e s i a .  I n d u s t r i a l  C e n s u s  1 9 7 4 / 7 5  ( s e e  a l s o
A p p e n d i x  T a b l e  4 . 1 ) .
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are supported by survey data disaggregated by occupation.
In Table 4.10 data are presented on average wages in a range 
of occupations in foreign, domestic private and state owned 
firms in a selection of cities and industries in Java. Wage 
differentials between domestic state and domestic private 
corporations were quite small for most occupations. But there 
were large differentials between foreign and domestic owned 
firms: differentials between foreign and state owned
corporations ranged from 5-1:1 and between foreign and 
domestic private firms from 6-2:1 for different occupations.
Only in two cases - unskilled labour in state enterprises and 
skilled labour in domestic private firms - were the differentials 
less than 2:1. The differentials were particularly marked 
for managers and for professional employees (secretaries and 
accountants) and foremen. This suggests that foreign firms 
place particular importance on the quality of professional and 
supervisory personnel and are prepared to pay much higher wages 
than domestic firms to recruit these employees.
The much higher wages, especially of professional and 
supervisory staff in foreign enterprises compared with domestic 
firms, also contributed to much greater inequality within 
enterprises in the foreign firms. The contrast is most marked 
between foreign and state owned enterprises. The average
This survey undertaken for preparation of the Second 
Year Plan (REPELITA II), covered a wide range of 
industries (and sectors) and locations in Indonesia. 
See Appendix 3.1 for a note on the coverage and 
reliability of this survey. Four industries - food 
and beverages, textiles, tobacco and chemicals - in 
six locations (Jakarta, Bandung, Solo, Semarang, 
Malang and Surabaya) are covered in Table 4.10.
The six cities were chosen because they are the major 
centres in which foreign, domestic private and state 
owned firms in the four industries competed.
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Table 4.10: Mean monthly wage of selected occupation
groups in several manufacturing industries 
by ownership group, 1971 (Rp 000)7
Occupation Foreign
Domestic
State owned Private
No. of firms 22 12 256
Av. no. of employees 282 501 113
Director/manager 137.5
Mean monthly wage (Rp 
28.7
000) 2 
21.8
Production chief 45.9 18.3 18.0
Secretary of 
manager 45.6 12.1 14.4
Accountant 87.3 21.7 15.3
Clerk 19.6 6.0 8.5
Typist 16.7 6.4 7.4
Foremen 26.6 8.6 7.6
Skilled 13.6 6.9 7.2
Semi-skilled 12.3) 4.5) 5.8)
) 10 .4 )5.6 ) 4.8
Unskilled 8.5) 6.6) 3.8)
Covers food and beverages, textiles, tobacco products and 
chemicals, all industries in which foreign, domestic state 
owned and domestic private firms compete. The industries 
were located in six cities: Jakarta, Bandung, Solo, Semarang, 
Malang and Surabaya.
Mean wage includes payments in cash and kind but excludes the 
value of facilities (housing, transport etc.) and social 
contributions given to employees. Data presented in this table 
were aggregated from basic data compiled by province, industry 
and type of ownership (e.g. state owned textiles in Jakarta 
etc.). The aggregate data were weighted by the number of 
firms in each category but not by the number of employees. Not 
all firms provided data for all occupations.
Source: Computed from data included in the report by
Indonesia, Dept, of Manpower (1973:Appendix I).
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differential between both unskilled and semi-skilled employees 
on the one hand and professional employees on the other, was 
especially small in state enterprises compared with foreign 
firms (Table 4.11).'*'
To some extent these differentials may be explained by 
the concentration especially of private, domestic owned firms 
in low wage industries such as tobacco (especially kretek) and 
the higher proportion of these firms in low wage regions of 
Central Java (or, conversely, the relative concentration of 
foreign firms in Jakarta and in Surabaya). But even taking 
these interregional and interindustry differences into account, 
the differentials between foreign and domestic firms are still 
large. For example, data for chemicals, food and beverages 
in Jakarta show that wages for almost all occupations were 
higher in foreign compared with domestic firms in each of these 
three industries (see Appendix Table 4.2). These results are 
not inconsistent with our more general hypotheses concerning 
the influence of labour demand patterns and industrial structure 
on wage differentials. Unfortunately, the data do not permit 
more in-depth analysis of these wage differentials by size of 
firm, technology and various human capital characteristics of 
employees. This task will be taken up in our analysis of micro 
data in later chapters of the thesis.
IV. The Form of Wage Payment
We have seen in Chapter Two that form of wage payment as
2well as the level of wages may differ considerably between firms.
However, the relatively small differentials in wage payments 
in state firms may in part be compensated by the generous 
facilities (cars, housing, travel allowances etc.) offered 
to managerial and professional personnel. Owing to anomalies 
in the classification of unskilled and semi-skilled employees, 
the results are much more plausible if the unskilled and 
semi-skilled categories are combined.
For example, wage increases according to seniority, and 
various fringe benefits were offered mainly by large scale 
firms in Japan in an attempt to minimise labour turnover.
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Table 4.11: Selected occupational monthly wages and
salaries as a multiple of unskilled and 
semi-skilled wages_in_several major 
industries in Java, 1971
Ownership
group
Multiple of 
semi-skilled
unskilled
wages
and
Foreign Domestic
Occupation State Private
Director/manager 13.2:1.0 5.1:1.0 4.5:1.0
Production chief 4.4 3.3 3.8
Secretary of manager 4.4 2.2 3.0
Accountant 8.4 3.9 3.2
Clerk 1.9 1.1 1.8
Typist 1.6 1.1 1.5
Foreman 2.6 1.5 1.6
Skilled 1.3 1.2 1.5
Semi-skilled/unskilled 1.0 1.0 1.0
See Table 4.12 for industries and regions covered, and 
definitions used.
Source: Indonesiar Dept, of Manpower (1973:Appendix 1).
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In studies of the Indonesian wage system the form of wage 
payments has been given some attention because of the 
inhibiting effects that some wage payments (especially payments 
in kind and family allowances) have had on incentives and labour 
productivity.^ In this section of the chapter we will provide 
some data which suggest that needs based payments are not as 
widespread in the private sector as some of these studies imply. 
Quite a wide range of fringe benefits are given by state 
enterprises and by some large scale, modern sector firms. But 
there is little evidence that they are a major element in the 
wage systems of the majority of medium and small scale 
enterprises. In the early 1970s the major fringe benefits 
were not given by a high proportion of enterprises in 
manufacturing, and payments in kind were not a major share 
of labour costs in most manufacturing industries. Even where 
fringe benefits have contributed significantly to wage costs, 
these payments have not necessarily been offered merely as 
welfare payments to workers. Indeed several types of fringe 
benefit are likely to have had a positive effect on incentives 
and labour productivity.
In this section we will look first at the wage and salary 
systems (including the nature of salary scales, prevalence of 
seniority benefits, rules regarding promotion and rank in the 
enterprise etc.). This will be followed by a discussion of both 
the incidence of fringe benefits and of their contribution to 
total wage payments.
1. V7age and Salary Systems
At the outset it should be noted that the influence of 
public sector wage systems on forms of wage payment in the
1 See especially Arndt and Sundrum (1975); Gaffney 
(1976); and ARTEP (1972).
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private sector in Indonesia has probably been quite uneven.
In some private firms the basic salary system is even more
oriented towards seniority than the government system.^ The
basic wage system in public enterprises (set by law) follows
closely the government system. Although these enterprises
do have some freedom to set payments in kind and other
allowances, as in the civil service, seniority and education
2play a major part in determining rank.
But the Dept, of Manpower Report (Indonesiar Dept, of 
Manpower 1973:29-30) notes that the government salary system 
has had much less influence on foreign and small scale firms.
In foreign enterprises, wages tend to be set for certain jobs and 
for tasks performed rather than according to seniority or 
education. Systems of wage payment among small scale labour 
intensive firms probably have even less resemblance to those 
used in the public sector. The ARTEP (1972:44) Report notes 
that few small-sized firms pay their workers on the basis of 
fixed salary scales (this is also likely to be the case in a 
high proportion of medium-sized enterprises).
The importance of salary scales and increments according 
to seniority in the domestic private sector and in public 
enterprises can be exaggerated. Two major qualifications
The Dept, of Manpower Report (Indonesia, Dept, of Manpower, 
1973:28-9) quotes the example of one firm with a salary scale 
which increases the wages of the lowest paid employee by more 
than sixfold over a twenty-five year period; after 25 years 
such an employee would receive a higher basic wage than an 
employee at the highest level with 9-10 years experience. It 
is likely that such welfare-oriented wage systems are much 
more important among pribumi rather than non-pribumi firms 
(this point is taken up later in our micro study).
See Government Regulation No.22, 1967 and McCawley (1971^) 
for rules governing public enterprise wage systems.
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to the above discussion should be borne in mind. First, even 
in the civil service the basic salary may account for only a 
small proportion of an employee's total salary.^
Second, seniority benefits based on fixed salary scales 
are only given to relatively permanent monthly employees in 
many firms. These systems do not apply to the quite high 
proportion of daily and piece work employees in many 
enterprises.
2. Allowances or Payments in Kind
The 1971 Dept, of Manpower Survey (Indonesia; Dept, of 
Manpower 1973:70, 82-3) found that some fringe benefits 
were given fairly uniformly in different sectors and 
regions in Indonesia. Health care and social welfare 
contributions (contributions for marriage, death and other 
major family life-cycle events) were the most common fringe 
benefits (Table 4.12) . But most fringe benefits were not given 
by a high proportion of firms. A rice allowance was given by 
only about to one-third of all firms in different regions and 
a much smaller percentage offered family allowances. Transport 
was also made available only to managers or workers in 15 percent 
of firms, and housing in less than 10 percent of firms.
Differences in the incidence of fringe benefits given to 
various kinds of firms become more apparent when the data are
Other payments distributed regardless of rank (in kind 
allowances, family allowances etc.) and payments more closely 
related to responsibility in the enterprise (job allowances 
and fringe benefits such as housing and transport) may 
reduce the overall impact of salary scales on worker 
performance. The relatively large job allowances (tunjangan 
jabatan) for senior civil servants is a good example of such 
an allowance. The allowance was introduced in March 1977 and 
provides civil servants with an additional allowance ranging 
from Rp 10,000-120,000. In several cases this allowance is 
likely to be greater than a civil servant's basic salary plus 
work allowances. See Kompas, 21 and 23 March 1977. See also 
Gray (1979) for a survey of the variety of emoluments 
received by civil servants.
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broken down by ownership class. As might be expected, state 
enterprises gave a much higher proportion of almost all fringe 
benefits than foreign and domestic private owned firms (Table 
4.12). Except for rice allowances, a higher percentage of 
foreign firms gave fringe benefits than domestic private 
enterprises.'*’ Thus, high wages are associated also with 
quite a high incidence of fringe benefits.
Although quite a high proportion of enterprises provide
certain fringe benefits, there is no presumption that these
are distributed evenly among employees or that particular fringe
benefits are given to all employees. More disaggregated data
collected in the 1973-74 Manpower survey (ILO and Indonesia,
Dept, of Manpower 1975:Vol.II, Tables VIII 9-16) show that both
managers and professional employees tend to receive more fringe
benefits than other occupational groups, and that unskilled
workers receive considerably less of certain fringe benefits
than other employees. Managerial and clerical employees were
especially favoured in the distribution of family allowances,
transport and housing, meals and medical coverage. A much
smaller proportion of firms gave these fringe benefits and
2also annual bonuses to unskilled employees.
Unfortunately, the data are not broken down by size of firm 
so it is not possible to compare foreign and domestic firms 
in the same size classes.
This unequal distribution of fringe benefits within the firm 
underpins an important point concerning the effect of fringe 
benefits on occupational differentials and incentives. Fringe 
benefits may be convenient method of disguising wage 
differentials within the firm both for tax evasion purposes 
and also to minimise potential conflict within the firm. The 
latter motive may be particularly important in LDCs because 
occupational differentials tend often to be very large and may 
cause resentment especially from low paid, unskilled workers. 
The need to hide such differentials may be especially felt in 
societies like Indonesia where pronouncements concerning 
social goals of achieving greater equality are common in 
public statements and documents.
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Table 4.12: Percentage of firms giving various fringe
Benefits in manufacturing in three cities
by ownership group,1 Java 1971
Allowances State Foreign Domesticprivate
Family allowance 68 41 6
Goods in kind:
Rice 64 31 36
Sugar 32 11 3
Work clothes 32 18 18
Midday meal 25 32 29
Medicine 18 25 13
Facilities:
Housing: manager 32 18 4
workers 18 14 5
Transport: manager 18 7 10
workers 18 14 8
Other benefits:
Medical care 97 93 85
Social welfare contribution 79 71 50
Bonuses 65 43 32
N 28 28 346
The three cities were Jakarta, Semarang and Surabaya; selected 
because of a sufficiently large sample of domestic private, 
state owned and foreign manufacturing firms in each.
Source: Indonesia, Dept, of Manpower (1973).
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What is the contribution of fringe benefits to total wage
costs and workers' incomes? Two sources suggest that payments
in kind were approximately 25 percent of wage income in all large
scale establishments in major centres in Java."*- But they were
much lower in medium scale establishments and payments in kind
were also found to be less important in several outer island
ocities compared with Java. But, although medium sized firms 
on average paid a much smaller proportion of their wages in kind 
than larger firms, there was not a marked difference in the 
importance of these payments between industries with varying 
average sizes of firms, (see Appendix Table 4.3).
Industries which paid a higher percentage of wages in kind 
also appeared to offer slightly higher wages than the sample 
as a whole. But as Appendix Table 4.3 indicates, the difference 
in the importance of fringe benefits between high and low wage 
industries was not great. The lack of a strong relationship 
between these two variables - size of firm and wage levels - 
and payments in kind indicates that historical and locational 
factors specific to certain industries have probably been a major 
influence on the incidence of payments in kind.
Two major sources of information on this subject are the 
cost of living surveys conducted in 1968/69 and 1970/71 
and the 1970 Survey of Manufacturing Establishments conducted 
by the Central Statistics Bureau.
These quite high figures on the value of payments in kind 
hide a wide range in the value of these payments between 
industries and firms. For different industries this may 
be seen from data collected in the 1970 Survey of 
Manufacturing (See Appendix Table 4.3). The percentage 
of wages in kind in large and medium sized firms in 
various industries ranged from 53 to five percent. All 
except six of the industries recorded a percentage lower 
than the mean score (22.7 percent) and in one-third of 
all industries payments in kind contributed less than 
10 percent of all wages.
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This brief survey highlights the considerable interfirm 
and interindustry variation in the size of payments in kind. 
Manufacturing firms which offered a high percentage of wages 
in kind tended to be concentrated in certain industries: they 
were particularly important in industries where government 
ownership plays an important role (for example, cement, sugar, 
spinning and finishing, and paper were all major areas of public 
investment in 1970) . They were also concentrated in 
agricultural-based industries (sugar, tea-processing, coconut 
oil, rubber and rubber products) where payments in kind, 
especially to estate workers, have been traditionally high.'*'
Closely related to payments in kind is the payment of 
family allowances. These payments appear to have contributed 
significantly to wage differentials within the government sector. 
However there is very little information on how important 
family allowances are in the private sector. Arndt and Sundrum
Although it is difficult to find data on the trend in 
payments in kind over the past decade, all evidence 
suggests that they have probably begun to decline in 
importance with the achievement of more stable prices, 
and owing to greater reliance on the price mechanism 
and economic efficiency; they have probably declined 
also because of a much less powerful trade union 
movement compared with before 1965.
However, between 1968-72 the wage differentials owing 
to family size declined substantially. In 1968 an 
employee with four children on the lowest rung of the 
civil service received twice the earnings of a 
married man at the same level with no children. By 
1972 the differential had halved (ARTEP, 1972:51). 
McCawley (1971a) notes that a differential for family 
size existed in the PLN similar to that prevailing 
generally in the government sector in 1968. These 
differentials have probably fallen even further with 
the abolition of kind payments to more than three 
children in large families.
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(1975:374-5) and Gaffney (1976) draw upon data from the 
1968/69 cost of living surveys to suggest that family allowances 
make a major contribution to the total wages of Indonesian 
employees.
This conclusion is not supported by the other survey data.
As we have seen, the 1971 Dept, of Manpower survey indicates 
that family allowances are far less important in private 
enterprises than in the public sector: only 13 percent of all
enterprises (and only six percent of private domestic enterprises) 
offered family allowances in cash and only one-third of all firms 
offered rice allowances. The latter would have been offered in 
many cases only to the monthly employees and, moreover, in 
several firms they are likely to have been only made available 
to more senior employees.
It is difficult to find reliable aggregate data on the 
value of other fringe benefits. The 1974-75 Industrial Census 
of large and medium establishments records that annual bonuses 
were a major expenditure in most industries and amounted to 
just under eight percent of total wage expenditure in all 
industries in Java. Contributions to pension funds and other 
social contributions together accounted for a further ten percent 
of total wage costs.
Survey data on expenditure on employees' health care and
other social welfare payments show very wide variations by
2region and by industry. In part this must be attributed to 
rather inadequate data. Reporting of these wage components
In seven cities a single man received approximately twelve 
percent of his income in kind, a married man with two 
children approximately 17 percent whereas a family with 
six children or more received 25-30 percent of their income 
in kind (Gaffney, 1976:10). In Jakarta the differential in 
incomes according to family size was even greater.
The 1974-75 survey of wages in various provinces of Indonesia 
found huge variations in the value of these payments between 
industries in the same region and also between regions for 
the same industry (Indonesia, Dept, of Manpower, 1975a:
Table 6).
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appears to be even less reliable than of wages in cash and 
kind. But in part these variations may also reflect even 
wider differentials between different kinds of firm (large, 
capital intensive and foreign versus small, labour intensive 
and domestic) in the payment of these fringe benefits. 
Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to examine this 
possibility further.^"
From this survey it may be concluded that fringe benefits 
have played an important role especially in public remuneration 
systems in Indonesia. However, their significance in the 
private sector has probably been overestimated by some 
commentators on the wage structure. It is not easy to 
evaluate the effects which fringe benefits might have had on 
incentives. Nevertheless it is probable that the welfare 
effects of such payments have also been given too much emphasis 
in the literature. In the government sector, fringe benefits 
are important both at junior and senior levels. At lower 
levels they do provide employees with guaranteed wage increases 
with seniority and some protection from the effects of 
inflation. For senior civil servants additional benefits such 
as housing and transport may be seen as one means of maintaining 
parity with wages in equivalent private sector positions. They 
cannot, therefore, be classified purely as welfare payments.
At the same time they perform a useful role from the government's 
point of view - they tend to hide the large (and probably 
growing) wage inequalities within the public sector.
In the private sector the two single most important fringe 
benefits were annual bonuses and medical care. Both of these 
payments are not unrelated to labour productivity. Annual 
bonuses are not always set at a flat rate but are frequently 
determined according to performance, especially of more senior
1 This possibility is examined further in our micro-study, 
see especially Chapter Eight.
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employees. Provision of medicine and payment of employees' 
health bills are certainly not pure welfare transfers to 
workers in a country where medical care is so inadequate and 
so costly relative to average incomes.
Other fringe benefits - payments in kind, family allowances, 
transport etc. - are given quite generously in a small 
proportion of firms in the manufacturing sector, especially 
by state enterprises and some foreign firms. Undoubtedly 
their effect these enterprises has been to reduce the incentive 
element in the wage system. But these fringe benefits are not 
widespread in the private sector, they do not contribute to a 
high proportion of total wage costs and in many firms are only 
offered to more senior employees.
From the available data it is not possible to evaluate 
the affect that fringe benefits have on incentives and labour 
productivity. It is quite reasonable to expect that some firms 
offer fringe benefits with the objective of increasing labour 
productivity, in others they may have adverse effects. This 
issue of the relationship between forms of wage payment and 
labour productivity in different kinds of firm will be examined 
more fully at a micro level in Chapter Eight.
V . Labour Supply Influences: Interregional, Urban-Rural and 
Male-Female Wage Differentials
In Chapters Two and Three we noted that in addition to 
the factors which influence labour demand, wage differentials 
between firms and industries may also be affected by labour 
supply factors. Location of firms in different regions or in 
rural and urban areas, and the employment of male or female 
employees are three labour supply influences which are 
particularly relevant to the study of wage differentials in 
Indonesia. Secondary data on each of these aspects of wage 
differentials will be examined in this section of the Chapter.
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1. Interregional Wage Differentials with Special Reference to 
Java
Wage differentials between Java and the outer islands in 
particular have received some attention in literature on 
interregional wage differentials in Indonesia. They reflect 
the relative surplus of labour on Java compared with most 
other islands in Indonesia. But they also provide evidence 
of relative immobility of labour on Java. There are also 
important regional differentials within Java which partly 
reflect the greater population concentration in some regions 
(especially Yogyakarta and Central Java). These are partly 
a consequence of the relatively rapid recent growth of labour 
demand especially in Jakarta.
Data collected by BAPPENAS on wages paid to various 
categories of workers on public works (INPRES) projects 
indicates the quite large wage differentials between various 
provinces in Java (and between Java and the major outer island 
groups) for unskilled workers (Table 4.13). The differential 
between Jakarta and other provinces (with the exception of 
Yogyakarta) in Java declined slightly over the four year period 
1971/2-1975/6. However, wages in Jakarta were still 50 percent 
higher than in East Java, nearly 70 percent higher than in 
Central Java and well over twice as high as in Yogakarta in 
1975-76. Wages in West Java were also considerably higher than 
in other regions although these differentials also appear to 
have declined since 1971-72.^ The table suggests that wages 
in Jakarta are more in line with average wages in Sumatra than 
with the rest of Java.
Of course these overall provincial averages hide considerable 
intra-provincial variation in wage rates. These differentials 
were partly influenced by the relatively high wages in major 
urban centres (especially in West and East Java) compared 
with other kabupaten (see discussion on rural-urban wage 
differentials below). Excluding provincial capitals, wage 
differentials between kabupaten in Java (excluding Yogyakarta) 
were 2.0:1 in East and Central Java and lower (1.6:1) in West 
Java.
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The differences in money wages were partly but not 
completely offset by regional price differentials (see the 
last column in Table 4.13). Yogyakarta recorded the lowest 
cost of living index for the three years 1972-74 but prices 
were only slightly more than 10 percent below those recorded 
for Jakarta. The regional price index (which covers only 
the capital city in each province) is almost certainly an 
understatement of price differences between Jakarta and some 
parts of the other provinces in Java. It is doubtful, 
however, that the real provincial average would be sufficient 
by high to compensate for the quite large wage differentials.^
These differentials are probably partly the result of 
concentration of a high proportion of large foreign and 
public owned enterprises in relatively modern sectors in 
Jakarta. Many low wage, traditional industries e.g. batik, 
kretek, tobacco processing are, on the other hand, located 
mainly in Central and East Java and in Yogyakarta. There 
is evidence also of quite substantial wage differentials 
even when data are broken down by ownership class, industry 
and occupation in different regions. In Table 4.14 data are 
presented from the 1971 Dept, of Manpower survey for domestic 
firms in four industries, (chemicals, textiles, food and 
beverages) in several major cities in Java. There was a 
large wage differential between Jakarta and other regions 
for production workers (with the exception of the semi skilled 
group in Bandung) and to a lesser extent for clerical workers. 
The differentials between Bandung and the Central Java cities
The real wage differential is much smaller if wages recorded 
in the provincial capitals of Bandung and Surabaya (rather 
than for the province as a whole) and adjusted for cost of 
living differences and compared with Jakarta. The money 
wage indices for these two cities compared with Jakarta (100) 
were 94 and 88 in 1975-76. But for Central Java and 
Yogyakarta the differences with Jakarta were still large 
even if wages for Semarang and the municipality of 
Yogyakarta were compared with the national capital and 
adjusted for cost of living differences.
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Table 4.14: Average wages of various occupations in private
domestic owned firms in selected industries in
Jakarta , Bandung, Semarang and Solo,I 1971
(Rp 000/mth)
Occupation Jakarta Bandung2 Semarang2 Solo2
No. of firms 89 35 31 23
Av. no. of employees 86 76 73 47
Manager/director 23.1 25.6 28.6 12.2
Production chief 20.4 12.4 27.1 11.2
Secretary of manager 17.6 7.2 10.6 18.1
Accountant 18.6 9.4 16.1 17.5
Clerk 10.5 7.4 5.3 6.4
Typist 9.3 5.9 5.0 4.9
Foreman 9.3 6.4 4.1 5.2
Skilled employees 9.7 6.7 6.3 3.7
Semi-skilled A . I 3 4 6.9 2.9 3.3
Unskilled 4.7 3.1 2.8 2.4
2 Industries include chemicals, textiles , food and beverages.
Data for each industry is weighted by 
only.
2 Only one firm in beverages and two in
the number 
chemicals.
of firms
3 Only one firm in textiles.
4 Excludes food, data unreliable.
Source: Indonesia, Dept, of Manpower (1973).
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is also quite consistent with the INPRES data. But there 
appear to be much smaller regional differentials in managerial 
and professional salaries. The latter result is not surprising 
given the greater nationwide scarcity of some of these 
skills; many of the tasks of managerial and professional 
personnel are likely to be much more firm—specific and their 
wages more determined by internal market considerations than 
is the case for other occupations.'*'
2. Urban rural wage differentials
We have seen in Chapter Two that urban rural wage
differentials are a major factor contributing to high rates
of rural urban migration and urban unemployment in many LDCs.
Given relatively slow rates of overall urban growth,
short distances between rural and urban areas and an abundance
of short distance transport, it might be expected that urban
2rural wage differentials would not be large in Java. Although 
wages appear to be relatively high in some of the rapidly 
expanding large cities, the general expectation of narrow 
urban rural wage differentials is supported by the secondary 
data.
The extent of urban rural wage differentials has been 
estimated from INPRES data on wages in both the provincial 
capital and all kotamadya (municipalities) compared with all
See also Chapter Seven. It is probable that the total value 
of wages of employees in these senior positions are likely 
to consist of a wide range of special facilities not 
necessarily recorded in figures on wage incomes. It is also 
likely that many of these senior and trusted employees may 
receive a significant share of their salaries out of 
profits or in the form of annual bonuses which may not be 
registered in company records.
See Hugo (1978:99-104) for a description of the wide range 
of short distance transport servicing Jakarta and Bandung 
from nearby towns and rural areas.
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kabupaten (regencies). These data are presented in Table 4.15.-*- Th 
table shows that daily wages of construction employees are not 
always higher in kotamadya than in all kabupaten in Java (or 
Sumatra). Indeed, the opposite is more often the case. Among 
the provinces of Java, average wages were significantly higher 
in all kotamadya only in West Java. For Java as a whole the 
kotamadya and kabupaten averages were very similar. In contrast 
to the quite large interprovincial wage differentials these 
data suggest that Java's work force is relatively mobile over 
short distances between rural and nearby urban areas.
But although overall urban-rural wage differentials 
appear to be quite small, differentials between the major 
cities in Java and all kabupaten were quite marked. Money 
wages in Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya in particular were all 
considerably higher than the average for all kabupaten in West 
and East Java, and also higher than for Java as a whole. The 
difference was most marked in East Java: daily wages in
Surabaya were 25 percent higher than the average for all
It should be noted that wage differentials between all 
kabupaten and kotamadya may be considered only a rough 
measure of urban rural wage differentials. The 
advantage of these data over other sources on urban 
rural wage differentials is that they provide a 
comparison of unskilled employees in similar occupations 
in rural and urban areas. Comparison of average wages 
or average incomes, or incomes of employees in 
different occupations or industries is likely to be 
much less valid. However, kabupaten-wide wages are 
likely to be also influenced by urban wage rates in 
these kabupaten. Despite this problem, these data 
are probably one of the most comprehensive sources of 
information on urban rural wage differentials. Leiserson 
(1974:351) used the 1971/72 data from the same series to 
estimate rural-urban wage differentials.
A similar pattern may be seen for Palembang and Medan 
in South and North Sumatra respectively.
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kabupaten in this province. This result suggests that 
relatively rapid growth especially of manufacturing in these 
urban centres has probably had a major influence on urban 
rural wage differentials.^
The picture of relatively small, overall urban rural 
wage differentials is further supported by data on incomes 
of wage earners collected in the 1976 intercensal labour force 
survey. Although quite large urban rural differences were 
apparent at extreme levels of income, a high proportion of 
both rural and urban employees earned incomes in the middle 
of the range (Rp 5,000-15,000 for men and Rp 3,000-7,000 
for women) (Table 4.16).
3. Male-Female Wage Differentials
In contrast to the narrow urban rural wage differentials,
the secondary data suggest that there are quite large
differences in the wages of males compared with females.
We saw in Chapter Two that male—female wage differentials
contributed to interindustry wage differentials in several
empirical studies of other LDCs. It is reasonable to expect
that the interindustry and interfirm wage differentials
discussed above may partly be associated with the concentration
2of female employees in certain industries.
Of course, the cost of living is likely to be higher 
in these larger cities than in other urban areas. However, 
interprovincial differences in the cost of living (see 
Table 3.15) suggest that cost of living differences 
may not be large enough to outweigh the 20-25 percent 
higher wages in Bandung and Surabaya compared with all 
other kabupaten in West and East Java, or to outweigh 
the even larger differential between Jakarta and other 
kabupaten in Java.
The subject male-female wage differentials is particularly 
relevant to this study because of the high concentration 
of female employees in two of the three industries 
(weaving and kretek) included in our micro survey.
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Table 4.16: Average monthly income of wage and salary
earners in urban and rural areas in 
manufacturing, 1976
Income group 
(Rp'OOO)
Male Female
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Percentage of employees
<3 2 7 30 57
>3-5 6 10 28 20
>5-7 10 19 14 13
>7-10 24 28 11 6
>10-15 23 20 8 3
>15-30 25 15 6 1
>30 10 1 3 0
Total
N1 ('000)
100
362.8
100
638.0
100 
157.6
100
327.0
Excludes not stated
Source: SUPAS (1978) Table 19.
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Quite large differences in incomes of female compared 
with male employees in manufacturing are demonstrated in 
Table 4.16 above. In urban areas less than two percent of 
males earned lower than Rp 3,000 and only eight percent 
earned less than Rp 5,000 compared with 30 and 58 percent 
respectively for females. In both urban and rural areas few 
females earned more than Rp 10,000 (16.5 percent in urban 
areas and 4.2 percent in rural areas) compared with over half 
of all urban males and 36 percent of rural males.
The much lower incomes of females in manufacturing appear 
to be explained partly by the concentration of females in low 
wage, low productivity industries. Although we have a 
breakdown of the manufacturing labour force by sex and industry 
group only for large and medium scale enterprises up to 1971, 
the data indicate that female employees were concentrated in 
6 major industries: tobacco, textiles, tea processing, 
foodstuffs (excluding tea), rubber and other chemicals 
(pharmaceuticals, jamu, cosmetics etc.) (Table 4.17). Only 
’other chemicals' (excluding jamu) out of these industries 
may be regarded as a relatively modern industry. These 
industries accounted for 93 percent of all female employment 
in large and medium scale manufacturing in 1970 (see column 
(2) in Table 4.17).^
Although there is no breakdown of hours worked by income 
and industry, it seems reasonable to attribute some of 
these differences to lower hours of work among female 
employees. This is especially true of rural areas where 
nearly 30 percent of females in manufacturing were 
recorded as working less than 25 hours a week and almost 
50 percent worked less than 35 hours a week compared 
with 12 and 21 percent of male employees respectively. 
However, the differences between the sexes in hours 
worked we re much smaller in urban areas (only 12 percent 
of females worked less than 25 hours compared with five 
percent of males).
The concentration of females in these industries is a 
little less surprising if the concentration of all 
employees in these industries is also noted - 87 percent 
of all employees were employed in these six industries 
in 1970. Data was computed for 1970 (rather than for 
1971) because this is the last year in which data was 
broken down by large and medium scale categories.
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Table 4.17: The proportion of female employees and average
wages in selected industries in large and 
medium firms, Indonesia, 1970, 1974-75
Female employment 
as a percentage 
of industry's 
work force in 1970
Percentage of 
all female 
employment in 
manufacturing 
in 1970
Mean 
monthly 
wages 
(Rp* 000)1 
1970 1974-75
Tobacco 75.5 41.6 2.0 4.8
Tea processing 41.2 8.0 2.9 5.9
Textiles 34.9 18.4 3.1 7.2
(Weaving) (34.7) (12.0) (2.4) (6.5)
(Batik) (46.9 ( 3.3) (1.6) (6.5)
Sub total 53.5 68.0 2.6 6.1
Other chemicals 47.1 3.3 6.3 15.3
Rubber 23.9 8.7 3.8 10.2
Food (excluding 
tea) 18.8 12.5 3.4 8.4
All other industries 21.1 7.5 5.2 13.1
Sub total 22.0 32.0 4.1 11.3
All industries 36.7 100 3.4 8.9
Wages of both males and females
Source: Indonesia, Industrial Statistics 1970, 
Industrial Census 1974-75.
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In three of these industries (tobacco, textiles and tea 
processing) which accounted for close to 70 percent of all 
female employment in 1970, wages were very much lower 
than the overall average for the industrial sector both in 
1970 and 1974-75.1
It should also be noted that although a large 
proportion of women were employed in low wage industries, 
in several industries in which a high percentage of females 
worked, wages were relatively high. For 1970 and also 
1974-75 other chemicals and rubber (both included separately 
in Table 4.17 were relatively high wage industries. Several 
other small industries with a high proportion of females - 
electrical machinery, paper and glass - were also high wage 
industries. Thus a high proportion of all female employment 
in low wage industries is not inconsistent with high wages 
in several industries in which a small proportion of all women 
work.^
There does however appear to have been a preference for 
employment of a higher proportion of males in relatively modern, 
high wage industries. This may be attributed to several 
factors influencing the cost of labour in full-time shift work
Lowest average wages were recorded in the tobacco industry 
(which includes both kretek and tobacco drying and processing) 
where over 40 percent of all women employed in large and 
medium establishments worked in 1970. Although the wage 
level was a little higher in textiles, it was still 
considerably below the average for total manufacturing in 
both 1970 and 1974-75; this was particularly true of 
weaving and batik,the two major sub-sectors of female 
employment in textiles.
It is necessary to be careful with the interpretation of 
these wage differentials between sexes. They do not 
necessarily imply wage discrimination on the basis of sex. 
Although average female wages are much low7er than male 
wages, this is mainly a consequence of concentration of 
females in low wage, traditional industries. But wages 
are high in several 'modern' industries in which quite 
a high proportion of the work force is female.
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in modern industry. These include laws restricting the 
employment of females at night, generous menstruation and 
maternity leave, the employers' expectations of greater 
labour turnover among females.^ Unfortunately, the data 
do not allow more in-depth analysis of these questions. They 
also will be taken up in our micro study.
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have attempted a broad survey of 
the current wage structure in Indonesia. This has been set 
in the context of overall surplus labour supply conditions 
in both rural and urban areas especially on the island of 
Java. It is clear from this survey that despite pressing 
problems of labour supply there are quite large wage 
differentials between (1) various sectors (especially between 
mining and agriculture), (2) different manufacturing
industries, (3) different kinds of firm (in particular between 
foreign and domestic owned firms), (4) between various regions 
(especially between Java and the outer islands, and between 
both Jakarta and other major urban centres, and other areas 
in Java) and (5) between the sexes.
Owing to insufficient information it was not possible to 
investigate the causes of wage differentials in any depth. 
Nevertheless, the data presented in this chapter are not 
inconsistent with some of the major propositions raised in 
Chapter Three. Intersectoral and interindustry wage 
differentials - especially high wages in mining and banking 
and in several modern industries - appear to be associated 
with new relatively large and capital intensive investment 
and, in many cases, with foreign ownership. The rapid expansion 
of these types of investment especially in the major urban 
areas of Java has probably contributed to wider wage 
differentials between these areas and areas of less rapid growth.
1 In the following chapter we will discuss this labour 
legislation more fully.
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Marked differences in the average wages of males and females 
may be partly explained by discrimination against females in 
employment in many modern sector industries rather than merely 
discrimination in wages between the sexes.
In part, quite large wage differentials between various 
segments of the economy may be explained by imperfections in 
labour supply - especially poor information and communications - 
inhibiting response of Javanese labour to high wage 
opportunities in the outer islands and in relatively high wage 
sectors and firms. Low mobility of some sections 
of the Javanese population may be attributed in part to 
extreme poverty and an inward looking response to population 
pressure. Relatively good communications in Java and the 
strong connections between urban and rural labour markets 
(evidenced by the relatively small urban rural wage 
differentials and the prevalence of commuting and circular 
migration), suggest that at least a section of the population 
is highly mobile over short distances in search of new jobs 
and better earning opportunities.
We have given some attention in this chapter to 
interindustry and interfirm differences in forms of wage 
payment. The importance of various fringe benefits appeared 
to have some correlation with levels of wages, but this 
relationship was not strong. State enterprises in particular 
offered more fringe benefits. To a lesser extent this was 
also the case among larger and foreign firms. The effects of 
a high proportion of wages paid in kind or paid in the form of 
other fringe benefits, could not be generalised. Much depends 
on the kind of fringe benefits offered and to which employees 
they were extended. It is not necessarily true that a large 
number of fringe benefits reduces incentives and negatively 
affects labour productivity. Much more information than was 
available in the secondary sources is required to make 
definitive statements concerning these effects of fringe benefits.
As we have mentioned, sufficient information is not
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available from secondary sources to explain the quite large 
wage differentials identified in this chapter. It is clear 
that both foreign and state owned enterprises have an 
influence on the level and form of wage payment. But most 
data on intersectoral, interindustry and interregional 
wage differentials do not permit an investigation of the 
extent to which these differentials may also be the result 
of differing capital intensities, sizes of industrial 
establishments or different ownership patterns. It is not 
possible from the available data to examine the extent to 
which wage differentials between industries and firms may 
be the result of differences in skills and tasks performed, 
or of different labour management patterns. We were not 
able to test whether institutional factors were a major 
cause of these differentials. Thus some of the interesting 
questions raised in Chapter Three concerning the existence 
of internal labour markets in modern sector firms, and 
labour market segmentation in dualistic manufacturing sectors 
in LDCs, could not be dealt with adequately.
As in many countries, secondary data in Indonesia are 
not sufficiently comprehensive to test the extent to which 
wage differentials represent differences in efficiency wages 
for similar quantities and quality of labour. Partly the 
difficulty rests in the quality of wage data. They do not 
always cover comparable skill categories or include all 
components of labour income. In addition it is generally 
not standardised for variations in days and hours of work 
between firms. We need also to know much more about the 
human capital characteristics of employees - especially 
education and experience - and also more about labour 
performance in order to draw meaningful conclusions concerning 
efficiency wage differentials.
The quite large wage differentials between various groups 
of employees (despite abundant unskilled labour) do suggest
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that more in-depth analysis of the causes of wage differentials 
i^ warranted. This task will be taken up in our micro study 
of the wage structure of two industries in Java.
CHAPTER FIVE
INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON WAGES IN INDONESIA
In Chapters Two and Three we gave some attention to the 
subject of institutional (mainly government and trade union) 
influence on the wage structure in LDCs.  ^ It was suggested that 
their influences on wage differentials has probably been 
exaggerated in the literature on labour markets in LDCs. 
Nevertheless, in Chapter Three we suggested that these 
institutional factors are likely to be one of several influences 
which contribute to high modern sector wages. In this chapter 
we examine several of the major institutional forces which are 
relevant to the study of wage differentials in Indonesia.
The extent of trade union influence on wages partly depends 
on the attitudes of the government to trade union activities.
In many LDCs, including Indonesia, the activities of trade 
unions are tightly controlled by the government. We shall see 
that even during the Soekarno period when unions were given a 
considerable amount of political freedom, the Indonesian 
government was concerned to curb the activities of unions.
In the first section of the chapter we look briefly at the 
influence of institutional forces on wages during the colonial 
period and in the early independence period (1950-65). There 
have been some major changes since 1965. But it is clear that
As we have noted in Chapter Three, we define institutional 
forces to include government and trade union actions which 
have a direct or indirect influence on wages and wage costs.
It will be useful to distinguish between the influence of 
institutional forces on the level of wages from their 
influence on wage costs. Minimum wage legislation, public 
sector wage policies and trade union bargaining all have an 
effect on the level of wages. But several other institutional 
influences affect wage costs but not necessarily the level 
of wages. These include labour legislation pertaining to 
conditions of work and employment (leave and holidays, hours 
of work, safety and other conditions of work, freedom to 
dismiss workers, etc.). In this chapter we are concerned 
with both kinds of influences.
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although the political and economic climate has altered 
considerably, there is continuity in the policies of successive 
Indonesian governments towards the determination of wages and 
working conditions in the private sector. Despite the greatly 
diminished political influence of trade unions, their impact 
on wages has not changed markedly since the Soekarno era.
In the second part of the chapter we look at government 
and trade union influences on wages and working conditions since 
1965. Several new policies have been introduced to improve 
wages and working conditions. But despite these changes 
government influence on wages would appear to be small in 
Indonesia. As in the period before 1965, the influence of trade 
unions and government on wages continues to be restricted 
largely to the small modern sector.
I. The Influence of Government and Trade Union Policies on 
Wages Before 1965
1. The Colonial Period
During the colonial period the Dutch government made little 
attempt to regulate the wages and working conditions of 'free' 
(non-contract) wage labourers in Indonesia. The main efforts 
of the colonial government in the field of labour protection 
were directed towards the protection of contract workers on 
estates and of Europeans. Regulations demanded that coolie 
contracts specify the level of wages, hours of work, duration 
of the contracts and methods of recruitment. A labour 
inspectorate was established to supervise the execution of 
contracts and the safety and health conditions on estates which 
employed indentured contract labour (Thompson, 1947:144-58). 
Various regulations were also passed concerning the methods of 
recruitment of Europeans and their conditions of employment, 
forms of wage payment etc. (Tedjasukmana, 1961:255-62). But the 
large majority of wage labourers in Java received no protection 
concerning hours of work, holidays, the level or form of wages
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or any social insurance except for workman's compensation (set 
by law in 1939).^
Tight control over the activities of trade unions also 
allowed management a free rein in setting wages and working 
conditions in most industrial establishments. Fear of the 
potential political power of unions led the government to place 
strikes which disturbed the public order under penal sanctions 
as early as 1923 (Tedjasukmana, 1959:13-5). The strongest 
unions were in the public sector (especially railway employees) 
but the activities of these unions were tightly controlled after 
1926 when many of the politically active union leaders were 
exiled and restrictions on the right to assembly were 
introduced. Total union membership was less than 100,000 in 
1939; official statistics record that an average of only 20 
enterprises and 1,250 workers were involved in strikes annually 
over the period 1936-40 (Thompson, 1947:160).
Thompson sums up the relatively powerless state of the 
union movement before the war:
Even the small size of union membership ... did not 
accurately reflect the insignificant status of 
unionism in the islands ... promotion of measures 
to improve working conditions came principally from 
government employees, who possessed by far the 
largest number of unions and were naturally concerned 
simply with improving their own status ... The 
NEI [Netherlands East Indies] government did not 
favor joint negotiations by employers and employees 
for the regulation of working conditions. No public 
machinery existed for the arbitration of management- 
labor differences' (Thompson, 1947:160-1).^
Although there is a paucity of data on the structure of 
wages during the colonial period, it appears that the absence
Two other exceptions were the 1925 law which aimed at 
protecting women and children from night employment and 
legislation passed in 1930 covering conditions of work in 
mines (Tedjasukmana, 1961:388-97).
However, in 1937 conciliation machinery was provided for 
disputes involving railway employees.
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of significant government intervention in the determination of 
wages and working conditions and the extreme weakness of the 
trade union movement contributed to a relatively homogeneous 
wage structure compared with that described in Chapter Four.
In particular there is little evidence of markedly higher wages 
in the foreign sector. Incomes on estates (which were mainly 
foreign owned) tended to be slightly higher than in nearby 
farming areas but these differences were small except for 
Central Java (Coolie Budget Commission, 1956:46-7). Overall, 
wages on estates were little higher than those paid in the 
traditional industries and, indeed, appear to have been slightly 
lower than those paid in the traditional batik industry 
(Thompson, 1947:140-3; Pillai, 1947:180-1; Coolie Budget 
Commission, 1956:61-73).
Wages and working conditions were reported to be higher in 
the small number of foreign owned manufacturing firms that 
flourished in Java after 1935. However, even in these firms 
wages do not appear to have been much above those in traditional 
industries. Wertheim (1956:215) reports that: '... wages
remained extremely low, working hours very long, social services 
practically non-existent and employers' powers excessive'. 
Similarly, wages, long hours of work and high levels of labour 
turnover and absenteeism were found in a foreign owned textile 
factory near Surabaya (Willner, 1961).
2. Early Years of Independence, 1950-65
With independence there was a total change in the 
institutional environment in which private enterprise operated. 
Successive governments in the 1950s declared their support for 
policies to protect and improve the welfare of the working class 
(see especially Tedjasukmana, 1961). A stronger 
trade union movement was given greater freedom to make claims 
for improvements in wages and working conditions.
Of course there were very large differences in wages between 
Europeans (and Eurasians) and Indonesians. The former 
dominated skilled jobs in the modern sector and in government. 
See Kahin (1952:29-36) and Furnival (1939:251-2).
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Government legislation, especially in the area of labour 
protection, placed pressure on firms to improve wages and 
working conditions. The Basic Law on Labour Protection (Act 
No.l, 1951) limited hours of work, provided for holidays and 
rest days and ratified colonial legislation concerning 
restrictions on the employment of women and children. Other 
legislation was introduced covering workers compensation, 
collective labour agreements and labour inspection.^
Despite ostensibly pro-labour sympathies on the part 
of several early governments, government action to protect 
wage earners was slow in some major areas (Tedjasukmana, 
1961:419-21, 448-95). This applied particularly to minimum 
wage legislation, legislation to protect labour against 
arbitrary dismissal and legislation dealing with various aspects 
of social security (especially health and accident insurance).
New legislation had been drafted on these three subjects by the lat 
1950s but further action was delayed by government officers 
wary of the burdens which the new legislation might place 
on private enterprise.^
The trade union movement emerged from the independence 
struggle highly politicised (Tedjasukmana, 1959). It was 
dominated by SOBSI (Central Labour Organisation of All Indonesia) 
which saw foreign capital as an agent of imperialism. SOBSI1s 
demands for better wages and working conditions were bound up 
with a wider political struggle to rid Indonesia of foreign 
economic domination. A wave of strikes, especially in the 
plantation sector in 1950-51, led to government emergency3legislation aimed at controlling industrial unrest. Although
See Act No.2, 1951, Law No.21, 1954 and Law No.3, 1951.
A new law providing protection against individual and mass 
dismissals was introduced only in 1964 and legislation on 
minimum wages and accident insurance came into operation under 
the New Order more than a decade later (see below).
See Emergency Act No.16, 1951; this was superceded by Law 
No.22, 1957 which is the basis for present-day arbitration of 
labour disputes.
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the number of strikes was never large by international standards 
(especially if they were compared with the number of industrial 
disputes settled by arbitration),^ they were an important 
feature of labour relations in the 1950s and declined 
significantly only after 1957 following the nationalisation 
of Dutch interests and even tighter measures brought in to 
prevent industrial action (Hawkins, 1963:264-8).
Although trade union membership was quite large, the 
movement continued to be divided along political and ideological 
lines throughout the 1950s and early 1960s (Hasibuan, 1968). 
Unions competed for membership within enterprises and it was not 
uncommon for several unions to be represented in certain 
enterprises.
Thus both in the liberal period of the early 1950s and 
later during guided democracy the trade union movement was 
more oriented towards political rather than welfare
3objectives. By the early 1960s the major trade unions 
had become closely involved in the wider political struggle 
between the army and the communist party (PKI). Under 
such conditions the large membership of trade unions was not 
a true indication of their economic influence. Few unions 
concluded collective labour agreements and, indeed, the 
government appears to have had little faith in the capacity 
of unions and management to negotiate at enterprise level.
Both the 1957 law regarding labour disputes and the 1964 law 
governing dismissals contributed to more centralised decision-
See Richardson (1958:69).
Altogether there were at least 12 labour federations in 
Indonesia in 1957-58 with an overall membership of over 
two million. Approximately half of these were affiliated 
to SOBSI (Hawkins, 1963:259-61).
See especially Hasibuan (1968:Ch. 6) on how economic 
objectives of the unions played only a minor role in their 
activities in the estate sector in North Sumatra in the 
early 1960s. Willner (1961:Ch. 6) describes the 
political orientation of the SOBSI affiliated SBT (Textiles 
Union) in an East Java textile factory.
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making and took the initiative away from managers and unions 
(Hasibuan, 1968:231-40; Tedjasukmana, 1961:386).
The overall effect of union activity and government 
legislation in the 1950s appears to have been to increase wage 
differentials within the economy, in particular between foreign 
firms (and sectors dominated by foreign capital) and domestic 
enterprises. Tedjasukmana (1961:211-3) refers to the 
development of 'dual labour relations' where the more active 
unions were found in large scale, foreign owned firms which 
offered higher wages and better working conditions: 'Trade
unions were stronger, more militant and aggressive and workers' 
demands more ruthless than in Indonesian enterprises where 
conditions were less favourable'. Lack of staff made it 
virtually impossible to ensure implementation of labour 
legislation in small firms but labour unions appear to have 
insisted that larger firms follow the provisions of the code 
(Hawkins, 1963:263-4).
Fragmentary information on wages in foreign firms tends to 
support this conclusion. Willner notes the vast improvement in 
working conditions in the textile firm she studied near Surabaya 
compared with the 1930s.^ Stanvac petroleum company had greatly 
expanded its training programme and provided a wide range of 
social services not available to employees during the colonial 
period (Center for International Studies, 1957).
However the gains made in wages and working conditions 
even in the foreign sector were for the most part shortlived.
Two factors contributed to declining real wages from about the 
middle of the 1950s: first, in 1957 the government nationalised
the Dutch firms and in the early 1960s almost all foreign firms 
were nationalised; second, after 1956 the rate of inflation 
increased substantially (Paauw, 1963:202-6). Government
Ownership of this firm moved to Indonesian hands after the 
revolution but management continued to be controlled by 
foreigners (Willner, 1961).
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management of former foreign enterprises suffered a plethora of 
problems, not least a shortage of capital, skilled labour and 
managerial personnel (Lim, 1962; Hasibuan, 1962:37-8). Even 
without high rates of inflation, the new managers might have 
been hard pressed to maintain the level of wages. Galloping 
inflation made it almost impossible to prevent a decline in 
real wages. A similar fate was experienced in the civil service 
and in various industries that were still dominated by private 
ownership (for example, kretek, dock workers, construction and 
harbour workers) (Hawkins, 1966:268-71; Blake, 1962:113-7).
One important effect of this period of economic instability 
and falling wages appears to have been the much greater reliance 
on payments in kind than in previous periods. But these 
payments were also the result of the expansion of government 
investment in various sectors. McCawley (1971a:100, 111) notes 
that in 1960 the PLN (State Electricity Company) paid a rice 
allowance to its employees which amounted to approximately 15 
percent of the total wage of an employee with three children 
(the percentage would have been slightly higher for a single 
employee). This rice allowance was later paid in kind and in 
addition to payments to the head of the household, each 
dependant was also granted a rice allowance. A similar 
situation appears to have prevailed in other parts of the public 
sector. These rice allowances which were also offered in public 
owned estates also helped to protect workers from declining 
real wages.
Wages in kind rose from approximately 20-30 percent of total 
wages of various groups of workers (workers on rubber and 
sugar estates and harbour workers) in Java in the early 1950s 
to 50-60 percent by 1961 (Hawkins, 1963:262); the percentage 
of wages paid in kind probably had risen even further by the mi 
1960s. In North Sumatra the percentage of wages paid in kind 
was already high in 1951 (64 percent) and had risen to over
80 percent by 1964 (Hawkins, 1966:268-9). The incomes of 
employees were to some extent insulated from price increases 
in firms where payments in kind played a major role. But in 
some sectors (for example kretek) payments in kind were not 
introduced and workers suffered an even greater decline in 
real incomes (Hawkins, 1963:262; 1966:268).
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Greater government participation in the economy also 
appears to have increased the 'welfare' nature of the wage 
system. In addition to payments in kind, family allowances 
were common in the public sector. These allowances played an 
increasing role in wage differentials within the PLN during the 
1960s and this was probably the case in other public sector 
employment as well (McCawley, 1971a:117).
Overall, wage differentials between different kinds of 
firm in the period 1950-65 probably increased slightly in the 
early period of the 1950s and then declined as a result of 
nationalisation, the increased role of the public sector in the 
labour market, higher rates of inflation and general economic 
stagnation. It also appears that there was a decline in wage 
differentials between various occupations. In the PLN the 
differential between the lowest and highest paid employees 
declined from 25:1 to 10:1 over the period 1960-67. A 
regulation in the newly nationalised estates in 1959 attempted 
to reduce differentials between lower and upper level personnel 
(Lim, 1962:11-2).
To sum up, significantly increased government attempts at 
labour protection and much greater freedom of trade union 
activities following Indonesian Independence did bring some 
major improvements to wage earners. The new labour laws 
probably overcame some of the worst abuses suffered by 
workers during the colonial period. Quite large and active 
trade unions assisted in the implementation of the new laws.
However the majority of Indonesia's wage earners 
benefited little from the new legislation and trade union 
activities. The new labour laws tended to be implemented 
only in the relatively small modern sector. Trade unions 
also were active mainly in modern sector firms. Thus, 
consistent with the experience of many other LDCs, government 
and trade union intervention in the labour market
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probably contributed to wider wage differentials between 
various groups of wage earners.
In the later years of guided democracy several forces 
tended to counter these pressures for wider wage differentials. 
High rates of inflation, relative economic stagnation, 
nationalisation of foreign enterprises and increased government 
participation in the economy probably all slowed down the 
tendency towards increased modern-traditional sector wage 
differentials. Our analysis of secondary wage data in 
Chapter Four suggests that intersectoral, interindustry and 
interfirm wage differentials may have begun to widen again with 
the inflow of foreign investment and rapid economic growth since 
1965. The next section examines the extent to which these 
differentials have been influenced by the government and trade 
unions. We shall see that, as in the period before 1965, these 
institutional forces have probably only had a minor influence 
on wage differentials in Indonesia under the New Order after 1965.
II. Institutional Influences on the Wage Structure under the
New Order
This section will briefly review the influence that 
institutional forces have had on the structure of wages under 
the New Order in Indonesia. The major issue is whether the 
pattern of wages described in Chapter Four has occurred primarily 
because of government or trade union intervention in the labour 
market or whether there are other explanations for interindustry 
and interfirm wage differentials. It is argued that the high 
wages in relatively capital intensive industries, and in large 
and foreign owned firms, cannot be attributed simply to the 
influence of these 'institutional' forces. In some areas - 
especially minimum wages and social welfare legislation - there 
has been greater intervention in the labour market than before 
1965. But several of these policies are very recent and their 
effects on the labour market are not yet visible. Moreover 
control of trade union activity has been tighter and more
156
effective than in the Soekarno era. Overall, there has not 
been a major change in the policies of either government or 
trade unions towards wages and working conditions in the 
private sector. We must search for other factors to explain 
the wide wage differentials which were obtained in the early 
and mid-1970s.
It is commonly believed that there has been a decline in 
the influence of these 'institutional' forces accompanying 
attempts to encourage a more laissez faire economy since 1965. 
This impression has been created by an exaggerated picture of 
the influence of both government and trade unions on wages in 
the private sector in the Soekarno period. As noted in the 
previous section, new labour legislation introduced in this 
period only had a significant impact on wage and working 
conditions in a small segment of relatively modern, highly 
unionised enterprises. Successive governments did not give 
high priority to new labour legislation.
The first two sections examine the changes in labour 
legislation since 1965 and indicate the extent to which this 
new legislation and existing legislation might have affected 
wages and working conditions. The next section discusses the 
impact of trade unions.
1. Minimum Wages
Direct intervention by the government in wage determination 
is relatively new in Indonesia. Minimum wages received some 
attention in efforts to extend labour protection in the 1950s 
but legislation has been initiated in a coordinated government 
programme only since 1975-76. Nevertheless, the government
Laws had already been drafted in the 1950s to set up Central 
and Regional Wage Boards to introduce minimum wage 
legislation. However the legislation was never enacted 
(Tedjasukmana, 1961:421, 448:51). Little was done until the 
early 1970s when following the example of the Jakarta 
Provincial Administration, several provinces (Central Java, 
Bali, East Nusatenggara, North Sumatra) set minimum wages for 
employees in the government sector. These wages were not 
binding on the private sector but were intended to provide a 
benchmark for private sector wages (McCawley and Manning, 
1976:44-5).
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has continued to move cautiously, in the scope of its
legislation, the pace of its introduction and in the
criteria which it has adopted for the setting of minimum 
1wages.
The government has opted for regional-sectoral minimum
wages (minimum wages set for individual sectors in each region)
rather than more ambitious regional or even a national
minimum wage. This is seen as a first step towards regional
and sectoral minimum wages and, in the longer term, a national
minimum wage. Although there has been much discussion of the
importance of introducing needs criteria measured by minimum
physical requirements (KFM) in the setting of minimum wages, in
practice these have not played a major role in determining
2minimum wage levels. Much greater attention has been given to
The procedures and principles for minimum wage legislation 
were worked out in a series of tripartite meetings between 
employers representatives , trade unions and government 
officials from 1974-76. The most important of these were 
the Lokakarya Pengupahan Nasional (National Workshop on 
Wages) held in Yogyakarta in August 1974 and Lokakarya 
Pengupahan (Wages Workshop) held in Medan in January 1976.
The broad principles underlining minimum wage policy are set 
out in the opening speech of the Minister of Manpower at the 
Lokakarya Pengupahan in Medan.
For several years the Department of Manpower has collected 
detailed data on monthly minimum physical requirements 
(Kebutuhan Fisik Minimum, KFM). The KFM are based on minimum 
nutritional requirements worked out by the Directorate of 
Nutrition in Jakarta. They also include estimates of the 
costs of fuel , housing, clothing and other items in various 
regions of Indonesia. The food item accounts for a major 
share of the KFM (in Jakarta in mid-1976 it contributed 51 
percent for a single man, and 73 percent for a married man 
with 3 children, to the total value of the KFM). However, it 
is unlikely that several items (meat, fruit, lighting, rent 
and various household goods) would be included in the regular 
budget of low income groups. Appendix Table 5.1 presents 
data on KFM for several regions of Indonesia for 1974. These 
may be compared with Sayogyo's (1974) poverty line (30 kg of 
rice a month, approximately Rp 3000-3500 in 1974 for a single 
man in urban areas). Such a comparison indicates that the 
KFM for Jakarta was approximately four times the poverty line; 
in most other regions the KFM was lower but still 
significantly higher than the poverty line. The ARTEP Report 
(1972:65) compared the KFM in Jakarta in 1972 with household
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current wage structure, and the capacity of small scale firms 
to pay. Broad statements of principles underlying minimum wage 
legislation emphasise that the government is concerned that 
minimum wages should not be set at a level which threatens the 
existence of small scale, low wage enterprises.1
In April 1976 the Minister of Manpower issued a decree
calling on Regional Wage Research Councils in each province to
carry out surveys of the wage structure and to submit proposals
for minimum wages in seven major industries: textiles
(including batik), cigarettes and kretek, estates, forestry
products, minerals, construction and other major light
2manufacturing industries in certain provinces. By the end of 
1977 several sectoral-regional and two region-wide (Central 
Java and North Sumatra) minimum wages had been ratified by 
the Central Government (Table 5.1). The minimum wages 
cover a wide range of industries according to their 
importance in different provinces (sawmills in West 
Kalimantan, coconut oil in North Sulawesi, kretek in East Java,
(continued)
budget data on expenditure on food and other items in Jakarta 
in 1968-69 and concluded that the KFM were 'unattainably 
high'.
For example, this point is stressed in the statement of the 
conclusions of a meeting on the technical aspects of minimum
wages in Semarang: 'The minimum wage .... must assist in
raising the standards of living especially of workers on very 
low wages but it must not threaten the existence especially 
of small scale, weak enterprises' (Indonesia, Department of 
Manpower, 1976:1, original in Indonesian, my translation).
The machinery for introduction of minimum wages was 
established in 1969 with the creation of a Central Government 
Wage Research Council (Dewan Penelitian Pengupahan Pusat) 
entrusted with the task of conducting research on wages and 
advising the Minister of Manpower on wage legislation. In 
1974 and 1975 Regional (provincial) Wage Research Councils 
were set up throughout Indonesia to investigate wages in 
their respective provinces and to advise their Governors on 
legislation to be submitted for approval by the Minister of 
Manpower.
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Table 5.1: Daily minimum wages in various industries
and regions, 1977
Province Decision Sector Year Rp/
day
I. Approved prior to
April 1976 decree
Sumatra
South Sumatra Minister Textiles 1975 400
Jambi Minister All sectors 1975 350
Java
Jakarta Governor Public sector 19 75 438
West Java Governor Textiles 19 74 125
East Java Governor Public sector 1975 260
East Indonesia
Bali Governor Public sector 1975 19 8
Husa Tenggara
Timur Governor Public sector 19 75 288
Irian Jaya - North Governor Public sector 19 75 300
- South Governor Public sector 19 75 270
II. Approved after April
19 76 decree
Sumatra
North Sumatra Minis ter All sectors 1976 431
Lampung Minister Construction 19 76 350
South Sumatra Minister Logging 1976 1250
West Sumatra Minister (1) Textiles 1976 350
(2) Construction 1976 400
Kalimantan
West Kalimantan Minister Sawmills 19 76 700
South Kalimantan Minister (1) Crumb rubber 1976 350
(2) Sawmills ply -
wood 1976 400
Java
Central Java Minister All sectors 1977 175
East Java Minister Kretek 1977 250
West Java Minister (1) Biscuits,
bread, cakes 1977 350
(2) Estates 1977 350
East Indonesia
Bali Minister (1) Canned food-
stuffs 1977 600
(2) Kretek 1977 650
South Sulawesi Minister Construction 1977 350
North Salawesi Minister Coconut oil 1977 350
Nusa Tenggara
Barat Minister Agriculture 1977 300
Source: Monthly and Quarterly Reports of Indonesia, Dept, of
Manpower (Laporan Pelaksanaan Program Kerja), 1974-1977.
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estates in West Java etc.). The large variations in minimum 
wages between sectors and regions indicate the government's 
concern to establish minimum wage rates which are broadly 
representative of market rates.
These new minimum wages represent a significant new step
in Indonesian government intervention in the labour market.
But, although it is too early to evaluate the impact of the new
legislation, it appears unlikely that it will have a major
effect on wages, either in the small scale sector or in large
scale establishments. As noted, the government has attempted
to set wage levels which do not jeopardise the existence of
small scale firms. Even if minimum wages are higher than
prevailing wages in small scale firms, it is unlikely that the
legal minimum will be strongly enforced.'*' Unionisation is low
in such firms and government enforcement of legislation is
difficult and costly. In large scale firms where unionisation
tends to be higher and government supervision more intensive,
2wages are likely to be already above the statutory minimum.
The burden of the new legislation will probably be felt most 
by medium scale firms.
2. Labour Protection and Welfare
Two major new laws concerning labour protection and welfare
have been introduced since 1965. First, in 1970 a law on
labour safety was introduced setting certain safety standards
3to be followed by firms. Second, new legislation establishing
a social insurance fund (Asuransi Sosial Tenaga Kerja, ASTER)
was passed in 1977. This law is likely to be of considerable4significance for workers' welfare and also for wage costs. The
One report on wages in the kretek industry in East Java notes 
that approximately one and a half years after minimum wage 
legislation was introduced, only 30 percent of firms paid 
wages equal to or above the minimum wage set for the industry 
(Kompas, 21/2/79).
We will take up this issue again in our discussion of wages in 
the two sample industries in Chapter Ten.
See Basic Law No.l, 1970.
See Government Regulation No.33, 1977.
3
4
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law applies only to firms with 100 or more employees or a wage 
bill of more than Rp 5m/month. The insurance fund provides 
workers' compensation, pensions and certain social contributions 
(payments to the families of a deceased employee, or for a 
marriage or a birth in the family). The fund is to be financed 
mainly by employers' contributions, supplemented by a small 
contribution from employees to a pension fund.^
ASTER is likely to be particularly important for employers
and employees in medium scale firms (with approximately 100-300
workers) where social insurance is much less comprehensive than
in many large scale firms. It is also likely to be more
important in these medium scale firms because ASTER is levied
on wage costs and, owing to more labour intensive techniques,
wage costs are likely to be a higher proportion of total costs
in these firms. Although ASTER excludes the large majority of
workers who are employed in manufacturing firms with less than
100 employees, it undoubtedly increases the number of wage
2earners receiving social welfare benefits.
In addition to safety regulations and ASTER, the government 
has encouraged collective labour agreements (CLAs) and work 
agreements (peraturan kerja) as a means of promoting the welfare 
of workers. The policy of encouraging the former (CLAs) has 
only had limited success: the Chairman of FBSI reported that 
up to January 1976 only 50 CLAs had been signed between
For most manufacturing industries the firm's contribution 
ranges from seven to 11 percent of wages and the individual's 
contribution to one percent of wages. The firm's 
contribution in the service sector is much lower (on 
average four percent) and in mining, timber and open sea 
fishing considerably higher. The overall range for all 
industries is two to four percent of wages. In most 
manufacturing industries the firm's contribution is five to 
eight percent of the wage bill for accident insurance, 1.5 
percent for pensions and 0.5 percent for death insurance.
According to the chairman of FBSI (Federation of Indonesian 
Trade Unions), over 300,000 workers were eligible for 
coverage by ASTER in 1977 (Sudono, 1977) .
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employers and employees (Pelita, 6/1/76).1 Owing to the slow 
spread of CLAs, in 1976 the Department of Manpower instructed 
all firms with more than 50 employees to draw up a list of 
work regulations covering wages and conditions of work. These 
were to be submitted to the department for approval. By May 1977 
just over 2,000 such agreements had been approved with slightly 
under half of all agreements being concluded in Jakarta and 
West Java (Indonesia, Department of Manpower, 1977a). Although 
this covers only a small proportion even of large and medium sized 
firms, it represents the implementation of labour legislation
on a wider scale than has hitherto been the case in Indonesia.
3. Implementation of Labour Protection Legislation
It is commonly believed that in several areas labour 
legislation has a significant effect on wage costs and labour 
allocation in Indonesia. These effects of the legislation 
have probably been exaggerated.2 Moreover, their impact on 
wages differs considerably between large and small scale firms.
We will look briefly at four subjects covered by labour laws 
which are relevant to this study. These are: (a) restriction
of hours of work, and confinement and menstruation leave among 
female employees, (b) restrictions on hours of work of 
children, (c) restrictions placed on hours of work of all 
employees, and (d) limitations placed on the rights of 
employers to dismiss workers.
Employment of females. Regulation of child and female 
employment in Indonesia dates back to the colonial period (see 
Section I).2 Female employment is not permitted at night under
Two and a half years later the Chairman of FBSI noted that 
only 1600 of 110,000 firms in Indonesia were covered by CLAs 
(Tempo, 29/7/78:48). It is not clear how this situation 
compares with 1976 since in several industries one CLA covers 
many firms in some regions.
This point has also been made by Leiserson (1978:63-6).
Unless Basic Laws (Undang-Undang) are enacted in new 
legislation, the clauses of the legislation are not valid. 
This is the case of much of Indonesian labour legislation and
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the 1951 Basic Law. However new legislation allows special 
permission to be granted.^- It appears that it is not difficult 
to obtain permission for night work provided that the firm can 
guarantee the safety of female employees especially in 
travelling between their homes and the factory. However in some 
regions social pressures militate against female employment at
2night and shortages of such workers appear to be quite common. 
These difficulties in obtaining female employees to work night 
shifts may help to explain a preference for male employees in
3many large scale firms.
Three months confinement and maternity leave on full pay 
and two days leave during menstruation are both additional 4costs which must be borne by firms employing female employees. 
Although it is unlikely that these regulations are implemented 
in small scale firms, they are quite important in the modern 
sector. These two articles of the labour law probably 
contribute to employment of less females in the modern sector.
3 (continued)
as a result old Dutch laws continue to apply despite major 
changes already foreshadowed in the Basic Laws.
See Decision No. 559/DD/II/Dpnpt/72 of the Directorate of 
Labour Protection and Maintenance (1972). The legislation 
states that it is necessary to grant permission for females 
to work at night because of increased labour demand 
especially in tourism; permits will be granted after taking 
into account the needs of increased production and weighing 
them against social and cultural considerations.
2 For example, despite quite high rates of female unemployment 
in the city of Bandung, several large scale firms offering 
relatively high wages have been unable to recruit a sufficient 
number of female employees to work shifts involving employment 
at night (Kompas, 4/3/76).
3 For example, in contrast to the situation in several other 
Asian countries (especially Japan), modern sector firms in 
textiles in Indonesia appear to have a preference for 
employment of males. One employer in Pekalongan (north 
Central Java) explained that in contrast to Japan it was not 
socially acceptable to house young girls in dormitories or to 
allow them to work at night.4 See Article 13, Basic Labour Law No.l, 1951.
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E m p lo y m en t  o f  c h i l d r e n . The c o l o n i a l  l a w s  r e g a r d i n g  c h i l d  
e m p l o y m e n t  c o n t i n u e  t o  a p p l y  i n  I n d o n e s i a .  I n  t h e o r y ,  f i r m s  
a r e  n o t  p e r m i t t e d  t o  e m p lo y  c h i l d r e n  u n d e r  t h e  a g e  o f  12 and  
may n o t  e m p l o y  c h i l d r e n  a g e d  1 2 - 1 8  on n i g h t  w ork  
(S oepom o,  1 9 7 5 : 4 5 - 5 4 ) .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  c h i l d  l a b o u r  i s  common i n  
s e v e r a l  i n d u s t r i e s  a n d  t h e  p l i g h t  o f  c h i l d  l a b o u r  h a s  r e c e i v e d  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  a t t e n t i o n  i n  p o p u l a r  l i t e r a t u r e  on c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
w ork  i n  I n d o n e s i a n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g .  The k r e t e k  i n d u s t r y  i s  
n o t o r i o u s  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  b u t  t h e  p r e s s  h a s  a l s o  n o t e d  t h a t  
e m p l o y m e n t  o f  c h i l d r e n  b e l o w  t h e  age  o f  12 i s  w i d e s p r e a s d  e v e n  
i n  l a r g e  c i t i e s  s u c h  a s  B an d u n g  an d  S o l o  (Kompas,  4 / 3 / 7 6 ,
6 / 3 / 7 9 ;  S u a r a  K a r y a ,  2 1 / 1 1 / 7 5 ) .  D e s p i t e  t h i s  a t t e n t i o n ,  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  h a s  n o t  r a i s e d  t h e  minimum a g e  e v e n  t o  14 i n  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  B a s i c  Law o f  1 9 5 1 .  I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  p o l i c y  
m a k e r s  a r e  a w a re  t h a t  i t  i s  e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  
e m p l o y m e n t  o f  c h i l d  l a b o u r  i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  i n d u s t r i e s  s u c h  a s  
k r e t e k  and  b a t i k . Thus  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  h e a d  o f  B andung  
Manpower  O f f i c e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  c h i l d r e n  b e l o w  t h e  age  o f  14 
s h o u l d  b e  a l l o w e d  t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  w ork  i n  j o b s  w h i c h  do n o t  
r e q u i r e  h e a v y  o r  d a n g e r o u s  w ork  (Kompas ,  4 / 3 / 7 6 ) .  M o r e o v e r  
many p e o p l e  p r o b a b l y  s h a r e  t h e  v i e w  e x p r e s s e d  by a Member o f  
P a r l i a m e n t  t h a t  i t  i s  s o c i a l l y  u n j u s t  t o  p r e v e n t  c h i l d r e n  o f  
p o o r  f a m i l i e s  f r o m  w o r k i n g  t o  a s s i s t  f a m i l y  in c o m e  ( N u s a n t a r a ,  
1 6 / 8 / 7 3 : 1 , 3 ) .
H o u r s  o f  w o r k . I n d o n e s i a n  l a b o u r  law  p r e s c r i b e s  a 40 h o u r ,  s i x
day  w o r k i n g  w e e k . ^  S p e c i a l  p e r m i s s i o n  m u s t  b e  g r a n t e d  f o r  an
e x t e n s i o n  o f  h o u r s  o f  w ork  t o  a maximum o f  54 h o u r s  a week ( n i n e
h o u r s  a d a y ) . R a t e s  o f  p a y  f o r  o v e r t i m e  a r e  s e t  a c c o r d i n g  t o
2
r u l e s  l a i d  down by  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  M anpow er .  I n  p r a c t i c e
^ F i r m s  w i s h i n g  t o  w o rk  a f i v e  d a y ,  40 h o u r  w o r k i n g  week m u s t  
o b t a i n  s p e c i a l  p e r m i s s i o n  f r o m  t h e  l o c a l  Manpower O f f i c e .
2
E m p l o y e e s  may w ork  a maximum o f  n i n e  h o u r s  a day  a t  on e  a n d  a 
h a l f  t i m e s  t h e  n o r m a l  r a t e s  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  h o u r  and  t w i c e  t h e  
n o r m a l  r a t e s  f o r  t h e  s e c o n d  h o u r .  On S u n d a y s  a n d  h o l i d a y s  
e m p l o y e e s  a r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  d o u b l e  p a y  f o r  up t o  s e v e n  h o u r s  
w o rk  a n d  t r i p l e  p a y  f o r  o v e r t i m e  ( s e e  D e c i s i o n  N o . 2 ,  1972 o f  
t h e  D i r e c t o r  o f  S u p e r v i s i o n  o f  Work N o r m s ) . D u r i n g  1 9 7 5 - 7 6  
t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  Manpower  r e c o r d s  t h a t  a p p r o x i m a t e l v  1 0 0 - 2 0 0
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there appears to be little difficulty in obtaining a permit to 
work more than the stipulated 40 hours. Implementation of these 
regulations is another area of difference between large and 
small enterprises. Various reports suggest that many small 
scale firms do not pay overtime in accordance with the 
regulations and some do not pay overtime at all.^
Dismissals. Quite stringent laws restricting employers' rights
to discharge workers have been frequently mentioned as an
obstacle to more rational allocation of labour in Indonesia.
The labour law requires that unless either the worker or the
worker's union agrees to a dismissal, individual dismissals must
2be permitted by regional disputes committes (P4D). Mass 
dismissals involving 10 or more workers must gain the approval 
of the Central Government Disputes Committee (P4P). The law 
regulates separation payments and long service payments that
3should be paid to discharged workers.
2 (continued)
firms were given special permission to work overtime each 
month (Dept, of Manpower, 1975b, 1976b).
 ^ For example, in October and November 1974, the Department of 
Manpower reported a total of nine weaving firms were fined 
for working longer than 40 hours a week (one firm worked a 
total of 71 hours without permission) (Indonesia, Dept. 
Manpower, 1974b). Similar reports appear from time to time 
in press reports of conditions of work in firms in Jakarta anc 
other regions (see for example, Sinar Harapan, 29/12/75, 
9/2/76; Kompas, 25/7/72, 31/8/72).
2 There seems to be some confusion in Indonesian law and in the 
interpretation of the law concerning the conditions under 
which employers must obtain permission from the P4D to 
execute an individual dismissal. Basic Law No.12, 1964 
(Articles 2 and 3) clearly states that permission is not 
needed if agreement between the employer and employee (or his 
union) is reached. This is contradicted by a
later decision of the Department of Manpower on the execution 
of the 1964 Law (see Decision of the Director General of 
Protection and Maintenance of Manpower, No.362, 1967; see alsc 
Soepomo, 1970:125). In practice, if agreement is reached 
between employer and employee on the dismissal, it is not 
generally taken to the P4D (see for example the statement of 
the Head of Jakarta Manpower Office, Kompas, 28/6/76).3 Separation payments are set according to the duration of 
employment with the firm in question (the maximum payment is 
four times the employees wage). Long service payments are 
payable after six years of service and may amount to as much
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The limitations which this legislation place on employer
decision-making can be exaggerated. A high proportion of
individual dismissals are settled between the employer and
employee without recourse to the disputes committees. Even if a
dispute does occur it appears that the legislation is
administered relatively efficiently.^ In the words of one
commentator the legislation '... now appears to be administered
in a prompt and reasonable fashion. Requests for dismissal of
superfluous or indisciplined workers are usually accepted and
2consent given within a week' (Leiserson, 1978:65).
Mass dismissals are a much more sensitive issue in 
Indonesia. The negotiations over these may take time and cause 
considerable cost to the firm (Arndt and Sundrum, 1975). d3ut 
as with other aspects of the labour law, special P4P permission 
for dismissal in practice applies only to large modern sector 
firms and especially to foreign enterprises. It is rare that 
the P4P does not agree to the company's demands provided that 
suitable separation payments are made. Two cases among foreign 
enterprises (Caltex and British American Tobacco) have received 
some attention in the press in recent years. But both were
3 (continued)
as five months wages for employees with more than 25 years 
service (see Regulation of the Minister of Labour No.9,
1964).
The reports of the Department of Manpower do not 
record disputes going before all P4D . Only a small number are 
recorded for Indonesia during 1975 and the first six months 
of 1976. On average only 60 disputes, a high proportion 
involving cases of dismissal, are recorded as going before 
P4D each month over this period. On average the P4D reached 
decisions on 45 of these disputes each month (see Laporan 
Pelaksanaan Program Kerja, January 1975-June 1976).
2 Interviews with labour officials in Bandung suggested that 
employers, especially of large firms, were often supported 
by the P4D committees because of their contacts with 
powerful (military or civilian) groups who could influence 
the decisions of the committees. In addition to quite 
flexible administration of the law, firms are given leeway 
in their hiring and firing policies by a three month 
probationary period and by provisions for the employment of 
contract labour.
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settled relatively quickly once compensation payments were 
agreed upon.^
Owing to a shortage of manpower and facilities, enforcement 
of labour law is largely restricted to the modern sector in 
Indonesia. In 1969 a Department of Manpower Official reported 
that there were only 132 job safety officers for all Indonesia 
compared with an estimated need of 700 to inspect each of the 
25,000 (large and medium sized) enterprises once a year 
(Indonesia Raya, 10/12/69:2). Other problems are lack of 
transport facilities and general financial support for labour 
supervision activities. Bastos' (1968:20) observation still
adequately describes the problems of implementing labour 
protection legislation in Indonesia:
Enforcement of labour regulations is impeded by low 
budgetary allotments and a shortage of qualified 
personnel. The Labor Inspection Service and Labor 
Safety Inspection Service have only a token work force 
for the number of establishments to be covered. They 
are further handicapped by distances and shortages of 
transport facilities. As a consequence, the 
application of labor legislation is restricted almost 
entirely to large foreign owned concerns which the 
government regards as more able to absorb the cost 
of implementing such legislation.
In conclusion, labour legislation covering all four 
subjects (employment of women and children, hours of work and 
dismissals) discussed in this section has tended to have greater 
influence in modern sector firms. These firms are more closely 
watched by the Department of Manpower Officials and given 
greater attention by trade unions and the media. For example, 
these modern sector firms are more sensitive to charges of 
exploitation of child labour, or of failing to adequately 
guarantee the safety of women employed on night shifts. The 
Department of Manpower and unions are quick to act on any 
reports of improper payment of overtime allowances or excessive 
hours of work in modern sector firms. It is also more difficult 
for these firms to dismiss workers.
The Caltex case involved 1,356 workers and British American 
Tobacco 512 employees (Berita Yudha, 15/4/69; Nusantara, 
22/4/69).
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As Bastos has suggested, these aspects of the labour law 
tend to have even greater impact on foreign firms. Nationalist 
criticism of foreign investment is still strong in Indonesia 
and exploitation of Indonesian workers is one charge to which 
foreign firms tend to be singularly sensitive. Dismissal 
cases in foreign firms in particular receive considerable 
public attention and may drag on for several months.^"
The greater influence of these aspects of the labour law 
in modern sector firms undoubtedly contributes to higher wage 
costs in these firms. They probably also result in even wider 
differentials in wage costs between firms and industries than 
the wage differentials described in Chapter Four. But they are 
unlikely to account for the large interfirm and interindustry 
wage differentials identified in that chapter.
4. The 'Development' and Control of Trade Unions
Since 1965 the trade union movement has had even less 
influence on wages and working conditions in the private 
sector than during the Soekarno era. Steps taken to reduce 
the political influence of trade unions after 1965 greatly 
weakened the movement. The banning of SOBSI which was the 
largest and most active trade union in the country imprisonment 
of many of its leaders and discrimination against ex-members 
dealt a severe blow to the trade union movement. Although the 
disappearance of SOBSI did not signify an end to trade union 
activity in Indonesia, the remaining unions were not united and 
received little government support. Following reorganisation of 
the political parties after the general elections in 1971 the 
badly splintered trade union movement was merged into a large, 
government-supported labour front. In this section we trace 
the steps leading to the creation of this new organisation and, in
1 See for example press reports on the closure of the British 
American Tobacco plant in Surabaya in 1972 (Pedoman, 17/4/72: 
2; Berita Buana, 25/5/72:2).
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general terms, discuss its impact on wages and working 
conditions in Indonesia.^
The large number of trade unions that continued to operate
in Indonesia after the 1965 attempted coup continued to have
some influence on wages and working conditions in areas where
they (and the political parties to which they were affiliated)
had traditional support (especially in parts of West Java and
the Outer Islands). However, in Central and East
Java (and in large public sector unions such as the railway
workers) where SOBSI affiliated unions had been strongest,
tight control over trade union activities and fear of
association with SOBSI prevented the development of effective
trade union representation for several years. Even
in areas where trade unions survived, continued domination by
political parties ensured that they remained mainly vehicles of
2political action and advancement. This was particularly true 
in an atmosphere in which many of the issues involving the 
rights of workers were sensitive politically because of their 
association with the platforms of the former left wing unions. 
Infighting between members and needless competition at 
enterprise level, as in the period before 1965, contributed to 
a relatively weak and divided labour movement.
The New Order government introduced two major changes to 
the industrial relations scene in an attempt to create a 
stronger, 'development-orientated' labour movement. First, it 
introduced the notion of 'Pancasila' labour relations based 
on cooperation and conciliation on a tripartite basis between
There has been virtually no research on the development of 
trade unions in Indonesia after 1965. The following sections 
are based on newspaper cuttings, various Department of 
Manpower reports and interviews with government officials 
and trade union leaders.
One outstanding example of the domination of trade unions by 
political parties was the direct intervention of the leaders 
of the Muslim Party, NU, in the election of the leadership of 
its affiliate labour organisation SARBUMUSI in September 1969 
(Nusantara, 11/9/69).
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employers, employees and the government. This was to replace
the confrontative attitudes of both unions and firms which
prevailed prior to 1965. Second, the government encouraged
unified union management of the labour movement. The
amalgamation of various unions in February 1973 into FBSI
(The All Indonesia Labour Federation) appeared as an independent
2decision of the major trade unions. In reality this
unification was mainly achieved through encouragement and
3behind-the-scenes pressure from the government.
The formation of FBSI in 1973 ushered in a new era for the 
labour movement and labour relations in Indonesia. It changed 
the essentially political nature of the movement to a much more 
functional one. The new federation of trade unions was not 
directly tied to any one political party and its leaders were
Although the exact nature of 1Pancasila labour relations' is 
rather vague its stated aims are cooperation among 
employers, employees and the government in raising production 
sharing profits and carrying out responsibilities to God, 
society, the worker's family and to the firm. These goals 
are to be implemented through tripartite and bipartite 
bodies, collective labour agreements, a workers' court, 
regulations protecting workers, worker education and other 
special avenues (see especially Ali Murtopo, 1975:17-31; 
Decision of the National Seminar on Pancasila Labour 
Relations, Jakarta, December 1974).
FBSI was not the first body set up to represent the trade 
unions since 1965. KABI (Kesatuan Aksi Buruh Indonesia) was 
formed in 1966 to assist other mass organisations in the 
overthrow of Soekarnoist forces. KABI had only short term 
political objectives and was superceded by MPBI (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Buruh Indonesia) consisting of 21 labour 
unions. MPBI functioned as a coordinating body and, from 
time to time, spokesman for the trade union movement. It did 
not greatly reduce the independent and often quite 
competitive activities of individual members.
As early as 1968 the Minister of Manpower had suggested that 
Indonesia needed a unified trade union movement (Sinar 
Harapan, 6/11/68; Nusantara, 14/12/68). This opinion was 
reiterated several times by the new minister (Sadli) (see for 
example Berita Buana, 18/9/72:2) . It is likely that the 
presidential advisor Ali Murtopo (who appears to have played 
an important role in developing the ideas of Pancasila 
labour relations) played a key role both in persuading 
various trade unions to join FBSI and also in supporting 
certain factions for leadership of the new organisation.
171
from several different political parties and unions.  ^ But the 
new organisation was not a strong independent force: it owed
its existence to government support; all its leaders were 
approved by the government; in its early years it depended 
almost entirely on the government for funds; and its structure 
was unwieldy and bureaucratic.
The constitution of the FBSI provides for democratic 
election of trade union leaders at various national and regional 
congresses. But initially FBSI leaders appear to have been 
chosen on the basis of musyarwarah (mutual consultation) between 
existing unions, the government and various extra-governmental 
agencies involved with security and political development. At 
all levels, trade union leaders had to be approved by local 
internal security agencies and police. Quite a high proportion 
of its leaders are ex-military men or even businessmen and many 
have little or no experience in trade union affairs. At 
enterprise level new leaders must be approved by the Regional 
Council on the recommendation of the branches. In practice 
managers of enterprises tend to play a major role in the 
appointment of enterprise union leaders. In many firms union 
leaders are managers or supervisors.^
The government is wary of the potential political power of 
such a large organisation. Only in 1977 was a law passed giving 
FBSI the right to collect dues from its members through a
3check-off system (deducted from salaries and paid by the firm).
The General Chairman of FBSI is from the Muslim trade union, 
GASBINDO. In the 1977 general elections FBSI remained 
independent and several of its Central Executive Council 
members stood for election in each of the three political 
parties (three stood for PPP, three for PDI and four for 
GOLKAR).
This information is based on interviews with trade union 
officials in Bandung and Majalaya. In Majalaya even at 
enterprise level union leaders need a clearance from local 
police officials.
Dues to be collected by the FBSI from its members are set out 
in a ministerial decision and range from Rp 25 for employees 
earning less than Rp 5,000 a month to Rp 500 for employees 
earning more than Rp 50,000 a month (see Decision of the 
Minister of Manpower 01/MEN/77).
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In addition the government has successfully kept tight control
of traditionally vocal, public sector employees. All public
sector employees (including employees in all categories of
public enterprise - perum, perjan and persero) are obliged to
join a separate, employees organisation KORPRI (Korps Pegawai
Republic Indonesia).^ Since the representatives of KORPRI are
usually senior civil servants or managers of the state
enterprises, the organisation is more an employers organisation
than a trade union (Hadisumanto and Salim, 1978). Government
Law No.23 1967 controls the level of wages and general
conditions of work in public enterprises and ministerial and
enterprise laws are passed within these guidelines to suit
conditions in individual public firms. There is no machinery
for settlement of individual labour disputes and to mid-1978
no public enterprise had drawn up a collective labour agreement
(Tempo, 29/7/78:48). It appears that many articles of the
2labour law are not followed by these firms.
The FBSI is extremely top heavy and bureaucratic. It
contains both industry-wide and regional hierarchies. The
trade unions are organised primarily on an industry basis with
21 industrial unions organised at three levels: Central,
3Regional (in practice, Provincial) and Branch (cabang). There 
is also a coordinating body for all unions at Central,
Regional and Branch levels.
See Presidential Decree 82, 1971.
Hadisumanto and Salim (1978:Appendix 3) list a range of 
activities in many state enterprises (employees on probation 
for six months or more, overtime work without a permit, no 
provision for indemnity allowances and no formal arrangements 
governing grievances) which are in conflict with basic 
articles of the labour law.
The industry-wide unions include agricultural and estate 
workers, oil and mineral industry workers, cigarette and 
tobacco workers, textile and clothing workers, etc. and also 
workers in several service and transport industries (trade, 
banking and insurance employees, employees in tourism, 
maritime workers, transport workers, health workers etc.).
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A l t h o u g h  on p a p e r  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a r a p i d  e x p a n s i o n  o f  FBSI 
s i n c e  i t s  f o u n d i n g  i n  19 7 3 ,"*" i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  t h a t  t h e  new t r a d e  
u n i o n  o r g a n i s a t i o n  h a s  h a d  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  i n f l u e n c e  on w a g es  
o r  w o r k i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  a t  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  l e v e l .  G o v e rn m e n t  
l e g i s l a t i o n  ( f o r  e x a m p l e ,  c o n t r o l s  p l a c e d  on t h e  r i g h t  t o  s t r i k e )  
l i m i t s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  t h e  s c o p e  o f  u n i o n  a c t i v i t y .  The g o v e r n m e n t  
( i n c l u d i n g  s e c u r i t y  an d  p o l i c e  o f f i c i a l s )  a n d  e m p l o y e r s  h a v e  a 
g r e a t  d e a l  o f  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n  
o f f i c e r s .  As a r e s u l t  u n i o n s  a r e  more  l i k e l y  t o  be  i n s t r u m e n t s  
o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  w o r k e r s  t h a n  c h a m p i o n s  o f  t h e i r  r i g h t s .
The r e l a t i v e  w e a k n e s s  o f  t h e  u n i o n s  may b e  s e e n  f r o m  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  e m p h a s i s  on  w ork  a g r e e m e n t s  ( s e t  u n i l a t e r a l l y  by  t h e  
f i r m )  r a t h e r  t h a n  c o l l e c t i v e  l a b o u r  a g r e e m e n t s  a s  a means  o f  
e n s u r i n g  a c c e p t a b l e  minimum w a g e s  a n d  w o r k i n g  c o n d i t i o n s .  I n  
m o s t  f i r m s ,  u n i o n s  a p p e a r  t o  be  t o o  weak t o  n e g o t i a t e  c o l l e c t i v e  
l a b o u r  a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t .
The r e l a t i v e  w e a k n e s s  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n s  h a s  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,
p r e v e n t e d  i s o l a t e d  p o c k e t s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  u n r e s t  m a i n l y  i n
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  low w a g es  and  p o o r  w o r k i n g  c o n d i t i o n s .  The
v i r t u a l  b a n  on s t r i k e s  h a s  n o t  c o m p l e t e l y  c o n t a i n e d  I n d o n e s i a n
w o r k e r s .  The D e p a r t m e n t  o f  Manpower  r e p o r t s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  e i g h t
s t r i k e s  i n  e i g h t  m o n th s  o f  1 9 7 4 ,  16 s t r i k e s  i n  1975 an d  a
f u r t h e r  s e v e n  i n  t h e  f i r s t  s e v e n  m o n th s  o f  1976 (L a p o r a n
P e l a k s a n a a n  P r o g r a m  K e r j a , 1 9 7 4 - 7 6 ) .  A l m o s t  a l l  o f  t h e s e
s t r i k e s  h a v e  b e e n  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  wage c l a i m s  and  a s m a l l  n u m b er
2a r o s e  o u t  o f  a n n u a l  b o n u s  an d  H a r i  Raya  p a y m e n t  c l a i m s .  A h i g h
The D e p a r t m e n t  o f  Manpower r e p o r t s  j u s t  u n d e r  6 , 5 0 0  u n i o n s  i n  
a l l  I n d o n e s i a  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  1977 ( s e e  L a p o r a n  P e l a k s a n a a n  
P r o g r a m  K e r j a , J a n u a r y  1 9 7 8 ) .  A t  t h e  F o u r t h  A n n i v e r s a y  o f  
FBSI i t s  C h a i r m a n  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  FBSI h a d  e s t a b l i s h e d  26 
R e g i o n a l  C o u n c i l s  an d  211 B r a n c h  c o u n c i l s .  A l l  21 C e n t r a l  
I n d u s t r i a l  U n io n  B o d i e s  h a d  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d  a n d  o v e r  4 , 0 0 0  
e n t e r p r i s e  u n i o n s  w e r e  i n  o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  a c l a i m e d  m e m b e r s h i p  
o f  o v e r  f o u r  m i l l i o n  w o r k e r s .
S e v e n  o f  t h e  43 s t r i k e s  r e c o r d e d  o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 7 4 - 7 7  
o c c u r r e d  b e c a u s e  o f  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h  b o n u s e s  o r  H a r i  
R aya  p a y m e n t s ,  s e v e r a l  o t h e r s  o c c u r r e d  f o r  a v a r i e t y  o f  
r e a s o n s  a n d  t h e  r e m a i n d e r  b e c a u s e  o f  wage c l a i m s .
2
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proportion took place in Jakarta in relatively large firms, 
many of which were Japanese joint ventures.^ However these few
2strikes have caused only minor disturbance to industrial peace.
Overall the government has been quite successful in controlling
and directing the activities of trade unions and in limiting
3the amount of industrial unrest in Indonesia since 1965.
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have examined the influence of 
institutional forces on the wage structure in Indonesia over 
three historical periods. Three major conclusions emerge from 
this survey. First, despite the very different political and 
economic environments which prevailed in the different 
historical periods, government and trade union intervention in 
the labour market has had little influence on the wages and 
working conditions of the majority of wage earners. Surplus 
labour supply conditions which had already emerged in Java by 
the beginning of the 19th Century have been the dominant 
influence on the incomes and conditions of work of wage earners 
in each of the three periods.
Second, the influences of government legislation and 
policies and trade union activities have been mainly felt in 
modern sector firms and especially by the foreign sector. There 
is little evidence of significant foreign domestic wage 
differentials during the colonial period when these institutional 
forces were weak. These differentials begun to emerge only with 
the new labour legislation and trade union activities in the
Approximately half of all disputes occurred in Jakarta, 
approximately 25 percent were in Japanese joint ventures and 
nearly half were in partly or totally foreign owned companies 
(Laporan Pelaksanaan Program Kerja, various months 1974-77).
2 However it should be noted that some strikes probably are not 
recorded in official statistics.
More recently there has been an increase in industrial unrest 
in response to price rises resulting from devaluation in late 
1978. See for example, Kompas 25/5/79 which provides a report 
on the increased number of strikes in Jakarta in the first 
half of 1979. See also Tempo, 16/6/79:8-12.
3
175
1950s (although the tendency towards widening wage differentials 
was cut short by nationalisation, high rates of inflation and 
economic stagnation). Since 1965 institutional pressures have 
probably contributed to widening interindustry and interfirm wage 
differentials, in particular between foreign and domestic firms.
Since Independence the small scale sector appears to have 
been little influenced by either trade unions or government 
legislation. We find the paradoxical situation in which 
legislation has been introduced to overcome abuses by employers 
that occur chiefly in the small scale sector, but the government 
has neither the means nor the will (mainly because of the 
employment implications) to implement much of the legislation 
in this sector. Indeed, some legislation deliberately excludes 
small scale enterprises. Labour legislation is to some extent 
a charade in poor countries like Indonesia.
Medium scale firms (in which conditions are often well 
below those required by law) may be more affected by government 
legislation and trade union activities than the large or small 
scale firms. Even in medium scale firms institutional forces 
appear to be relatively weak compared with several other Asian 
countries with longer histories of minimum wages, more 
comprehensive labour protection laws and a greater administrative 
capacity to implement these laws (see Watanabe, 1976).
Third, despite the greater impact of institutional forces 
in the modern sector there is little evidence to suggest that 
the quite large differentials in wages that emerged in the post- 
1965 period have been mainly the result of these institutional 
forces. New government legislation and better implementation 
of legislation may have contributed to improvements in wages 
and working conditions in modern sector firms. Trade unions 
have undoubtedly had greater impact in the modern sector and 
among foreign firms in the post-1965 period. But there is 
little evidence that government policies account for the quite 
large differentials that have emerged. Moreover the trade 
union movement has been much weaker since 1965 than at any 
time during the previous 15 years.
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It is difficult to demonstrate precisely how these 
institutional forces influence wages and working conditions. 
The relationship between government legislation, trade unions 
and changes in wages and working conditions is a complex 
subject which requires a study of its own, reaching beyond 
the confines of economics. The case-study which is the 
focus of this thesis explores alternative hypotheses which 
help to explain wage differentials within the manufacturing 
sector. The analysis of survey data supports the conclusions 
of the broad survey conducted in this chapter.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the causes of 
wage differentials, it is necessary to examine in Chapter 
Six the major economic characteristics and the nature of 
labour markets in the three industries that have been 
selected for intensive study. Several of the special 
characteristics of these three industries are important 
to an understanding of the wage structure and its 
determinants in the sample firms.
CHAPTER SIX
THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES OF 
THREE INDUSTRIES: WEAVING, KRETEK AND CIGARETTES
In the previous two chapters we reviewed employment patterns, 
wage structure and institutional influences on wages in the 
manufacturing sector in Indonesia. This chapter describes the 
industrial structure, employment and wages in three industries - 
weaving, kretek (clove cigarettes) and cigarettes - that have 
been selected for our field survey. It provides an important 
link between the more macro aspects of the labour market 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five and the analysis of survey 
data in later chapters.
A major objective of the thesis is to examine the extent to 
which wage differentials in manufacturing are associated with 
certain features of industrial structure, mainly differences in 
technology, ownership and, to a lesser extent, size of industrial 
establishments. The industries included in the field survey 
were chosen with the aim of examining the influence of these 
three variables on wages. The three industries are characterised 
by considerable diversity in size, technology and ownership 
patterns. The weaving industry is the most heterogeneous. Firms 
in this industry exhibit large differences in all three features 
of industrial structure. The kretek industry is marked by 
relatively homogeneous, labour intensive technology. However 
in this industry there is a wide range in size of firm.
Cigarette firms do not display a wide range in either size of 
firm or technology but they contrast in ownership patterns.
In this chapter we examine the main characteristics of 
industrial structure in each of the three industries and 
investigate other aspects of production and employment which 
are relevant to the study of wage differentials. These include 
the geographical location of firms, wage systems and the extent 
of employment of certain kinds of workers, especially female and 
rural workers. It is necessary to examine the industrial 
characteristics of the three industries in some detail because of
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the central role which they play in our later investigation of 
the causes of wage differentials. The survey of these 
characteristics indicates a wide range in technology and size of 
firm which challenges the notion of a simple dualistic pattern. 
The examination of secondary data on wages and worker 
characteristics enables us to analyse the field survey data in a 
broader perspective. It also provides some valuable information 
concerning the process of wage determination in the three 
industries. This is essential for the interpretation of the 
survey data.
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first 
two deal with the basic industrial structure, location of firms 
and nature of production in weaving, and kretek and cigarettes. 
The final part briefly examines the secondary data on wages and 
employment patterns in the three industries.
I. The Weaving Industry
The weaving industry is ideal for analysing some of the 
issues raised in earlier chapters. It is one of the oldest 
industries in Indonesia and one of the most complex. The 
industry is characterised by a wide range in technology and 
size of firm, and by diverse ownership patterns. Thus it 
enables us to study the influence of labour demand patterns 
associated with varying size, technology and ownership patterns 
on wages and working conditions. In this part of the chapter 
we examine the history of the industry and its current structure.
1. The Development of the Weaving Industry in Java
In Java the weaving industry developed beyond the household 
phase of production with the spread of the handloom (ATBM - 
alat tenun bukan mesin) in the late 1920s. From the earliest 
years handlooms had to compete with mechanised production which 
was introduced into West Java in the 1930s. Partly because of 
protection given by the government, ATBMs competed successfully 
with the mechanised sector in this period and also in the first 
15 years of Independence (Palmer, 1968:213-32). Up to the 
mid-1960s it appears that handloom production of mass consumption 
cloth, particularly sarongs and cambric, continued to grow.
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It has been estimated that in 1964 ATBMs provided employment 
for approximately four times the number of employees in the 
mechanised sector (Hill, forthcoming:Ch.4).
A major change began to occur in the structure of the 
industry after 1967. The changes may be attributed to the 
influence of several factors: the abolition of central yarn 
allocations (which had provided protection to the small scale 
sector), the admission and encouragement of foreign and large 
scale domestic investment and an improvement in the investment 
climate generally. Mainly due to the rapid increase in new 
relatively capital intensive investment, production of woven 
cloth expanded rapidly after 1967. The period 1967~76/77 
registered an almost fivefold increase in cloth production 
(from 225 million metres to 1215 million metres). Foreign 
capital bagan to play an important, though by no means 
dominant, role in the industry.
Despite government policies which have encouraged
the inflow of foreign investment and modern capital equipment,
it is surprising that much of the investment in weaving in
the post-1965 period has been in small scale establishments.^
Continued investment in relatively small scale industry tends
to question the common view that this sector cannot compete
2with large scale firms.
Perhaps of even greater significance for the productivity 
of the weaving industry since 1967 has been the increased use 
of high productivity, automatic looms and the decline of the3ATBM sector. The use of handlooms began to fall rapidly after
Over half of all new projects in weaving were in firms with 
less than 50 looms (in most of these, employment would have 
been much less than 100) and over 20 percent of the new 
firms had less than 20 looms (Indonesia, Direktorat Jenderal 
Industri Tekstil, 1976).
For example, Boucherie (1969:58) suggested that 'economic 
operation requires units of a minimum size of 200 looms'.
A few firms had imported automatic looms before 1965 but3
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government protection of the industry was withdrawn in 1967.^ 
Hill (forthcoming:Ch.4) estimates that the number of ATBM in 
operation has probably halved for all Indonesia in the period 
1968-75.
2. Industrial Structure: Size, Technology and Ownership
In this study we are concerned mainly with the relationship
between two characteristics of industrial structure - especially
technology and ownership of firms - and wages. Here we examine
briefly the nature of each and also the size of firms in the
2weaving industry.
Size of firm. Despite the changes in the structure of the 
industry since 1967, a surprisingly high proportion of firms 
reported in the 1974/75 Industrial Census were small scale or 
cottage. Throughout Indonesia 36,000 cottage industry and 2,200 
small scale weaving establishments operated in 1974 compared 
with 400 medium scale and 170 large scale establishments.
Cottage industries were mainly located outside Java whereas most 
large, medium and small firms operated in Java. Only 28 of the 
570 mechanised weaving establishments were located outside Java.
1 (continued)
these were an exception. Unfortunately there are no data 
on the proportion of new firms using automatic looms.
The proportion of handlooms in use compared with the total 
number of looms registered provides a crude but telling 
picture of this decline. The percentage of handlooms in 
operation in 1975 was only 36 percent (56,000) of all looms 
registered in Java. The percentage was even lower (less 
than 15 percent) in West Java (Hill, forthcoming:Ch.4).
2 The two major sources of data on the size, technology 
and ownership of weaving establishments used in this 
chapter are the 1974/75 Industrial Census and the 
list of all mechanised weaving firms published by the 
Textiles Directorate General (Indonesia, Direktorat 
Jenderal Industri Tekstil, 1976). For a discussion of 
various shortcomings of industrial statistics in Indonesia 
see McCawley and Tait (1979).
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In Java the large majority of establishments are cottage 
and small scale ATBMs. But the majority of employees are in 
medium and large scale establishments (Table 6.1) -
But the industry is by no means concentrated. Few plants
employ 1,000 employees in weaving alone (although there are
quite a large number of integrated textile plants of this
size). Hill has estimated that the top four firms produce
2well below 10 percent of the industry's total output.
According to this criteria of seller concentration, the 
industry was relatively competitive.
Technology. The division of the industry into mechanised 
and non-mechanised components highlights the dualistic nature 
of weaving in Indonesia. Recently, however, this dualistic 
structure has been further complicated by the introduction 
of modern automatic looms in many firms. The new technology 
is so much more productive than the semi-automatic ATMs that 
at least a threefold division is needed to describe the range
Whereas ATBM employment was concentrated in smaller 
firms (mainly in firms with 10-19 and 20-49 employees), 
approximately 75 percent of all employment in ATMs 
was in firms with 100 or more employees. Overall, 
the cottage sector accounted for only seven percent 
of all estimated employment in the industry in Java, 
the small scale firms (5-19 employees) 17 percent, 
medium sized firms (20-99 employees) 32 percent and 
large scale firms 44 percent. Although the small 
and medium sectors are quite large their contribution 
to total employment in the industry is much less 
than it is for the manufacturing sector as a whole 
(see Chapter Four).
This level is well below the 40 percent of production 
in the top four firms which Scherer (1970:60) suggests 
is a rough indication of the presence of oligopolistic 
power.
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of technology used in the industry (Plates 6.1 to 6.6 show 
the wide range in technology in preparation and weaving 
activities in the weaving industry.)"*“ The range in physical 
productivity and in labour inputs used per loom is shown 
in Table 6.2. Output per unit of labour from automatic 
looms is approximately 50 times that of handlooms and 10-15 
times that of semi-automatic looms. The differences would 
be even greater if quality differences in output were taken 
into account.
From an international perspective, textiles is regarded
as a labour intensive industry (see for example Lary, 1967).
But from a domestic viewpoint the extent of labour intensity
depends on which segment is being discussed. While the
handloom sector is relatively labour intensive, automatic
ATMs must rank high relative to many Indonesian firms in
capital intensity. However, since the secondary data fail
to distinguish these various subsectors in estimates of
capital and other inputs used, interindustry comparisons from
2these sources are of limited usefulness.
Hill disaggregated a step further to develop a fourfold 
division of firms based on different technologies. He 
identified ATBMs, two classes of semi-automatic ATM and 
automatic ATM.
Electricity consumed and expenditure on spare parts per 
unit of labour is much lower than in spinning or in 
more capital intensive industries such as structural 
metals. These indicators of capital intensity rank 
much higher in weaving than in the predominantly labour 
intensive sectors such as batik, kretek or tobacco 
processing. Since the data fail to distinguish even 
between mechanised and non-mechanised sections of these 
industries, these differences are only of very general 
significance.
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WEAVING TECHNOLOGY
Plate 6.1
Close-up of handloom operator. 
(Pedan).
Plate 6.2
Large handloom factory. One op­
erator 10-12 metres cambric per 
day. (Majalaya).
Plate 6.3
Japanese plant. One operator to 
30 looms, 750 metres of cloth a 
shift. (Bandung).
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PREPARATION OF YARN 
FOR WEAVING
Plate 6.4
Medium scale factory, semi-auto­
matic machines. (Pedan).
Plate 6.6
Non mechanised, handloom factory; 
young children and older women. 
(Majalaya).
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Table 6.2: Number of operators per machine and labour
productivity in weaving
Technique
Output/ 
machine 
shif t-2
Machines/
operators
Output per 
operator/ 
shift
Automatic looms 30 15-40 450-1,200
Semi-automatic
looms 20-25 2-5 45-125
Handlooms 8-12 1 13
Metres of blacu (cambric).
Source: Java Wages Survey 1975-76.
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The new investment in the modern sector in weaving has 
created a demand for a range of new skills.'*" This is one 
industry that probably has been affected by the shortage of 
skilled and professional manpower in Indonesia (see Chapter 
Four). Modern sector firms also have had to train less skilled 
employees (especially machine operators) to operate the new 
machinery. There is a similar contrast in the tasks performed 
by other machine operators. But completely unskilled labour 
administrative and supervisory labour is likely to be less 
technology-specific. Loom operators in weaving who man 
15-40 automatic looms in large scale establishments, require 
skills and perform tasks different from those of handloom 
operators in small scale factories.
Ownership patterns. In addition to wide variations in size of 
firm and technology, any study of the weaving industry is 
further complicated by diverse ownership patterns. These 
include foreign (joint venture) firms, state enterprises 
and cooperatives, and private domestic owned establishments.
By 1976 16 foreign firms (most of which were integrated 
spinning, weaving and finishing textile plants) operated weaving 
plants in Indonesia. These included 10 Japanese, three Hong Kong 
and one British and one American owned investment. All were 
joint ventures. With the exception of the British investment in
The relationship between technology and new labour demand 
patterns will be examined in detail in the analysis of 
our survey data.
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East Java, all are recent investments under the 1967 foreign 
investment law.
By Indonesian (though not by international) standards, 
these foreign firms were relatively large: five operated more 
than 500 looms and nine more than 350. Although foreign firms 
accounted for one-third of all firms with 500 looms or more, 
their overall loomage was less than 10 percent of all looms 
and employment in ATMs. Employment was probably a slightly 
smaller proportion of total employment in mechanised firms.
Before 1965 12 state enterprises were in operation in the 
weaving industry in Indonesia. These included several 
nationalised private Dutch investments and large Dutch government 
plants, and also weaving plants attached to large government 
spinning plants established in the 1950s and 1960s. Several 
of these plants are now run directly by the Central Government 
(or PN Sandang, the national textile company). Several others 
(including four in Central Java) have been transferred to 
Provincial Governments.^
The large batik cooperative, GKBI (Gabungan Koperasi Batik 
Indonesia) and several other batik producing cooperatives entered 
weaving in the pre-1965 period with the objective of securing 
cheap and regular supplies of cambric (blacu) for batik 
producers. Eleven of these - including the large GKBI plant near 
Yogyakarta - invested in weaving plants before 1965 and a further
They vary considerably in size. At one extreme several firms 
own less than 100 looms and at the other, two owned more than 
1,000. As we have mentioned above, the state sector now 
plays a much smaller role in the industry than before 1965. 
Only one small state owned unit has been opened under 
the New Order and total loomage and employment are 
probably lower than in the foreign sector.
It should be noted that PN Sandang is also involved 
in a joint venture with a Japanese company in a large 
integrated textile plant near Bandung.
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15 plants have been established since 1965. These cooperatives 
are on an average, smaller than state or foreign owned firms.
But, like state enterprises, they vary greatly in size. They 
are concentrated in the batik producing areas of Central Java 
(20 of the 26 cooperatives are located in Central Java).
One other aspect of ownership which is likely to be of some 
relevance to labour management patterns is the division of 
domestic owned firms into pribumi (indigenous Indonesian) and 
non-pribumi (chiefly Chinese) groups. The competition between 
pribumi and non-pribumi entrepreneurs is a major issue of 
industrial development in Indonesia (see for example McCawley, 
1979:68-73). There is a common belief in Indonesia 
(especially among pribumi) that non-pribumi entrepreneurs drive 
their workers harder and are less paternalistic than pribumi.
Weaving is one industry - like kretek and batik - where
pribumi entrepreneurs have played a prominant role and have
been able to compete with non-pribumi from the early years of
the development of these industries in Java. However in the
first major centre of the industry/ Majalaya and Bandung, the
non-pribumi from the earliest years, have threatened the position
of pribumi businessmen. Almost all textile mills operating in
Bandung were owned or financed by Chinese businessmen in 1976.
The Chinese control of the industry in Majalaya appears to
2have strengthened since 1967. One observer has described the
In addition to its major plant near Yogyakarta, GKBI 
has also invested in a large Japanese joint venture 
producing high quality cloth near Pekalongan in Central 
Java.
In early 1976 only 30 percent of the 118 firms (or 
approximately 10 percent of all looms in Majalaya) owned 
by pribumi were still operated independently. The rest 
were either rented out or pribumi received work orders. 
Nearly two-thirds of all ATM looms in Majalaya were 
owned by non-pribumi. (Information from interviews 
with PERTEKSI officials in Majalaya, March-April 1976; 
See also Hill, forthcoming:Ch.4).
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gradual withdrawal of many pribumi from textiles in Majalaya 
as the completion of a cycle beginning with involvement in 
agriculture, followed by movement to textiles and, finally, 
because of failure to compete wity non-pribumi, reinvestment 
again in agriculture.'*'
In Central Java - especially in Pekalongan on the north 
coast - pribumi appear to have fared much better than in West 
Java. Support from co-operatives, a more independent 
entrepreneurial spirit and a cohesive santri (muslim) trading 
community may have all contributed to the greater success of 
pribumi in Pekalongan (Price, 1977; Hill, forthcoming:Ch.4).
Many Pekalongan businessmen appear to have made the successful 
transition from ATBM to mechanised production, and several of 
the smaller ATM factories established since 1967 have been in 
Pekalongan.
Businessmen in Pedan, another pribumi stronghold in Central 
Java, have been less successful. In Pedan only two firms have 
purchased ATMs in response to difficulties faced by ATBM 
production. Pedan pribumi have either had to be satisfied with 
a decline in their ATBM sales or have moved (or have been forced 
into other fields of investment (for example, minibus transport 
to the nearby towns of Klaten and Solo).
3. Geographical Dispersion of the Weaving Industry
Owing to the quite large inter provincial wage differentials 
described in Chapter Four, it will be necessary to take location 
of firms into account in our study of wage differentials.
Location of the firm is important because although a few regions 
in Java contribute a high proportion of total output, the 
industry is nevertheless quite dispersed.
The major centres of the industry are in West and Central 
Java (Figure 6.1). Weaving on a large scale first developed in 
West Java and ATM production continues to flourish primarily
1 Indonesia. Dinas Perindustrian, Kabupaten Bandung (1975).
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in this region. The handlooms have been much more
successful in Central Java.'*' Despite the large number of 
ATBMs (more than 10,000) registered in West Java, this province 
has only a small proportion of firms operating ATBMs and 
probably an even lower percentage of employment in this segment 
of the weaving industry.
The mechanised weaving industry continues to be concentrated
in West Java which accounted for over half of total cloth output 
2in early 1976. Although ATM factories were not as geographically
concentrated as the ATBM, most of these firms were also grouped
in a few centres. Just over half of all ATM factories in
Indonesia were located in or around Bandung or in the small
town of Majalaya 30 kilometres south of Bandung. Within West
Java these centres accounted for 85 percent of all ATM factories.
Majalaya is by far the largest centre of small scale, mechanised
3weaving in Indonesia. Pekalongan is the main centre of weaving 
in Central Java. Over half of all ATM factories registered
Over 70 percent of cottage producers, over 60 percent of small 
scale ATBMs and just under half of all medium and large ATBMs 
were located in Central Java in 1974-75 (See Indonesia, 
Industrial Census 1974-75). Nearly 60 percent of all 
small scale ATBM operating in this province in 1974 were 
located in the two adjoining, southern kabupaten of Klaten 
and Sukoharjo (of which Pedan is the central weaving town).
Nearly two-thirds of all registered firms in 1976 were in 
West Java, a further 20 percent in Central Java and a small 
number in East Java, Jakarta and the Outer Islands (Indonesia, 
Direktorat Jenderal Industri Tekstil, 1976). A slightly 
higher proportion of smaller ATM firms (with less than 50 
looms) were located in West Java, whereas the larger 
establishments were more evenly distributed closer to 
the large population centres of Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang 
and Surabaya.
One-third of all small scale factories in Indonesia were 
located in Majalaya. The number of looms (estimated) per 
factory in Majalaya (45) was much smaller than in other 
major weaving centres in West or Central Java.
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in Central Java in 1975 (slightly less than 10 percent in 
Indonesia) were located in this town.^
II. The Kretek and Cigarette Industries
Cigarettes are produced in Indonesia in what (from the
perspective of technology) may be considered two separate
industries: kretek (clove cigarettes) and rokok putih (western
'white' cigarettes). Kretek are hand rolled, and contain cloves,
tobacco and a mixture of spices. 'White' cigarettes are made
purely from tobacco by imported cigarette-making machines
(See plates 6.7-6.12 showing the techniques used in cigarette
and kretek manufacturing). Like weaving, the production of
cigarettes is divided into both non-mechanised and mechanised
processes. Also similar to the weaving industry, there are
considerable contrasts between the types of firm which are
engaged in each of these manufacturing processes. The kretek
industry is outstanding in Indonesia for the huge variations
in the size of firm despite quite homogeneous, relatively labour
2intensive technology in production. Mechanised production of 
cigarettes is carried out by both domestic and foreign owned 
firms which contrast both in the size of the firm and technology 
employed.
Despite the contrasts between production processes in the 
manufacture of kretek and cigarettes, their product markets are
Whereas most of the small firms were located in the traditional 
weaving centres of Pekalongan, Solo and Klaten, larger scale 
establishments were more widely dispersed. Several were 
located in the large city of Semarang and others in or near 
other large towns in Central Java.
Over the decade 1967-77 all three of the major kretek 
companies have begun to produce machine-made kretek on a 
limited scale. But the majority of their employees 
continue to work in the production of hand-rolled kretek.
Unless otherwise stated, the kretek industry is taken 
here to refer only to hand-rolled kretek.
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KRETEK TECHNOLOGY
Plate 6.7
Kretek rolling machine, 3000-7000 
kretek per operator per day.
Plate 6.8
Packing by hand, 500-1000 packets 
a day. (Solo).
Plate 6.9
Trimming cigarettes, usually per­
formed by young children. (Solo).
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EMPLOYMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 
IN KRETEK AND CIGARETTES
Plate 6.10
'Modern' factory, packing oper­
ations. 1500 workers in one room. 
(Kediri)
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closely related. They sell closely substitutable products in 
the same markets (usually in the same cigarette stalls) and 
there is a wide range in the quality and price of both types 
of cigarette. In the past cigarettes have tended to be smoked 
by more affluent, western-oriented consumers. However these 
divisions in the product market appear to be breaking down 
(see below).^
From the viewpoint of production techniques and employment 
patterns kretek and 'white' cigarettes should be considered 
different industries. However they have been included in this 
study partly because they are close competitors in the same 
product markets. The marked contrasts within the two industries 
in size, technology and ownership provide us with an opportunity 
to examine some of the major questions raised in Chapter Three.
The difference in size of kretek firms, and in technology
and ownership in the 'white' cigarette industry (and the
contrasts between the two industries in some of these features)
have important implications for the structure of wages. In
this section we will briefly review the history of the two
industries in Java, and examine several of the structural
characteristics (technology, size and ownership) and the
2geographical dispersion of firms in the two industries.
A. The Kretek Industry
Like the weaving industry, the kretek industry has 
changed considerably over the past decade. Production has become 
more concentrated in a few non-pribumi firms and the industry has 
also become more concentrated geographically. But despite 
attempts to mechanise, the basic technology has remained unchanged. 
Indeed, with continued government protection, the industry has
Unfortunately, there have not been any studies of the 
cross elasticity of demand for these two products.
In the following sections kretek will be denoted as 
kretek or kretek cigarettes and rokok putih merely as 
cigarettes or 'white' cigarettes.
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been able to compete successfully with 'white' cigarettes. We 
will look briefly at these recent developments in the industry 
and the special characteristics of kretek production that are 
relevant to a study of wages.
1. Growth of the Kretek Industry
Kretek is one of the oldest industries in Indonesia. The 
industry began to develop at the end of the last century.^ It 
flourished in the early part of the 20th Century in the heavily 
populated region of Central and East Java, especially in Kudus 
in northern Central Java and along the Brantas valley in south 
and central East Java (see Map 6.1). Availability of cheap 
supplies of labour, proximity to major tobacco growing areas in 
Central and East Java and a relatively developed 'smoking habit' 
were probably the major factors which influenced the growth 
of the industry in these regions of Java (Castles, 1967:26-8).
The industry began as home industry. This was followed by
the putting-out system which developed on a large scale prior
to the emergence of factory production as the dominant mode of
production in the 1920s and 1930s. By 1929 the industry employed
approximately 65,000 persons and was one of the major employers
2of labour in manufacturing in Indonesia (Castles, 1967:36).
From the mid-1920s kretek producers faced competition from
machine-made cigarettes. As in the case of weaving, the industry's
survival was probably partly the result of protection provided by
3the colonial government. Kretek production grew rapidly
See especially Castles (1967:32-8) for a short history of the 
industry in the colonial era and Harahap (1952) for a 
discription of problems facing the industry in various regions 
before the Second World War and after Independence in 1949.
This was only slightly less than 70,000 employed in weaving 
(excluding cottage industries) in 1939 (Broek, 1942:81-3).
In the case of kretek, support took the form of a differential 
excise on cigarettes and limitations on increased investment 
in machine-made cigarettes. The excise was originally set at
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before and after the war. It rose from around two billion 
cigarettes in the early 1920s to 15 billion in 1940 and to 
20 billion in 1960s. At this time production was almost equal 
to the production of the cigarette industry. However under the 
New Order, production of kretek has grown at a faster rate than 
'white' cigarettes. By 1975/76 production had already topped 
30 million and by 1978 it exceeded 45 million compared with 
cigarette production which had reached only 20-25 million 
cigarettes. Castle's pessimism (he believed that the kretek 
industry would only be able to compete with cigarettes if it 
mechanised) concerning the future of the kretek industry has 
not been justified by the performance of the kretek industry 
over the past 12 years (Castles, 1967:39).
Part of the success of the industry since 1965 must be 
attributed to continued protection. The policy of differential 
excise taxes has been retained throughout the period of 
Independence.'*' In addition machine-made cigarettes production 
has been limited by application of strict licensing and 
several appeals by cigarette (and also kretek) factories to
1 (continued)
a flat rate (20 percent) for both cigarettes and kretek 
but partly owing to protests from kretek producers, 
a differential excise (20 percent on kretek and 30 
percent on machine-made cigarettes) was introduced 
(Harahap, 1952:210; Castles, 1967:30-7).
■*■ Since 1967 the excise has been set at 35 percent 
for kretek and 50 percent for cigarettes. However 
the protection afforded to the kretek industry has 
not only been by the level of the excise but also 
by the price at which it has been levied compared 
with the 'white' cigarette industry. Recently the 
government has attempted to reduce the discrepancy 
between market and banderol prices in the kretek 
industry (Tempo, 21/4/79:50-4).
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use new machinery have been turned down. However a switch
in demand by the growing, relatively prosperous middle class
away from cigarettes to higher quality kretek may also help
to explain the rapid growth in kretek demand. Improved quality
and vigorous advertising and promotional activities have enabled
the larger kret.ek firms to expand their markets. Although there
has been some expansion of machine-made kretek over the last
five years, these are still only a small proportion of total
kretek production. The government continues to oppose the
2widespread use of machinery in the industry.
2. Industrial Structure: Size, Technology and Ownership
Size of kretek firms. Since 1967 the industry has become 
increasingly dominated by three giant kretek firms (Gudang 
Garam in Kediri, Jarum in Kudus and Bentoel in Malang). They 
manufactured over half of all kretek production in 1975. 
Employment in the three companies amounted to approximately 
40,000 or close to half of all employees, (82,000 recorded in 267 
large, medium and small firms in the kretek industry in 1974). 
Unlike the weaving industry, kretek production is highly 
concentrated in a few firms. According to the 'rule of thumb' 
measure of industrial concentration the industry can be 
described as relatively oligopolistic (Scherer, 1970:60).
Other relatively large scale firms also play a major role in
Castles (1967:107) reports two cases - one involving a kretek 
company and one involving British American Tobacco - in which 
applications for use of new cigarette-making machinery were 
rejected in the 1960s. More recently, British American Tobacco 
again failed in an attempt to introduce new machinery. The 
giant kretek company, Gudang Garam, has since 1976 only been 
permitted to use eight of its 28 new filter machines (Tempo, 
21/4/79:51).
In 1972 the government gave permission to Bentoel in East Java 
to produce filter cigarettes for the domestic market. 
Subsequently two other companies have been allowed to produce 
limited amounts of kretek by machine for the export market.
A Department of Industry spokesman reported that this was 
approximately 10 percent of total kretek production in 1978 
(Merdeka, 26/8/78). We have estimated mechanised production
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the kretek industry. Twenty four firms with 500 or more 
employees (including the three giant firms) accounted for 
approximately 75 percent of all employment in kretek in 1974 
(Table 6.3). The average size (481) of all large and medium 
kretek firms was several times the national average (92) for 
all large and medium firms in 1974.
The concentration of production and employment in the three
giant firms and a handful of large firms has resulted in the
disappearance of many small firms from the industry over the
past decade. Although Castle's (1967:139) figure (908) for
the number of firms in the industry in 1961 is almost certainly
an overestimate/ it is nevertheless revealing to compare this
with 267 small, medium and large kretek firms recorded in the
21974/75 Industrial Census.
Nevertheless, despite the current high level of concentration 
within the kretek industry, quite a large number of small firms 
were recorded as still operating in 1974 (see Table 6.3). 
Thirty-seven percent of all firms had fewer than 20 employees 
(although these accounted for less than one percent of total 
employment in the industry) and over half employed fewer than 50.
1 (continued)
of kretek to be between three to four billion cigarettes in 
1978, slightly lower than 10 percent of total national 
production of kretek in that year (Tempo, 21/4/79:51).
 ^ The figure given by Castles was collected from the OPS 
Rokok-Kretek (the producers organisation) in Jakarta 
and almost certainly refers to registered firms rather 
than those actually operating.
2 The situation in Kudus is illustrative of changes in the 
structure of the industry. Castles (1967:153-4) reports 
that the 10 largest firms in Kudus accounted for half of 
the total employment in the industry in Kudus of 20,000 
in 1963. Another 200 firms employed the remaining 10,000 
workers. Eight years later only 39 firms with a total 
labour force of 22,400 workers operated on a regular 
basis in Kudus. Nine large firms were responsible for 
over 75 percent of all employment. By January 1976 only 
21 firms were actually in operation. Four of these - 
including Jarum - contributed 87 percent of all employment 
(25,000) in the industry in Kudus.
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It is likely that many of these small firms operated irregularly 
according to demand conditions and supplies of working capital. 
Their share of total production is likely to be even smaller than 
their share of employment in the industry.
Although the causes of the increasing concentration of
kretek production over the past decade are well beyond the scope
of this study, some possible explanations may be advanced.
Several factors - steadier supply of raw materials, easier access
to capital(especially for large firms) and increased efforts in
marketing and advertising - may all help to explain this trend.^
Quite dramatic increases in the price of cloves over the period
1968-74 appear to have adversely affected many small scale
producers who were unable to obtain sufficient capital to maintain
2their stocks of cloves.
Technology. Despite the increasing scale of production in the 
kretek industry, the basic technology in making and packing3cigarettes has remained almost unchanged. Even in the largest 
firms rolling of cigarettes continues to be carried out with the
In 1974 several large kretek companies began a huge advertising 
campaign by offering small gifts (generally a glass with the 
company emblem) for the presentation of a certain number 
(usually 10) empty cigarette packets at any retail outlet.
This together with advertising campaigns in newspapers and in 
other media, and lotteries have probably all helped them to 
gain relative to small scale kretek companies.
The price of cloves rose sixfold in 1968-69 (Rp.250 to Rp.1500 
per kilogram) and by another 300 percent in 1973-75 (Rp.1500 
to Rp.5000 per kilogram). This meant an increase in the 
capital for cloves to produce 100,000 cigarettes (daily 
production of a small to medium sized firm) from about Rp.35,000 
in 1968 to Rp.700,000 in 1974-75 (assuming the firm maintains 
enough cloves in stock for two months production).
This excludes the production of kretek by machine and 
also several innovations that have been introduced in 
the preparation of tobacco and cloves.
3
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help of simple wooden rolling machines, trimming is done with 
scissors and packing and packaging by hand (see Plates 6.7-6.9). 
Nevertheless, although technology is relatively uniform throughout 
the industry, productivity varies according to the skill of 
various operators and the number of hours and days worked a month.
Table 6.4 gives some indication of the range in physical 
productivity in the kretek industry. Owing to the younger age 
and higher quality of employees in the large firms, there is a 
slight variation in average productivity per shift (column 4) in 
the three firms represented in the table (see Chapter Nine for 
a discussion of these patterns). However, because of large 
variations in hours of work, differences in physical productivity 
in different sized firms per month were much larger (column 2).^
Table 6.4 also shows the contrast in physical productivity 
between selected kretek and cigarette companies. The 
productivity of machine operators in cigarette is 50-100 times 
higher than kretek rollers. However, because of low levels of 
capital utilisation and a high proportion of auxiliary workers, 
the differential in physical productivity is lower when measured 
on a monthly basis. The margin narrows even further when the 
much higher average price of kretek cigarettes is taken into 
account. But productivity is still considerably higher in 
cigarettes.
A second feature of technology used in the kretek industry 
is the low proportion of labour costs to total costs, despite 
the relatively simple technology used in the industry. From this 
viewpoint, the kretek industry can hardly be considered labour 
intensive. Castles (1967:138) calculated that labour costs 
amounted to only 2.3 percent of the official retail price (and 
only three percent of the retail price excluding the 25 percent 
excise) in the early 1960s. Tobacco and cloves contributed by far
1 Productivity differences were even larger when measured 
on a value basis owing to the much higher price of the 
more popular brands produced in large firms.
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Table 6.4: Comparison of physical productivity
in kretek and cigarette firms
Firm type Number of 
employees 
(1)
Output/labour ratio Output per 
operator 
(000 cigs) ' 
(4)
(000 cigs 
per month) 
(2)
(Rp 000 
per month) 
(3)
Kretek firm I 59 22 92 2-3
Kretek firm II 269 23 186 3
Kretek firm III 17,547 34 314 3-4
Cigarette firm I 97 161 333 176
Cigarette firm II 984 254 953 300
Note: Cases represented in this Table are chosen to illustrate
some of the major differences in technology according to 
firm size. They are not necessarily representative of 
the sample of industry as a whole.
2 Seven hour shift, cigarette making.
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76.
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the largest share of total costs. Labour union officials have 
estimated that wage costs had fallen to below two percent of the 
total in 1975 (Kompas, 29/12/75:9). Our own calculations (based 
on data collected by excise officials) suggest that despite the 
large increase in clove prices from 1968, the wage share has not 
changed greatly since 1963.
Table 6.5 shows the approximate contribution of various 
cost items to the average price of kretek at the end of 1974.
These calculations suggest a wage share of approximately 2.4 
percent of the market price of kretek.^  Cloves comprised 35 
percent of the retail price and were by far the most Important 
cost item. Given the volatile nature of clove and tobacco prices, 
it is understandable that the cost of these items rather than 
labour costs are the major concern of entrepreneurs.
A third feature of the technology of kretek production is
the high proportion of capital invested in stocks compared with
fixed capital assets especially in large firms. We have already
mentioned that the need for a minimum level of stocks has been
a major problem facing small firms in recent years.
To make medium to high quality cigarettes tobacco needs to mature
for one to three years. Most large kretek factories buy
relatively cheaply at harvest and store most of their tobacco
for at least 12 months. Although fixed capital costs may be a
small proportion of total costs, kretek firms need to undertake
2very large investments in stocks of tobacco and cloves.
We may contrast this with the weaving industry in which labour 
costs as a percentage of total costs were approximately 20 
percent for ATBM, 11-14 percent for medium scale ATM and eight 
to 12 percent for large scale modern firms (Hill, personal 
communication). In kretek wage costs were approximately four 
percent of total costs (excluding the excise and distribution 
costs).
In 1962 it was estimated that the current assets of a large 
kretek factory constituted over 90 percent of the value of 
total assets (Faruk, 1962:13). In Kudus in June 1976, one 
major manufacturer estimated that investment in tobacco and 
cloves amounted to four to five times the monthly value of 
production. Approximately 80 percent of the value of all
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Table 6.5: Estimated contribution of various cost items
to the retail price of one thousand kretek
cigarettes, second half of 1974
RpOOO Percentage of
retail price to
consumer
Raw Materials
Cloves (0.7 kg @ Rp5000/kg) 3.6 35
Tobacco (1.4 kg @ Rpl000/kg) 1.4 14
Paper etc. 0.4 4
Sub total 5.4
Wages 0.2 2
Profits and distribution costs 2.0 20
Retail Price (net of indirect 7 . 6 75
tax)
Excise^ 2.4 25
2Retail Price to Consumer" 10.0 100
Assume excise levied at harga banderol of Rp70.
2 Price of Bentoel Premier.
Note: Although data is based on an official paper by the
excise directorate, some adjustments have been made 
to this original data (in particular, the price of 
cloves is assumed to be Rp5,000 not Rp6,000 as in the 
original paper).
Source: Unpublished paper, Bea Cukai, Jakarta, 1975.
Personal communications with officials in 
Department of Finance.
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By this criterion also, kretek production is not as labour 
intensive as might appear from the nature of basic production 
activities.
However small scale firms, (because of shortages of 
working capital) do not have the capacity to maintain large 
stocks of raw materials or to extend large amounts of credit 
to wholesalers and retailers. It has been estimated that current 
assets were only slightly greater than 50 percent of total assets 
in small firms in Kudus in the early 1960s (Castles, 1967:137).^
As a consequence of their low level of stocks, small firms are 
much more vulnerable to short run variations in the supply and 
price of cloves and other raw materials.
Ownership. Unlike weaving, the kretek industry is totally owned 
by private domestic entrepreneurs. There has never been any 
direct state, cooperative or foreign investment in the industry. 
But as in weaving, competition between pribumi and non-pribumi 
businessmen is also intense in kretek. However, like that of 
weaving, the history of the industry has been one of gradually 
increasing non-pribumi control.
In its early years the kretek industry was a stronghold of 
pribumi entrepreneurship in Java. But even in the colonial period 
Chinese posed a serious challenge to the pribumi. In East Java 
Chinese businessmen have dominated the kretek industry from the 
time the industry was established. The fall of Nitisumito, the 
largest pribumi firm in Kudus (indeed probably the largest pribumi 
firm in Indonesia before the war) marked the end of the era of
2 (continued)
investment undertaken by the firm was in these two commodities 
(personal communication).
Many of the very small firms maintain little or no stocks 
of tobacco and depend upon current sales to provide 
sufficient capital to maintain production. Many of these 
only manufacture kretek irregularly according to supplies 
of capital.
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pribumi dominance of the industry in this region. Castles 
(1967:85) succinctly describes the declining role of pribumi 
entrepreneurs in Kudus:
Kudus therefore appeared to be one of the enclaves 
of indigenous entrepreneurship in an economy principally
controlled by foreigners.....The entrepreneurs of
Kudus did indeed found a new industry to replace commerce 
as the basis of the towns economy. The most successful 
of them built factories larger than ever before owned by 
Indonesians. But the problem of Chinese competition 
nevertheless proved too great for them in the end. In 
the post independence period the share of indigenous 
businesses in the kretek industry is probably smaller 
than it has ever been.
In the early 1960s pribumi production in Kudus was less than 
half of the total for that region. Out of a total of 10 large 
firms which employed more than 500 employees, only three were 
pribumi (Castles, 1967:87,153).
The pribumi share has declined further since 1965. The 
three giant firms - Gudang Garam, darum and Bentoel - are all 
non-pribumi. The four largest firms in Malang (which produced 
over 90 percent of kretek in that region) were also all 
non-pribumi. Even in Kudus, pribumi accounted for only 
approximately 25 percent of all kretek produced in 1975-76. Not 
only is the pribumi share of production much smaller but, owing 
to the problems faced by small firms in the industry (most of 
which were pribumi), their number of enterprises has fallen 
considerably since 1965.
3. Geographical Concentration of Kretek Firms
This industry is much more concentrated geographically than 
weaving. It was initially centred in Kudus and Kediri which both 
accounted for almost 80 percent of total kretek production in 
1934. By 1961 total production had almost doubled. However, 
the contribution of Kudus to the total had fallen substantially, 
Malang had become a major centre of kretek production and several 
other areas in Central and East Java - Semarang, Surabaya, Madiun, 
Solo - have emerged as important small kretek producing areas
(see Figure 6.1). This situation changed considerably over the
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next 14 years. A 50 percent increase in total production 
resulted from the more than doubling of production in Kudus and 
Kediri, and an increase of over 60 percent in Malang. Production 
in the various smaller centres of kretek manufacturing combined 
has almost halved over the past 10-12 years. Only in Solo among 
the major small kretek manufacturing areas in Java did absolute 
levels of kretek production increase.
B. The Cigarette Industry
The structure of the cigarette industry is very different 
from kretek. A small number of mechanised firms, including 
several foreign owned enterprises, employ only 6,000 workers.
But they produce half to two-thirds as many cigarettes as the 
kretek industry. The industry does not depend primarily on 
supplies of cheap labour from Java. Quite a large proportion of 
total output is manufactured in North Sumatra. The rest is 
produced in several major cities in Java.
As in the kretek industry, production of cigarettes is 
concentrated in a few firms. From the colonial period the 
industry has been dominated by two firms: British American
Tobacco (BAT) and the Belgian-owned Faroka.^  In the 1950s a 
number of domestic owned, mainly Chinese firms were established 
but these were mostly small scale and never produced a major 
share of total cigarette output.
By 1974 the number of cigarette companies in operation had
dwindled to only 15. BAT accounted for about one-third of all
output in the industry and BAT and Faroka together produced over
half of all cigarettes. Recently a Chinese owned firm in North
Sumatra, STTC, has begun to provide strong competition for the
2two large foreign firms. Three other foreign firms - all recent
Castles (1967:20-1) reports that three firms - BAT, Faroka and 
Industria - accounted for over 65 percent of production in the 
industry in the 1950s and probably an even higher share 
before the war.
In 1975 this firm produced approximately one-fifth of all 
cigarette output in Indonesia.
2
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investors - contributed less than 10 percent of all cigarette 
production in Indonesia in 1974.^ According to the 'rule of 
thumb' measure of concentration mentioned above, this industry 
is highly oligopolistic.
Several other North Sumatran firms also contributed a major
share of production and employment in the industry. Approximately
one-third of all output and 25 percent of employment in 1974 v/as
2from this region.
As we have already mentioned, there is considerable 
competition between kretek and 'white' cigarettes. There is a 
wider range in the quality and price of kretek cigarettes.
A packet of each of the major brands of both types of cigarette 
is sold at about the same price. Although there is some feeling 
in certain circles that 'white' cigarettes are superior, this 
attitude has tended to break down over the past five to 10 years 
with the increasing popularity of kretek. Even the more 
expensive 'white' cigarettes consumed by the higher income groups 
in Jakarta and other major cities, have to compete with higher 
quality kretek (especially various machine-made kretek, filter 
cigarettes and hand-rolled Ci Sam Soe and Gudang Garam) as well 
as with more prestigous imported cigarettes.
In Table 6.4 we have noted the much higher physical 
productivity of mechanised cigarette production compared with 
the production of kretek. But it is also important to note the 
contrast in productivity within the cigarette industry. All 
five foreign owned firms use more recent, more highly productive 
making and packing machines than are used in most domestic 
enterprises. As in the kretek industry, actual physical labour
Owing to strong competition from other cigarette and kretek 
producers, all three of these foreign firms had sold their 
investments in Indonesia by 1978.
Other domestically owned firms in Solo, Malang and Surabaya 
were much smaller and constituted less than five percent of 
all production in the industry in 1974.
2
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productivity depends greatly upon the number of shifts and 
hours worked in the cigarette industry.^" Unpredictable 
variations in supplies of raw materials and quite erratic demand 
for certain brands in particular locations have also resulted 
in quite large fluctuations in monthly production of particular 
firms in this industry. But as we shall see in the next section, 
relatively stable employment and use of time rather than piece 
rates of pay have provided much greater stability of earnings 
in cigarette firms than in kretek.
Ill. Wages and Employment Patterns in Weaving, Kretek and 
Cigarettes
The heterogeneity of the three industries in terms of size,
technology, ownership and location makes it difficult to
generalise about wages and employment patterns. Aggregative,
secondary data are of limited usefulness because they fail to
take sufficient account of some of these variations. Nevertheless,
the data do give a broad picture of both changes in wages and
employment patterns over time, and of how the three industries
compare with other industries in the manufacturing sector.
We will examine the level and form of wages, some of the
characteristics of employees in the industry and the influence
of 'institutional' forces - trade unions, employers'
organisations and government policies - on the determination of
wages and working conditions in weaving, kretek and cigarettes.
This provides a useful general perspective from which the
2micro-survey data may be examined.
Since all cigarette firms noted in Table 6.4 were producing 
well below capacity at the time of our field survey, it is 
likely that the table understates the 'normal' differential 
in labour productivity between kretek and cigarette firms.
Owing to a lack of secondary data on wages and working 
conditions in the cigarette industry, this section deals 
almost exclusively with weaving and kretek.
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1. Wage and Employment Patterns Before 1965
Factory production became important in both kretek and
weaving in the 1920s and 1930s. By 1939-40, textiles and the
tobacco industry (in which the largest branches were weaving
and kretek respectively) employed approximately one-third of all
workers in factory employment in Java (Sitsen, 1942:41). Even
in the colonial period kretek manufacturing was well known as a
low wage industry. Average wages of 12.5 cents (increasing to
15-20 cents for longer term employees) were only 50-75 percent
of average wages of unskilled and semi-skilled employees in
several other branches of industry (Castles, 1967:78).
Wertheim (1956:214-5) notes that kretek (along with batik) was
one industry marked by paternalism in labour relations which
provided a mantle for even worse exploitation than in other
industries in Java. Labour conditions 'demanded from workers a
2practically unlimited amount of work for minimum reward'.
Weaving does not have such a reputation as low wage industry. 
In the pre-war period the industry developed in West Java where 
wages were generally higher than in Central and East Java. Owing 
to a shortage of skilled workers in the early years of the 
industry, wages have been relatively high (Wertheim, 1956:226-7). 
But, in the mid-1930s wages in Majalaya were low by standards of 
manufacturing employment at that time. In several jobs - 
especially in preparation activities in which women and children 
were employed - workers only received a daily wage of 10 cents. 
Even weavers in Majalaya only received 20 cents compared with
At this time 12.5 cents were worth approximately two and 
a half litres of rice (approximately 5c/litre).
In the villages which received work from the factories 
earnings were even lower. Sitsen (1942:26) reports that 
these wages were about half those in factories and 
Harahap (1952:211-2) notes that earnings were only eight 
cents (about 1.3 litres of rice) for 13-16 hours of 
work.
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20-30 cents for unskilled workers in other branches of industry 
(Hiroshi, 1970;1). Availability of relatively cheap labour was 
probably a major factor contributing to the development of 
factory industry in Majalaya.
The weaving and kretek industries shared other common 
characteristics. Quite a high proportion of employees in both 
industries were women and children."^ In Majalaya, the higher 
paid jobs in the weaving industry (mainly loom operators) were 
held mainly by men (Hiroshi, 1970:41). Also a high proportion 
of the work force in both industries was rural. This was 
common in the kretek industry in all locations. Although most 
weaving labourers in Majalaya already had been driven off the 
land, over 70 percent still participated in harvesting or 
planting in the mid-1950s (Hiroshi, 1970:41).
The rural origins of the work force (and probably also 
the high proportion of female and child workers) had an 
influence on patterns of labour utilisation in the two industries. 
In kretek, employees worked no more than 800-900 hours a year 
(approximately 100 eight hour working days) and absenteeism was 
high. Although absenteeism does not appear to have been nearly 
as high in Majalaya, a survey of 300 firms found that workers 
were only employed for 6.4 hours a day (Sitsen, 1942:26).
After Independence, earnings in these two industries (as 
in all manufacturing) were greatly influenced by high rates 
of inflation and, to a lesser extent, union and government 
efforts to improve wages and working conditions (See Chapter Five). 
Real wages in kretek more than halved over the period 1951-64 
(Castles, 1967:147-9). The decline in real wages was only 
slightly compensated for by increases in wages negotiated by a
1 Sitsen (1942:42) notes that 39 percent of all employees 
in tobacco and 34 percent in textiles were female.
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relatively active trade union movement which, from the early 
1950s, negotiated wages and working conditions with the 
employers' organisation, GAPPRI.^ In weaving there was much 
less centralised determination of wages and working conditions. 
Wages negotiated by some firms appear to have set the standard 
for negotiations between unions and management in other 
enterprises in the weaving industry in the Bandung region.
But here also wages probably declined considerably after 1956.
2. Wages and Employment Under the New Order
Since 1965 the situation of wage earners in weaving in 
the Bandung region has improved considerably,mainly as a 
result of industry-wide wage negotiations. In 1968 several 
trade union organisations in the city of Bandung signed a 
collective labour agreement with the producer's representatives, 
PERTEKSI. In addition to a number of clauses covering various 
aspects of employees' welfare, this provided for regular wage 
increases.
The minimum wages negotiated under this agreement have
increased markedly in real terms for daily and monthly employees,
and also significantly for piece-workers. Minimum daily rates
increased 10 fold over the period 1968-77 compared with only a
threefold increase in rice prices over the same period (Appendix 
2Table 6.1). Although the relative weakness of the unions since 
1965 did not guarantee that the agreements would be implemented, 
the agreements appear to have been associated with a major
The agreements in 1968 and 1969 covered hours of work and 
payment of overtime, separation payments, pensions, health 
coverage, special allowances, payment of wages during 
holidays and procedures to be followed in dismissal cases.
Annual negotiations between PERTEKSI and the unions also 
covered annual bonuses and Hari Rayci bonuses, both of 
which also increased considerably in real terms over 
this period.
2
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improvement in wages and working conditions compared with 
the pre-1965 period.^"
Similar agreements have not been negotiated on an 
industry-wide basis in weaving in other regions. It is likely 
that employees (especially in the poorer regions of Central 
and East Java) may not have fared as well as in West Java. Up 
to June 1976 only five textile mills in Central Java had 
signed CLAs with their workers.
Since 1965 the annual negotiations on wages and bonuses
paid in the kretek industry have continued in all the major
2producing regions. However these negotiations do not appear 
to have greatly improved real wages in this industry. By 
1975-76 real wages (in rice equivalents) in Kudus had improved 
on the lowest levels experienced during rapid inflation in the 
1960s. But they were still well below levels reached in the 
early 1950s (Appendix Table 6.2). Minimum real daily wages 
had increased markedly in the 1970s but piece rates for 
cigarette rollers (tukang giling) had risen only very slightly 
since 1964. In contrast to weaving in Bandung, the industry 
has not experienced generally improved wages in the 1970s.
There are numerous differences between various regions of 
Java in the level of wages negotiated in the kretek industry. 
Daily and piece rates were lowest in Solo and highest in Malang
It appears that the annual agreements concerning wages and 
bonuses were well known and generally followed for daily and 
monthly employees. Minimum wages were much more difficult 
to implement for piece workers whose basic rates varied 
according to the type of cloth and whose incomes depended 
considerably on hours and days worked a week.
These agreements include articles on a seven hour day 
and a 40 hour working week, annual holidays with full 
pay, double pay on public holidays, confinement leave 
and pay during confinement and medical treatment in the 
event of sickness.
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(Table 6.6). These variations were, however, quite small for 
piece workers and the agreements have had a great influence 
on the uniformity of wage payments in different regions in the 
kretek industry (this will be shown later in the analysis of 
survey data).
Despite formal agreements between the unions (after 1973 
represented by FBSI and GAPPRI) the kretek industry continues 
to be known for its low wages and for various abuses of clauses 
in the labour law (especially employment of child labour, long 
hours of work without adequate overtime payments and poor working 
conditions) (See for example, Kompas, 4/3/76).^ Average wages 
recorded in the 1974-75 Industrial Census were much lower in the 
kretek industry than in weaving or cigarettes. Indeed kretek 
remains one of the lowest wage industries in Indonesia, and the 
tobacco industry (of which it is part) had the lowest wages of 
all four digit industries in Indonesia in 1974-75 (Table 6.7).
The contrast was particularly marked between kretek and 
cigarettes. According to the Industrial Census the latter was 
one of the highest wage industries in Indonesia.
Two important features of wages in the both kretek and 
weaving are the high proportion of piece workers and relatively 
small proportion of wages paid in kind. In Majalaya, quite a high 
percentage of jobs in ATM factories and almost all jobs in 
handloom factories were carried out on a piece work basis. Wages 
are rarely influenced by length of service, thus encouraging 
high rates of labour turnover. (Hiroshi, 1970:74-5). Also 
payments in kind were a relatively small proportion of total 
wages in weaving (Table 6.7). In this industry, as in kretek, 
rewards appear to be quite closely related to productivity in 
a high proportion of firms.
Only in Kudus are specific provisions made in the industry-wide 
agreements for overtime payments. Firms in most regions do not 
admit that they employ children as cigarette trimmers. The 
children are regarded the responsibility of the cigarette 
rollers (who generally recruit them) and are paid by the 
rollers.
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Table 6.6: Minimum wages in the kretek industry in various
regions of Java
Region Daily(Rp)
Monthly
(Rp)
Cigarette 
rolling 
(Rp/000 cigs)5
Holiday
Pay
(Rp/day)
Solo 125 (115) 1 3,250 60 60
Kedin 150 3,600 65 40
Kudus 165 3,500 103 80
Malang 200 6,000 70 63
1 Rp 125 for males, Rp 115 for females.
For cigarettes up to 8cm in length or cylindrical 
cigarettes (Malang).
Overtime rate Rpl05 for more than 3,000 kretek.
Source: Agreements between FBSI and various kretek producers,
organisations, OPS Rokok Kretek Surakarta, PPRK 
(Kudus), GAPEROMA (Malang), GAPEROKED (Kediri).
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A similar pattern of wage payment and employment exists 
in kretek. All major production tasks - rolling, packing, 
trimming and packaging cigarettes - are performed on a piece 
work basis. Piece workers (mostly women) account for well 
over half all employees in most kretek factories. In addition, 
data for the tobacco industry as a whole indicate that payments 
in kind are a small proportion of total wages compared with 
other industries (Table 6.7).
A high proportion of female employees continues to be a
major feature of the kretek and cigarette industries (see
column (3) in Table 6.7; Plates 6.7-6.9 show that almost all
major operations in kretek are performed by women). The
proportion of female employees in the kretek industry have
increased over the past 30 years. In 1970 females comprised
over 75 percent of all employment in large and medium kretek
factories. This was almost double the percentage of females
recorded in the industry in 1939-40.^ This trend appears to be
very marked in Kudus where males, who had played a major role
in rolling and packing, have almost been totally replaced by 
2females. This is probably due to low wages in this industry 
since the 1960s.
A high proportion of kretek workers - especially those 
involved in basic piece work operations - continues to live 
in rural areas. Castles (1967:53) noted that in Kudus in 1964-65 
only a small proportion of employees in kretek factories lived 
in the town. In Kudus a number of factories (especially those
As we have noted in Chapter Four, the tobacco industry 
accounted for approximately 40 percent of all female 
workers employed in medium and large firms in Indonesia 
in 1970.
One respondent in Kudus commented that, in contrast 
to the pre-war period, it was no longer socially 
acceptable for males to be employed in kretek.
2
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owned by the big firms) were actually located in rural areas 
close to Kudus. In other regions rural employees travel 
several kilometres to work each day.
In contrast, quite a high proportion of the work force in 
weaving in Majalaya appears to have completely severed its 
links with agriculture. In 1967-68 many of the employees in 
weaving in one village either came from other regions or were 
employed in non-agricultural pursuits in the town (Hiroshi, 
1970:74-5). Only the declining ATBM sector consists primarily 
of rural employees.
To sum up, the secondary data on wages and employment 
patterns provide general support for some of the propositions 
advanced in Chapter Three. Wages were much lower in the labour 
intensive kretek industry than in weaving or in cigarettes.
They were much higher in the relatively capital intensive, 
foreign dominated cigarette industry. The contrast in wages 
between the industries appear also to be associated with 
certain patterns of labour supply. Kretek firms employed a 
much higher proportion of female and rural employees than 
weaving (and probably also cigarettes).
However these secondary sources provide only a superficial, 
piecemeal picture of wages and employment in the three industries. 
The data are especially inadequate in describing these patterns 
in the heterogeneous weaving industry. Majalaya (from which 
much of the secondary information on this industry is drawn) is 
by no means representative of the weaving industry. Secondary 
data provide very little information on wages and employment 
in the small cigarette industry. We will need to turn to 
our survey data to provide a more satisfactory explanation 
of the causes of wage differentials between (and within) the 
three industries.
In 1976 several factories were located, five to 10 
kilometre from Kudus and one as far as 19 kilometre 
from the town.
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Summary and Conclusions
This analysis of the three industries included in our field 
survey has highlighted the considerable contrasts in industrial 
structure and wages both within and between the industries.
The weaving industry is marked by a wide range in technology 
ownership and size of firm and kretek by huge variations in 
scale of firm. Both contrast with the small, concentrated and 
foreign dominated cigarette industry.
There were also some similarities, especially between the 
weaving and the kretek industries. They are among the oldest 
industries in Java and both have experienced major structural 
changes since 1965. Capital intensive and foreign firms have 
become much more important in weaving. In kretek, production 
and employment have become increasingly dominated by three 
firms.
The industrial characteristics of the three industries 
have important implications for the pattern of wage 
differentials. The extreme labour intensive kretek industry is 
one of the lowest wage industries in Indonesia. Its low wages 
may be attributed to high levels of labour intensity and a large 
proportion of female and rural workers employed in kretek firms. 
At the other extreme, the capital intensive, foreign dominated 
cigarette industry is one of the highest wage industries in 
Java. The contrast between wages in cigarettes and kretek is 
consistent with the proposition that wages are positively 
correlated with capital intensity and foreign ownership (see 
Chapter Three). Weaving, like kretek, is a relatively low wage 
industry and also employs a high proportion of female workers. 
But it is difficult to generalise about the possible causes of 
wage differentials in this industry because of the heterogeneous 
nature of technology and ownership; secondary data on wages do 
not distinguish between the quite different segments of this 
industry.
There was not sufficient secondary data to allow us to 
examine the relationship between wages and the major structural
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characteristics of the three industries described in this 
chapter. We also need to know much more about the 
characteristics of workers and patterns of labour management 
in the different kinds of firm in order to be able to 
satisfactorily examine the causes of wage differentials. This 
task will be taken up in the following four chapters in which 
survey data collected from a sample of firms in the three 
industries will be analysed.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE DETERMINANTS OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS: A MULTIVARIATE APPROACH
This chapter examines several propositions concerning the 
causes of interfirm wage differentials in the weaving, kretek 
and cigarette industries in Indonesia. The hypotheses are 
derived mainly from the general framework of analysis presented 
in Chapter Three. But they also take into account some of the 
special features of Indonesian labour markets and of the three 
industries discussed in Chapters Four to Six.
In Chapter Three we concluded that three broad groups of 
factors are likely to influence wage differentials between 
capital and labour intensive firms. These were internal labour 
market factors, human capital influences (worker characteristics) 
and institutional factors. The effect of human capital and 
institutional factors on wages is examined in this chapter. The 
influence of internal market variables (especially firm- 
specific training and wage productivity effects) is much more 
difficult to measure. In this chapter we only provide indirect 
evidence for the influence of these factors on wages. This is 
done through an examination of the extent to which capital 
intensity and certain worker characteristics are related to 
wages. In Chapter Nine these internal labour market influences 
are discussed further through an examination of the different 
approaches to training in capital and labour intensive firms.
In Chapter Ten we investigate the influence of capital intensity 
and foreign ownership on labour turnover and absenteeism.
In order to examine the separate influence of various sets 
of factors on wages, the data analysis was undertaken in two 
stages. First we investigated the influence of three sets of 
variables on wages. These were (i) capital intensity, foreign 
ownership and other firm characteristics; (ii) worker 
characteristics; and (iii) several institutional variables.
The influence of all these variables on wages have been given 
feome attention in the theories or empirical studies of wages 
discussed in Chapters Two and Three. In the second stage we 
examined the joint influence of a combination of the more
important of these variables on.wages.
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The chapter is divided into four parts. The first briefly 
describes the sample and field survey on which the subsequent 
data analysis is based. The second part investigates three 
hypotheses concerning the separate influence of firm 
characteristics, worker characteristics and institutional 
factors on wages The third part examines the influence on 
wages of all the major variables which recorded a significant 
relationship with wages in the regression equations tested in 
part two. The interrelationships between these variables are 
also investigated. The analysis in the second and third parts 
is undertaken for one occupational category only. In the 
fourth part we examine the extent to which the conclusions of 
the earlier analysis apply also to several other occupations.
I. Major Characteristics of the Sample
The field survey was primarily designed to provide data 
which would enable an investigation of the relationship between 
various characteristics of manufacturing firms and wages. Firms 
were selected from three industries - weaving, kretek and 
cigarettes - which exhibited a wide range of size, technology 
and ownership patterns (Chapter Six). The sample was 
selected on a stratified random basis to portray these 
variations. The range in the three main characteristics of 
the sample firms is represented in Table 7.1.^
The differences within the sample broadly reflect the
variations within and between the three industries that were
2described in Chapter Six. The largest number of firms was
The sampling procedure adopted in this study is described 
at greater length in Appendix 7.1.
However it should be noted that stratification of the 
sample by size and ownership (the latter in weaving and 
cigarettes) has resulted in over-representation of large 
and foreign firms compared with the proportion of these 
firms in each of the three industries.
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selected from the weaving industry. The sample from this 
industry included both ATM (mechanised) and ATBM firms and 
private domestic firms, cooperatives and state enterprises, 
and joint venture firms."*- As might be expected from the 
inclusion of both ATMs and ATBMs in the sample, there was a 
wide range in capital labour ratios between firms (see standard 
deviation in Table 7.1).
Weaving firms were selected in several of the major
producing areas of Java. The sample includes firms from the
large modern cities of Jakarta and Bandung, from the
traditional Central Javanese city Solo and from the small
traditional weaving towns of Majalaya and Pedan respectively
2(see Figure 6.1).
The kretek sample is marked by huge variations in the 
scale of firm. The number of employees in the kretek sample 
(over 60,000 employees) and the average size of kretek firms 
(3,000) was considerably influenced by the inclusion in the 
sample of two of the three "giant" kretek firms in the 
country. The sample from this industry contrasts with the 
high proportion of foreign and relatively capital and intensive 
cigarette firms in the sample. Firms in the latter were on 
average much smaller than in the kretek industry. The sample 
included a census of all six foreign owned firms in the 
cigarette industry in 1975-76.
Overall, the sample was relatively equally distributed in 
terms of size of firm, location and years of operation. It
No distinction is made in this study between joint venture 
firms and direct foreign investments. All foreign firms in 
weaving and all but two in cigarettes were joint ventures. 
Since in most cases the foreign share is 75 percent or 
more and most joint ventures are managed by foreign managers, 
the distinction between direct and joint venture is not 
particularly relevant to this study.
Two firms - one foreign and one large cooperative - were 
from other areas of Central Java (Batang on the North Coast 
and Sleman near Yogyakarta respectively).
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included fourteen firms with less than 60 employees and 12 
employing more than 600; the majority of firms were fairly 
evenly distributed in terms of size between these two extremes.'*' 
Over half of all firms were from Central Java (mainly Solo and 
Kudus) and Majalaya with a further 12-18 percent each being 
located in Jakarta, Bandung and East Java (chiefly in Malang). 
The sample divided fairly evenly into three groups of firms 
established less than five years ago, 5-19 years ago and more 
than 20 years ago.
However as might be expected there was a close
interrelationship in levels of capital intensity between three
of the variables (mechanisation, ownership and size of firm)
on which the sample was based. Large, mechanised and foreign
firms all recorded considerably higher capital labour ratios
than small, non-mechanised and domestic owned firms respectively 
2(Table 7.2). Capital labour ratios in foreign firms were more 
than 20 times higher than in non-mechanised establishments; in 
foreign firms they were approximately double the values recorded 
for a domestic mechanised firms (these contrasts were even 
greater for the weaving industry alone). In light of the 
central role given to capital intensity and ownership in this 
study, the interrelationship between these two variables in 
particular will need to be taken into account in the analysis 
of the causes of wage differentials.
In various calculations the sample was divided into 
three groups according to number of employees: <100 
employees, 100-499 and 500 or more. In the text the 
former category will be referred to as small, the 
second as medium and the third as large. Our definition 
of these categories should not be confused with the 
official Indonesian classification of the size categories.
Capital labour ratios were only calculated for weaving and 
cigarettes. See below for details of the measure of 
capital labour ratio used in this study.
2
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Table 7.2: Capital labour ratios by size of firm, mechanisation
and ownership (weaving and cigarettes only,Rp 'OOP/ 
worker)
Size of firm 
mechanisation, 
ownership
N
(firms) Weaving Cigarettes
All
firms^
1. No. of employees
<60 14 437 - 437
60-249 16 950 2145 1174
250-599 19 1432 1678 1471
600 +
2. Mechanisation, 
ownership
12 3698 2032 3420
Domestic -
non-mechanised 12 163 - 163
mechanised 37 1280 1229 1876
Foreign 12 5257 2179 3718
All firms 1478 1942 1539
N (firms) 61 53 8
Excludes all kretek firms
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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Before we begin to analyse the data, it is necessary to 
summarise briefly the main methods of data collection. Data 
was collected through interviews conducted by the author on the 
basis of questions set out in a questionnaire. Interviews were 
generally conducted with the personnel manager or other 
managerial staff and were supplemented, where possible, by 
information provided by other employees (especially foremen 
and machine operators). There was a wide range in the length 
of interviews, in the amount of information that firms were 
prepared to divulge and also, in several cases, in the 
reliability of data provided. Secondary sources from the 
local Department of Industry or Manpower Offices, information 
from competing firms and independent informants (for example, 
machinery or raw material suppliers) provided valuable data 
which was used to check and supplement information obtained 
by interviews.
II. Three Hypotheses Concerning the Causes of Interfirm Wage 
Differentials
In this part we test three hypotheses concerning the causes 
of interfirm wage differentials. In general terms, it is 
suggested that interfirm wage differentials are closely 
correlated with
(i) Capital intensity and foreign ownership
(ii) Worker characteristics
(iii) Certain institutional influences.
We shall present each hypothesis in turn and explain briefly its 
theoretical importance and the specific characteristics of the 
Indonesian labour market which are relevant to each.
1 Details of the field survey and problems encountered in 
data collection are discussed in greater detail in 
Appendix 7.1.
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Hypothesis 1: Wages in Manufacturing are Highly Correlated
with Capital Intensity and Foreign Ownership
1. The Regression Equation
The relationship between capital intensity (and to a lesser 
extent foreign ownership) and wages was central to the discussion 
of the causes of wage differentials in Chapter Three. There it 
was suggested that high wages in capital intensive and foreign 
firms are likely to be closely related to several internal 
market factors (the demand for modern sector skills and wage 
productivity effects), personal characteristics of workers and 
several institutional influences. We noted also that 
institutional effects are likely to have a greater influence 
on the wages of foreign firms. However several other firm 
characteristics are likely to help explain interfirm wage 
differentials. These include: other ownership patterns, size 
of firm, industry, location and years of operation. Thus we 
have the following equation:
Y1 = a + bX1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + bgX6 (1)
where = hourly wages
X^ = capital intensity 
X2 = ownership 
X3 = size of firm 
X4 = industry 
X^ = location of the firm 
Xg = years of operation
The predicted influence of each of these other firm characteristics 
on wages will be discussed briefly.
(i) Ownership. Besides the contrast between foreign and domestic 
firms, two other aspects of ownership are relevant to this study 
(see Chapter Six). These were the distinction between domestic 
pribumi and non-pribumi enterprises, and the distinction between
private and state enterprises or co-operatives.
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Data presented in Chapter Three suggest that state owned 
enterprises pay higher wages than private firms. Also it is 
believed widely in Indonesia that pribumi firms are more 
welfare oriented and pay higher wages than the 'exploitative' 
non-pribumi.
(ii) Size of firm. Since the size of firms is closely 
associated with technology (especially in the weaving industry), 
it may be expected that this variable is also highly correlated 
with wages. In addition, oligopolistic power associated with 
size of firm in kretek and cigarettes may contributed to higher 
wages in large firms.
(iii) Industry, location and years of operation. It may also be 
expected that other special characteristics of each of the three 
industries may have some influence on the level of wages. For 
example, the prevalence of industry-wide union and employer 
wage negotiations may lead to relatively high
wages in the kretek industry. High wages of unskilled workers 
in the capital city Jakarta and to a lesser extent in Bandung 
(Chapter Four) might also be expected to influence interfirm 
wage differentials. In addition, the regional wage differentials 
between both Jakarta and West Java and the other provinces in 
Java are likely to contribute to manufacturing wage differentials
The effect of age of the firm on wages is likely to be more 
problematic. More recently established firms might pay higher 
wages to attract new workers. On the other hand, it could also 
be argued that employees in more established firms may benefit 
from longer years of service and wage payments tied to seniority.
Overall, a range of firm characteristics may be associated 
with high wages. All of these characteristics are likely to be 
associated at least to some extent with differences in technology 
and ownership between firms and industries. In addition to 
identifying the main influences on wage differentials, it will 
be necessary to attempt to take these interactions into account.
1 In the final part of this chapter the analysis is extended to 
examine wages in several occupations.
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Equation (i) above was tested for a relatively homogeneous 
occupational group of machine operators (operator 1). The 
reasons for choosing this occupation and the manner in which 
each variable was specified is discussed briefly below.
(i) Choice of an occupational group. The occupational category 
of machine operators (operator 1) includes the major semi-skilled 
occupations in each of the three industries (loom operators in 
weaving, cigarette rollers in kretek and machine tenders in the 
cigarette industry). Although this group of employees is likely 
to be less homogeneous between industries (and firms operating 
with different technologies) than unskilled workers, it was 
chosen for several reasons. First, in each of the three industries 
operator 1 is one of the largest occupations. Second, it is an 
occupation which is central to the production process in each of 
the three industries. Since this study focuses on the 
relationship between technology and wages, it was felt that the 
different wage and labour management policies of capital and 
labour intensive firms would be best illustrated through an 
examination of an occupation in which labour productivity was 
closely related to performance. Finally, although the tasks 
performed by operator 1 required some skill, the tasks are
learnt relatively easily either on-the-job or through special
training courses conducted by the firm. Wages in this occupation
in each of the three industries were likely to be quite
2sensitive to the surplus supply of unskilled workers.
(ii) The dependant variable (y^). Hourly earnings was 
chosen as the dependant variable. This measure was selected
In the final part of this chapter the analysis is extended 
to examine wages in several occupations.
In order to guard against any biases introduced into the 
analysis because of the focus on one particular occupation, 
we also investigated the determinants of wages of a general 
category of unskilled workers and another category of machine 
operators (See Part IV below).
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primarily with the objective of obtaining a measure of wage
costs.^ However, owing to problems of allocating the value
of certain fringe benefits to particular occupations, some
2important wage cost items have not been included. The measure 
of hourly earnings includes overtime payments, the value of 
meals provided and meal allowances, family and transport 
allowances, the value of goods in kind, cost of living 
allowances and attendance and incentive payments.
(iii) The explanatory variables
(a) Capital intensity: Two measures of capital intensity
were used in the analysis. First a capital labour ratio was 
calculated from the 1975 estimated value of all investment in3land, buildings and machinery. However, owing to problems
In particular the measure of hourly earnings standardises for 
variations in hours of work in different kinds of firm and in 
the different industries.
The items excluded were annual bonuses, the value of medical 
care, housing, transport and social welfare benefits provided 
by the firm. We shall see in the following chapter on fringe 
benefits that although some of these items make quite a large 
contribution to total wage costs, their exclusion does not 
significantly affect the findings concerning the determinants 
of interfirm wage differentials.
Two methods were used to calculate capital labour ratios. For 
recent large scale investments, the 1975 value of all land, 
buildings and equipment was estimated (taking account of 
depreciation and inflation). For all other firms we calculated 
the present market value of all buildings, land and machinery0 
There are several biases in this measure of capital labour 
ratios. First, it tends to overstate the capital intensity of 
integrated textile operations since all investment (including 
investment in relatively capital intensive spinning and 
finishing operations) was included in the calculation compared 
with only weaving machinery in the smaller plants. Second, there 
is a tendency to overstate capital labour ratios of very small 
operators whose land was often much more valuable than the 
machinery owned, and represented an independent investment by 
the owner. Third one needs to make adjustment for the fewer 
number of shifts worked by many small and medium scale 
factories which tends to overstate the capital intensity of 
their operations. Owing to these problems we have used a 
categorical variable (which divides firms into broad low and 
high capital intensity groups, see below), as well as the
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involved in the computation of the value of fixed capital 
assets in kretek factories, capital labour ratios were not 
calculated for their firms. Thus the capital labour ratio 
has been used only in calculations which did not include kretek 
firms. For the sample as a whole, a second, categorical variable 
was derived which combined the measure of capital labour ratios 
and the dichotomous variable for mechanisation. Three 
categories were distinguished: mechanised high K/L, mechanised
low K/L and non-mechanised (all cigarette companies and ATM 
fall into one of the first two categories, all kretek and ATBM 
firms are included in the third).
(b) Other explanatory variables. The other explanatory
variables require little explanation. Ownership was divided
into four categories (foreign, state or co-operative, pribumi
and non-pribumi), three locational categories were distinguished
(Jakarta, Bandung and other regions) and each of the three
2industries was represented as a separate category. Years of
operation was represented as a dichotomous variable which
distinguished between firms that had been established less than3ten and more than ten years prior to the survey. Finally size 
of firm (number of employees) was measured as the one continuous 
variable in all equations.
The dummy variables for each of the categorical explanatory 
variables were specified as follows:
(continued)
continuous variable for capital intensity. In addition 
we also tested the influence of a measure of capital intensity 
based on the value of machinery only.
These difficulties were encountered primarily with large 
scale kretek establishments whose factories were physically 
dispersed and which could not provide a reliable estimate of 
the value of capital investment.
Since the wage systems adopted by cooperatives are likely to 
be considerably influenced by public sector wage systems, 
cooperatives were included with the group of state enterprises.
All new investors under the domestic and foreign investment 
laws had been established during the ten years prior to the 
survey.
3
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(i) technology:
(ii) ownership:
(iii) industry:
(iv) location:
(v) years of 
operation:
D^X^ = 1 if the K/L ratio was greater 
than Rpl.5m and the firm was mechanised,
0 if otherwise
Ü2X^ = 1 if the K/L ratio was less than or 
equal to Rpl.5m and the firm was mechanised, 
0 if otherwise
= 1 if the firm was not mechanised,
0 if otherwise
D1X2 = 1 if the firm was foreign owned,
0 if otherwise
D^X2 = 1 if the firm was state cooperative 
owned, 0 if otherwise
0 ^ 2  = 1 if the firm was domestic non-pribu 
non-pribumi owned, 0 if otherwise 
D ^ 2  = 1 if the firm was domestic pribumi 
owned, 0 if otherwise
D-^ X^  = 1 if the firm was in cigarettes,
0 if otherwise
D2X4 = 1 if the firm was in kretek 
0 if otherwise
D^X^ = 1 if the firm was in weaving,
0 if otherwise
D - ^ X = 1 if the firm was in Jakarta,
0 if otherwise
D2XC- = 1 if the firm was in Bundung,
0 if otherwise
D ^ X = 1 if the firm was in other regions,
0 if otherwise
D-^ Xg if the firm was established less 
than ten years ago, 0 if otherwise
2. The Findings of the Regression Analysis
The regression equation helps explain a considerable amount
2of the variation of earnings of operator 1. The adjusted R
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(R ) was 0.60 and 0.70 for linear and log linear (log y^ ) forms
of the equation respectively (Table 7.3). The findings of the
regression analysis provide support for the basic hypothesis
concerning the influence of capital intensity on wages. The
dummy variable for high capital intensity recorded a positive,
statistically significant coefficient in both the linear and
log linear equations. The low capital intensity variable
recorded a significant coefficient in the equation with log y^
(see equation (lb), Table 7.3). The coefficients of both
dummies for capital intensity were also found to be significant
when these variables were tested for the weaving industry alone
2(equation (lc) in Table 7.3). Moreover the relationship between 
capital intensity and wages was equally strong when capital 
intensity was measured as a continuous variable (equation (Id) 
in Table 7.3).^
However capital intensity was not the only variable that 
was closely correlated with earnings. In particular, foreign 
ownership appears also to have had powerful, positive influence4on wages. The dummy variable for foreign ownership was quite
-2
Monthly earnings were also tested as the dependant variable 
with the same group of explanatory variables. The overall 
regression coefficients were slightly lower than for hourly 
earnings. But the differences were small and similar 
explanatory variables were significant in both sets of equations
Separate regressions were run only for weaving because the 
cigarette industry was too small and the kretek industry too 
homogeneous with respect to the major variables (capital 
intensity and ownership) to allow meaningful analysis of each 
of these industries individually.
Investment in machinery alone was also tested in the regression 
equation for the weaving industry; the findings for this 
variable were very similar to those for the overall measure 
of capital intensity.
But it is also noteworthy that the influence of foreign 
investment on wages was quite insignificant when the 
continuous measure of capital intensity was included in the 
equation (see equation (Id) Table 7.3). Clearly the 
relationship between wages and foreign ownership is affected 
by the latter's association with high levels of capital 
intensity (see below).
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large and significant in the first two equations for the sample 
as a whole. Other forms of ownership had a less significant 
impact on earnings. The coefficients for state and cooperative 
ownership were only significant in the log linear equation.
The dummy variable for non-pribumi ownership appeared to have 
little influence on wages.
None of the coefficients for the other firm characteristics 
was as consistently significant as the coefficients for capital 
intensity and foreign ownership in the equations la-d in Table 7.3. 
Nevertheless several of the other firm variables were 
significantly related to hourly earnings in at least one of 
the equations. The coefficient for size of firm was positively 
correlated with earnings in the linear equation for all firms 
but not in the log linear equation. Moreover size of firm was 
not significant in either of the equations run for the weaving 
industry alone. Years of operation and one of the industry 
variables were also significant in at least one of the equations 
for all the sample (as might be expected the coefficients were 
negative for kretek and positive for cigarettes). Location of 
the firm in Jakarta appears to have had some positive influence 
on wages in the weaving industry. But neither of the location 
dummies were significant in the two equations for the sample 
as a whole.
The extent of the differentials in hourly earnings according 
to various firm characteristics is demonstrated in Tables 7.4 
and 7.5. Very large differentials were recorded in average 
earnings between cigarette and kretek firms, highly capital 
intensive and non-mechanised firms and between foreign and 
domestic private firms. In all these cases the differentials 
in the hourly earnings of operator 1 were approximately 3:1.
The differentials for capital intensity and ownership were 
slightly smaller for the weaving industry (column (3) in Table 
7.4) but they were still greater than 2:1. The differentials
The difference between weaving and the sample as a whole in 
these differentials is partly the result of very high wages in 
two foreign owned, capital intensive firms.
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Table 7.4: Mean hourly wages by several firm characteristics
(all firms and weaving, operator l)
All f irms Weaving
Firm characteristics Rp No. Rp No.
firms firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 . Capital Intensity
Non-mechanised 
Mechanised:
30 32 (3) (4)
low K/L (< Rp 1.5 m.) 
Mechanised:
55 29 55 12
high K/L (> Rp 1.5 m.) 107* 21 88* 15
2. Ownership
Domestic: pribumi 45 26 49 22
non-pribumi 42 39 50 21
state/coop. 82 4 82 4
Foreign 130** 13 103** 7
3 . Number of Employees
<100 39 24 43 19
100-499 56 31 54 20
500+ 80* 27 87* 15
4. Industry
Kretek 29 20 - -
Weaving 59 54 - -
Cigarettes 133* 8 - -
5. Location
Jakarta 89 14 85 12
Bandung 65 13 65 13
Other 50 55 46* 29
6 . Years of operation
<5 years 75 28 80 18
5-20 47 27 53 21
21 + 55 27 41* 15
59 82 59 54
k
F statistic significant at one percent level
* k
F statistic significant at five percent level 
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-75
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by size of firm were slightly smaller, and as the regression 
equations suggest, differentials were not large for either 
location of the firm or years of operation.
It is also noteworthy that there was only a very small 
differential in the wages paid to machine operators in pribumi 
compared with non-pribumi firms.^ But, consistent with the 
findings of the regression equation, state and cooperatively 
owned firms paid considerably higher wages than domestic, 
privately owned establishments.
The range in hourly earnings of machine operators in labour
intensive, capital intensive and foreign owned firms is
demonstrated in Table 7.5. The table indicates the very large
differentials between almost all non-mechanised compared with
high K/L domestic firms and foreign owned enterprises. Only
one non-mechanised firm for the sample as a whole, and none in
weaving, recorded hourly earnings of Rp50 or above. In contrast,
in no foreign firm and in only 20 percent of high K/L, domestic
firms did machine operators earn less than Rp50 an hour. However
there is no evidence in Table 7.5 of a marked dualistic pattern
of wage differentials. The table indicates that there exists
quite large differentials between foreign and high K/L domestic
firms, and also between domestic low K/L mechanised and
2non-mechanised establishments.
As we have stressed in the introduction to this chapter, 
there was quite a high level of multi-collinearity between 
several of the explanatory variables. This was particularly
3evident for the ownership and capital intensity variables.
However when the data are standardised by technology, pribumi 
firms tended to pay slightly higher wages than non-pribumi in 
firms with similar levels of capital intensity.-
The higher standard deviations recorded for the sample as a 
whole compared with weaving may be partly attributed to the 
very high wages in the two foreign cigarette firms and also in 
one kretek factory.
3 The correlation coefficient between the dummy variables for
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Table 7.5: Hourly wages by capital intensity and
foreign ownership, weaving and all 
firms (percentage of firms,(operator 1)
Domestic Foreign All firms
Wage Group Non- Mechanised
mechanised low K/L high K/L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weaving
<30 Rp. 42 4 + 0 0 11
30-49 58 42 12 + 0 35
50-74 0 39 44 14 + 28
75+ 0 IS1* 44 86 26*
100 100 100 100 100
N (firms) 12 26 9 7 54
Mean (Rp.) 33 57 78 103 59
SD 7 19 30 15 17
All Firms
< 3 0 Rp . 66 3 + 0 0 27
30-49 31 41 20 0 28
50-74 0 41 40 15 + 21
75 + 3 + 15 40 85 24*
100 100 100 100 100
N (firms) 32 27 10 13 82
Mean 30 52 74 130 59
SD 18 19 26 65 46
 ^ Less than four firms in category
Chi-square significant at one percent level
Source: Java Wages Survey , 1975-76
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It is quite plausible that the close relationship between wages
and capital intensity was primarily a result of high wages paid
in foreign firms. We tested for this possibility by running a
separate regression equation in which all foreign firms were
excluded. Wages were regressed with all the other firm
characteristics. The results are presented in equation (le)
Table 7.3. The equation indicates that the capital intensity is
significant independantly of foreign ownership. Although the - 2R (0.65) was slightly lower than when foreign firms were 
included, it was still large and highly significant. The 
coefficients of both dummy variables for capital intensity 
were significant at a one percent level.
Table 7.5 also indicates that, despite the close 
interrelationship between foreign ownership and capital 
intensity, wage differentials were still quite large between 
domestic owned firms with varying levels of capital intensity. 
Similarly, foreign firms paid higher wages than domestic firms 
even when differences in the capital intensity of the two 
groups of firms are taken into account. This is also demonstrated 
in Table 7.6. In both the low and high K/L categories, foreign 
firms paid considerably higher wages than domestic owned 
establishments. However, the relationship between size of firm 
and earnings is much less obvious once different levels of 
capital intensity are taken into account (this was particularly 
apparent in the non-mechanised category, column (1) in Table 7.6).
In brief, the findings of the regression analysis support 
the hypothesis concerning the positive relationship between 
earnings and both capital intensity and foreign ownership. The 
close correlation between capital intensity and wages is consistent 
consistent with some of the internal labour market explanations 
of wage differentials raised in Chapter Three. However the 
importance of foreign ownership suggests that institutional 
factors also may play a central part in determining interfirm
(continued)
high K/L and foreign ownership was 0.59 for the sample as a 
whole (equations (la) and (lb) in Table 7.1) and 0.56 for 
weaving (equation (lc) in Table 7.3).
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Tabic 7.6: Mean hourly wages by ownership and size
of firm by capital intensity (operator 1)
Ownership/ Capital Intensity All firms
size of firm Non Mechanised
mechanised low K/L high K/L
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ownership
Domestic 30 52 74 45
Foreign - 91 + 137 130
Size of Firm
<100 employees 29 48 59 + 39
100-49 25 53 114 56
500 + 36 76 115 80
All firms 30 55 107 59
Less than four firms in category 
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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wage differentials; this possibility is examined below when 
considering the third hypothesis. The relatively small 
differential by size of firm (once capital intensity is taken 
into account) is an important finding.^" It suggests that the 
emphasis in much of the literature (especially on Japanese 
labour markets) on interscale wage differentials may be 
misplaced. The other firm variables were mainly related to 
earnings because of their association with capital intensity 
or ownership. But some of these - especially the dummy 
variable for industry - were closely related to earnings.
Hypothesis 2: Interfirm Wage Differentials are Highly
Correlated with Several 'Worker Characteristics'
1. The Regression Equation
This hypothesis derives partly from a broad human capital 
explanation of earnings differentials. But it also suggests 
that there are important relationships which are not included 
in human capital explanations of earnings differentials. These 
relationships were included in the discussion of the determinants 
of wage differentials between capital and labour intensive 
firms, and of the existence of stronger internal labour markets 
in capital intensive firms (Chapter Three). The hypothesis is 
partly derived from the discussion of wage differentials 
associated with several specific worker characteristics 
(especially differentials by sex) in Indonesia. Overall we 
have derived the following equation:
Despite the huge variations in size of firm in the 
kretek industry hourly earnings in the large scale 
firms (500 employees or more), were less than twice 
as high as in the small firm category (less than 
100 employees). However differences in monthly 
earnings between these two groups of firms were 
much greater (Rp 8400 compared with Rp 2500) because 
of longer hours of work in the large scale firms.
246
Y1 a + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + bllXll 
where = hourly wages of machine operators
= schooling
X = seniority (years of service)
O
XQ = external experience
(2)
= sex of employees
X , = residence (urban or rural)
We shall briefly explain the importance of each of the 
variables. Both age and years of service are likely to be 
positively related to earnings. However the influence of 
external experience on wages will not necessarily be positive. 
In Chapter Three it was noted that capital intensive firms may 
prefer to recruit and train completely inexperienced workers. 
Thus, contrary to what might be predicted in a human capital 
analysis of earnings, external experience may be inversely 
related to earnings.
Education is a major variable associated with human 
capital and should be positively related to earnings. Education 
should include both formal and informal schooling and, broadly 
defined, may include participation in various training programs 
within the firm.
Both weaving and kretek are two industries dominated by 
female employment (Chapter Six). Low average wages in these 
two industries suggests that there may be an inverse relationship 
between employment of females and wages. It is also likely that 
a high proportion of employees in small scale firms live in 
rural areas. A negative relationship between wages and both 
employment of females and employees living in rural areas may 
be an indication of wage discrimination on the part of employers, 
and a degree of stratification of the labour market.
In sum, a range of personal characteristics of workers is 
likely to affect wages.. It is reasonable to expect that several
247
of these are interrelated: for example younger employees may 
be mainly females with little education who live primarily in 
rural areas. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to attempt 
to identify the most important of these worker characteristics.
The dependent variable (hourly earnings) was the same in 
this analysis as for the firm characteristics. Two of the 
variables (experience and residence) were categorical and 
the others were continuous. All calculations were based on 
estimates of each characteristic for the firm as a whole rather 
than for individuals (for example, years of schooling for 
operator 1 referred to the estimated mean years of schooling 
for all machine operators in each firm.)^
Education, age and seniority were all calculated from data
provided for each occupation for the firm as a whole. Levels of
oeducation were measured by mean years of formal schooling,“ and 
age and seniority by mean age and years of service for each 
occupation. Sex was represented by the proportion of female
Many firms could not provide detailed information on the 
personal characteristics of workers. As a consequence data 
were collected by asking managers (or foremen) to estimate 
the proportion of employees with various characteristics. 
For example, data was collected on the proportion with less 
than primary schooling, the proportion with primary, lower 
secondary and higher levels of schooling. This data was 
checked (where possible) from company records. The moan 
years of schooling for each operator in each firm was 
calculated from this grouped data. A similar procedure 
was followed for age and seniority. The proportion of males 
and females was calculated directly from data on the number 
of employees broken down by sex. See Appendix 7.1 for 
further elaboration on problems of data collection and 
analysis.
As we have mentioned earlier levels of education ideally 
should be measured from informal schooling and also take 
into account both formal and on-the-job training. 
Unfortunately we were unable to collect sufficiently 
reliable data on these subjects. However some aspects of 
training are discussed further in Chapter Nine.
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employees working in each occupation. External experience 
and residence were measured by dichotomous dummy variables.^ 
Thus:
D-^ Xg = 1 if less than half the employees in each
occupation had experience outside the firm,
0 if otherwise
D1X11=  ^ ^  more than 75 percent of employees lived 
in urban areas, 0 if otherwise
2. The Results of the Regression Analysis
The overall regression coefficient in the equations with
hourly earnings were quite similar to those recorded for firm
- 2characteristics. In the linear equation the R was 0.67 and
in the log linear equation it was 0.74 (Table 7.7). In both
equations it was found that the R2 was significant.
For all firms in the sample, the coefficients
for schooling, seniority and residence were significant in
both linear and log linear equations. All were positively
2related to earnings.
Slightly different results are recorded for the weaving 
industry alone (see equation (2c) in Table 7.7). The overall 
regression coefficient was lower (though still significant) 
than for the sample as a whole. Only schooling, sex and 
external experience were significant in the log linear and3linear equations for this industry.
Firms were asked the percentage of employees with experience 
in the same job and the data were recoded in categories 
(for example, firms in which less than 25 percent of loom 
operators experienced, etc.).
However sex (negative) and external experience (positive) 
were significant only in the log linear equation. Average 
age was also tested in these equations but partly as a 
result of a close association with seniority, was not 
significant either for the sample as a whole or for weaving.
Only the results of the log linear equation are recorded 
in Table 7.7.
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The quite substantial wage differentials for operator 1
according to several of these worker characteristics are shown
in Table 7.8. Wage differentials were greatest in the case of
schooling, external experience and residence: the differentials
in earnings for each of the three variables were approximately
3:1 (although they were lower than this in the weaving
industry). Differentials by sex were slightly lower.
Surprisingly, there did not appear to be a consistent pattern1of differentials according to years of service.
As in the case of firm characteristics, the interaction
between several of the explanatory variables was quite marked.
Schooling in particular recorded high correlation coefficients
with percentage of female employees and percentage of experienced
2workers (both negative) and with urban residence (positive).
These problems of multicollinearity suggest that some care must 
be taken in interpreting the relationship between individual 
worker characteristics and earnings.
Overall, the high correlation coefficient recorded between 
education and earnings suggests that human capital factors have 
a major influence on wage differentials between firms. The 
close, negative association between experience and education, 
and the negative relationship between experience and earnings, 
implies that high wage firms also place considerable emphasis 
on the training of more educated workers. This finding is 
consistent with the internal labour market explanations of wage 
differentials given in Chapter Three. There it was suggested 
that certain firms offer higher wages to employ educated, 
inexperienced workers in order to provide them with certain 
skills not easily obtained on the external labour market.
This may be explained partly by the fact that investment 
in several high wage, foreign firms is quite recent (see 
part II above).
The correlation coefficients between education and these 
three variables were -0.64, -0.66 and 0.56 respectively.
2
Table 7.8: Mean hourly wages by human capital characteristics
of workers (operator 1)
Worker characteristics
All f irms Weaving
Rp. N Rp. N
1. Education
< SD (primary) 29 33 35 15
SD 54 21 50 18
7, 8 years 94 16 77 11
SLP (lower sec.)+ 1051- 12 92 t 10
2. Seniority
<3 years 66 20 71 18
3, 4 years 49 39 50 25
5+ 70 t 22 59 10
3. External Experience
25 percent 103 22 86 15
25-74 54 34 56 27
75 + 27 t 26 33 + 12
4. Percentage living in 
rural areas
<25 percent 95 26 72 20
25-74 50 35 58 23
75+ 30 t 21 37 + 11
5. Percentage female
<25 percent 79 41 65 34
25-74 62 10 61 9
7 5+ 32 f 31 37 11
All firms 58 82 59 54
F statistic significant at one percent
Percentage of employees with external experience 
Source: Java Wages Survey 1975-76
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The higher wages of males and urban workers may be partly 
attributed to more schooling. Capital intensive and foreign 
firms tend to employ educated male workers with little previous 
work experience, who lived in urban areas. Divisions in the 
labour market occurred in several characteristics of workers 
rather than one particular characteristic such as education.
Hypothesis 3: Several Institutional Factors have a Positive
Influence on Wages
Although a range of institutional factors (government and 
trade union pressures, humanitarian values, etc.) may affect 
wages, in practice these are difficult to measure. Three have 
been identified in this study: trade union pressures, the 
signing of company collective labour agreements (CLAs) and 
work agreements, and memberships to producers' organisations 
which negotiate wage increases on an industry-wide or regional 
basis.^
The influence of institutional factors on wages was tested 
with these three variables:
W1 = W(X12' Xi3' Xi4) (3)
where = hourly earnings of operator 1
X12 = ’tra<^ e uni°n influence
X13 = enterPri-se wage and labour agreements
X,^ = industry or regional wage agreements
All three of these variables may be expected to be positively 
correlated with wages. All three were also likely to be 
interconnected: strong enterprise unions may conclude wage 
agreements and also participate in industry-wide collective 
labour agreements.
1 However in Chapter Ten we also examine the influence of 
minimum wage legislation on wage differentials by capital 
intensity and ownership.
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All these institutional influences were categorical and 
were specified by dummy variables. Thus we have:
D1X12 = ^  tra-de union was active, 0 if otherwise
D2X12 = 1 if the trade union was inactive, 0 if otherwise
D3X12 = 1 if there was no trade union, 0 if otherwise
°1X13 = 1 the firm had a collective labour agreement,
0 if otherwise
D2X13 = 1 if the firm had a work agreement, 0 if otherwise
D3X13 = 1 the firm had neither CLA or work agreement,
0 if otherwise
= 1 if the firm was a member of a producer's
organisation involved in annual wage negotiations 
with unions, 0 if otherwise
The findings of the regression analysis for these variables
are presented in Table 7.7 (equation (3). The overall
-  2regression coefficient (R ) was only 0.32, much lower than for 
either the firm or worker characteristics. Only two of the 
dummy variables (enterprise and work agreements and CLAs) 
recorded a positive relationship with wages. Although both 
their coefficients were positive, neither of the dummy variables 
for the influence of trade unions were significant. The small 
number of trade unions which were reported as actively engaged 
in the negotiation of wages and working conditions, do not appear 
to have had a significant influence on the level of wages; the 
coefficient for inactive enterprise unions was even smaller. It 
is also of some interest to note that a negative coefficient 
was recorded for the dummy variable for regional and industry­
wide wage agreements. These agreements, especially in the kretek 
industry, may have helped to restrain wage increases rather than 
assist employees obtain higher wages.
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This part of the chapter has examined three hypotheses 
concerning the causes of wage differentials in the three 
industries. Although some institutional factors were found 
to be significant, these variables were much less important 
than firm and worker characteristics. Thus the data question 
the common proposition that wage differentials are primarily a 
consequence of institutional pressures on wages. The 
analysis has focused on the extent to which these three 
groups of variables individually determine wages. However it 
was the interaction between capital intensity, human capital and 
institutional factors which was highlighted in the framework 
of analysis developed in Chapter Three. We may ask several 
questions concerning the nature of these interactions* For 
example, to what extent do capital intensive and foreign firms 
pay high wages in order to recruit certain types of workers?
Are high wages also a result of the greater influence of 
institutional factors on wages in capital intensive and foreign 
firms?'*’ These issues are taken up in the next part of the 
chapter where we combine the major variables in equations 
(1) - (3) in one equation to test their overall effect on wages.
III. The Joint Determination of Wages: Interaction between
Firm Characteristics, Worker Characteristics and 
Institutional Factors
To test the influence on wages of all the major variables 
in each of the three groups, al1 the variables which recorded 
significant coefficients in the regression equations discussed 
in the previous two parts were combined in one equation. In the 
linear equation with the same dependent variable (hourly 
earnings) this included four firm characteristics (dummies for 
capital intensity, ownership, the cigarette industry and years 
of operation), three worker characteristics (education,
In Chapters Nine and Ten we present evidence which indicates 
the greater influence of internal labour markets in capital 
intensive and foreign firms. These include the training 
policies of these firms (Chapter Nine) and the effect of their 
high wages on labour turnover and absenteeism (Chapter Ten)
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residence and seniority) and the dummies for work agreements 
and CLAs. In the log linear equation size of firm, sex and 
external experience were also included among explanatory 
variables.
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 
7.9. The R? was 0.78 for both y^ and log y^. This was only a 
slight improvement compared with that recorded in the separate 
log linear regression equations for firm and worker 
characteristics. Seniority and foreign ownership both recorded 
highly significant coefficients in linear and log linear 
equations and several other variables (including size of firm 
and the dummy variables for collective labour agreements, the 
kretek industry and sex) were significant in at least one of the 
equations. But, surprisingly, the two major variables (capital 
intensity and schooling) that had recorded highly significant 
coefficients in the separate log linear equations were not 
significant when combined in the same log linear equation. Also 
schooling did not record a significant coefficient in the 
regression equation for the weaving industry alone (equation 
4c in Table 7.9).
The results of the regression analysis generally support 
the proposition that there is likely to be a high degree of 
interaction between the major groups of explanatory variables.^ 
The dummy variables for high levels of capital intensity and 
foreign ownership were both closely associated with personal 
characteristics of workers, and to a lesser extent with both 
of the institutional variables. These interrelationships 
between variables in each of these different groups are 
indicated by the high partial correlation coefficients for 
different pairs of variables (Table 7 JLO )  . The two major firm 
characteristics, high K/L ratios and foreign ownership, were 
highly correlated with four of the worker characteristics: 
schooling, experience, sex and residence. It is noteworthy that
High levels of mult.icollinearity also helps to explain the 
unstable nature of several of the coefficients and seemingly 
contradictory findings in equations 4a-4c in Table 7.8.
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Table 7.9: Coefficients of the regression equation for hourly
earnings with firm characteristics, worker 
characteristics and institutional factors (operator 1)
Dependant variable: Hourly earnings
Explanatory variables All firms Weaving
Y2(4a)
log Y2 
(4b)
log Y2 
(4c)
D1X1 (High K/L) 22.46 t 
(12.50)
0.057
(0.085)
0.19 tt 
(0.07)
D2X1 (Low K/L) 2.50
(7.87)
-0.018
(0.06)
-0.065
(0.05)
DiX2 (Foreign) 35.33t
(11.03)
0.20
(0.06)
0.167 tt 
(0.069)
^>2^2 (State/coop) 6.23
(13.35)
0.077
(0.077)
0.12
(0.065)
Xg (No. of employees '000) — 0.010 tt 
(0.0001)
-
D^X^ (cigarettes) 6.03
(11.82)
— —
D 0X ^ (kretek) — -0.090 
(0.057)
-
D,X r (Jakarta)J- D — — 0.13 t (0.05)
D,X^ (<10 yrs operation) 1 6 2.90(7.55)
- -
X^ (schooling) 4.18 t 
(2.61)
0.006
(0.016)
-0.013 
(0.017)
Xg (seniority) 7.39 t 
(1.44)
0.020 t 
(0.007)
Xg (experience) - 0.068
(0.043)
0. 087 tt 
(0.04)
X1Q (sex) — -0.002 t 
(0.0067)
-0.0017t 
(0.0005)
X ^  (residence) 13.97
(7.29)
0.16 t 
(0.04)
—
D1X13 (CLAS) 24.81(13.41)
-0.022
(0.077)
—
D2X14 w^or^ agreements) 1.01(9.70)
0.018
(0.036)
0.096
(0.058)
Intercept
R2
R2
-15.78 
0.78 
0.81 +
1.59 
0.79 
0.83 t
1.76 
0.71 
0.7 6 t
f Significant at one percent level 
tt Significent at five percent level
Note: See Table 7.1
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there was a particularly close interconnection between capital 
intensity and the two worker characteristics (schooling and 
experience) that have been given considerable attention in the 
discussion of human capital and internal labour market 
influences on wages. The strength of these interrelationships 
is consistent with the proposition that capital intensive firms 
employ more inexperienced, educated workers who might be expected 
to respond best to training (see Chapter Three).
The table also indicates the quite high correlation 
coefficients between the dummy variable for work agreements 
and both capital intensity and foreign ownership. It is 
instructive that these interrelationships with the two 
institutional variables appear to be stronger among the foreign 
firms.^
High levels of multicollinearity are mainly taken account 
of in econometrics by elimination or modification of some of 
the more highly correlated variables. Paradoxically, 
multicollinearity in this case is a confirmation of some of the 
major propositions raised in earlier chapters. Rather than 
omit or modify some of the more highly correlated variables 
(for example schooling and capital intensity), we argue that 
these interrelationships are central to understanding the causes o 
wage differentials in manufacturing. For example, capital 
intensive firms employ more educated, male and inexperienced 
workers at relatively high wage rates in order to achieve 
certain labour management objectives.
In order to understand fully the factors which contribute 
to wage differentials, it will be necessary to examine the 
interactions between these various explanatory variables in 
greater depth. This task is taken up in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
However, first it will be useful to compare the results found
It should be noted that the table also demonstrates the high 
level of multicollinearity between various worker 
characteristics (columns (3) to (6)) (see Part Four above).
►
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for operator 1 with other occupations. Two major questions are 
considered. First, does operator 1 differ from other 
employees in the same broad skill categories (for example 
another class of machine operators, or unskilled workers)? 
Second, do the major factors affecting wage differentials of 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers apply also to more senior 
level technical and administrative personnel? These issues are 
taken up in the final part of the chapter.
IV. The Determinants of Wage Differentials in General 
Occupations
The same variables included in the regression equations for 
operator 1 were tested for five other occupations: one category
of unskilled and one semi-skilled (operator 2) group of workers, 
and three administrative and technical occupations (foreman, 
clerk and machine mechanic). We shall discuss the findings 
for unskilled employees and operator 2 first and then briefly 
look at the results obtained for the other occupations.
1. Unskilled Employees and Operator 1^
The results of equations for unskilled employees and
2operator 1 broadly support the findings for operator 1. In 
the log linear equation for firm characteristics, a high r2 
(0.82) was recorded for operator 2. All explanatory variables 
recorded significant coefficients with the exception of years 
of operation and non-pribumi ownership. A lower r2 (0.53) was
Unskilled employees included general labourers. Operator 1 
covered preparation workers in weaving and another category 
of machine tenders in the cigarette industry. It did not 
include any occupational category in the kretek industry.
The findings of the regression equations with the firm 
characteristics and personal characteristics of workers are 
presented for each occupational category in Appendix 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2. In all the cases the dependent 
variable was hourly earnings.
2
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recorded for unskilled employees. However the dummy variables 
for high capital intensity and foreign ownership were 
significant for both occupations.^
The findings for the regression equation which tested the
effect of worker characteristics on earnings were similar for
both operator 1 and operator 2 (Appendix Table 7.2). However a
much lower R^  (0.36) was recorded for the influence of worker
characteristics on earnings of unskilled workers: only the
variables for schooling and seniority recorded significant
(positive) coefficients in the equation for hourly earnings of
2unskilled workers.
2. Foremen, Clerks and Mechanics
The regression equations for the more skilled and 
administrative employees indicate a rather different pattern 
of wage differentials to that recorded for unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers. The same firm characteristics were 
closely associated with the earnings of foremen but this was not 
the case for either clerical employees or mechanics. Neither 
capital intensity nor foreign ownership was significantly 
related to earnings for these two occupations. Moreover only 
education was significant in any of the equations which tested 
hourly earnings with various worker characteristics.
Earnings of foremen were closely correlated both with 
capital intensity (high K/L) and foreign (and state or 
co-operative) ownership (equation (3), Appendix Table 7.1). 
However the relatively high r2 (0.53) in the regression equation 
with firm characteristics for this occupation contrasts with the
In contrast to the findings for operator 1, both locational 
variables (Jakarta and Bandung) recorded significant positive 
coefficients in the regression equations for operator 2 and 
unskilled workers.
We also tested the three institutional variables with hourly 
earnings for both operator 2 and unskilled employees. Quite 
similar results were obtained to those for operator 1. The 
dummy variables for CLAs and work agreements recorded the 
only significant coefficients.
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findings for clerical employees and mechanics. For clerical 
employees the R2 was 0.41 and for mechanics a much lower 0.33.
In the former case both industry (including a positive 
coefficient for the kretek industry) and location dummies 
recorded significant coefficients.^ In the case of machine 
mechanics, only the dummy variable for the cigarette industry 
recorded a significant coefficient.
In the equations for various worker characteristics, 
schooling was significantly related to the earnings of foremen 
and mechanics but it was not significant in the case of clerks. 
For foremen the R2 was 0.41. However for mechanics and clerks 
it was very much smaller (0.20 and 0.11 respectively).
Earnings by capital intensity and ownership are contrasted 
for the various occupations in Table 7.11. The large 
differentials for operator 1 and 2 stand out from the other 
occupations. The differentials between foreign and domestic 
firms, and between domestic firms of varying capital intensity, 
were also quite large for unskilled workers and for foremen.
But they were small for clerks and machine mechanics.
Overall, the results of regression equations for clerks 
and mechanics do not support the findings for unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers. Earnings of clerks and mechanics have not 
been greatly influenced by the inflow of modern technology and 
foreign investment in Indonesia over the past decade. Although 
there may be a shortage of skilled manpower in the modern 
sector, our data do not suggest that this has caused 
significant differentials in wages of skilled employees in the 
modern sector firms compared with the skilled workers in more 
labour intensive establishments. One explanation for this 
finding may be that relatively strong internal markets operate
The high wages of clerical officers in kretek may be partly 
attributed to the fact that they were only employed in large 
and medium firms and tended to be given a wider range of 
responsibilities than in weaving.
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Table 7.11: Mean hourly and monthly earnings by
occupation (Rp)
Domestic Foreign All 
f irmsOccupation Non Mechanised
mechanised low K/L high K/L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hourly (Rp)
Unskilled 38 37 63 95 51*
2Operator 2 21 32 60 108 50*
Operator 1 30 52 74 130 59
Mechanic^ - 101 117 166 120*
Clerk 154 97 131 171 137*
Foreman 89 116 148 255 133*
Monthly (Rp ’000)
Unskilled 7.7 8.2 12.1 15.8 9.9
2Operator 2 2.9 6.9 11.7 18.0 9.2
Operator 1 5.9 11.5 14.5 21.9 11.3*
2Mechanic - 23.0 22.9 27.9 24.2
Clerk 31.7 19.0 24.2 29.7 26.2
Foreman 18.3 25.5 29.0 43.3 26.3
2 Excludes all kretek firms
* F statistic significant at one percent level
Java Wages Survey, 1975-76Source:
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for clerical and technical employees in labour intensive 
establishments. Employees in these occupations are likely to 
be given quite a range of responsibilities and perform many 
firm-specific tasks in labour intensive establishments.
They appear to be rewarded according to quite different 
principles to those used for unskilled and semi-skilled workers.
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has shown that there were quite large wage 
differentials between firms in the sample and that these were 
closely associated with certain characteristics of the firm 
and with worker characteristics. The regression analysis 
provides support for several hypotheses advanced in the second 
part of the chapter: wage differentials in the three
industries were closely related to levels of technology and 
foreign ownership and with a range of human capital and worker 
characteristics. But they were much less influenced by 
certain institutional factors.
However the analysis also indicates that these findings for 
machine operators (operator 1) should not be generalised to all 
other occupations. The regressions for these occupations 
suggest that technology and worker characteristics are not 
major determinants of the earnings especially of clerks and 
mechanics. These findings are consistent with the notion that 
in these occupations firm-specific skills and knowledge may have 
a greater influence on wages in labour intensive firms.
The regression analysis also indicates that wages are 
jointly determined as a result of interaction between these 
groups of variables. A major finding of the chapter is the 
group multicollinearity between capital intensity and foreign 
ownership on the one hand, and certain worker characteristics 
and, to a lesser extent, institutional factors on the other.
In order to gain a better understanding of the causes of 
interfirm wage differentials it is necessary to examine the 
interrelationships between capital intensity and foreign 
ownership, and both worker characteristics and institutional
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variables. It is also necessary to gain an understanding of 
how these interconnections affect wages. These subjects are 
taken up in Chapters Nine and Ten.
Chapters Nine and Ten examine the interrelationships 
between the various groups of explanatory variables and their 
influence on wages. Chapter Nine looks at how foreign and 
capital intensive establishments employ workers with different 
characteristics compared with domestic and labour intensive 
firms. It also investigates the influence that the different 
characteristics of workers are likely to have on wage 
differentials between these groups of firms. Chapter Ten 
examines the impact of various institutional factors on wages 
in foreign and capital intensive firms. It indicates the 
extent to which these firms differ from labour intensive 
establishments in certain aspects of labour management 
(especially labour turnover and absenteeism). It shows the 
extent to which these contrasts help explain interfirm 
wage differentials.
Before turning to these issues, it will be necessary first 
to look at interfirm wage differentials in the form of wage 
payment. In the next chapter it will be shown that the form 
as well as the level of wages differs between capital intensive, 
foreign owned and state or cooperative owned firms on the one 
hand, and labour intensive firms on the other. The payment of 
certain fringe benefits by the former group of firms is closely 
related to certain labour management objectives (for example, 
minimisation of labour turnover and the adoption of wage 
policies to raise labour productivity) discussed in Chapter Ten.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE FORM OF WAGE PAYMENT AND FRINGE BENEFITS
In Chapter Seven we saw that there were large contrasts 
in the level of wages between firms operating different 
technologies and with varying ownership patterns. In this 
chapter it will be demonstrated that these differences occur 
not only in the level of wages but also in the form of wage 
payment. Varying forms of wage payment are closely related to 
different systems of labour management. They are likely to 
have contrasting effects on labour productivity in different 
groups of firms.
It has already been suggested (Chapter Three) that there 
are quite rational economic reasons why certain kinds of firm 
adopt high wage policies. The findings of the econometric 
analysis in Chapter Seven are consistent with this proposition. 
In this chapter it is argued that capital intensive and 
foreign firms in particular adopt certain wage payment systems 
and fringe benefits to help to achieve their labour management 
objectives. Their labour demand schedules are associated with 
particular forms of wage payment. It is also noted that there 
are some important more general economic and social reasons why 
these payments are retained.
The chapter addresses itself to two major issues. First, 
it is argued that the form of wage payment has an influence 
on labour productivity independently of the level of wages.
In order to understand fully the different labour demand 
schedules of firms with contrasting levels of capital intensity 
and ownership patterns, we need to comprehend the causes of 
differentials in the form as well as the level of wages. 
Examination of the forms of wage payment provides some 
valuable insights into the general labour management systems 
adopted by different groups of firms. It will facilitate a 
much better understanding of the causes of wage differentials.
A second issue concerns the failure of scholars to 
allow for the existence of many fringe benefits in the 
measurement of wages, especially in secondary data on 
wages in LDCs. This raises questions as to the validity
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of generalisations based on conventional measurements of wages 
used in collection of secondary data. The issue is particularly 
relevant for an empirical analysis of wages. Understatement or 
outright neglect of fringe benefits will not greatly affect 
economic analysis if these payments are distributed evenly 
between firms, industries and regions (and even between 
countries). However, it will be shown that the payment of 
fringe benefits may be quite unequal between different kinds of 
firm. Moreover, neglect of some of these payments may result in 
an understatement of the extent of wage differentials within 
the economy. It is likely to hamper our understanding of the 
operation of labour markets and causes of labour market 
segmentation in countries like Indonesia.
The first section of the chapter looks briefly at 
some theories concerning the payment of fringe benefits in 
LDCs. We attempt to classify fringe benefits into three groups 
in ordei co facilitate an understanding of the empirical data.
In the second and third sections data are presented on interfirm 
differentials in the payment of fringe benefits.
I. The Effect of Fringe Benefits on Labour Productivity in 
LDCs: Some General Considerations
It is widely believed that fringe benefits are common in 
wage systems in LDCs and that wage systems are directed more 
towards promoting employees' welfare than raising labour 
productivity (Turner, 1965; Smith, 1969:102-16; Berg, 1969:
304-6). This contradicts what Turner has suggested may be 
regarded as a 'natural history' of wage systems in which wages 
should be more closely related to productivity in the early 
stages of industrialisation.^ He gives three major reasons to
This point was made by Turner as the main discussant of the 
topic of forms of wage payment at a conference on wages and 
economic development reported by Smith (1969:102-4).
Turner advanced several reasons as to why wages are likely to 
be closely related to output in the early stages of 
industrialisation: .market instability and uncertainty faced
by newly established firms in LDCs require that labour costs 
be as flexible as possible; scarcity of capital encourages 
an incentive system that promotes high levels of capacity
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explain why wage systems are not more closely tied to output: 
non-economic and political pressures and trade union activities, 
the influence of government wage systems and the influence of 
wage systems used by foreign firms (in which labour costs tend 
to be small and fringe benefits are used to buy local goodwill) 
(Smith, 1969:102-6) .
Turner identifies several aspects of wage systems in LDCs 
which are unrelated, or even negatively related to output.
These include (i) the predominance of time rather than piece 
rates (ii) several fringe benefits (cost of living allowances, 
seniority payments, family allowances) and social benefits 
(unemployment benefits, sick pay, pensions, e t c . ) B u t  he 
also notes that certain fringe benefits - health services, 
better accommodation, food subsidies and educational facilities 
- may result in an improvement in health and efficiency (Smith, 
1969:104-5, 107-8).
Much of the literature on the payment of fringe
benefits in less developed countries is unsatisfactory because
of excessive generalisation. It does not take account of the
very large interfirm and interindustry differences in wage
2systems that may exist in these countries. For example, the 
allowances in kind and facilities provided by large mining 
companies in isolated environments are likely to contrast 
considerably with the payments and facilities offered by small 
scale labour intensive firms. This example represents two 
extremes but, given the large differences in size, technology
1 (continued)
utilisation; scarce managerial and supervisory skills need 
to be accompanied by a system which encourages worker 
productivity; and finally, workers using less advanced 
technology prefer a system where increased effort will 
be directly translated into higher incomes.
 ^ One element of employment systems - deterrants to dismissal - 
is also mentioned in this context of factors tending to 
reduce labour productivity in LDCs.
Eriksson (1966:115-32) does give some idea of the very 
great range in fringe benefits between industries and 
countries for selected Latin American countries.
2
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and ownership patterns even within the manufacturing sectors of 
LDCs, it is reasonable to expect that the differences are likely 
to be more marked than in developed countries. Indeed, one 
might envisage dual wage systems, analogous to Turner's early 
and later phases of a natural history of wage systems, co­
existing within the same economy. Small labour intensive 
firms might be expected to relate labour earnings closely to 
output through the adoption of piece rates and a minimum of 
fringe benefits. Larger capital intensive firms on the other 
hand, might be expected to offer a wide range of fringe 
benefits, and adopt a more stable wage payment system with the 
aim of maximising longer term labour productivity.'*' In 
addition, as Turner has suggested, government and trade union 
pressures for more fringe benefits and more stable time rates 
are likely to be more strongly felt in larger, more capital 
intensive and foreign firms.
A second shortcoming of some of the literature on fringe 
benefits in LDCs is the failure of many writers to distinguish 
the varying effects of different fringe benefits on incentives 
and output. As Turner has correctly pointed out, different 
fringe benefits may have contrasting effects on labour 
productivity. Moreover, the effects are likely to differ 
between various occupational and wage groups. For example, 
housing and a company car provided for the managers of an 
enterprise are likely to be given with quite different 
objectives to barracks provided to house unskilled workers, 
or transport provided for unskilled workers.
In order to clarify the discussion of the effects of 
fringe benefits, we have isolated three broad sets of 
influences: (i) positive effects on physical well being of
employees, (ii) positive effects on productivity as a result
of financial incentives inherent in certain fringe benefits,
This appears to have been the case in Japan where certain 
wage payments (annual bonuses, housing etc.) were also 
adopted by large scale firms for these reasons and also 
partly to minimise labour turnover (see Chapter Two).
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(iii) negative effects on incentives and productivity 
of certain payments aimed primarily at increasing 
workers' welfare. We will look briefly at the influence of 
each of these groups of effects on worker productivity with 
the aid of simple diagrammatic presentation.
(i) Effects on worker's health and wellbeing. It has 
often been suggested that increased wages are likely to improve 
workers' health and productivity (see especially Leibenstein, 
1957:94-8). However empirical studies do not provide strong 
evidence to support this relationship (Smith, 1969:108). 
Increased wages may be spent on consumption goods which make 
little contribution to workers' health or wellbeing, or 
they may be distributed to the most needy in a worker's family. 
But, as Turner has suggested, payments in kind - medical care, 
midday meals, free milk, etc. - directly consumed by workers 
are much more likely to improve their health and productivity.
The proposition that these fringe benefits positively 
affect the health of workers and their productivity may be 
shown diagrammatically (Figure 8.1). Units of work are 
represented on the horizontal axis and wages and the marginal 
productivity on the vertical axis. At the initial low wage 
rate (w^ ) ON^ work units are employed in the production process. 
Introduction of medical care (assuming the level of cash wages 
is constant) would raise the value of wages to The
resulting increase in productivity is represented by an outward 
movement in the marginal productivity curve from MP^ to MP^
(the slope of the new curve is drawn on the assumption that 
new medical care will have a much smaller effect on the 
productivity of higher paid workers). Despite the increase in 
wages, the actual number of work units applied in the production 
process actually increases from w-^  to
Addition of other fringe benefits which have a positive 
effect on the worker's health (for example, provision of a 
midday meal) may raise labour productivity even further. The 
new benefits will raise -wages to w^ and further push the 
marginal productivity curve to the right to MP^. However the 
relatively small increase in productivity compared with that
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which resulted from the introduction of medical benefits is 
reflected in an overall fall in the number of work units from 
ON^ to ON^. The increase in work units resulting from the 
introduction of the midday meal is offset by a reduction in 
work units employed at the higher value of wages.
(ii) Financial incentives: Incentive payments (gifts,
bonuses, attendance allowances and other factors which influence 
labour productivity relatively uniformly regardless of the level 
of wages) are likely to increase the number of work units 
applied in the production process of both low and relatively 
high wage groups.^ These effects are demonstrated in Figure 
8.2. Payment of annual bonuses, for example, to low and high 
wage employees (earning w^ and w^ respectively) would push the 
value of wages up to w^ and respectively. As a result of 
increased effort applied by both groups of workers, work units 
applied in the production process increase to ON^ and ON^ for 
the low wage and high wage workers respectively. Relatively 
uniform outward movements in the marginal productivity curve 
may also result from the introduction of new facilities (for 
example, transport) which boosts the productivity of various 
groups of workers relatively uniformly.
(iii) Fringe benefits with a dampening effect on
incentives: Several fringe benefits (pro rata payments in
kind, family allowances, social welfare payments) may have no 
positive effect on labour productivity. In cases where these 
benefits are offered even when the employee is not at work, 
these payments may actually reduce incentives. Payments in 
kind may have a positive effect on labour productivity at lower 
levels of income (owing to improved consumption and health of 
an employee) but at higher levels these payments are unlikely
However the incentive payments might be expected to
have a greater influence on the work effort of
lower wage groups owing to the diminishing marginal utility
of income. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that
the differences in these effects between high and low wage
earners will be much’ smaller than in the case of payments
that directly affect physical productivity.
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to have any positive effect on productivity. If these payments 
replace cash wages which were closely tied to labour 
productivity (for example piece rates) they may actually result 
in a fall in the marginal productivity curve. Thus, in Figure 
8.3, we have a fall in the marginal productivity curve from 
MP^ to MP^ at a constant value of wages (w ) resulting from the 
replacement of piece rate payments partly (or wholly) by 
payments in kind. Family allowances are unlikely to make any 
positive contribution and, as with the case of payments in 
kind, may actually reduce productivity. Social payments (gifts 
for social occasions, loans, sickness pay) even when the 
employee is not working are likely to result in lower labour 
productivity compared with other wage systems more oriented to 
promoting worker effort.
It should be noted, however, that the possible negative 
effects on labour productivity of payments in kind, family 
allowances and social payments are often exaggerated in the 
literature on fringe benefits. First, if they replace stable 
monthly earnings rather than piece rates, the effect on 
incentives is likely to be small. Second, the offer of such 
payments may promote worker loyalty and reduce labour mobility, 
to some extent offsetting the negative effects on labour 
productivity. These effects are difficult to
quantify but they do suggest that it is necessary to be quite 
careful in generalising about the disincentive effects of 
different wage payment systems. Examination of survey data on 
the payment of fringe benefits in Indonesia indicates the 
complexity of these various influences. We now turn to the 
survey data to examine wage payment systems, the payment of 
fringe benefits and their likely effects.
These various effects of fringe benefits are a major 
concern in this study because it will be demonstrated that 
different groups of firms - mainly divided according to capital 
intensity and ownership patterns - contrast in the kinds of 
fringe benefits that they offer. Variations between 
groups of firms in the forms of wage payment are 
likely to be closely interrelated with differentials in the
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level of wages investigated in Chapter Seven. Knowledge of the 
different types of fringe benefit offered (and of contrasting 
effects of various kinds of wage payment) in capital intensive 
and foreign firms will assist the examination of the causes of 
interfirm wage differentials.
II. Characteristics of Firms and the Form of Wage
Payment
In Chapter Four we discussed the evolution of wage 
payment systems and the importance of fringe benefits 
in Indonesian manufacturing. From this survey of secondary 
materials it was concluded that, although fringe benefits 
play a major role in the wage systems of state enterprises 
and some private concerns, their significance has probably 
been exaggerated in some studies of the wage system in 
Indonesia. Payments in kind, and various fringe benefits 
associated with the expansion of the public sector, probably 
reached a peak in the period of rapid inflation in the 1960s 
but both have declined with the resurgence of private sector 
activity and greater price stability since 1970.
The secondary data were unable to provide sufficient 
detail on the extent to which the payment of fringe benefits 
differed between various industries and kinds of firms.
This is the major task of this chapter. First, we look briefly 
at systems of wage payments in the sample firms and the 
importance of all fringe benefits to wage costs. Second, we 
will discuss the types of fringe benefit given in the sample 
firms and their likely effects on incentives and labour 
productivity in firms of different sizes, capital intensities 
and ownership patterns.
1. Systems of Wage Payment
The wage systems adopted by different firms are likely to 
have varying influences on labour productivity. Two broad 
systems - time and piece rate - may be contrasted in the 
extent to which they relate wages to output. Turner has 
suggested (see above) that the predominance of time over piece 
rates is one aspect of the wage systems of LDCs which conflicts
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with his nolion of a natural history of wage systems. Our 
survey data suggest, however, that while time rates predominate 
in the modern sector in Indonesia, they are not so common 
among labour intensive firms. This important difference 
between the sample firms needs to be briefly mentioned before 
we look at the topic of fringe benefits.
Although the relatively capital intensive firms in the 
sample almost all used time rates of pay, this was not the case 
for non-mechanised and relatively labour intensive firms. For 
example, only one firm with a high capital labour ratio (Rp two 
million or more) used piece rates. This contrasts with the use 
of piece rates for the majority of employees by all non- 
mechanised firms (all ATBM in weaving and all kretek firms) in 
the sample; piece rates were also used by two-thirds of the 
mechanised firms with a capital labour ratio of less than 
Rp one million.
Thus wage payment systems within the sample broadly conform 
with what might be expected from the natural history theory of 
payment systems. In labour intensive firms the close relationship 
between physical input of labour and output makes piece rates 
the most suitable means of wage payment. However in the more 
capital intensive firms time rates, which may be adopted for a 
variety of other reasons (to promote stability of earnings and 
employment, or to prevent overuse of expensive capital 
equipment), are preferred.
It should be noted that various time rates may also not be 
uniform in their effects on labour productivity. In Indonesia 
both monthly and daily time rates are commonly used. Monthly 
systems of remuneration, (which are used throughout the public 
service) provide greater security of income and, in many firms, 
symbolize a commitment to more permanent employment. Thus in 
the private sector monthly rates are adopted for middle and 
senior level employees whereas daily rates are most commonly 
used for production workers (see Chapter Four).
1 Only one of these mechanical, relatively labour intensive 
firms employed no piece workers at all.
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Daily rates of pay for production workers were more 
common than monthly rates among the sample firms. However the 
latter system was used especially among foreign firms. Nearly 
60 percent of all foreign firms used monthly rates of pay for 
production workers compared with only one domestic owned firm.
The predominance of monthly wage systems among foreign 
firms may be partly explained by the desire of these firms 
(especially the European, American and Japanese firms) to 
encourage a more stable employment relationship. But it must 
also be partly attributed to the desire of some of these 
companies to promote a good image by following the wage system 
adopted by the government (this issue is discussed in Chapter 
Ten) .
Not only did foreign firms predominate among firms which 
paid employees on a monthly basis but more foreign firms (three 
out of the four were Japanese owned) offered wage increases 
according to seniority and used a fixed salary scale for 
employees.'*' Only three domestic owned firms gave automatic 
wage increases according to seniority (including a state owned 
firm and a cooperative).
However even among foreign owned firms, automatic increases 
according to seniority were not common (less than one-third of 
all foreign firms offered such benefits). It is surprising that 
the public service salary system with its heavy emphasis on 
seniority has not had greater effect on the private sector in 
the sample firms. There is no strong institution similar to 
the lifetime employment system in Japan among large scale, 
relatively capital intensive and foreign firms in the sample.
2. Fringe Benefits Relative to Total Wages
The first question to pose concerning the differences in 
the size of fringe benefits between firms is the extent to which
We noted in Chapter Two that the lifetime employment system 
with its strong emphasis on seniority has been a feature of 
wage systems of large scale firms in Japan.
.
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these payments modify the findings for the determinants of 
total wages (see Chapter Seven). Does the payment of fringe 
benefits contribute to greater or smaller wage differentials 
between capital and labour intensive, and foreign and domestic 
firms?
To answer this question we tested regression equations 
with three dependent variables: the value of fringe benefits
per worker (f^ ) the value of all wage payments excluding fringe 
benefits (f^) and the percentage contribution of fringe 
benefits to the total wage bill (f^). All three explanatory 
variables were tested with the three structural characteristics 
of firms (size, capital intensity and ownership) and the three 
'other firm' variables (industry, location and years of 
operation).^
It was expected that fringe benefits might contribute to
wider wage differentials between firms of different sizes,
technology and ownership. However the data do not support such
a proposition. The regression equations suggest that the
payment of fringe benefits is largely neutral in its effect on
interfirm wage differentials. The for f^  (value of all
fringe benefits per worker) and for (the value of all wage
payments excluding fringe benefits) were very similar. In all 
_2cases the R was highly significant at a one percent .level. Also 
the coefficient for foreign ownership and one measure of capital
The results of the regression equations are presented in 
Appendix Table 8.1. Both log and natural forms of the dependent 
variables were tested and both were found to be highly 
significant (with r2 of approximately 0.75 for f, and 
and 0.65 for f^  in both forms. The natural forms are 
presented for each variable in Appendix Table 8.1.
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intensity were statistically significant.'*'
However there were some major differences in the 
coefficients of several of the explanatory variables in the 
equation for f^ compared with the equations for f^ . Whereas 
the coefficients for years of operation and the cigarette 
industry dummy were significant in the case of the
coefficient for state and cooperative ownership and location 
of the firm in Jakarta were both highly significant in the 
equation for f (value of fringe benefits per worker). Location 
of the firm in Jakarta, and whether the firm is state or 
cooperatively owned, has a much more important influence on the 
payment of fringe benefits (see below).
The separation of wage payments into a fringe benefit and
non-fringe benefit components does not change the analysis
significantly. It is instructive that f (the percentage
of the wage bill devoted to fringe benefits) also recorded
a statistically significant R2 (0.65) when regressed with the
firm variables. For this variable, location of the firm in
both Jakarta and Bandung recorded significant (positive)
regression coefficients. The coefficients of the dummy
variables for state and cooperative ownership were also 
2significant.
The differences between firms in the mean share of the 
total wage bill devoted to fringe benefits are shown in Table 8.1. 
Overall the proportion of expenditure by these firms on fringe
The coefficient for high K/L was significant in the equation 
for f2 ; however the coefficient for low K/L was significant 
in the equation for f^.
There might appear to be contradiction between the high R2 
^or ^2 anc^ also for fß. However although the proportion of 
the wage bill devoted to fringe benefits was positively 
correlated with location and several of the structural 
variables, fringe benefits were not a large enough share of 
total wages to influence the value of the overall coefficient 
for f2.
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Table 8.1: Mean percentage of wage bill devoted to
fringe benefits by size of firm, capital 
intensity and ownership
Measures of fringe benefits
All fringe All fringe
Explanatory benefits benefits N
variables excl. ann. (firms)
bonus
(1) (2) (3)
Size of firm
< 100 employees 14 9 24
100 - 499 19 13 29
500 + 29 * 21* 24
Capital intensity
Non-mechanised 15 8 20
Mechanised: Low K/L 18 13 27
High K/L 32* 26* 30
Ownership
Domestic private 16 10 61
Domestic state/coop. 48 43 4
Foreign 33* 26* 12
All Firms 20 14 77
Note All fringe benefits include annual bonuses, meal
allowances and value of meals provided, family 
allowances, allowances in kind, medical care, 
estimated value of housing provided, housing 
allowances, value of transport provided, transport 
allowances, and value of clothing issues. For 
details on methods used to estimate the value of 
individual items see Appendix 1 and sections on 
particular fringe benefits below
F statistic significant at one percent level
Java Wages Survey, 1975-76Source:
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benefits was close to twice that of small labour intensive and 
domestic owned firms. Exclusion of annual bonuses, the 
single most important fringe benefit, tends to increase this 
differential between these different kinds of firm (column 
(2) in Table 8.1). The differential was particularly marked 
for relatively capital intensive compared with labour 
intensive firms. The table also shows that the small number 
of state owned enterprises and cooperatives allocated a 
very high proportion of their total wage bill (43 - 48 
percent, depending on the measure adopted) to fringe benefits.
Owing to problems of multicollinearity between the three 
structural characteristics (see Chapter Seven), it will be 
useful to establish the extent to which each of these 
structural characteristics - size, technology and ownership 
patterns - influence the payment of fringe benefits 
independently of the other two.^
In Table 8.2 we have controlled for size and examined the
mean percentage of the wage bill allocated to fringe benefits
in firms with different technologies and ownership patterns.
Even when size of firm is held constant quite substantial
differences are still apparent in fringe benefits given by
capital intensive and foreign firms compared with non-
2mechanised and domestic owned firms respectively.
However for some groups of firms distinguished 
according to capital intensity or ownership, the relationship
As in the case of the level of wage payments, it is 
necessary, for example, to understand the extent to which 
differences between foreign and domestic (or between 
mechanical and non-mechanised) firms are mainly a 
consequence of the greater average size of foreign (or 
mechanised) firms.
Within each size group the mean percentage contribution of 
fringe benefits to total costs is considerably greater in 
foreign firms than in domestic firms. For small and medium 
scale firms the difference between non-mechanised and 
mechanised, low capital intensive firms was relatively 
slight. But it was-quite substantial for large scale firms.
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Table 8.2: Mean percentage of wage bill devoted to
fringe benefits by capital intensity 
and ownership (controlled by size of 
firm)
Explanatory
variables
Control variable
Size of firm 
< 100 100 - 499
employees
(1) (2)
500 + 
(3)
All
firms
(4)
Capital intensity
Non-mechanised 12 15 19 15*
Mechanised: Low K/L 13 16 36 18
High K/L 24 + 34 33 32
Ownership
Domestic private 14 16 21 16*
Domestic state/coop. - 44 + 50 + 48
Foreign 37 32 33
All firms 14 19 29 20
N (firms) 24 29 24 77
+ Less than four firms in category * F statistic significant at one percent 
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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between proportion of the wage bill allocated to fringe 
benefits and size of the firm is less clearcut. The proportion 
of wages allocated to fringe benefits was guite similar in 
different sized non-mechanised and foreign firms. It is clear 
that size of firm was less important than capital intensity and 
ownership in determining both the level of wages and the 
importance of fringe benefits.
One might expect that the difference between capital 
and labour intensive firms was largely the result of the 
greater number of foreign firms in the capital intensive 
category. However even among domestic owned firms the 
differential between relatively high and low capital intensity 
firms was still substantial.^
The regression equations discussed above suggested that 
the industry variables had little independent influence on the 
proportion of the wage bill devoted to fringe benefits. Table 
8.3 confirms these results. A much higher proportion of wages 
are paid in the form of fringe benefits in cigarettes than in 
the two other industries. However, when differences in the 
capital intensity and ownership of cigarette firms are taken 
into account, these interindustry differences are quite small. 
Within the weaving industry (and to a lesser extent within the 
small sample of cigarette firms) there was a wide range in the 
percentage of wages allocated to fringe benefits according to 
size, ownership and capital intensity.
However the regression analysis did suggest a much higher
expenditure on fringe benefits in Jakarta (and to a lesser
extent in Bandung) than in the other regions covered in the 2survey. Even when account is taken of differences in capital
The percentage of the wage bill allocated to fringe benefits 
in high capital intensity domestic firms was almost twice as 
high as the proportion offered in low capital intensity and 
non-mechanised, domestic owned firms.
It should be noted that the payment of fringe benefits in 
regions other than Jakarta and Bandung was not uniform. In 
the kretek producing areas of Kudus and Malang the mean 
proportion of wages given to fringe benefits was 
approximately 20 percent but it was considerably smaller
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Table 8.3: Mean percentage of wage bill devoted to
fringe benefits by size of firm, capital 
intensity and ownership by industry
Explanatory
variables Weaving
(1)
Industry
Cigarettes
(2)
Kretek
(3)
All
firms
(4)
Size of firm
< 100 employees 13 24 + 19 14
100 - 499 16 32 18 19
500 + 34 31 + 19 29*
Capital intensity
Non-mechanised 9 - 19 15
Mechanised: Low K/L 18 17 + - 18
High K/L 31 33 - 32*
Ownership
Domestic private 15 21 + 19 16
State/coop. 48 - - 48
Foreign 33 35 — 33*
All firms 20 31 19 20
N (firms) 52 7 18 77
Less than four firms in category
•k F statistic significant at one percent 
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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intensity and ownership, this pattern was still quite marked 
(Table 8.4). The public sector wage system with its heavy 
emphasis on fringe benefits appears to have had considerable 
effect on the wage system adopted in the private sector in 
the national capital. The differences between regions were 
partly the result of the slightly larger average size of firms 
and lack of mechanical establishments in the sample for the 
capital. But even for smaller scale and relatively labour 
intensive firms, the differences were substantial (for example 
Table 8.4 shows that small and medium sized firms in Jakarta 
paid almost twice the proportion of their wages in the form 
of fringe benefits compared with small and medium scale firms 
in Bandung and other regions). Indeed the pressures on firms 
in the capital city to pay more fringe benefits appear to have 
been felt chiefly among smaller labour intensive and domestic 
owned firms. The differences between firms in Jakarta and in 
other regions were smallest among the larger, capital intensive 
and foreign owned firms. Most of these firms paid a high 
proportion of their wages in the form of fringe benefits 
regardless of the location of the firm.
To sum up, the proportion of wages allocated to fringe 
benefits was closely correlated with capital intensity and 
ownership patterns in the sample firms. It was also positively 
correlated with size of firm but this result was considerably 
influenced by the greater capital intensity and by foreign 
ownership of larger scale firms.
In contrast to the findings for total wages, industry seems 
to have had no independent influence on the payment of fringe 
benefits.^- However location of the firm had considerable
2 (continued)
(10 - 13 percent) in the small weaving towns of Pedan and 
Maj alaya.
However the share of wages devoted to fringe benefits in the 
kretek industry (and especially by small scale kretek firms) 
was unexpectedly high (especially in light of the low levels 
of average wages in this industry). The large share of wages 
given to fringe benefits in this industry may partly be 
attributed to the existence of regional, industry-wide 
collective labour agreements in all major producing areas.
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Table 8.4: Mean percentage of the wage bill devoted to
fringe benefits by size of firm, capital 
intensity and ownership by location of firm
Explanatory
variables
Jakarta
(1)
Location
Bandung
(2)
Other
regions
(3)
All
firms
(4)
Size of firm
< 100 employees 37 + 20 10 14
100 - 499 29 1 7 1 16 19
500 + 39 28 26 29*
Capital intensity
Non-mechanised - 18 + 15 15
Mechanised: Low K/L 26 18 16 18
High K/L 38 28 27 32*
Ownership
Domestic private 29 20 + 13 16
State/coop. 62 i - 44 + 48
Foreign 35 31 34 33*
All firms 34 23 16 20
N (firms) 13 13 51 77
Less than four firms in category
* F statistic significant at one percent 
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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influence on the payment of fringe benefits. It was found 
that small to medium scale firms in Jakarta tended 
to pay more of their wages in the form of fringe benefits than 
similar sized firms in other regions.
The payment of a higher proportion of wages in the form of 
fringe benefits in relatively capital intensive, foreign owned 
firms suggests two possibilities. Either these firms tend to 
place greater emphasis on the welfare of employees. Or, 
alternatively, certain fringe benefits have been adopted to 
achieve specific labour management objectives which could not 
be achieved through simply paying cash wages. Examination of 
individual fringe benefits will help resolve which of these 
factors has a greater influence on the choice of wage 
payment systems of relatively capital intensive, foreign firms. 
This will provide additional insights into the process of wage 
determination, and how wage policy is integrated with broader 
labour market forces and labour management objectives in 
different kinds of firm.
3. Individual Fringe Benefits
According to the conceptual framework developed in the 
first part of this chapter, it will be useful to divide fringe 
benefits into four groups according to their likely effects on 
incentives and productivity. These four groups may be 
distinguished by the following characteristics:
(i) those fringe benefits which might be expected to 
influence the physical wellbeing and productivity of 
workers.
(ii) those fringe benefits which do not necessarily
^-v
affect physical wellbeing but may have a positive 
effect on the efficiency of workers (chiefly 
through their influence on attendance rates, 
punctuality and intensity of work).
(iii) those fringe benefits which may affect productivity 
through incentives to work.
1 (continued)
These agreements regulated the payment of certain fringe 
benefits (especially annual bonuses) by kretek firms.
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(iv) those fringe benefits which are likely to have 
little positive effect on productivity or may 
actually reduce productivity.
The fringe benefits given by the sample firms are grouped 
according to these four categories in Table 8.5. This 
classification and the likely effects of various fringe 
benefits on worker performance should, however, be qualified 
in two ways. First, certain fringe benefits will not always 
fall neatly into one category. For example, if medical care is 
also extended to the employee's family, this must partly be 
considered a welfare payment (group iv). Or annual bonuses 
(as we shall see) may be determined by custom rather than 
according to an individual's (or the firm's) performance. 
Therefore these four categories should not be thought of as 
rigid. They are adopted here mainly to facilitate discussion 
of the wide range of fringe benefits given by the sample firms.
Secondly, it is necessary to know which groups of 
employees benefit from various fringe benefits. Clearly payment 
of medical expenses or provision of transport is likely to 
have a different effect on incentives of well paid managerial 
personnel to the effect that it is likely to have on 
unskilled workers. It will be necessary to look carefully 
into who benefits from different fringe benefits. Both these 
qualifications should be borne in mind in the following 
discussion of differences in the payment of fringe benefits 
in the sample firms.
Table 8.5 indicates the extent to which the various 
individual fringe benefits are offered to employees in the 
sample firms. The table indicates a wide range in the 
proportion of firms giving various fringe benefits. Only two 
items - Hari Raya bonuses (bonuses given for the holiday 
following the Muslim fasting month) and medical care - were 
given to all employees in more than half of all firms. At the 
other extreme, no firm provided housing or housing allowances 
for all employees, and few provided transport or cost of living
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Table 8.5: Percentage of firms giving fringe benefits
to all or to some employees, and contribution 
of fringe benefits to the total wage bill
Fringe benefits
Percentage
Given to 
all
employees
(1)
of firms
Given to 
some
employees
(2)
Mean percent, 
of wage bill
(3)
(i) positive effect on 
physical wellbeing
Medical care^ - 74 10 2.6
Meals 28 ) 33 ) 6.1
Meal allowance ) ) 5.3
(ii) affect worker 
efficiency
Housing - 50 4.4
Transport 13 22 3.5
Transport allowance 1 21 1.8
Housing allowance - 12 0.9
Work clothing 38 28 1.0
(iii) affect incentives
Hari Rayi bonus 96 2 7.3 )
Other bonus 31 - )
(iv) welfare-orientated
Goods in kind 33 10 5.2
Family allowance 16 5 5.2
Cost of living allowance 5 8 nd
Credit 44 40 nd
Social welfare nd nd 0.4
Given on a regular basis to employees 
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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allowances. Thirteen to 44 percent of firms offered a range 
of fringe benefits (meals or meal allowances, transport, work 
clothing, other bonuses, goods in kind and family allowances) 
to all employees.
In quite a high proportion of firms various fringe 
benefits were given to some employees only (generally to a 
minority of administrative, technical or supervisory employees). 
Over 20 percent of firms provided at least one of several fringe 
benefits (meals, housing, transport, work clothing, credit and 
various allowances) only to some employees.
Table 8.5 also shows quite a wide range in the mean 
proportion of wages devoted to various fringe benefits. Hari 
Raya and other bonuses on average contributed by far the 
highest proportion of wage costs (seven percent). This was 
followed by meals and meal allowances (five - six percent), and 
payments in kind, family allowances, housing and transport 
(four - five percent).
This rather diverse pattern and its relationship to the 
structural characteristics of firms will be better understood 
by examination of interfirm differences in payments in each 
group of fringe benefits. We will look briefly at each in turn.
(i) Medical care and meals and meal allowances. Midday 
meals (and meal allowances) and provision of medical care were 
the two major items which might be expected to influence the 
physical wellbeing of employees in the sample firms. There was 
a marked difference in the provision of these benefits 
especially between both large and foreign firms and the rest of 
the sample. Few small non-mechanised firms offered meals 
or meal allowances to all employees. This contrasts
with half all large scale firms (75 percent in weaving) and 
over 70 percent of foreign firms (Table 8.6). Quite a 
large proportion (30 - 40 percent) of the small, non-mechanised 
firms offered meal allowances to some of their employees 
(generally to administrative or supervisory personnel) but the 
majority of employees were unaffected by such payments.
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Table 8.6: Percentage of firms giving meals and meal
allowances and medical care by size of 
firm, capital intensity and ownership
Meal/meal allowance Medical care
Explanatory
variables
To all 
employees 
(1)
To some 
employees 
(2)
To all 
employees 
(3)
To some 
employees 
(4)
Size of firm
< 100 employees 13 33 33 13
100 - 499 19 36 87 9
500 + 50 29 93 7
Mechanisation
Non-mechanised 6 38 59 12
Mechanised 41 30 82 8
Ownership
Domestic owned 19 35 71 9
Foreign owned 71 21 86 14
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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The few firms which did not provide medical 
care for all their employees on a regular basis were almost all 
small and non mechanised (see column (3) in Table 8.6). Only 
one-third of all small firms provided such medical care on a 
regular basis. Moreover there was a large difference compared 
with larger firms in the kinds of medical care provided. Quite 
a large number of the bigger firms and nearly 60 percent of 
foreign firms had their own clinics. Regular services were 
usually provided by a doctor. Some foreign firms also 
guaranteed the hospital costs of employees for a period of up 
to six months or a year. By contrast only one small and one non- 
mechanised firm had their own clinic and few, in practice, were 
prepared to pay the hospital costs of workers.'*'
These differences in the quality of the medical coverage
are reflected in very large differences between firms in the
percentage of medical costs to total labour costs, and in
average expenditure on health care per worker (see Table 8.7).
In capital intensive and foreign firms the proportion of the
wage bill spent on medical care was on average 5-6 times that
spent by non-mechanised and domestic firms (column (4) Table
8.7). Average expenditure on medical care per worker was over
20 times higher in capital intensive firms and 10 times higher
in foreign firms compared with non-mechanised and domestic firms
2respectively (column (4), Table 8.8).
The proportion of the wage bill spent on medical care was 
particularly high (over 10 percent) in the small number of
A second important qualitative difference in the provision of 
health care was that over half of the foreign firms and both 
state enterprises provided medical care for the employee's 
family (usually for a maximum of three dependants) compared 
with only five (eleven percent) private domestic firms.
2 Comparison of foreign and domestic, large scale firms 
reveals that the foreign/domestic differential is smaller 
but still quite substantial. For example, in weaving large 
scale foreign firms spent approximately Rp 1745 per worker on 
medical care compared with Rp 813 spent by large scale 
private domestic firms.
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Table 8.7: Proportion of wage bill devoted to medical
expenses by size of firm, capital 
intensity and ownership.1
Percentage of wage bill
Explanatory
variables
spent on medical expenses All
firms
(4)
Weaving Cigarettes 
(1) (2)
Kretek
(3)
Size of firm
Small 1.3 2.It 0.8 1.3
Medium 1.3 12.3 1.0 2.8
Large 4.2 6.1 1.5 3.3
Capital intensity
Non-mechanised 0.8 - 1.2 1.1
Mechanised: Low K/L 1.5 6.8 + - 1.4
High K/L 4.2 10.5 — 6.1
Ownership
Domestic private 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.4
Domestic state/coop. 3.3 - - 3.4
Foreign 5.5 12.1 — 8.5
All firms 2.1 9.1 1.2 2.6
N (firms) 46 7 17 70
Less than four firms in category
Only includes those firms that made some regular expenditure 
on medical care
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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Table 8.8: Mean monthly expenditure on fringe benefits
per worker by size of firm, capital 
intensity and ownership (Rp/month)
Explanatory
variables Weaving
(1)
Industry
Cigarettes
(2)
Kretek
(3)
All
firms
(4)
Size of firm
< 100 employees 241 206 + 41 214
100 - 499 238 4831 69 817
500 + 1243 3709 + 111 1024
Capital intensity
Non-mechanised 48 - 88 76
Mechanised: Low K/L 279 791 - 271
High K/L 1285 4479 - 2293
Ownership
Domestic private 271 142 + 88 210
Domestic state/coop. 953 - - 953
Foreign 1745 5333 - 3376
All firms 523 3850 88 750
N (firms) 46 7 17 70
Less than four firms in category 
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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foreign cigarette companies. Foreign firms in this industry 
were particularly concerned to protect their workers from 
tobacco-related diseases. However the proportion of the wage 
bill spent on health care (and the absolute rupiah expenditure) 
was much lower in the kretek firms in which the health risk 
from working with tobacco might be expected to be similar to 
that in cigarettes.^
Overall, higher expenditure especially by relatively 
capital intensive and foreign firms on meals and medical care 
might be expected to improve labour productivity considerably 
compared with smaller labour intensive enterprises. The data 
presented above do suggest that at least as far as medical care 
and meals and meal allowances are concerned, foreign, relatively 
capital intensive firms are prepared to invest quite large 
amounts in the physical wellbeing of their workers.
(ii) Housing and transport. The provision of housing and
transport (and also housing and transport allowances) may be
expected to improve the work efficiency of employees for several
reasons. Provision of transport and housing remove the
uncertainties and the costs of private transport. They may be
expected to lead to more regular and punctual attendance. These
effects are likely to be more important in large cities
such as Jakarta and Bandung where employees often have to travel
long distances in congested traffic to arrive at work. Housing
allowances may facilitate employees finding a home closer to the
factory. Transport allowances remove the excessive cost of
transport in some areas. Provision of either housing or
transport will enable the firm to recruit from a wider
2geographical area and a larger labour market.
Given the squalid (especially poor lighting and ventilation) 
and often cramped working conditions in many kretek 
factories, it is likely that many of their employees suffered 
from tobacco-related diseases (despite regular checkups in 
most firms). Abundant labour supply made it possible for 
these firms to easily replace workers.
It should also be noted that provision of housing may also 
make a contribution to the health of workers where such 
housing is greatly superior to that to which the worker is 
accustomed.
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To what extent did different firms in the sample provide
housing or transport to attempt to raise worker efficiency?
As we have seen in Table 8.5, no firm provided housing for all
its employees and only 13 percent provided transport for all
employees (or all production workers). ^ There was little
difference between large and small, mechanised and non-
mechanised, and between foreign and domestic firms in the
percentage of firms providing housing for production workers
2(column (2), Table 8.9). However housing (and housing 
allowances) for middle and upper level occupations were both 
provided in a much higher percentage of larger, mechanised 
and foreign firms (column (l)in Table 8.9).
A high percentage of larger and foreign firms provided 
transport for all employees (see column (4) in Table 8.9). This 
was especially evident in the weaving industry in which 39 
percent of large scale firms and half of all foreign firms 
(including three out of the four Japanese firms provided3transport for production workers to and from work. As in the 
case of housing, transport for a small number of administration 
and other senior
With regard to housing it is interesting to note that the 
weaving industry differs considerably from the Japanese 
pattern in weaving where country girls were housed in 
barracks. Housing for production workers appears to be much 
more common in some other countries (for example Thailand 
where up-country girls are provided housing by the firm).
It is, of course, quite widespread in the estate sector in 
Indonesia.
Many of the small, medium and large firms which provided 
housing for production workers were located in Jakarta and 
recruited their work force from Central Java or, in one 
case, West Java.
There was not a large difference between various 
types of firm in the percentage of the wage bill spent 
on housing and transport. The imputed value of housing 
provided was slightly higher, and the value of the 
transport slightly lower, in small firms (since in several 
cases employees in small firms tended to sleep in the 
factory or at the employer's house, the imputed housing 
costs in these firms were probably overstated).
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employees was also much more common among larger, capital 
intensive and foreign firms.^
To sum up, although larger, mechanised and foreign firms 
tended to supply a higher percentage of employees with housing 
and transport, neither housing nor transport were given to a 
majority of employees in a high proportion of firms. Nor did 
they represent a major share of labour costs. Both housing and 
transport facilities and allowances were more directed towards 
middle and upper level employees than to production workers. It 
is unlikely that the provision of such facilities affected major 
differences in the efficiency of workers in firms of different 
sizes, capital intensities and ownership patterns.
(iii) Hari Raya and other bonuses. Hari Raya bonuses were 
given most widely of all fringe benefits. They were given to 
all employees in almost all firms (see Table 8.5 above).
Together with other annual bonuses they were the largest single 
item in the wage bill of all groups of firms. Nevertheless 
there were some significant differences between various groups 
of firms in the contribution of these payments to the total wage 
bill.
On average, annual bonuses accounted for a larger share of 
the total wage bill in large scale and foreign firms (Table 
8.10). But there was no clear pattern according to capital 
intensity. This latter finding was mainly the result of the 
higher share of the wage bill allocated to fringe benefits in 
the kretek industry. Annual bonuses were given by all kretek 
firms and represented a significant proportion of total labour 
costs in this industry regardless of size of firm. In contrast,
Work clothing was another fringe benefit which was also given 
mainly to employees in large scale firms (except in the 
kretek industry) and in foreign firms. In weaving only 30 
percent of small scale firms and no non mechanised firm 
offered work clothing to all employees compared with 72 
percent of large scale and all foreign firms. However this 
item was only a minor element in total labour costs. 
Expenditure on work clothing only average one percent of all 
wage expenditure and only one firm allocated more than two 
and a half percent of the total wage bill to this item.
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Table 8.10: Annual bonuses as a percentage of the total
wage bill by size of firm/ capital 
intensity and ownership by industry
Explanatory 
variables Weaving
(1)
Industry
Cigarettes
(2)
Kretek
(3)
All
firms
(4)
Size of firm
< 100 employees 4.7 10.9 + 8.1 5.6
100 - 499 5.9 6.4 11.7 7.1
500 + 8.4 11.9 + 8.9 8.8
Capital intensity
Non-mechanised 3.2 - 9.6 7.9
Mechanised: Low K/L 6.8 7.1 - 6.8
High K/L 7.6 8.7 - 7.3
Ownership
Domestic 5.7 8.9 9.6 6.9
Foreign 9.4 8.1 - 8.9
All firms 6.2 8.3 9.6 7.3
N (firms) 53 8 19 80
Less than four firms in category 
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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in weaving the percentage of the wage bill allocated to annual 
bonuses was closely correlated with size of firm, capital 
intensity and ownership (column (1), Table 8.10).
The relatively high proportion of the wages bill devoted to
fringe benefits in kretek firms was partly a consequence of
industry-wide regional negotiations between the kretek producers
organisation and FBSI of annual bonuses (and also an end of year
bonus) in all major kretek producing regions. In weaving, such
negotiations were only conducted in Bandung and nearby regions
(see Chapter Four).  ^ In firms where bonuses were not negotiated
on an industry-wide basis, the Hari Raya bonus continued to be
set largely according to custom - in the majority of firms one2month's salary was most commonly given to production workers.
Although annual bonuses might be expected to 
be related to the individual's (and the firm's)performance, in 
the majority of firms this was not the case. Large, capital 
intensive and foreign firms allocated more of their wage bill to 
annual bonuses than other firms. But this was generally not a 
consequence of payments more oriented to provide incentives 
compared with the small labour intensive firms. Higher annual 
bonuses paid by the former group appear to have been adopted 
for social or political reasons (i.e. owing to pressure for 
the government or to promote goodwill) rather than with the 
intention of achieving specific labour management objectives.
In these agreements the level of annual bonuses were 
generally set at one month's salary (or at a flat rate which 
was intended to approximate average monthly earnings of 
piece workers). Years of service and the annual rate of 
inflation were the major factors which influenced the level 
of bonuses agreed upon at these meetings.
However there were two exceptions to this pattern. First, 
a small proportion of larger, mainly foreign owned firms in 
weaving offered their employees a second bonus ( seven 
out of eight of these firms were foreign owned). These 
second bonuses were, in several cases, more closely related 
to individual (or the company's) performance than the Hari 
Raya bonus. Second, the value of bonuses paid to middle and 
upper level employees varied much more according to 
years of service and performance than the bonuses paid to 
production labour.
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(iv) 'Welfare-oriented1 fringe benefits - payments in 
kind, family and cost of living allowances, and 
social welfare contributions.
Some fringe benefits might be considered directed more
towards increasing the welfare of employees than promoting
efficiency and greater work effort. The 'social' function
of these payments has been stressed in the literature on
fringe benefits in Indonesia and in LDCs generally (see
Chapter Three). But, with the exception of credit extended
to employees, none of these were given by many of the sample
firms and none made a significant contribution to total
average labour costs. We will look briefly at the importance
of each in firms with varying levels of capital intensity and
different ownership patterns.
Payments in kind were given to all employees by
approximately one-third of the sample firms. However only
12 percent of all the sample firms paid any rice or food
allowances.'*' For a small number of firms (mainly state
enterprises) these payments made a large contribution (10-20
percent) to total labour costs. But overall they averaged
2only just over five percent of the wage bill.
Family allowances were given in a slightly smaller percentage 
of firms than payments in kind. Sixteen percent of firms paid 
such allowances and almost all were in weaving (most were 
weaving establishments with 500 or more employees). Like 
payments in kind, the average contribution of these allowances3to total labour costs was only slightly over five percent.
This group of enterprises included large, medium and small 
firms, seven out of a total of eight were domestic owned 
and all were mechanised.
Over half of the firms offering payments in kind gave daily 
(or weekly) cigarette and kretek rations to all their 
employees.
Cost of living allowances were given by an even smaller 
percentage of firms, also mainly in the weaving industry. 
These were also relatively well distributed between large 
and medium scale firms.
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Credit was extended by a much higher proportion of firms 
than either of these other 'welfare-oriented' payments (see 
Table 8.5 above). Like annual bonuses, credit was made 
available by a relatively high percentage of small 
non-mechanised and domestic firms as well as by larger, 
mechanised and foreign firms."*"
Finally, brief mention should be made of social welfare
contributions. These included contributions made by the firm
in the event of a death, marriage or birth in the employee's
family. The size of these payments tended to be specified in
the company regulations or in collective labour agreements of
large firms. In medium and small firms they were generally
made personally by the owner-manager directly to individual
workers. Although it was difficult to obtain an estimate of
the value of these payments, it appears that they were rarely
2above one percent of the total wage bill.
4. A Typology of Fringe Benefits
In this chapter we have found that groups of firms differed 
considerably according to the value of the wage bill spent on 
fringe benefits. A small group of state enterprises and 
cooperatives paid a large share of their wage bill in the form 
of fringe benefits. Capital intensive and foreign firms also 
tended to pay considerably more of their wage bill as fringe 
benefits compared with other firms in the sample. At the other 
extreme, small, relatively labour intensive firms did not offer 
many fringe benefits. These payments did not contribute 
significantly to their total labour costs.
However in small scale firms credit generally represented an 
advance on salaries, or a small loan for basic consumption 
expenditures whereas in large scale firms it was likely to 
take the form of more formalised, longer term loans (often 
through a consumer cooperative set up by the firm).
In the 22 firms which provided data on the value of social 
contributions to workers, these averaged only 0.4 percent 
of all expenditure on wages.
2
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To facilitate a summary of these differences between 
firms in the payment of fringe benefits, we have developed a 
typology in which the firms are placed in four groups according 
to the importance of fringe benefits.^
The first group covered approximately one-third of the 
total sample which offer few fringe benefits (Table 8.11).
Almost all firms in the group gave annual bonuses, some 
provided irregular medical coverage (or medical coverage for a 
few mechanics, foreman or administrative personnel) and credit 
in the form of a weekly advance on salary. In almost all cases 
the percentage contribution of fringe benefits did not exceed 
10 percent of the total wage bill. If annual bonuses are 
excluded, it did not exceed 5 percent in any of these firms.
Almost all used piece rates of remuneration for the majority 
of their workers. A high percentage were small firms and most 
of them were non-mechanised and relatively labour intensive 
(including all ATBMs in the weaving industry). They were 
spread widely in the major producing areas except Jakarta.
With a minimum of fixed costs, fluctuations in hours or days of 
work and consequent changes in production were directly 
related to the size of the wage bill and labour earnings. In 
these firms there was a close direct relationship between the 
quantity and quality of labour input, labour productivity and 
earnings.
The second group covered a further 25 percent of firms 
which provided a wider range of fringe benefits. Most of these 
were given to a small proportion of supervisory, technical and 
administrative personnel. Overall, fringe benefits accounted 
for about 12-15 percent of the total wage bill (about 
five to seven percent if annual bonuses are excluded). Both piece 
and time rates were used for direct employees and a few firms 
also employed direct labour on a more permanent monthly basis.
This group included mostly medium scale, domestic owned firms in
The typology is intended only to be broadly consistent with 
the data presented above. There may be some small 
differences in the details of some fringe benefit offered.
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the weaving and kretek industries. Wages were relatively 
closely related to productivity in this group also. Except for 
annual bonuses, medical care and credit (and cigarette 
allowances in the kretek industry) fringe benefits were 
important only to a small proportion of employees. They were 
offered mainly with the intention of retaining skilled 
employees.
The third group mainly included larger, more capital 
intensive foreign and domestic firms. Almost all were in 
weaving and cigarettes and were located in or close to the major 
cities in Java. They gave a larger number of fringe benefits 
to all employees. These included wider medical coverage for 
all family members, transport, family allowances and work 
clothing for all employees. Few used piece rates for any 
employees and either daily or monthly rates of pay were used 
for the majority of workers. Fringe benefits contributed on 
average approximately 30 percent of the total wage bill.
Except for annual bonuses, most of the major payments and 
facilities to production workers in these firms were related to 
labour productivity through their effect on the health and 
regularity of attendance.^ However quite a significant share 
of their wage bill was also devoted to the provision of fringe 
benefits - housing, transport, bonuses - to middle and upper 
level groups of employees. Fringe benefits are given in these 
firms in order to ensure the stability of the labour force, 
increase physical productivity and to reduce rates of 
absenteeism.
The final group consists of a small number of state owned 
enterprises, cooperative and a few (mostly pribumi) private,
Although family allowances were offered to all employees by 
several firms in this group, they accounted for a small 
proportion of the total wage bill compared with the 
importance of these payments in public enterprises and a few 
welfare-oriented private firms. For example in none of the 
five Japanese firms which gave family allowances were they 
more than five percent of the total wage bill; on average in 
these firms they were only two percent of the wage bill.
These aspects of labour management in this group of firms 
will be taken up in greater detail in Chapter Nine.
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domestic firms all in weaving and cigarettes. In this group, 
fringe benefits ranged from between 35 - 60 percent of the 
total wage bill. This group of firms tended to spend more on 
several of the facilities provided by the third group, and 
some also provided allowances in kind for all employees.
In almost all of these firms monthly systems of remuneration 
were used for all employees. Fixed labour costs were therefore 
high in this group of firms and several payments - especially 
payments in kind and family allowances - contributed a 
significant share of the total wage bill. The excessive 
'welfare-orientation' of the wage system in these 
firms may have had a negative effect on labour efficiency and 
productivity.
Summary and Conclusion
At the beginning of this chapter we suggested various 
reasons why the relationship between wages and labour 
productivity is not likely to be independent of the form of 
wage payment. The form of wage payment may have a positive or 
negative effect on labour productivity. It was also suggested 
that forms of wage payment are likely to vary substantially 
between firms and industries in LDCs especially because of the 
large differences in technology, size of firm and ownership 
patterns in these economies. Examination of these interfirm 
differences in forms of wage payment may be more relevant to 
understanding wage systems (and their effects) in LDCs than 
more general notions such as Turner's 'natural history' of 
wage systems.
Data collected from the sample of firms supported these 
general propositions. The form of wage payment - both salary 
and wage systems and the kinds of fringe benefits - differed 
substantially between firms. Neglect of some major categories 
of fringe benefits is likely to misrepresent the nature of wage 
differentials between firms and industries. We found that
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fringe benefits tend to be positively correlated with the level 
of wage payment.'*'
The relatively high percentage of the wage bill devoted to 
fringe benefits in certain firms - mainly capital intensive and 
foreign firms - had two major effects. First, fringe benefits 
were likely to have a positive effect on labour productivity in 
these firms. This was mainly the result of their influence on 
the health and incentives of employees. There was little 
evidence that the form of wage payment adopted by these firms 
(with the exception of a small number of state enterprises) 
inhibited effort and labour productivity.
Second, these capital intensive and foreign firms offered
a range of facilities to senior skilled and professional
employees. (Indeed relatively senior employees in all kinds of
firms, both capital intensive and labour intensive, received a
substantial range of facilities and fringe benefits in most
enterprises). These payments imply the existence of
relatively strong internal labour markets for these employees,2especially in capital intensive and foreign firms.
The wage systems adopted by capital intensive and 
foreign firms did not closely relate overall rewards to 
worker productivity. Daily and monthly payment systems 
of remuneration adopted by these firms guaranteed more 
stable incomes than the piece rate systems used by labour 
intensive firms. But they did not directly encourage worker 
effort. However monthly systems in particular may have 
stimulated more commitment to longer term employment in some 
of these firms. It is interesting to note that few 
firms had a wage system which resembled the permanent 
employment system used in large scale firms in Japan.
However, because fringe benefits were not a major share of 
total wage payments, they did not contribute significantly 
to wider interfirm wage differentials.
This subject will be taken up again in Chapters Nine and 
Ten.
2
307
Wage systems adopted by small scale, labour intensive 
firms differed markedly from those used by capital intensive 
and foreign enterprises. There was little evidence of 
traditional paternalism in the wage systems of these firms.
Most did offer credit (or advances on salaries) and gave annual 
bonuses to their employees. But their wage systems were 
generally closely tied to labour productivity. They offeredv t y
few fringe benefits and almost all used piece work systems of 
remuneration. Employers were unable, or unwilling, to bear 
the fixed labour costs that outlay on certain fringe benefits 
would have required. Except for a small number of clerical, 
technical and supervisory staff, the fortunes of employees in 
these enterprises were closely tied to those of the firm.'*'
A third group of employees received a quite high 
proportion of their total wages in the form of 'welfare- 
oriented' fringe benefits. These were primarily employees in 
government enterprises (and joint ventures with the government), 
cooperatives and some private, pribumi owned firms. The large 
and medium scale pribumi firms generally tended to be much more 
influenced by the public sector wage system than non-pribumi 
firms. But the high percentage of wages devoted to fringe 
benefits in these firms probably also reflects a more 
paternalistic approach to employees on the part of pribumi 
entrepreneurs.^
Employees in public enterprises in particular received a 
high proportion of their wages in the form of 'welfare oriented' 
fringe benefits (especially payments in kind and family 
allowances). Since public enterprises are under-represented in 
this sample compared with their role in modern sector employment 
in Indonesia, this study tends to understate the importance of
Unlike in Japan (Yasuba, 1976:285-8), payment of fringe 
benefits in large scale firms in Indonesia does not appear 
to be a compensation for the loss of paternalistic protection 
offered in small firms.
Although as we have- noted in Chapter Seven there is no 
indication that pribumi firms paid higher wages than non- 
pribumi in firms of comparable size and capital intensity.
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fringe benefits to wage earners in the modern sector. But the 
wage payment systems of small scale firms (which with cottage 
industries make up by far the largest share of total 
manufacturing employment in Indonesia) are much more 
representative of the form of wage payment received by the 
majority of wage earners in manufacturing.
Slightly over 25 percent of all employees in large and 
medium establishments surveyed in the 1974/75 Industrial 
Census were employed in government enterprises (or in 
joint ventures with government enterprises).
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CHAPTER NINE
HUMAN CAPITAL AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WORKERS 
AND LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION
In Chapter Seven it was found that a range of human capital 
and personal characteristics of workers had a significant 
influence on wage differentials in the sample firms. These 
characteristics included years of schooling, amount of external 
job experience, residence (the percentage of employees living in 
urban areas) and sex (the proportion of female employees). The 
empirical analysis also indicated that several of these 
variables were closely interrelated with the certain 
characteristics of firms (especially technology and ownership). 
This chapter examines these interrelationships and the nature 
of their effects on wages.
The contrast in wage rates between capital intensive and 
labour intensive firms is likely to be associated with (i) 
differences in the characteristics of workers recruited in the 
external labour market and (ii) various skills generated 
internally. It will be useful to represent both of these 
processes diagrammatically.
The joint determination of wages by certain characteristics 
of the firm and by worker characteristics has been described as 
'bilateral labour market segmentation' (Wachtel and Betsey,
1972 :123) . We apply this concept to illustrate the joint 
determination of wages through the interaction of demand 
schedules related to capital intensity and certain labour 
supply characteristics of workers in labour surplus LDCs. The 
main relationships are demonstrated in Figure 9.1. The figure 
shows three sets of labour demand and supply schedules 
associated with different levels of capital intensity in three 
firms. The demand schedule of the labour intensive firm (D^ D^ ) 
intersects with a perfectly elastic supply curve (w-^ S^ ) to give 
a wage rate of w^.
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(a) LABOUR INTENSIVE FIRM
(b) CAPITAL INTENSIVE FIRM
Wages
----S
-  -  S2-----
Employment
(c) H IG H L Y  CAPITAL INTENSIVE FIRM
Wages
- -  S
Employment
F i g u r e  9 . 1 :  J o i n t  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f
wanes : v a r i a t i o n s  i n  
c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  w i t h  
w o r k e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
and i n t e r n a l  s k i l l  
g e n e r a t i o n
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More capital intensive firms prefer to recruit workers with 
certain characteristics and abilities (for example, more 
educated workers) whose supply curve (S2S2 in (b)) can be 
expected to be less elastic than for workers employed in labour 
intensive firms. The demand curve (D2D2) of more capital 
intensive firms intersects with S2S2 to provide a higher wage 
rate, W2- A third group of firms (for example, highly capital 
intensive foreign firms) employ a different group of even more 
highly educated workers whose supply curve (S^S^ in (c)) is even 
less elastic. These firms offer even higher wage rates (w^ ) at 
the point of intersection of their labour demand (D^D^) and 
labour supply schedules.
 ^Thus we may envisage a series of labour demand and labour 
supply schedules associated with different levels of technology. 
The intersection between the demand schedules of firms with 
varying technology and certain characteristics of workers will 
result in a range of wage rates in manufacturing.
The second group of factors which is likely to contribute 
to higher wages in capital intensive firms is the training of 
employees recruited on the external market. Unskilled 
employees who are in relatively elastic supply on the external 
market are provided with scarce new skills through training 
within the firm. The effect of generation of new skills on 
wage differentials between capital and labour intensive firms 
is also represented in Figure 9.1. All new skills are purchased 
on the external market by the labour intensive firm at wage 
rate w^. In contrast, some skills are provided internally by 
capital intensive firms. The increased productivity of their 
workers as a result of training is shown in (b) by an outwards 
movement of the labour demand schedule ^ 2^2 t0 D2' D2' * T^ei-r 
labour supply curve becomes less elastic (S2S2 moves to S2,S21)/ 
as a consequence of the new scarce, firm-specific skills 
provided internally. Wages rise to ^7^ ' in these firms. A 
similar though more marked process of skill generation is shown 
in (c) for the highly capital intensive firms. The even less 
elastic nature of the new supply curve for these firms ^ 2 ' ^ 3 '^
312
and the even higher wage rate w^' may be partly attributed to 
special skills obtained internally which are specific to 
foreign firms.
This chapter examines two aspects of the joint 
determination of wages by technology and ownership on the one 
hand and worker characteristics on the other. First, we 
investigate the extent to which certain worker characteristics 
are associated with capital intensity and foreign ownership. 
Specifically, we look at the relationship between several worker 
characteristics (including years of schooling, external 
experience, sex and percentage of rural employees) and 
capital intensity and ownership patterns of machine operators 
and in a selection of occupations. The chapter also 
investigates differences between capital and labour intensive 
firms in the internal generation of skills. The second issue 
raised in the chapter is the extent to which wage differentials 
between capital and labour intensive firms may be attributed to 
a combination of worker characteristics. The survey data suggest 
that differences in the quality of labour inputs provide only 
part of the explanation for the wage differentials between 
capital and labour intensive and foreign and domestic firms.
The first part of the chapter provides an overview of 
differences in the personal characteristics of workers employed 
in firms with different technologies and ownership patterns.
It also examines several of these worker characteristics and 
the nature of internal development of skills in some detail.
In the second part we evaluate the nature of the relationship 
between various worker characteristics, and wages 
in firms with varying technology and ownership patterns. The 
discussion focuses on the characteristics of machine operators 
(operator 1). The final part examines the various worker 
characteristics in several occupations in capital intensive and 
foreign firms compared with labour intensive and domestic 
establishments.
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I. Worker Characteristics by Capital Intensity and Ownership
Machine operators in relatively capital intensive and 
foreign firms mainly differed from operators in other firms in 
sex, average years of schooling, urban origins and external 
experience. These differences are demonstrated in Table 9.1. 
The table presents mean scores and standard deviations for the 
percentage of female machine operators, average age, 
years of schooling and years of service. The percentage of 
firms in various categories is recorded for residence and 
external experience."*-
The table shows the large differences between non- 
mechanised and mechanised firms in the four characteristics 
mentioned above. The contrast is particularly marked for 
percentage of female employees (84 percent in non-mechanised 
firms compared with 10-18 percent in various mechanised 
categories). In all four of these characteristics even the low 
capital intensity mechanised firms differed substantially from 
non-mechanised firms.
Foreign firms also recorded major differences with all
other groups of firms for three of the four variables (sex,
2years of schooling and external experience). Similarly, the 
figures for machine operators in domestic capital intensive 
firms (column (3) in Table 9.1) were higher than all other 
domestic firms in years of schooling, percentage of urban 
workers and (lack of) external experience.
In contrast to the other worker characteristics, there was 
only a slight difference between machine operators in age and 
average years of service in the four groups of firms. However
Data on both of these variables were obtained in a 
categorial form only.
The percentage of operator 1 living in urban areas was 
slightly lower in foreign firms than for domestic capital 
intensive firms; but it was substantially higher in foreign 
firms than in domestic labour intensive establishments.
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both of these variables (which are likely to be quite closely 
interrelated) were influenced considerably by variations in the 
number of years of operation in different groups of firms.^ We 
examine these relationships in greater detail below.
The relationship between capital intensity and foreign
ownership, and several of the worker characteristics may be
interpreted more meaningfully if the data are broken down by
industry. Table 9.2 presents data on worker characteristics in
the weaving industry. In contrast to the findings of Table 9.1,
all of the characteristics of workers were closely related to
2capital intensity and ownership in weaving. As might be 
expected from the fact that investment is relatively recent in 
capital intensive foreign firms in the weaving industry, loom 
operators in these firms were on average younger (22 years old), 
a smaller proportion were married (34 percent) and average years 
of service were shorter (2.1 years) than among other foreign3firms in the sample.
Table 9.2 also indicates that the percentage of female 
machine operators was very low (13 percent) and average years of 
schooling relatively high (9.4 years) in these recently 
established, foreign weaving firms compared with all foreign 
firms in the sample.
Elsewhere we have noted the relative homogeneity of levels 
and forms of wage payment in the kretek industry, despite large
Twelve of the 14 foreign firms and six of the 10 domestic, 
capital intensive firms had been established in the five 
years prior to the survey. Consequently it is not surprising 
that, despite relatively low rates of labour turnover (see 
Chapter Ten), a high proportion of employees in these 
categories are young, unmarried and had little work 
experience.
The F statistic was significant at a one percent level in all 
but one case. For the two categorical variables the chi- 
square was significant at a one percent level.
In contrast, average age (32) and years of service (7.5 
years) were considerably higher in foreign firms in the 
cigarette industry.- This result was influenced considerably 
by the high average age (38 years) and years of service (14) 
recorded for employees in the two foreign cigarette companies 
which have operated in Indonesia since before the war.
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differences in the size of firm. This was also true of the 
personal characteristics of cigarette rollers (tukang giling) 
in this industry (Table 9.3). Average age was slightly younger, 
years of service slightly longer and the percentage of 
experienced workers lower in large scale firms. But there was 
a remarkable similarity in the other characteristics of kretek 
workers regardless of size of firm. Almost all were female, a 
high proportion had not graduated from primary school, more 
lived in rural areas and most had had some job experience prior to 
working with the firm. They shared much in common with ATBM 
workers in the weaving industry in all these characteristics.
In brief, several of the worker characteristics were 
closely related to capital intensity and foreign ownership both 
for the sample as a whole and also for the weaving industry.
These relationships were stronger in weaving where there was a 
much wider range in technology and ownership than in kretek.
In the kretek industry there were no marked differences in the 
personal characteristics of cigarette rollers even in firms of 
very different sizes.
In the light of the earlier discussion of the causes of 
wage differentials (Chapter Three) several aspects of interfirm 
differences in worker characteristics are worthy of greater 
attention. These are the recruitment by domestic, capital 
intensive and foreign firms of (i) young employees with little 
experience and more schooling, and (ii) a high proportion 
of male workers who live mainly in urban areas. The data 
suggest that there was considerable labour market segmentation 
in terms of schooling, external experience and employment of 
workers on the basis of sex and residence. But, although 
average years of schooling were considerably higher in domestic, 
capital intensive and foreign firms, several of these firms 
employed quite a high proportion of employees with relatively 
low levels of schooling. The recruitment of young inexperienced 
employees in domestic, capital intensive and foreign firms 
suggests greater emphasis on internal skill development in 
these enterprises. In this respect these firms differed
Table 9.3: Worker characteristics by size of firm
(cigarette rollers, kretek only)
Worker
characteristics <100
(1)
Employees
100-499
(2)
500 + 
(3)
All 
f irms 
(4)
Mean Score
Sex (percentage 
(female) X 100 100 98 98
Average age (yrs) X 26 25 24 25
Average schooling 
(yrs) X 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.0
Years of service 
(Yrs) X 2.8 4.3 4.5 4.1
Percentage of firms
More than 
75 percent of 
employees urban 0 0 10 0
Percentage experienced: 
<25 percent 0 0 10 5
>75 percent 100 100 40 70
N (firms) 4 6 10 20
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76.
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considerably from labour intensive establishments. These 
contrasts in three major characteristics of workers (schooling, 
age and experience, and sex and residence) in the different 
groups of firms are examined in greater detail in the following 
three sections of the chapter.
1. Schooling
The much higher average years of schooling of employees in 
domestic capital intensive and foreign firms compared with the 
rest of the sample seems to suggest a division of the labour 
market similar to that described in Chapter Three. It implies 
that more educated workers were employed only in the modern 
sector and non-educated workers in the traditional sector. In 
reality, the pattern was much less uniform.
Although the mean years of education among operator 1 in 
foreign firms was approximately the level of a graduate from 
lower secondary (SLP), over one-third of employees in these 
firms had received only primary education (Table 9.4). At the 
other extreme over 20 percent had received upper secondary 
education (SLA). This range in educational qualifications 
occurred in several foreign firms and a similar pattern also 
obtained (though with a higher proportion of primary educated 
operators) in domestic owned, capital intensive firms.
Why was there such a wide range in the educational 
qualifications of loom operators in foreign and domestic, 
capital intensive firms? Besides attempts to screen employees 
on the basis of education^ in modern sector firms 
historical, social and locational factors appear to have 
influenced the educational mix of employees. In several of the 
older firms recruiting standards have adjusted to the abundance 
of secondary educated job seekers. In the 1950s and most of 
the 1960s secondary educated employees were scarce and most 
went into government, or accepted higher paid clerical and 
administrative posts in private enterprise. It seems that a 
surplus of secondary educated graduates began to flow into semi­
skilled and unskilled jobs in the modern, private sector in
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Table 9.4: Percentage of employees in various educational
groups by capital intensity and ownership
(operator 1)7
Level of Non-
Domestic
Mechanised
Foreign All 
f irms
Schooling mechanised
(1)
Low K/L 
(2)
High K/L 
(3) (4) (5)
SD
(0-8 years) 99 84 50 35 77
SLP
(9-11 years) 1 15 37 44 17
SLA+
(12 years or
more) 0 1 13 21 6
Total 100 100 100 100 100
N (firms) 32 27 10 14 83
2 Figures calculated from percentage of operators with different 
levels of schooling in each firm, not for all employees in the 
sample.
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76 .
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Indonesia only in the late 1960s and 1970s. Similar to a trend 
which has occurred in other LDCs, less educated employees appear 
to have been to some extent 'bumped out' of employment 
opportunities in these new modern sector firms (Fields, 1974; 
Barnum and Sabot, 1976).
Secondary educated (especially SLA graduates) are not
always preferred in modern sector firms.^ However pressure from
individuals in positions of influence both within and outside
the firm often made it impossible for personnel managers to
resist recruitment of at least a small number of SLA graduates
2in these firms. Also, regional pressures encouraged some 
foreign, capital intensive firms to recruit primary graduates. 
Several of the large foreign firms are located on the outskirts 
of major cities in rural environments and are pressed by local 
government officials to recruit a certain number of local 
primary (SD) graduates.
Compared with foreign firms, the much higher percentage of 
machine operators with only primary education in domestic, 
capital intensive firms may be attributed to less emphasis 
given to formal educational qualifications in these firms. But, 
despite a much larger proportion of primary educated in domestic 
capital intensive firms, minimum educational requirements in 
almost all these firms were set at the same level as in foreign 
firms. Most firms in both categories were not prepared to 
recruit employees with less than completed primary schooling 
(Table 9.5). The higher proportion of secondary educated 
employees in foreign firms compared with domestic capital
SLA graduates were considered by several firms to be 
1 overeducated' for the job of machine operator. Recruitment 
of these graduates was resisted by several firms because they 
often demanded higher pay and positions which they felt was 
commensurate with their educational status.
One manager in charge of recruiting new personnel for a 
foreign factory recounted that he actually had to go into 
hiding for several months over the major recruiting period 
in order to resist some of these pressures.
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Table 9.5: Percentage of firms with minimum educational
requirements by capital intensity and 
ownership (operator 1)
Level of 
Schooling Non-mechanised
(1)
Domestic
Mechanised 
Low K/L High K/L 
(2) (3)
Foreign
(4)
All
firms
(5)
No min, educ. 
requirement 100 63 20 __ 61
SD (6 years) - 37 60 93 35
SLP (9 years) - - 20 7 4
100 100 100 100 100
N (firms) 32 27 10 14 83
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76.
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intensive firms must also be attributed to the much greater 
demand by secondary educated for the prestigious higher paid 
jobs in foreign firms.
A completely different picture emerges for labour intensive 
firms. No non-mechanised firm employed any SLA graduates as 
machine operators and only two employed a few SLP graduates. A 
considerable proportion of employees in non-mechanised firms 
had not even completed primary school.'1' A higher proportion of 
mechanised, low capital intensity firms employed lower secondary 
graduates (see column (2) in Table 9.4), but here too the 
majority of loom operators had received only primary or less 
than primary education. As Table 9.5 indicates, in none of the 
non-mechanised firms (and only in one-third of mechanised labour 
intensive firms) is primary education a prerequisite for 
employment in this sector.
Overall, the differences in education qualifications of
operator 1 by technology and ownership may be explained partly
by the greater emphasis on screening on the basis of schooling
in capital intensive and foreign firms. It may also be
attributed to the demand of secondary educated unemployed for
higher wage jobs in the modern sector. Partly it is the result
of considerable 'stratification' of the labour market on the
supply side: unwillingness on the part of the secondary
2educated to accept low wage jobs.
Despite high levels of urban unemployment (especially 
among SLA graduates, see Chapter Four), almost no secondary 
educated sought employment in non-mechanised firms and few 
were employed in labour intensive, mechanised firms. Low 
wages may have contributed to the reluctance of SLP or SLA
Unfortunately it was not possible to collect detailed data on 
the educational levels of employees in most of these firms.
Few of the non-mechanised firms were able to provide detailed 
information on the proportion of primary school educated 
compared with those that had not graduated from primary school.
See Fields (1974) for a definition of this notion of labour 
market stratification.
2
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graduates to seek employment in labour intensive establishments.^
However the expectations of secondary educated job seekers
concerning the jobs which were worthy of their social status
undoubtedly prevented many from accepting jobs in labour
intensive firms. The dislike, especially of secondary school
graduates, of manual labour probably contributed to their
reluctance to work in labour intensive and particularly in non-
2mechanised establishments.
Recruiting processes and methods of skill acquisition in 
labour intensive firms may have, paradoxically, provided a 
further obstacle to employment of secondary educated in these 
firms. In labour intensive firms recruiting and training both 
tended to be carried out on an informal basis through family 
and friends of employees. Just as the less educated had few 
contacts who could assist their entry into the modern sector, 
so the more educated were unlikely to have the contacts for 
entry into the traditional sector.
2. Generation of Skills: External Experience and Training
We have already noted that domestic capital intensive and 
foreign firms differed considerably from the rest of the sample 
in their approach to the development of basic skills of machine 
operators (operator 1). These firms preferred to recruit 
inexperienced, younger employees and to train them for new jobs. 
They adopted these policies partly because of the shortage of 
employees familiar with the new technology used by most firms in 
the modern segment of each industry. Also, training programs
It may be argued (along lines proposed by Harris and Todaro, 
1970) that some secondary educated are prepared to accept a 
period of temporary unemployment in order to be free to 
search for higher paid modern sector jobs. However the 
relatively high rates of unemployment of secondary educated 
in the major urban centres in Indonesia suggests that the 
probability even of the secondary educated of obtaining 
unskilled modern sector jobs is likely to be low.
See especially Myrdal (1968:1124-9) for a discussion of the 
attitudes of the educated unemployed in India to manual 
work.
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had been introduced especially by foreign firms to transmit new 
firm-specific technology and practices. As we have noted in 
Chapter Three, the internal generation of skills is likely to be 
a major factor contributing to high modern sector wages. In 
this section we will examine briefly the contrasting methods of 
skill generation in firms with different technologies and 
ownership patterns.
Table 9.6 shows the relatively small proportion of 
employees with previous experience in the same job that were 
recruited in most domestic capital intensive and foreign firms. 
In nearly two-thirds of foreign firms less than 10 percent of 
machine operators had some external experience in their current 
job. A similar result was obtained for domestic capital 
intensive firms. In contrast, in labour intensive firms a 
substantial proportion of machine operators had some work 
experience. Over 80 percent of operator 1 in all non- 
mechanised firms and over half in labour intensive, mechanised 
firms were experienced.
We have seen in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 that machine operators 
in these modern sector firms were relatively young. In the 
weaving industry the relatively low average age (22 years) of 
loom operators in capital intensive and foreign firms can be 
partly attributed to the recent nature of these investments.
But average age at recruitment was also relatively low.'*' As in 
Japan, many of these firms preferred to recruit recent high 
school graduates with no previous job experience.
In weaving, the policy of recruiting and training 
inexperienced workers was particularly marked in the four 
Japanese joint ventures. In addition to transmitting new basic 
skills associated with the operation of automatic looms, these 
firms placed considerable emphasis on work habits and
Average age at recruitment of operator 1 for the sample as a 
whole was 22 years in domestic capital intensive firms and 
19 in foreign firms.
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Table 9.6: Percentage of experienced machine operators
by capital intensity and ownership
(operator 1)
Percentage of Domestic Foreign All
machine
operators
experienced
N on-
mechanised
(1)
Mechanised 
Low K/L High K/L 
(2) (3) (4)
f irms 
(5)
<10 percent 0 4 10 64 14
10-49 percent 9 44 70 29 31
50-74 percent 9 52 20 7 24
75+ 82 - - - 31
Total 100 100 100 100 100
N (firms) 32 27 10 14 83
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76 .
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discipline. Intensity of work, punctuality, dress and general 
bearing were all given considerable emphasis.
The different methods adopted by modern sector firms to
provide machine operators with basic skills is shown in Table
9.7. Fifty percent of all foreign firms adopted short formal
training courses (three weeks to one month in duration) for
employees during their three month probation period. A smaller
percentage (25 percent) of domestic capital intensive firms
adopted formal training courses but all provided formal on-the-
job training through special instructors or supervisors and
mechanics. In contrast, most relatively labour intensive,
mechanised firms encouraged experienced workers to teach members
of their family or friends. Internal transmission of skills
was achieved mainly through 'learning by doing' on the part of
kretek cigarette trimmers and preparation workers in ATBM in 
2weaving.
One manager in a Japanese firm explained that it was more 
costly to employ experienced rather than inexperienced 
workers. Japanese managers felt that many of the former were 
unable to lose sloppy technical practices and also less 
capable of adapting to much tighter work discipline than 
younger job seekers without any employment experience.
In most cases informal training was achieved at very little 
cost to the firm. In ATBM it mainly involved preparation 
workers teaching themselves to operate hand looms either 
after office hours or (either because of absenteeism or 
labour turnover) when the loom was not occupied. Cigarette 
trimmers (tukang gunting) in the kretek industry learnt to 
roll cigarettes under similar conditions. Especially in a 
small ATM, a relative of a would-be-loom operator may take 
time off to teach the new employee to operate the looms so 
that he (or she) could fill existing or any future 
vacancies. In more specialised weaving activities (for 
example the manufacture of sarongs) weavers were even 
encouraged to teach their sons the trade during work hours. 
Training activities in these relatively labour intensive 
enterprises were closely related to the family nature of 
recruitment. Employees in these firms were frequently 
encouraged to recruit and help train friends and family 
members for vacancies.
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Table 9.7 : Major methods of skill generation by
capital intensity and ownership
(operator 1)
Major methods 
of skill 
generation
Domestic Foreign All
N on-
mechanised
(1)
Mechanised 
Low K/L High K/L 
(2) (3) (4)
firms
(5)
Percentage of firms
Learning by 
doing 72 - - - 25
Help of friends/ 
family 14 59 20 - 28
Formal on-the- 
job training 14 41 60 50 36
Special training 
courses - - 20 50 11
100 100 100 100 100
N (firms) 28 27 10 14 79
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76.
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Mostly, labour intensive firms preferred to obtain the 
skills that they needed through the recruitment of experienced 
workers on the external market. Relatively high rates of labour 
turnover in these firms (see Chapter Ten) made it fairly easy 
for them to recruit new experienced operators. This contrasts 
with the greater stability of employment in the modern sector 
which tended to limit opportunities for recruitment on the 
external labour market.
A lack of emphasis on internal skill generation in labour 
intensive firms probably influenced their decision to employ a 
high proportion of female and rural workers. The next section 
examines differences between these firms and capital intensive 
and foreign firms in the employment of females and workers 
living in rural areas.
3. Employment of Male and Urban V7orkers
The data presented in Chapter Seven and at the beginning of 
this chapter suggest that a high proportion of both male 
employees and urban employees are likely to be closely 
associated with the high wages offered in capital 
intensive firms. Both variables were positively related to 
wages and also to foreign ownership and capital intensity. This 
section examines some of the reasons for the concentration of 
males and urban employees in capital intensive and foreign 
firms.
Two major reasons were given for employment of a high 
proportion of males in domestic capital intensive and foreign 
firms: males were stronger and there were no problems involved
in their employment on night shifts. Generous maternity leave 
(with pay) and menstruation leave (see Chapter Five) were
Approximately 25 percent of firms gave each of these reasons 
as the major reason for preferring to employ males. As we 
have noted in Chapter Five, firms must obtain special 
permission to work night shifts in Indonesia. Several firms 
reported also that there was still quite strong local 
opposition and general social disapproval of employment of 
women on night shifts.
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additional factors discouraging some firms from employing 
females. Besides, the job of loom operator in mechanised 
weaving firms tended to be regarded as a 'male' job.
The high proportion of urban employees in most of these 
foreign and domestic capital intensive firms was partly the 
result of the location of these firms. Several were located in 
or close to the large cities of Jakarta and Bandung where they 
could draw on a relatively large surplus of educated manpower. 
But even foreign and capital intensive firms situated on the
2outskirts of urban areas preferred to recruit urban workers.
The employment of mainly male, urban workers in these firms must
be attributed to the belief that these workers would respond
better to modern factory discipline and training. The longer
term labour management planning of some of these firms
encouraged them to employ male, urban workers who were expected
3to be more stable and a better long term investment.
In contrast to domestic capital intensive and foreign 
firms, kretek factories employed a high proportion of females 
and rural employees. All three major operations in this 
industry - rolling, trimming and packing - were carried out 
almost exclusively by female employees. Also almost all
The Manager of one firm, for example, reported that he 
employed males because they were adept at making small 
adjustments and repairs to machinery.
Over 70 percent of firms located on the outskirts (within 
5 km of the city limits) of large cities recruited more than 
three-quarters of their workers from urban areas.
However it is instructive that at least one foreign 
(Japanese) firm with a relatively high proportion of rural 
machine operators reported that there was no visible 
difference in the performance of these employees compared 
with those recruited in urban areas. (Interview conducted in 
Bandung, 25/2/76).
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cigarette rollers in Kudus and Malang lived in rural areas.^
Indeed the labour supply situation in the kretek industry
appears to have changed little (despite a marked increase in
surplus labour in urban areas) since Castles investigated the
2industry in the early 1960s. Rural workers continued to walk
as far as 10-15 km. a day to work in the kretek factories
located in or on the outskirts of the major towns of Kudus,
3Malang and Solo.
A similar pattern also prevailed in ATBM factories in 
weaving. Even in the small town of Majalaya there was quite a 
marked contrast in the age and rural origins of the work force 
employed in ATM and ATBM firms. No urban employees in Majalaya 
worked in ATBM factories and younger, rural employees sought 
employment (even at lower wages) in preparation in mechanised 
factories rather than work as loom operators in ATBM firms.
Why were almost all the employees in kretek factories from 
rural areas and mostly female? The high proportion of female 
employees may be partly attributed to the nature of tasks 
performed: rolling, trimming and packing by hand all required
a high degree of manual dexterity. But the reliance on rural 
workers in these establishments must also be partly due to the 
willingness of employees to work long hours for low wages in 
poor working conditions. Several of the larger kretek factories 
operated 10-12 hours a day six (or even seven) days a week.
One exception to this pattern should be noted. A large 
kretek factory (more than 2,000 workers) in Surabaya 
recruited over half its work force from urban areas.
However (it is noteworthy that) this firm paid by far the 
highest wages of any kretek firm in the entire sample and 
also provided (along with the giant firm Gudang Garam) the 
best working conditions for workers.
Castles (1967:54) noted that the industry has 'not created a 
new clan of thoroughly urbanised and industrialised workers 
in Kudus but merely swollen and modified somewhat the class 
of "little people" to be found in any Javanese town'.
However one major change since that time may have been the 
movement of many of.the larger factories into rural areas 
within a 20 km. radius of Kudus. The work force in kretek 
in Kudus may have been becoming more rather than less rural.
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Earnings per hour were even lower relative to other firms than 
total weekly and monthly earnings. These workers in non- 
mechanised firms also experienced considerable seasonal 
fluctuations in employment and earnings as a result of unstable 
production. It is likely that rural workers in particular were 
more accustomed to (and accepted more readily) these seasonal 
fluctuations than urban dwellers.^
Nevertheless the lack of urban workers in the kretek
industry cannot be attributed to economic factors only.
Prejudice against undertaking the mechanical rolling and
trimming tasks in kretek which urban dwellers considered to be
fit for rural people only - probably has had a major influence
2on the pattern of supply response in this industry. Similarly, 
employment in ATBM factories in Majalaya was considered by urban 
dwellers to be low status.
To sum up, the first part of this chapter has examined the 
differences in worker characteristics according to contrasting 
patterns of capital intensity and ownership in the sample firms. 
Variations in several of these worker characteristics (schooling, 
external experience, sex and residence) were closely correlated 
with differences in capital intensity and ownership. However 
the differences between firms in (some) other variables 
(especially age and seniority) were much less marked.
The above discussion has highlighted the differences between 
both domestic capital intensive and foreign firms and all other 
firms in the sample. Two other divisions between the sample 
firms should also be mentioned. First, there were some major 
differences in all of the worker characteristics between non- 
mechanised and mechanised firms. Second, foreign firms stood
See Manning (1977) for a discussion of seasonal fluctuations 
in hours worked and earnings per hour in ATBM and kretek 
establishments.
However it should be noted that quite a significant proportion 
(usually 20-30 percent) of all kretek employees lived in 
urban areas. This included daily paid, unskilled male 
workers and more senior employees. In addition a high 
proportion of cigarette packers (tukang verpak) also tended 
to come from urban areas.
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out from all domestic firms, especially because of more 
schooling provided for machine operators and more formal methods 
of training adopted in these firms. Overall, although the 
differences in worker characteristics between both domestic 
capital intensive and foreign firms and the rest of the sample 
are most obvious, there was not a marked dualistic pattern.
As a consequence of the contrasts in labour demand patterns 
of these different kinds of firm, there was relatively little 
direct interaction between workers with different labour supply 
characteristics. At one extreme foreign enterprises in weaving 
and cigarettes almost all recruited a high proportion of young, 
male high school graduates from urban areas as machine operators. 
At the other the non-mechanised ATBM and kretek firms recruited 
a high proportion of uneducated (or at most primary educated) 
women from rural areas.
There were some exceptions to this pattern. The market was 
not perfectly segmented. Several foreign firms employed quite a 
high proportion of females, and some rural and primary educated 
workers.1 In several ATBM firms, more than half of all loom 
operators were male. Despite loss of status, some secondary 
graduates were employed (at least temporarily) in labour 
intensive ATM firms.
Nevertheless, at the extremes, the division of the sample 
firms into distinct groups according to the characteristics of 
workers was quite marked. In over 80 percent of all non- 
mechanised firms, machine operators had the following 
characteristics: average education SD (primary) or less; 50
percent or more were female, lived in rural areas and had had 
previous external experience in their current job. In contrast, 
not one mechanised firm employed machine operators who had all
However it should be noted that in the case of primary 
educated, rural employees the segmentation was broken down 
mainly by non-market forces (the intervention or pressure 
from local and other governmental bodies).
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of these characteristics.^ At the other extreme, well over half 
of all foreign and domestic capital intensive firms employed 
workers with an average education of seven years or more; less 
than 50 percent of employees in these firms were female, rural 
or experienced. Less than 20 percent of labour intensive 
mechanised establishments and no non-mechanised firm employed 
machine operators with these characteristics. As we have noted 
in Chapter Four, the labour market operates under conditions 
of surplus labour in both urban and rural areas, and among the 
secondary educated as well as the less educated. This ensures 
that even considerable expansion of labour demand in the modern 
sector is unlikely to influence the wages of the large majority 
of wage earners employed in labour intensive firms, or the 
prospects of employment of relatively uneducated, female and 
rural job seekers.
II. The Influence of Worker Characteristics on Wage
Differentials by Capital Intensity and Ownership
In this section we examine the extent to which wage 
differentials by capital intensity and ownership may be 
attributed to differences in worker characteristics. To what 
extent do wage differentials between capital intensive and 
labour intensive firms remain after the differences in worker 
characteristics of employees in these firms are taken into 
account? Are we justified in seeking other explanations for 
wage differentials? 2
It should be noted that this data refer to the average for 
all operator 1 in each firm not to the characteristics of 
individual machine operators in each firm.
It was not always possible to examine the effect of worker 
characteristics on wage differentials because employees in 
the various groups of firms (foreign, domestic, mechanised 
capital intensive and labour intensive, and non-mechanised) 
did not always share the same characteristics. For example, 
we were not able to compare wages in mechanised and non- 
mechanised firms for a comparable group of urban males since 
there were no urban males employed as machine operators in 
non-mechanised firms. Nevertheless there was sufficient 
overlap to enable a comparison to be made of wages of 
employees with similar characteristics in firms with varying 
capital intensity and ownership patterns.
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Wages were compared in firms with different levels of 
technology and ownership patterns for employers with the same 
worker characteristics. The results of these calculations are 
presented in Table 9.8. In this table hourly earnings of 
machine operators are compared for various groups of employees 
in four firm categories: non-mechanised, domestic low K/L, high
K/L and foreign. It is clear from the table that there were 
still substantial wage differentials between the four groups of 
firms even when worker characteristics are held constant. For 
example, wages of employees with 7-8 years or SMP 
schooling were more than twice as high m  foreign firms than in 
labour intensive, mechanised establishments.'*' Similar results 
were also found when differences in groups of employees in years 
of service, external experience and percentage of female and 
urban employees were taken into account. The contrast was most 
marked between foreign and domestic firms, and between all 
groups of mechanised firms on the one hand, and non-mechanised 
firms on the other.
However evidence that individual employee characteristics 
do not fully account for interfirm wage differentials does not 
necessarily mean that a combination of these characteristics 
might not account for the differentials. But even when a 
comparison was made of a group of firms in which employees 
shared several similar worker characteristics, the wage 
differentials were still quite large. For example, wages were 
compared in a group of firms in which machine operators had 
all of the following characteristics: seven or more years of
schooling, less than half were female, rural and experienced.
This was not true for the group of primary graduates. The 
table suggests that employees in labour intensive firms 
actually receive a higher wage than those in the foreign 
firm category (Rp 81 compared with Rp 70). However only one 
foreign and two domestic firms are included in each of 
these categories.
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The results are given below:
Mean Hourly Wages (operator 1)
Rp Firms
Domestic: low K/L 61 (n = 5)
high K/L 83 (n = 6)
Foreign: 147 (n = 9)
differentials were still substantial especially between
foreign and domestic firms.
These differences in wages of workers with similar socio­
economic characteristics in firms of varying capital intensity 
and ownership do suggest that we need to search beyond worker 
characteristics for an explanation of wage differentials in the 
sample firms. We shall see in the next chapter that other 
aspects of labour management and, to a lesser extent, some 
'institutional' forces need to be introduced to help explain 
the extent of wage differentials by capital intensity and 
ownership.
Ill. Worker Characteristics in Several Occupations
Before turning in the next chapter to labour management and 
institutional influences on wages, it is necessary to examine 
briefly the extent to which the findings for machine operators 
(operator 1) may be generalised to other occupational 
categories.
Although this study is mainly concerned with wage 
determination in markets for unskilled and semi-skilled labour, 
it will be useful to examine the extent to which these processes 
differ for more skilled, administrative and supervisory 
personnel. We pose the question: how much do the findings for
operator 1 apply to other occupations in the sample firms?
Data for the five occupations discussed in Chapter Seven 
(operator 2, unskilled labourer, mechanic, clerk, foreman) 
indicate some similarities with the patterns observed for 
operator 1. But there were also some major differences. First, 
we look at the worker characteristics of the two categories of
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unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and then examine the three 
categories of skilled^ supervisory and administrative employees.
There were some major differences in the worker
characteristics of operator 2 compared with operator 1.^
Operator 2 tended to be younger than operator 1 and in several
cases they were recruited at very young ages. Also they had
experienced fewer years of service and a higher percentage
2were female especially in small scale firms. But despite 
these differences, the same variables - especially education 
and percentage of female employees - were highly correlated 
with capital intensity and ownership (Table 9.9).
The category of unskilled workers (general labourers) 
revealed a somewhat different pattern to operators 1 and 2. In 
most firms all were male, they were on average considerably 
older (28) and averaged longer years of service (four years); 
years of service were longer especially in small scale, 
relatively capital intensive firms (Table 9.10). The 
employment patterns of these general labourers showed some 
similarities with relatively skilled employees. Especially in 
small scale, capital intensive firms, they tended to be 
recruited more on a personal basis than machine operators, and
3were considered more as permanent employees. Nevertheless,
It should be remembered that the category of operator 2 
included preparation workers in weaving and machine tenders 
in cigarettes only. Since there were only eight cigarette 
companies, the characteristics of workers largely reflect 
those of preparation workers in weaving.
Average age of operator 2 was 22 years, years of service 
averaged three years and 78 percent were female (compared 
with 26 years of age, four years of service and 42 percent of 
females for operator 1). However average minimum age at 
recruitment was much younger especially for labour intensive 
firms in weaving. In ATBM firms the average minimum age at 
recruitment was only 13_ years and in labour intensive ATMs 
only 16_ years. Employment of young children in preparation 
followed a similar pattern to that which occurred for 
trimmers (tukang gunting) in kretek factories. Many obtained 
their job through parents or relatives employed in the same 
factory.
In slack periods they may be employed on other jobs by the 
firm's owners (especially in the fields or at home).
and ownership in several occupations
Table 9.9: Years of schooling by capital intensity
Domestic Foreign All N
Occupation Non-mechanised
Mechanised 
Low High
firms (firms)
K/L K/L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean years of schooling
Unskilled 4.7 5.2 5.7 6.1 5.2 82
Operator 1 3.8 5.5 6.8 7.0 5.7 62
Operator 2 4.2 6.4 7.9 8.6 6.0 83
Foreman 7.8 10.0 11.1 11.9 9.7 79
Clerk 11.3 11.0 11.3 11.5 11.3 55
Mechanic 6.0 7.1 9.6 11.3 8.7 52
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76.
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Table 9.10: Years of service by capital intensity
and ownership in several occupations
Occupation
Domestic
Non- Mechanised
mechanised Low High
K/L K/L
(1) (2) (3)
Foreign
(4)
All
firms
(5)
N
( f irms) 
(6)
Mean years of service
Unskilled 4.7 3.8 3.4 3.0 4.0 82
Operator 1 1.6 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.7 62
Operator 2 3.7 4.1 3.0 4.4 3.9 83
Foreman 6.7 6.5 4.6 4.6 6.0 79
Clerk 5.9 5.1 3.8 4.1 4.9 44
Mechanic 7.0 5.4 4.3 3.6 4.8 52
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76.
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although wage differentials between both capital and labour 
intensive and foreign and domestic firms were smaller for 
general labourers than for machine operators (Chapter Seven) 
they were still quite large for unskilled workers and also 
were highly correlated with schooling (Table 9.9).
However the association between both capital intensity and 
ownership, and certain worker characteristics of skilled 
supervisory and administrative employees differed considerably 
to that which prevailed for unskilled and semi-skilled workers.
A relatively high percentage of these employees was male 
(except for clerks) even in non-mechanised establishments.
Almost all lived in urban areas.'*' However except in the case 
of clerks, educational differentials by capital intensity and 
ownership were similar for these occupations to the
2differentials for unskilled and semi-skilled employees.
Average years of schooling are considerably higher in capital 
intensive and foreign firms (Table 9.9).
Moreover, consistent with our findings for general 
labourers, internal markets for this group of employees appeared 
to be stronger, especially in labour intensive firms, than was 
the case for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Average years 
of service were much higher than for machine operators (see 
Table 9.10). In part, this may be attributed to a relative 
scarcity of more skilled employees on the external market. But, 
as we have seen in Chapter Four, high school graduates are 
relatively abundant in Indonesia and potential supervisory and
Castles (1967:54) refers to this group of workers in the 
kretek industry as the 'labour aristocracy', the 'better 
paid, urban dwellers ... and more committed to the factory 
as their sole source of income'.
The small difference in educational status of clerical 
workers irrespective of capital intensity and ownership may 
be attributed to the similarity of clerical tasks regardless 
of the type of firm. In all firms clerical workers were at 
least SMP educated. By contrast, educational qualifications 
were not nearly so important for mechanics who learnt many 
of their skills on-the-job.
342
clerical staff relatively easy to recruit on the external
market.^" It is more likely that the tasks of many of these
workers were more firm-specific than those performed by less
skilled employees. This was especially true of mechanics and 
2clerks. Trust and confidentiality were particularly important
in small scale firms in which the manager relied on a few
3employees for efficient running of the enterprise.
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has examined the relationship of certain 
worker characteristics to capital intensity and foreign 
ownership and their relationship with wages. It was found that 
there are large differences in some of the characteristics of 
semi-skilled machine operators between both capital intensive 
and labour intensive, and foreign and domestic firms. These 
differences in personal characteristics of workers provide 
evidence for considerable labour market segmentation between4these different groups of manufacturing firms. However, 
characteristics of employees alone were not sufficient to
Many supervisory personnel are recruited from among retired 
military personnel.
Taira (1966:289-92) argues that a strong commitment of 
salaried employees to the firm in many LDCs, and the wide 
range of tasks required of these employees, help explain 
their relatively secure employment and high levels of 
remuneration relative to manual workers.
One category of employee - professionals - has been excluded 
from this discussion mainly because this group of employees 
(accountants, engineers, secretaries) were employed only in a 
very small proportion of firms. But it is worth noting that 
the foreign-domestic differentials were relatively small for 
these employees; they too were highly paid in domestic firms 
partly because of the personalised recruitment processes and 
emphasis on a high degree of commitment to the firm 
(especially in Chinese-owned enterprises).
The third criterion of labour market segmentation given in 
Chapter Three was concentration of workers with certain 
characteristics in capital intensive firms.
4
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explain the wage differentials that were closely related to 
capital intensity and ownership.
Employees in capital intensive and foreign firms differed 
from the rest of the sample mainly in education and in the 
percentage of females and rural employees. These were also 
the major factors contributing to interfirm wage differentials. 
Differences in educational status were significant for almost 
all categories of employee. But in contrast to the findings for 
machine operators, differences in several of the personal 
characteristics of technical workers, clerks and foremen (and 
to a lesser extent general labourers) were not so closely 
related to capital intensity and ownership. In labour intensive 
firms employees in these other occupations tended to be older 
males and to have worked several years more than machine 
operators. Much smaller interfirm differences in the 
characteristics of workers suggests stronger internal labour 
markets operated for these occupations in labour intensive 
firms.
Although the chapter has suggested that there is a 
relatively high degree of labour market segmentation in markets 
for unskilled and especially semi-skilled workers, we have not 
been able to identify the extent to which there is interaction 
between the different labour markets. This subject will be 
raised in the discussion of labour turnover in the following 
chapter. We will also examine other aspects of labour 
performance and the influence of 'institutional' factors on 
interfirm wage differentials.
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CHAPTER TEN
LABOUR TURNOVER, ABSENTEEISM AND 
INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
In the previous chapter we saw that the labour market in 
the three industries was segmented according to various labour 
supply influences. But these influences did not entirely account 
for wage differentials between firms with varying capital 
intensity and ownership patterns.
In Chapter Three it was suggested that high wages in 
capital intensive firms may be adopted partly to raise labour 
productivity (wage productivity effects) and minimise labour 
turnover. Here we examine the extent to which the survey data 
support this proposition. The chapter also investigates the 
extent to which wage differentials related to capital intensity 
and ownership are the result of institutional pressures.
Capital intensive firms are likely to be particularly 
concerned with maximising labour productivity because of high 
costs of underutilisation or misuse of expensive capital 
equipment.^ Moreover capital intensive and foreign firms may 
be induced to pay relatively high wages because of high turnover 
costs and greater skill specificity. The latter is likely to be 
related to the short term shortage of 'modern sector skills'.
In weaving and cigarettes in Indonesia this shortage is one 
consequence of the rapid growth of investment in modern technology 
which has occurred since 1967. In part high wages are likely also 
to derive from the specific nature of tasks and of general labour 
practices demanded by foreign investors.
The first part examines the influence of capital intensity 
and ownership on two measures of labour 'performance', labour 
turnover and absenteeism. Similar to the approach taken in 
Chapter Seven, we also investigate the extent to which these firm
1 See Chapter Three for a discussion of these issues.
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characteristics jointly influence labour turnover and absenteeism 
with certain features of labour supply. The second part examines 
the influence of institutional factors on wages and labour 
management practices of capital intensive and foreign firms. Data 
collected from the three industries suggest that these 
institutional factors have only a minor influence on wage 
differentials between domestic capital intensive and foreign 
firms on the one hand, and labour intensive enterprises on the 
other.
I. The Influence of Capital Intensity, Foreign Ownership and 
Worker Characteristics on Labour Turnover and Absenteeism
High rates of labour turnover and absenteeism of industrial 
workers have been identified by some writers (Kerr et al., 1973: 
177, 179) as indicators of the lack of 'commitment' of workers 
to industrial employment in industrialising countries. High 
levels of both have been viewed as evidence of the continuing 
rural ties and the limited wants of new industrial workers.
In practice the patterns and causes of labour mobility and 
absenteeism in manufacturing appear to have been quite varied in 
predominantly agrarian societies. The importance of social and 
psychological factors influencing the commitment of industrial 
workers has probably been exaggerated by some writers. In 
many situations workers appear to have primarily adapted to 
different labour demand patterns. In India, relatively high 
rates of labour turnover and absenteeism appear to be only 
slightly (if at all) influenced by the failure of rural-urban 
migrants to view industrial work as permanent. Several studies 
indicate that a high proportion of workers have made a permanent 
move from rural areas and that high rates of labour turnover 
indicate considerable mobility (often in response to differences 
in wages and working conditions) between different non-agricultural 
employments (Morris, 1965:Ch.IV, 87-91; Sharma, 1974:9-11; Lambert, 
1962:59). Moreover Morris has suggested that high levels of 
turnover among factory .workers in Bombay in the early part of
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the 20th Century were based on "thoroughly rational calculation" 
of management. After the initial years of establishment of the 
industry, low-wage, experienced workers could easily be obtained 
by factories. As a consequence managers placed little emphasis 
on policies that might encourage labour stability. Low wages, 
poor working conditions and long hours of work encouraged 
workers to move frequently between factories in search of better 
conditions. (Morris, 1965:199-205). In a quite different 
environment, Puerto Rico, higher rates of labour turnover and 
absenteeism (of what has been described as a 'committed' labour 
force) in some firms have been attributed primarily to quite 
rational worker response to wage and other labour management 
policies (Gregory, 1960:152-8).
In some urban situations (for example Uganda) manufacturing 
production does appear to have been disturbed by an unstable 
work force much of which tended to return to rural areas after 
only a few years employment (Elkan, 1956:6-16, 29-37). But even 
in these situations, labour management policy appears to have a 
major influence on rates of labour turnover. In addition to the 
persistence of social ties with villages, high rates of turnover 
among female workers in textiles in Japan appear to have been 
also the result of extremely low wages and poor working conditions 
in this industry (Koh, 1966:63-74; Saxonhouse, 1976: Shindo, 1961: 
36-8) .1
However high rates of labour turnover either between 
manufacturing establishments or rural and urban areas have not 
always been the norm. In contrast to the situation in textiles, 
lifetime employment systems adopted in large firms encouraged a 
high degree of stability of permanent employees in Japan (Taira,
Indeed most Japanese firms in the manufacturing sector 
relied on a cheap supply of temporary workers from the 
agricultural sector to assist in overcoming labour bottlenecks, 
especially during periods of more rapid manufacturing growth. 
(Taira, 1970) .
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1970; Shinohara, 1968). Morris attributes the high levels of 
stability among the workers at Tata iron and steel factory in 
India mainly to better wages and working conditions than in many 
other manufacturing firms (Morris, 1960). Also in Peru, workers 
in textile factories have exhibited low rates of turnover for 
several decades (Chaplin, 1967:Ch.6).
In contrast to most of the literature on interindustry 
and interfirm wage differentials in LDCs (Chapter Two), some of the 
above studies attempt to relate wages to turnover and absenteeism. 
These studies also indicate that both absenteeism and labour 
turnover are the result of historical, locational and economic 
factors which affect both the supply and demand for labour. But 
few studies have investigated these relationships in the light 
of dualistic (or differentiated) patterns of industrial 
development that have been a major factor contributing to interfirm 
wage differentials in many less developed economies.
Such a task is taken up in this chapter. The first section 
examines the relationship between labour turnover and absenteeism 
on the one hand, and capital intensity, ownership and other firm 
characteristics on the other. We indicate the extent to which 
labour turnover and absenteeism contribute to wage differentials 
between domestic capital intensive and foreign firms and other 
firms in the sample. This is followed by an investigation of the 
influence of two worker characteristics - sex and residence - 
on labour turnover and absenteeism.
1. Firm Characteristics
Consistent with the arguments developed in Chapter Three 
to explain wage differentials between capital and labour intensive 
firms, we would expect a strong negative relationship between 
capital intensity and foreign ownership, and both labour turnover 
and absenteeism. Also we expect these firm characteristics 
(rather than other firm characteristics such as size of firm, 
industry, location and years of operation) to be the major 
influences on turnover and absenteeism. These relationships were 
tested by multiple regression analysis with data collected from
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the sample firms. We first present the results of the regression 
analysis and then discuss the findings in greater detail.
Labour turnover and absenteeism were specified as the
dependent variables, and capital intensity, foreign ownership
and other firm characteristics as explanatory variables in the
regression equations.^" In equations for both labour turnover_2and absenteeism an R of approximately 0.5 was recorded. In
—  2both cases the R for the regression equation was statistically
2significant at a one percent level. In the case of labour 
turnover, the coefficients of the dummy variables for low capital 
intensity and foreign ownership were both negative and 
statistically significant at a five percent level (see equation 
(1) in Appendix Table 10.1). The two other dummy variables for
The results of the regression analysis are presented in 
Appendix Table 10.1 at the end of this chapter. The explanatory 
variables in equations (1), (3), (5) and (6) were the same as
for equation (1) in Chapter Seven. In equations (2) and (4) 
we included a dummy variable for mechanisation in place of the 
capital intensity variables. These reduced equations included 
the dummy variables only for mechanisation, ownership and 
industry. For both labour turnover and absenteeism the 
semilogarithmic form (with the dependent variables specified 
in a natural log form) provided the best fit.
- 2 2For labour turnover (log form)2 the R was 0.44 (R 0.51) and 
for absenteeism it was 0.48 (Rz 0.55).
Separation rates (quits plus dismissals) were used as a measure 
of labour turnover. Quit rates are a more appropriate measure 
of voluntary turnover but the data provided by firm did not 
always distinguish between voluntary and involuntary causes of 
turnover. However owing to the relatively small number of 
dismissals (in only 12.5 percent of firms did dismissals 
account for more than 25 percent of all separations), separation 
rates may be considered an acceptable proxy for quit rates. 
Separation rates were used as a substitute for quit rates 
throughout this chapter and are referred to as either labour 
turnover or separation rates. The formula used to calculate 
separation rates was LT = 100. S where LT = annual
h (L2+L2)
separation rates; S = the total number of separations per annum 
and L]_ and L2  the firm’s workforce at the beginning and end of 
the year respectively (all figures are for 1975). We were not 
able to obtain data on the labour turnover of particular 
occupations; LT refers to quit rates of all production 
workers.
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capital intensity and ownership (high K/L and state/cooperative 
ownership) recorded quite large coefficients with the expected 
(negative) sign. The dummy variable for the cigarette industry 
was highly significant. But the dummy variable for kretek and 
the two other firm variables (location and years of operation) 
were not significant. Similar to the findings of the regression 
equation for wages, the coefficient of size of firm was not 
significant.
_2The overall R (0.49) was slightly higher for the equation
with absenteeism and the coefficients of all four dummies for
capital intensity and ownership were significant at a five percent
level or higher (equation (3) in Appendix Table 10.1).^ The
coefficients for both industry variables (cigarettes and kretek)
were quite large and recorded the expected signs in equation (4)
(negative and positive respectively). But, similar to the
equation for labour turnover, size of firm, location and years
of operation recorded small, statistically insignificant
coefficients. Exclusion of all these variables and replacement
of the capital intensity dummy variables by a dummy variable
_2for mechanisation improved the R slightly for the equation with
2absenteeism (see equation (4) in Appendix Table 10.1).
Absenteeism rates were calculated for machine operators only. 
The formula used to calculate absenteeism was AB = A .100.
of mandays lost owing to absenteeism (excluding annual leave).
N = Number of employees, D = number of days worked. Absenteeism 
was measured by levels of absenteeism in the month prior to the 
survey. A measure of 'normal' monthly rates of absenteeism 
(mean monthly rates of absenteeism over the past year) was also 
tested in the regression equation. The overall fit for normal 
rates of absenteeism and the size of indivudual variable 
coefficients were very similar to those recorded for absenteeism 
in last month. Consequently in all other compulations (unless 
otherwise specified) we used absenteeism for the last month 
as the measure of absenteeism.
A similar procedure was followed also for the_equation 
with labour turnover giving a slightly lower R^, (equation 
(2) in Appendix Table 10.1).
Where AB = rates of absenteeism for machine number
2
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The same explanatory variables were also tested with labour
turnover and absenteeism for the weaving industry alone (equations
(5) and (6) in Appendix 10.1). In the case of absenteeism the 
-2R was slightly lower (0.42) than for all firms in the sample.
But the two capital intensity and ownership dummy variables all
recorded statistically significant, negative coefficients. For
-2labour turnover the R was very much lower (0.15) than for the 
sample as a whole. Although the coefficients of the dummy 
variables for capital intensity and ownership recorded the 
expected (negative) signs, only the dummy for low K/L was 
statistically significant.
Capital intensity and ownership. The regression equations with 
absenteeism confirm the hypothesis that capital intensity and 
foreign ownership were major factors affecting the rates of 
absenteeism in the sample firms. But the results for labour 
turnover were less conclusive. Although in all equations the 
coefficients for capital intensity and ownership were quite 
large and recorded the correct signs, none were significant in 
all the equations. Foreign ownership was significant for the 
sample as a whole but not for weaving. The low capital intensity 
dummy was significant in all equations and so too was the dummy 
variable for mechanisation.^ But the coefficient for high K/L 
was not significant in any of the equations with labour turnover.
The pattern of differentials in absenteeism and labour 
turnover suggested by the regression equations is shown more 
clearly in Table 10.1. The table suggests that these were two 
major divisions between the sample firms. The first was the 
large differential between foreign and domestic firms. For the 
sample as a whole both rates of labour turnover and absenteeism 
were slightly less than half as large in foreign firms as in 
domestic capital intensive firms. The second division was the
Although the results are not reported in Appendix Table 10.1, 
the dummy variable for mechanisation was also significant in 
the equation with the other explanatory variables for weaving 
alone.
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Table 10.1: Mean rates of labour turnover and absenteeism
by capital intensity and ownership
Capital intensity 
and ownership
Labour turnover Absenteeism
Weaving
(1)
All firms 
(2)
Weaving
(3)
All firms 
(4)
Domestic
Non-mechanised 42.6 39.7 13.3 19.6
Mechanised: low K/L 22.0 21.6 7.0 7.2
high K/L 24.3 22.9 7.1 7.2
Foreign 18.3* 11.4* 3.5* 4.4*
All firms 26.8 27.4 8.0 11.6
N (firms) 54 79 54 82
■k
F statistic significant at one percent level
Java Wages Survey, 1975-76Source:
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very much higher rates of labour turnover and absenteeism in 
non mechanical establishments compared with mechanised firms.
The former were nearly twice as high as the rates for domestic 
mechanised firms and closer to four times the rate of turnover 
and absenteeism in foreign firms.
The table also confirms the regression findings which 
suggested that there were not large differentials between labour 
intensive and capital intensive domestic firms in either rates 
of labour turnover or absenteeism. It does not appear that the 
high wages in domestic capital intensive firms had a significant 
effect on rates of labour turnover and absenteeism. This is 
an important finding. It casts some doubt on the existence of 
a general relationship between capital intensity, wages and 
certain dimensions of labour management and performance. This 
point will be taken up again below.
Before discussing the economic significance of these 
findings, it is necessary first to examine the extent to which 
the pattern of differentials in labour turnover and absenteeism 
discussed above is related to wage differentials between firms 
of varying capital intensity and ownership. These relationships 
are demonstrated in Table 10.2. Two important conclusions may be 
derived from the table. First, as in the case of characteristics 
of workers, differences in labour turnover and absenteeism 
according to mechanisation and ownership were closely related to
the level of wage payment. Not only did the high wages offered in 
foreign firms attract relatively educated urban males but they 
also encouraged greater stability of employment and better labour 
performance in these firms. The greater stability of employment 
(low rates of labour turnover) in these firms contributed to 
greater labour market segmentation. Employees in foreign firms 
are relatively protected in high wage jobs. On the other hand 
low paid employees in non-mechanised establishments are highly 
mobile, moving from one low wage job to another.
The second conclusion is that even when wage differentials 
are taken into account,- foreign firms still tend to exhibit
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lower rates of turnover and absenteeism than other firms in 
the sample. For example in the high and medium wage groups 
(see columns (3) and (4)) labour turnover was very much lower 
in foreign compared with other firms. On the other hand in the 
low and medium wage groups rates of labour turnover and 
absenteeism were very much higher in non mechanised than in 
mechanised firms. Some other aspects of wage payment systems 
and the structure of earnings, and also labour management 
practises may help explain these differentials. The use of 
more stable monthly wage payment systems payments according to 
seniority in some foreign firms (see Chapter Eight) and generally 
greater opportunities for vertical advancement may help to explain 
the lower turnover in these foreign firms. Greater emphasis on 
efficiency and intensity of effort may also contribute to 
relatively low rates of absenteeism.
Not only were wages low in the non-mechanised sector but
employees in these firms also experienced considerable fluctuations
in hours of work owing to the firm’s vulnerability to short term
changes in demand and other factors affecting production (supply
of inputs, credit, etc.).'*' Since machine operators in all these
non-mechanised firms were paid on a piecework basis, changes in
2hours of work were a direct cause of variations in earnings.
See Chapter Five and Hill (forthcoming Chapter 4) for a 
discussion of factors contributing to fluctuations in production 
in small scale ATM and ATBM factories in weaving. All but two 
(94 percent) non mechanised firms in our sample experienced 
twenty percent or greater fluctuations in production over the 
past year compared with only half of all mechanised firms. In 
non mechanised firms production fluctuated by nearly 90 percent 
compared with 'normal' monthly production. Quite a high 
proportion of non mechanised firms operated for less than 35 
hours a week in months when production was at a maximum.
Table 10.3 indicates the extent of these fluctuations 
in monthly earnings of machine operators (operator 1) in non 
mechanised firms compared with capital intensive and foreign 
firms. Machine operators in all non-mechanised firms experienced 
some monthly fluctuations in earnings compared with operators 
in approximately 60 percent of other domestic and only 20 percent 
of foreign firms (see column (2) in Table 10.3)„ Monthly 
fluctuations in earnings averaged 41 percent of normal earnings 
in these non-mechanised firms (indeed, in several of these firms
355
T.able 10.3: Monthly fluctuations in earnings by capital
intensity and ownership (operator 1)
Capital intensity 
and ownership
% firms with 
no signific- 
fluctuation 
in earnings^
(1)
Firms with a significant 
fluctuation in monthly 
earnings
% of firms 
(2)
mean monthly^ 
fluctuations 
(3)
Domestic
Non mechanised - 100 41
Mechanised: Low K/L 37 63 31
High K/L 40 60 30
Foreign 77 23 13
Firms in which fluctuations in monthly earnings of operator 1 
were less than 10 percent were regarded as having no significant 
fluctuations in earnings
2 Mean monthly fluctuations measure the difference in maximum 
average monthly earnings and minimum monthly earnings over 
the past year as a percentage of earnings in a 'normal' 
month
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
356
Slumps in output were accompanied by temporary layoffs, quits 
in search of higher paying jobs in the same industry or in the 
agricultural sector, and higher rates of absenteeism as 
employees supplement their meagre earnings with income from 
other jobs.
Table 10.2 confirms the findings of the previous table that 
there is no discernable pattern of higher rates of labour 
turnover or absenteeism among low capital intensity compared 
with high capital intensity domestic firms. In each wage group 
there were no consistent differences between high and low K/L 
mechanised firms.
Why were rates of absenteeism and turnover high in domestic 
capital intensive firms despite higher average wages in these 
firms compared with more labour intensive mechanised 
establishments? In part this may be explained by the extent 
of wage differentials between the capital intensive firms and 
the more labour intensive enterprises. Differentials between 
the two groups of firms in hourly earnings was approximately 
1.4:1. (this contrasts with a differential of almost 2:1 between 
foreign and domestic capital intensive establishments, see 
Table 7.4 above). The higher wages in domestic capital intensive 
firms may not have been sufficient to reduce turnover or 
absenteeism. But other factors probably also help to explain 
the smaller differentials in absenteeism and turnover among 
domestic mechanised firms. In several aspects of labour 
management domestic capital intensive firms followed policies 
which were closer to labour intensive firms than to foreign 
enterprises. These included less security of employment and 
earnings, a greater reliance on daily wage systems (see Chapter 
Eight) and fewer opportunities for vertical advancement in 
domestic capital intensive firms compared with foreign enterprises.
(continued)
minimum monthly earnings were less than half of earnings 
in a normal month). This constrasts with only a little 
over ten percent fluctuations in earnings in the small 
number of foreign firms in which earnings were not 
stable.
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These enterprises did not pursue internal wage and labour 
management policies aimed at raising labour productivity to 
nearly the same extent as foreign firms.
Other firm characteristics. The influence of ownership and 
mechanisation on rates of labour turnover and absenteeism was, 
of course, closely intercorrelated with the influence of 
some of the other firm characteristics.^ This was especially 
true of the dummy variable for industry. The significant 
coefficients recorded for the industry dummies in the regression 
equations highlights some major interindustry differences in 
these labour performance variables. The main contrast was 
between firms in the small group of cigarette firms and 
kretek firms. Average rates of labour turnover in kretek firms
were more than five times higher than in cigarette enterprises;
2absenteeism was approximately four times higher.
These differences reflect the two major divisions (foreign/ 
domestic and mechanised/non—mechanised) between the sample firms 
in absenteeism and labour turnover. They were also closely 
correlated with much higher average wages in cigarettes compared 
with kretek and differences in the supply characteristics of 
workers in the two industries (see below).
None of the other firm characteristics - size of firm, 
location and years of operation - had a significant effect on 
labour turnover or absenteeism. The low regression coefficients 
for size of firm and location may be partly attributed to 
interrelationship with capital intensity, ownership and the 
industry dummy variable. But even within the kretek industry 
(which was relatively homogeneous in terms of capital intensity
See Chapter Seven for a discussion of the interrelationship 
between these firm characteristics.
Labour turnover and absenteeism in kretek were 38 and 
23 percent respectively compared with seven percent 
for both in cigarettes.
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and ownership, size of firm was not closely correlated with 
either labour turnover or absenteeism (Table 10.4). A 
relatively, young mobile work force in many of the larger 
kretek factories helps to explain the slight differences in 
turnover compared with small scale firms.^ The more intensive 
operations of these larger firms helps explain the relatively 
high rates of absenteeism (beyond a certain intensity of work, 
kretek rollers valued leisure more highly than additional 
earnings).^
The firm characteristics discussed above tend to be 
associated with labour demand patterns. Although these factors 
have been neglected in some of the literature on 'commitment' 
of workers to industrial work, we have seen that several of 
these demand factors - especially technology, ownership and 
industry - have a considerable effect on labour turnover and 
absenteeism. What of supply factors? How much do the 
characteristics of workers contribute to rates of turnover 
and absenteeism. We look at the influence of some supply side 
influences - particularly the percentage of rural and female 
employees - in the next section.
2. Worker Characteristics
In the introduction to this chapter we noted that some of 
the literature on labour turnover and absenteeism has emphasised 
the influence of labour supply response on the stability and
Large kretek firms employed a much higher proportion of younger 
women and this group of workers tended to be more mobile for 
both economic and social reasons than older women. Younger, 
more able women tended to respond quickly to short term slumps 
in production in a particular firm by seeking employment 
elsewhere. In addition young unmarried women (aged 14-19) often 
moved for social reasons - to be with friends or to try a new 
environment - than older women.
In several of the larger kretek firms which operated over 60 
hours seven days a week, employees were expected to take at least 
one days leave. A total work force of 20-30 percent higher than 
that required by a particular factory was generally enrolled for 
work. Much shorter hours of work in smaller factories obliged 
employees to attend more regularly to earn minimum daily needs.
Table 10.4 Mean rates of labour turnover and absenteeism 
by size of firm (kretek industry)
Size of 
firm Labour turnover Absenteeism^" N (firms)
< 100 employees 48 11 4
100 - 499 18 13 6
500 + 22 14 10
All firms 24 13 20
Normal monthly rates of absenteeism 
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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commitment of the work force to industrial employment in LDCs. 
Other writers have paid more attention to labour demand patterns 
as major variables affecting the performances of industrial 
workers. In the preceding section of this chapter we saw that 
specific labour demand patterns - mainly those associated with 
mechanisation and foreign ownership - are closely correlated 
with labour turnover and absenteeism. It is necessary to examine 
the extent to which these findings are influenced by certain 
characteristics of workers. Two questions may be posed: (i) Is
there a close association between certain characteristics of 
workers and labour turnover and absenteeism? (ii) Does this 
association occur regardless of whether workers with certain 
characteristics are employed in foreign and mechanised firms 
rather than domestic or non mechanised firms? Or is the 
relationship between these worker characteristics and labour 
turnover and absenteeism mainly a consequence of the employment 
of certain kinds of workers in mechanised and foreign firms?
For example, educated, male urban workers may record low rates 
of turnover because they are mainly employed in foreign firms.
If the relationship implied in this latter question is found to 
be significant, it suggests that labour demand (associated with 
foreign ownership and mechanisation) and labour supply 
jointly influence rates of labour turnover and absenteeism. An 
interrelated influence of firm and worker characteristics on 
rates of turnover and absenteeism would tend to cast doubt on 
the notion that certain workers - for example, females and rural 
residents - have a natural propensity to high absenteeism and 
turnover.
The two supply characteristics which might be expected to 
have considerable influence on labour turnover and absenteeism 
are sex and residence (the percentage of employees living in 
rural areas).'*' As we have noted above, the rural links of the
Both age and seniority could also be expected to be closely 
correlated with rates of labour turnover: firms in which 
employees recorded longer years of service and higher average 
ages might be expected to have lower rates of labour turnover.
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work force have been suggested by several writers as a major 
cause of the poor performance of industrial workers in LDCs.
It is plausible also to expect that women are less attached to 
particular jobs (owing partly to attrition from the work force 
because of marriage, child bearing and child-raising).^ Because 
of more commitments at home, females could also be expected to 
exhibit higher rates of absenteeism than males.
The differentials in rates of labour turnover and 
absenteeism by sex and residence are shown in Table 10.5. Firms 
which employed more than 75 percent of females (operator 1) and 
employees living in rural areas recorded two to three times 
the levels of labour turnover and absenteeism recorded in firms 
with less than 25 percent of female and rural employees. High 
rates of labour turnover and absenteeism are clearly both closely 
correlated with percentage of female and rural employees.
To what extent were these differentials a consequence of
the employment of a high proportion of males and employees from
urban areas in foreign firms? To answer this question the
influence of sex and residence on labour turnover and absenteeism
were tested in regression equations with the firm characteristics
(mechanisation, ownership and industry) that were found to be
significant in the earlier regressions (see equations (2) and
2(4) in Appendix 10.1). The results are presented in Appendix 
10.2 at the end of this chapter. Neither percentage of female
High turnover rates among young female workers in the 
textile industry in Japan has, in addition to low wages 
and working conditions, been explained by their 
withdrawal from the work force and return to their 
villages upon marriage. (Koh, 1966).
Unless otherwise specified, percentage of female 
employees applied only to machine operators (operator 
1) whereas percentage of rural employees was for 
the firm as a whole.
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Table 10.5 Mean rates of labour turnover and absenteeism 
by percentage of female and rural employees
Labour
turnover Absenteeism N(firms)
Percentage of females 
a) all employees
< 25 percent 15 7 17
25 - 49 23 7 29
49 - 74 31 10 11
75 + 39** 21** 14
b) operator 1 only
< 25 percent 20 7 39
25 - 49 25 6 6
49 - 74 39 9 4
75 + 36** ]_ 9 * * 30
Percentage rural employees
< 25 percent 19 7 24
25 - 49 23 6 12
50 - 74 28 9 22
75 + 40** 24** 21
All firms 27 12 82
* * F statistic significant at one percent level
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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employees or percentage of rural employees recorded significant
coefficients with labour turnover, and only the dummy variable
for a high percentage of rural employees recorded a significant
coefficient in the equation with absenteeism.^ In both equations
the dummys variables for foreign ownership and industry were
similar to those recorded in equations (2) and (4) in Appendix 
2Table 10.1. The findings for all firms were also supported 
by results obtained for absenteeism in the weaving industry 
(equation (3) in Appendix 10.2).
What are the implications of these findings? The regression 
equations support the proposition that certain characteristics of 
employees are correlated with absenteeism and labour turnover 
mainly because of their association with firm characteristics. 
Educated male urban workers respond to higher wages and other 
labour management policies in foreign firms by lower rates of 
labour turnover and absenteeism. There is little evidence that 
female and rural employees are less stable in their jobs, or 
female employees less punctual, in foreign firms.
We also ran separate regression equations for all the supply 
side variables (age, schooling, seniority outside experience, 
sex and residence. In these equations the r2 were similar 
(approximately 0.5) to those recorded for the firm 
characteristics. As might be expected, seniority recorded a 
very high, significant coefficient in the equation with labour 
turnover. The coefficients for percentage of female and rural 
employees, and for years of schooling were all significant in 
the equation with absenteeism but not in the equation with 
labour turnover. However none of these supply side 
characteristics (with exception of seniority in the equation 
with labour turnover and percentage of rural employees in the 
equation with absenteeism) recorded significant coefficients 
once they were included in the regression equation with the 
firm characteristics. We also included several institutional 
variables - influence of trade unions, existence of CLAs and 
work agreements and membership to producers organisations 
(bound by industry-wide CLAs) but none were significant either 
with labour turnover or with absenteeism.
- 2 - 2The R for absenteeism improved from 0.52 to 0.59 but the R-
for labour turnover improved little with the addition of the 
two labour supply variables. Mainly because of its close 
association with percentage of rural employees and also to a 
lesser extent, percent of females, the mechanisation variable 
(DiXi) did not record a significant coefficient.
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However there is likely to be a dynamic interaction between 
the labour demand patterns of certain types of firms and the 
wage rates they offer, and worker characteristics. Females and 
workers living in rural areas accepted low wage jobs in 
non mechanised kretek firms partly because these firms allowed 
a more flexible employment relationship. Females could take 
time off to attend to pressing household tasks and could also 
easily take up their old job (though perhaps in a different 
firm) after childbirth. In most kretek firms employees living 
in rural areas were allowed time off to participate in the 
harvest. Adult males on the other hand could not support their 
families from the low and irregular earnings in many kretek 
factories. Thus different groups of workers tended to choose 
work environments which best suited their overall pattern of 
living and work.
II. The Influence of Institutional Forces on Structural Firm
Characteristics and Wages
Many studies of labour markets in LDCs have stressed 
institutional reasons for wage differentials (see Chapter Two). 
We suggested in Chapter Five that several institutional 
influences - primarily those resulting from government and 
trade union intervention in the labour market - are weak in 
Indonesia. Chapter Seven confirmed some of these influences 
did not significantly affect wage differentials in the sample 
firms. In this part we investigate the indirect effects of 
these variables on wage differentials mainly because of their 
association with particular patterns of labour demand 
(especially foreign ownership and capital intensity). Several 
aspects of these institutional influences are examined. These 
include the activities of trade unions and adherence to various 
work agreements, collective labour agreements and minimum wages. 
Although unions and labour agreements tend to be more common 
in foreign owned firms, these forces are not sufficiently 
powerful to explain the wage differentials that we have observed 
between these and domestic firms or between firms of varying
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capital intensity.
1. Trade Unions, CLAs and Work Agreements
Trade unions did not play a major role in the determination 
of wages and working conditions in the sample firms. Less than 
half of all firms had a trade union and in less than a quarter 
were unions active in the negotiation of wages (Table 10.6) . 
However the relatively high proportion of foreign firms with 
unions suggests that these may have contributed to wage 
differentials between this group of firms and the rest of the 
sample. A higher proportion of foreign firms also had CLAs 
and work agreements compared with other groups of firms.
However it should be noted that the distribution of trade 
unions and CLAs was quite uneven among the small group of 
foreign firms. Five out of six of the foreign firms with an 
active trade union were in the cigarette industry and all three 
firms with a CLA were in this industry (three out of the five 
foreign firms with work agreements were also in cigarettes).
Few of the more recently established foreign firms in weaving 
had either CLAs or active trade unions and foreign managers 
(especially Japanese managers) discouraged the formation of 
trade unions.
Wages were on average higher in unionised firms than in 
firms without trade unions. However the inclusion of the two 
highest wage firms in the sample in the group of firms with 
trade unions greatly influenced this result. If these two 
firms are excluded, wage differences between these two groups 
of foreign firms were quite small.'*'
Average wages of operator 1 in firms which had trade unions 
were Rp 26,447 compared with Rp 18,282 in firms without 
trade unions. However if the two high wage firms are 
excluded from the former group average wages fall to 
Rp 18,643.
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Unionisation or labour agreements do not appear to have 
greatly influenced wage differentials between various groups of 
domestic firms. Indeed not one high capital intensity, 
domestic firm had an active trade union or had signed a 
collective labour agreement. Both non-mechanised and mechanised 
domestic firms (the former almost all in kretek, the latter in 
weaving in Bandung) were members of producers' organisations 
bound by annual wage agreements. Especially in the kretek 
industry, these agreements appear to have served employers more 
than workers by placing a maximum to the level of piece rates 
to be offered in the industry. They certainly did not contribute 
to higher wages than those paid by firms that were not members 
of a producers' organisation.
Although institutional factors such as the influence of 
trade unions may not have had a major influence on wage 
differentials, this does not discount the effect of other less 
easily measured political or cultural factors. For example, 
attempts to buy political goodwill or humanitarian considerations 
on the part of foreign managers have been mentioned in the 
literature as major factors contributing to wage differentials 
between foreign and domestic firms. We cannot ignore these 
potential influences on wages in foreign firms. But they were 
unlikely to be a major concern of capital intensive domestic 
owned establishments. The quite large wage differentials 
between these and other domestic firms suggests that 
characteristics of workers and other factors associated with 
technology have a major influence on the extent of wage 
differentials.
2. Minimum Wages
Although there is no national minimum wage in Indonesia, 
there is quite a range of regional minimum wages set by 
provincial governments (and in some cases by the Department 
of Manpower). It is reasonable to expect that these minimum 
wages might have contributed to the pattern of wage 
differentials described in earlier chapters. In particular 
it is reasonable to expect that minimum wages might have
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influenced these differentials because of stricter supervision 
of (and greater sensitivity to) government regulations by 
foreign and larger, capital intensive firms.
To test this proposition we have compared minimum wages
in several regions (Jakarta, Bandung and Central Java) with
actual earnings in the sample firms.^ Table 10.7 demonstrates
the extent to which the level of these minimum wages appear
to be related to wages in firms divided according to capital
intensity and ownership. The tables contrast the wages of
unskilled, general labourers, and operator 1 in these different 
2firms. It is clear that (with exception of one foreign firm
for unskilled workers) wages in foreign and capital intensive
firms were considerably higher than the minimum levels
established in each of the regions. Although mean wages in
foreign firms were only slightly higher than the minimum
established for public sector employees in Jakarta, they were
well over twice as high as the minimum wage set in Bandung
3and Central Java. It appears unlikely that these minimum 
wages had a significant influence on wages in most foreign 
firms in the sample.
Two of the minimum wages (Jakarta, Central Java) were set 
for employees working on government projects but were also 
regarded by some firms as a benchmark for private sector 
wages. The minimum for Bandung refers to the minimum wage 
for various occupations agreed upon by the textile producers' 
representatives Perteksi and the National Labour Union 
(FBSI) for the city of Bandung.
Unskilled 'general' labourers accounted for only a small 
proportion of the work force and almost all were males. 
Operator 2 on the other hand were much more numerous and 
in many firms included a high proportion of females; this 
was the lowest paid occupation in many firms.
It should be noted that the industry wide minimum wages 
agreed on for Bandung did not strictly apply to the nearby 
town of Majalaya. But in practise the wage negotiated in 
Bandung was regarded by businessmen in Majalaya a.s also the 
appropriate minimum for that town.
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Table 10.7: Monthly earnings of unskilled workers
and operator 2 compared with minimum 
wages in Jakarta, Bandung and Central
Java (Rp 000/month).
Capital intensity/ Jakarta Bandung/ Centralownership Maj alaya Java
1. Unskilled workers 
Domestic
Non-mechanised - 7.2 6.4
Mechanised: Low K/L 9.2 8.4 7.8
High K/L 15.6 10.8 5.5
Foreign 13.9 13.1 18.6
All firms 9.9 9.3 7.8
2. Operator 23 
Domestic
Non-mechanised - 3.4 2.4
Mechanised: Low K/L 8.0 6.1 7.7
High K/L 14.0 11.4 5.9
Foreign 17.1 14.2 21.1
All firms 13.4 7.0 7.9
Minimum wage 211.3 4.73 4.64
Excludes all kretek firms
2 Set by the Jakarta Provincial Government (for employees in 
government projects) in April 1975 at Rp 435 (Assumes 26 
working days a month)
3 Set in regional-industry wide CLA for the textile industry 
in Bandung in mid 19754 Set by Central Java Provincial Government for employees 
working on government projects in early 1976
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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It is instructive to note that in almost all firms earnings 
of unskilled employees in all three regions were (even in most 
of the non-mechanised firms) higher than the minimum wages set 
in these regions. However this was not the case for operator 2.
In several non-mechanised, and labour intensive mechanised firms, 
average earnings of operator 2 were lower than the minimum wage. 
For example, the average for all non-mechanised firms in Bandung 
and Central Java was below the minimum set in these two regions. 
Minimum wages could be more easily supervised in the case of 
daily wages for general unskilled labourers. But it was much more 
difficult to enforce minimum rates in the case of operator 2 
who were generally paid on a piecework basis in labour intensive 
establishments.
Although some of these institutional factors contributed 
to wider wage differentials, especially between foreign and 
domestic firms, they were not sufficiently strong to account 
for the large differentials that we have described in earlier 
chapters. Differences in the characteristics of 
workers and in their performance are not merely a consequence 
of institutionally determined high wages. Rather they have 
played an important role in determining the extent of these 
differentials. This point will be taken up again in our 
concluding chapter.
Summary and Conclusions
The findings of this chapter support the proposition that 
high wages in foreign firms encourage low rates of labour 
turnover and absenteeism. Both rates of labour turnover and 
absenteeism were considerably lower in foreign firms than in 
domestic establishments. However, although there were marked 
differences both rates between domestic mechanised and non- 
mechanised establishments, the relationship between capital 
intensity and both turnover and absenteeism was not particularly 
strong. Within the group of domestic mechanised establishments, 
relatively capital intensive firms did not differ significantly
371
either in labour turnover or absenteeism from more labour 
intensive firms. Contrary to the argument developed in 
Chapter Three, higher wages in domestic capital intensive 
firms did not encourage a more stable or more productive 
work force.
However in the capital intensive, foreign firms high 
wages were associated with a more stable work force. To the 
extent that low absenteeism rates are an indication of greater 
work effort, employees in these firms worked more intensively 
than workers in other establishments. Employees in foreign 
firms clearly responded to higher wages. But other factors - 
the wage system adopted, payment of certain fringe benefits 
and relatively stable earnings - also encouraged greater 
intensity of work and stability of employment in these firms.
On the other hand, employees in non-mechanised establishments 
were much less committed to employment in particular firms. They 
recorded much higher rates of turnover and absenteeism than 
other firms in the sample. Low wages encouraged multiple job 
holding or tended to attract employees (especially women and 
children) who may not be committed to longer term employment 
on a full-time basis. Many employees in labour intensive firms 
were continually on the lookout for higher paying opportunities. 
Quite large seasonal fluctuations in earnings in these firms 
encouraged mobility especially of younger workers. And much 
greater contact with the agricultural sector enabled them also 
to find additional income from part-time employment in 
agriculture. Seasonal patterns of labour demand in agriculture 
also had some influence on rates of absenteeism and labour 
turnover in non-mechanised firms.
Certain characteristics of workers did not have a significant 
independant influence on rates of turnover or absenteeism. There 
was no evidence that females or employees living in rural areas 
had inherently higher rates of labour turnover. The stability 
of the work force appears to be much more closely affected by 
the interaction of labour demand patterns of foreign and
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mechanised firms with certain worker characteristics than by 
these labour supply factors alone.
However it is noteworthy that absenteeism was higher among 
employees living in rural areas irrespective of these labour 
demand patterns. The agricultural commitments (especially at 
certain times of the year) of employees in rural areas appears 
to have had a major influence on rates of absenteeism.
The final section of the chapter examined the influence 
of some institutional forces on interfirm wage differentials. 
This questioned the extent to which high wages in domestic 
capital intensive and foreign firms were the result of these 
institutional forces rather than a consequence of wage policies 
adopted deliberately to employ higher quality workers and 
increase labour productivity. We presented data which suggests 
that institutional pressures appear to have some importance, 
especially among a small group of foreign firms in the 
cigarette industry. But these influences were not strong 
enough to explain wage differentials according to capital 
intensity and foreign ownership. This conclusion was especially 
supported by the fact that these institutional factors were of 
little importance in relatively high wage, capital intensive 
domestic owned firms.
These issues will be discussed at greater length in the 
concluding chapter. To what extent does our empirical study 
provide evidence of labour market segmentation in the three 
industries? What are the main features of labour market 
segmentation in the three industries? What are the broader 
implications of the findings for Indonesian labour markets 
and more general theories of labour markets in LDCs? These 
questions will be taken up in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has examined the extent and causes of wage 
differentials in the manufacturing sector in Indonesia. The 
study has exphasised the relationship between the wage structure 
and recent, relatively rapid growth of modern manufacturing.
What have been the major findings of the study and what are its 
implications for more general labour market issues in Indonesia? 
What is its contribution to more general theories of wage 
differentials in labour surplus LDCs? We shall consider these 
questions in this concluding chapter.
I. The Major Findings
The major aims of this research project were to identify 
and explain wage differentials in the manufacturing sector in 
Indonesia. The study concentrated on the extent and causes of 
wage differentials associated with capital intensity and ownership. 
We examined several possible causes of high wages in capital 
intensive and foreign firms, including internal labour market 
factors, worker characteristics and certain institutional forces.
The major findings of the study should be viewed in the 
overall context of labour market conditions and the general wage 
structure in Java. The island suffers from acute problems of 
labour surplus and underutilisation of manpower. At least a 
section of the labour force is relatively mobile especially 
between rural and urban areas. But the secondary data surveyed 
in this study indicated that there are quite large wage 
differentials between major sectors, industries and regions in 
Java. There are also large differentials between state, foreign 
and domestic private owned enterprises. These differentials, 
especially between the public and private sectors, encompassed 
the form of wage payment as well as the level of wages.
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There is little reliable time series data on changes in the 
structure of wages. But it is likely that differentials may have 
increased in recent years. The small size of the modern sector 
before 1967, and both high rates of inflation and substantial 
direct government involvement in the economy, probably contributed 
to quite narrow interfirm and interindustry wage differentials 
during the early years of independence.
But there is little evidence that greater wage differentials 
in Indonesia have been mainly caused by 'institutional' factors 
(government policies and trade union pressures). These have never 
had a major influence on wages in manufacturing in Indonesia.
Both during the colonial period and throughout the period of 
independence successive governments have sought to curb the 
influence of trade unions on wages and working conditions. Since 
independence, governments of quite different political persuasions 
have also been wary of the possible effects that minimum wage 
legislation (and other government intervention in the labour 
market) might have on the level of wages and wage costs in the 
private sector.
Secondary data suggest that institutional pressures on wages 
certainly have not increased since the New Order Government took 
control in 1965. Indeed, the activities of trade unions have 
been even more tightly controlled than before 1965. Increased 
activities of the government controlled labour front (FBSI) and 
recent minimum wage and social insurance legislation may have 
some impact on wages in medium and large scale enterprises. But 
the majority of Indonesian workers in smaller scale establishments 
continue to be little affected by government and trade union 
activities.
To what extent were the findings of our field survey 
consistent with these broad patterns? Our study of the wage 
structure of the weaving, kretek and cigarette industries 
indicated the existence of large interfirm wage differentials 
for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. These were associated 
with capital intensity and foreign ownership rather than with
377
other firm characteristics. These two variables were much more 
important than industry or location of the firm in determining 
wage differentials. Indeed they helped to explain interindustry 
and interregional wage differentials. Moreover, once account was 
taken of variations in capital intensity and foreign ownership, 
wage differentials according to size of firm were relatively 
small.
The absence of a close relationship between location of the
firm and wages is surprising especially in light of considerable
attention given to high wages in Jakarta in much of the literature
on wage differentials in Indonesia. Our study indicates that the
concentration of modern sector firms in Jakarta has been the major
cause of wage differentials between the capital and other regions.
Wages paid in foreign or domestic capital intensive and labour
intensive firms were not substantially higher in Jakarta than in
2similar firms in other regions. But it is interesting to note 
that fringe benefits accounted for a much higher percentage of 
the wage bill in the capital city. Wage systems in manufacturing 
in Jakarta have to a considerable extent been influenced by the 
large public sector in this city.
The failure of size of firm to influence wages once capital 
intensity and ownership were taken into account, is an important 
finding. It suggests that size of firm may have been given too 
much emphasis in the literature on wage differentials. In the 
literature, the relationship between size of firm and wages has 
generally been attributed to redistribution of some of the high
A second factor is the higher wages offered by the public 
sector in Jakarta compared with other regions of Java. The 
minimum wage for unskilled employees on government projects 
in Jakarta in 1975 (Rp 435) was substantially higher than 
minimum wages set by the government in any other region 
(see Table 10.7) .
Indeed once the higher cost of living in the capital is taken 
into account, real wages may actually have been lower in the 
capital city.
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profits to workers in relatively concentrated industries. The 
greater influence of capital intensity on wages implies that 
internal labour market factors rather than factors associated 
with concentration, may be the major cause of interfirm and 
interindustry wage differentials.
There is little evidence from the field data of a dualistic
pattern of wage differentials. But the distribution of wages
according to ownership and capital intensity was not perfectly
continuous. The labour market was divided into several segments.
Four major segments were distinguished: foreign firms, domestic
capital intensive and labour intensive mechanised establishments,
and non-mechanised firms. Differentials were largest between
foreign and all groups of domestic firms, and between all
mechanised and non-mechanised establishments. But they were
also substantial between domestic capital intensive and labour
intensive mechanised establishments. The differentials covered
both the form of wage payment - including salary systems and
2fringe benefits - and the level of wages.
What were the major causes of these differentials? The 
field survey confirms our general observation (Chapter Five) 
that institutional pressures have not had a major impact on 
interfirm wage differentials in Indonesia. Although the foreign- 
domestic dichotomy (which might be considered evidence of strong 
institutional influences) was one major dimension of wage 
differentials, there is little evidence that foreign firms were 
under a great deal of pressure from either the government or 
trade unions to pay high wages. It is likely that some less 
easily quantifiable influences - a desire on the part of foreign 
managers to maintain good relations with the Indonesian
The distinction between these two groups of domestic firms 
broadly corresponds with Hills (forthcoming) distinction 
between firms with Ml (automatic looms) and M2 and M3 (semi­
automatic looms) in weaving.
However state enterprises, cooperatives, some pribumi firms 
and firms located in Jakarta also tended to pay a higher share 
of their wages as fringe benefits than other firms in the 
sample.
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Government and both humanitarian and equity considerations - 
may have encouraged foreign firms to offer high wages. But 
our survey does not indicate that these influences were 
sufficiently great to account for the large wage differentials 
between foreign and domestic firms for unskilled and semi­
skilled workers.
Instead, it is argued that the high wages of unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers in foreign and capital intensive firms 
workers may mainly be attributed to the characteristics of 
workers, and to internal labour market policies. The survey 
findings suggest that these two sets of variables were closely 
interrelated. Foreign and domestic capital intensive firms 
employed young, mostly secondary educated and inexperienced 
workers. Most were male and lived in urban areas. The firm 
trained them to operate capital intensive machinery and they 
also learnt other tasks and work habits necessary for the 
efficient operation of the expensive equipment. Several of the 
foreign firms (especially Japanese enterprises) offered language 
courses in English and other foreign languages.
Workers in foreign firms exhibited much lower rates of 
labour turnover and absenteeism than workers in other firms in 
the sample. By contrast, labour intensive, non-mechanised 
establishments employed less educated, experienced hands, many 
of which were female and lived in rural area. These workers 
tolerated high rates of labour turnover. They moved from firm 
to firm in search of better paid jobs or because of seasonal 
slumps in production and earnings. In some cases workers in 
non-mechanised firms moved for social reasons (for example, to 
be with friends in a new work environment).
Absenteeism rates too were high in non-mechanised firms. 
Long hours of work (especially in some of the huge kretek 
factories), alternative income earning opportunities in 
agriculture,^" the home commitments of females and seasonal
Since earnings in agriculture were not always higher than in 
the factory, these too were often attractive partly for social 
reasons (for example, a change in work environment or a chance 
to enjoy the harvest festivities).
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fluctuations in earnings all help to account for high rates of 
absenteeism. The flexible labour management systems and low 
wages offered in these firms further encouraged both high levels 
of turnover and absenteeism. High rates of absenteeism and 
labour turnover were a consequence of the interaction between 
the labour management systems adopted by non-mechanised firms 
and the characteristics of workers that tended to be employed 
in these firms.
The contrast between foreign and non-mechanised 
establishments in wages, interfirm mobility and the 
characteristics of semi-skilled workers is illustrated in Figure 
11.1. High wages in foreign firms are associated with low rates 
of interfirm mobility and with the employment mainly of secondary 
educated urban males. Non-mechanised firms on the other hand 
employ less educated rural females at very much lower wage rates 
than all other groups of firms. The figure indicates the high 
levels of mobility between firms in this sector. In between these 
two extremes are the state enterprises and cooperatives, and 
domestic capital intensive and labour intensive mechanised firms. 
There was not a great difference in wage rates or in the 
characteristics of workers employed between state enterprises 
and cooperatives on the one hand and private domestic capital 
intensive firms on the other. But the former group experienced 
much lower rates of labour turnover associated with greater 
security of employment and more generous fringe benefits.
Domestic capital intensive establishments contrast with 
mechanised labour intensive firms in both wage rates and the 
characteristics of workers recruited on the external labour 
market. But, despite relatively high wages in these capital 
intensive firms, labour turnover was very similar to that 
recorded for mechanised labour intensive establishments.
This was one major exception to the proposition that more 
capital intensive firms adopt higher wages in order to minimise 
turnover and to encourage high levels of labour productivity.
The large differences' between mechanised and non-mechanised
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M A JO R  S E G M E N T S  O F  M A IN  C H A R A C T E R IS T IC S
T H E  L A B O U R  M A R K E T  O F  W O R K E R S
High
Low
Foreign firms
Domestic Low K/L
Domestic High K/L
State enterprises/Coops
Non-mechamsed
Male, secondary educated, 
urban, no experience
Female, primary/less than 
primary education, rural, 
experienced
MOBILITY/RECRUITMENT PATHS
----------  High
—--------Medium
U  Firms .............  Very low
Figure 11.1: Wage differentials and labour market
segmentation (unskilled and semi- 
skilled workers)
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firms in both turnover and absenteeism may be largely attributed 
to the differences in wage rates and other management policies 
between these two groups of enterprises. But the relatively 
high wage, domestic capital intensive firms did not differ 
significantly from mechanised labour intensive establishments 
in either of these rates.
The labour management systems adopted by domestic capital 
intensive firms did not encourage stability of employment or a 
high degree of commitment to the firm. Their labour management 
practices were more adapted to Java's surplus labour conditions 
than those of foreign firms. It is probable that costs of 
recruitment and screening in domestic capital intensive firms 
were not as high as in foreign firms."*-
But it is also likely that high rates of labour turnover 
of workers trained to operate new machinery, and high rates of 
absenteeism contributed to greater underutilisation costs in 
domestic capital intensive firms compared with foreign firms.
While they were more flexible in taking advantage of surplus 
labour conditions than foreign firms, domestic capital intensive 
establishments had not adapted their management systems to make 
optimum use of costly capital equipment.
The higher wages paid in domestic capital intensive firms 
compared with mechanised labour intensive firms cannot be 
explained adequately by the influence of institutional or internal 
labour market factors. There is little evidence that trade 
unions were more active or government pressures on wages greater 
in domestic capital intensive firms; and relatively high rates 
of labour turnover and absenteeism suggest that internal labour 
market factors probably were not more important in these firms
Restrictions in the labour law on the dismissal of workers 
were felt more acutely by foreign firms (especially because 
the issue of dismissals by foreign firms tends to be a 
politically sensitive one). These restrictions probably induced 
foreign firms to place more emphasis and spend more on the 
recruitment and screening of workers.
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than in mechanised labour intensive firms. Wage differentials 
between these two groups of firms may be attributed to 
differences in the characteristics of workers employed in each 
of the two groups of firms. But since secondary educated urban 
workers were mainly employed in capital intensive firms, pressure 
from surplus secondary educated urban workers might be expected 
to bring about much narrower wage differentials with mechanised 
labour intensive firms. The concept of a social minimum wage 
(see Chapter Three) among secondary educated urban employees 
may help to explain the persistence of quite large differentials 
between the two groups of firms.
To what extent does the pattern of wage differentials 
described above suggest that the labour markets for unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers in the three industries were highly 
segmented? Three criteria were mentioned in Chapter Three to 
indicate the extent of labour market segmentation: large and 
continuing wage differentials, little mobility between capital 
intensive and labour intensive firms and concentration of workers 
with different characteristics in each segment. On the basis 
of these three criteria we can conclude that the labour market 
is highly segmented between firms at the extreme ends of the 
capital intensity continuum. Foreign and domestic capital 
intensive firms paid high wages and employed workers with 
different personal characteristics who had rarely worked in 
non-mechanised establishments (indeed these firms preferred to 
employ workers who had no experience in labour intensive firms). 
According to these criteria labour market segmentation was 
greatest between foreign and capital intensive firms and between 
all mechanised and non-mechanised firms. It was less marked 
though still significant (especially in terms of wage 
differentials) between domestic capital intensive and labour 
intensive mechanised establishments.
Although foreign and domestic capital intensive firms 
mainly employed secondary educated urban males as machine 
operators, the labour market was not perfectly segmented in 
terms of these worker characteristics. On the one hand local
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pressures induced several foreign firms to employ less educated 
workers who lived in rural areas. On the other hand some 
secondary educated workers did seek jobs as machine operators 
in mechanised labour intensive firms. However the failure of 
more unemployed secondary educated to find employment in low 
wage labour intensive firms must be attributed in part to their 
reluctance to accept jobs in these firms and their hopes of 
obtaining higher paid, modern sector jobs.
There was little indication of a preference for more 
educated workers in labour intensive mechanised and non-mechanised 
firms. It was very rare for any of these firms to screen workers 
on the basis of schooling. Prior work experience and a guarantee 
from an existing employee were far more important criteria for 
selection of new employees in these firms.^
Although the above discussion of labour market segmentation 
has stressed contrasts between groups of firms, some major 
differences within the major groups should also be mentioned.
This applied particularly to the foreign sector. Wages of 
machine operators in the two well established cigarette companies 
were almost twice the average for the foreign sector as a whole, 
and almost three times as high as in the lowest wage foreign 
firms. Except for attrition owing to old age, sickness or 
accidents, there were virtually no quits in these firms and 
absenteeism was extremely low. Together with a handful of 
established foreign firms in other manufacturing industries in 
Java, employees in these factories are the real labour elite 
among semi-skilled and unskilled workers in the manufacturing 
sector in Indonesia. Wages and working conditions are comparable 
with those in the high wage, mining sector.
The assumption that education has little influence on 
productivity in the labour intensive sector is relevant to 
the labour market in the three industries. This assumption 
is probably more realistic than the alternative that 
education does affect productivity in this sector (see 
Chapter Three, Part II).
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A notable difference within the domestic mechanised group 
was the contrast between both state enterprises and cooperatives 
on the one hand and private domestic establishments on the other. 
Although wages were not always higher in the former groups of 
firms, turnover and absenteeism were extremely low. This may be 
partly attributed to more generous fringe benefits (especially 
health care), more stable earnings and security of employment 
in these firms. It was also partly a consequence of a more 
paternalistic approach to labour management, especially in state 
enterprises.
The pattern of wages and labour market segmentation 
described above applied only to unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers. Interfirm wage differentials and differences in worker 
characteristics were much smaller for administrative and 
supervisory staff, and for skilled technical employees. The 
smaller differentials according to capital intensity and 
ownership for these occupations were attributable to much stronger 
internal markets for these occupations in labour intensive firms. 
There was one interesting consequence of the smaller wage 
differentials by capital intensity and ownership for these 
occupations compared with wage differentials for machine operators. 
Inequalities within the firm tended to be greater in labour 
intensive firms than in foreign and domestic capital intensive 
establishments.'*' The gap between the wages of machine operators 
on the one hand and administrative, supervisory, and technical 
personnel on the other tended to be much greater in labour 
intensive firms. Ironically, despite the shortage of skilled 
workers in the modern sector, differentials within these firms 
were smaller than in the labour intensive sector.
Two exceptions should be noted. These were the very large 
differentials between foreign and domestic personnel in 
foreign firms; some foreign firms also paid extremely high 
wages to Indonesian managers especially in the fields of 
finance and accounting.
1
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II. General Implications of the Study for Labour Market
Theories and Labour Markets in Indonesia
What is the significance of this study for various 
theories of wage differentials discussed in Chapters Two and 
Three? The first important finding is that institutional 
factors do not appear to have a significant influence on wages 
in the private sector. This conclusion supports the results 
of various studies of the labour market in Japan which attribute 
wage differentials to 'economic' factors rather than cultural 
and social influences. Although institutional influences - 
governments and trade unions - may play a significant role 
in determining wages in some LDCs, this study suggests that 
these influences are not a necessary condition for large 
wage differentials within the manufacturing sector.
It is likely that the impact of these institutional factors 
has been exaggerated in many studies of the wage structure in 
LDCs. This overemphasis may have arisen because of 
the interrelationships between institutional factors and other 
influences on wages. As we have stressed above, institutional 
variables are likely jointly to determine wage differentials 
together with internal market factors and worker characteristics. 
The influence of institutional forces on high wages in foreign 
firms has been given considerable attention because 
redistribution of foreign investors' profits to workers is 
generally considered a legitimate means of maximising the 
benefits of foreign investment. But excessive attention to 
these relationships has tended to obscure the internal market 
objectives of wage policies adopted by foreign firms, and their 
tendency to pay high wages to obtain better quality workers.
The association of large wage differentials with capital 
intensity and foreign ownership despite the absence of strong 
institutional forces does suggest that interfirm wage differentials 
may be a structural aspect of development in many LDCs. High
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rates of rural urban migration, urban employment and 
underemployment related to high wages in certain segments 
of the manufacturing sector may be an automatic consequence 
of a pattern of capitalist development in which there is rapid 
technological change, a wide range in technologies and foreign 
investment.
A second important conclusion from this study is that 
internal market objectives are likely to be given greater 
emphasis by foreign firms than by domestic enterprises. Foreign 
enterprises in the sample paid higher wages and offered a 
wider range of fringe benefits than domestic capital intensive 
establishments. Foreign firms also placed considerable 
emphasis on formal training organised by the firm. Absenteeism 
and labour turnover were much lower than in domestic capital 
intensive firms.
A third finding was that the relationship between wages 
and worker characteristics was significant for both foreign 
and domestic capital intensive firms. Thus the survey suggests 
that where there is a wide range in technologies, wage differentials 
are likely to be determined by the characteristics of both 
firms and of workers.1 The study does not support either 
pure human capital interpretations of earnings differentials, 
or some of the more extreme labour market segmentation theories 
that are highly sceptical of the relationship between human 
capital factors and earnings. Worker characteristics differ 
between firms partly because they provide signals which enable 
foreign and domestic capital intensive firms to select from 
long labour queues. But these worker characteristics may also 
have a direct impact on labour productivity. Employees with 
more schooling are likely to respond faster to training and to 
learn to operate new technology more quickly. Male educated 
employees may be preferred in capital intensive firms partly 
because these enterprises are interested in the performance of
1See Chapter Three for a discussion of these issues.
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workers over a range of jobs and in a longer term employment 
relationship. Males are preferred to females because the 
costs of turnover owing to childbearing or marriage are likely 
to be high in capital intensive firms.
On the other hand this study also suggests that the 
relationship between workers' characteristics and wages is 
not independent of the demand patterns of capital intensive 
compared with labour intensive firms. For example, there 
was little evidence of more educated urban male employees 
earning higher wages than less educated rural females who performed 
similar jobs in labour intensive firms. But the crucial point 
is that firm characteristics and worker characteristics tend 
jointly to influence wages. Uneducated females from rural 
areas are rarely employed in foreign firms and it is unusual 
for urban males to find jobs in labour intensive establishments. 
Given the joint determination of wages by firm characteristics 
and worker characteristics, it makes little sense to argue 
about which has the greatest influence on wages.
This study has highlighted the differentials in earnings 
within three manufacturing industries in Java and has suggested 
that the labour market is quite highly segmented. To some extent 
these findings may be specific to the three industries. For 
example, the very wide range in technology in weaving provides 
a contrast in intraindustry wages and labour management practices 
which may not be so marked in many other industries. The 
kretek industry stands out from other Indonesian industries 
the highly labour intensive operations in the kretek industry 
and this industry's extreme dependence on female workers from 
rural areas is almost unique in Indonesia.
Nevertheless, the manufacturing sector as a whole in 
Java is marked by contrasts in technology, size of firm, 
and ownership similar to those which play a central role in 
the three industries. The study indicates that wage differentials
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for unskilled and semiskilled workers in manufacturing 
are very large. It suggests that these differentials 
are to some extent inherent in the pattern of development 
followed by Indonesia since 1965.
What are the implications of this pattern of wage 
differentials for the allocation of labour especially between 
rural and urban areas in Indonesia? Our data support the 
findings of an increasing number of research projects dealing 
with Java which suggest that rural employees come to the cities 
mainly to seek low wage jobs rather than because of the lure 
of high wages in the modern sector (Temple, 1975, 81; Hugo,
1978: 183). The probability of most rural urban migrants 
obtaining modern sector jobs is small for two reasons. First, 
they are unlikely to have contracts within foreign or capital 
intensive firms (or among more powerful figures in urban 
areas) which would facilitate their entry into the modern 
sector. Second, since a high proportion of foreign and capital 
intensive firms prefer to employ secondary educated workers, 
most rural urban migrants will not be eligible for jobs in 
the modern sector. The vital role which contacts play in 
the migration process and in obtaining any job in urban areas 
(Jellinek, 1978), suggest that high modern sector wages are 
likely to be of little relevance in attracting migrants to 
urban areas.
The large variations in wages related to capital intensity 
and ownership question the relevance of aggregate measures 
of urban or manufacturing wages in studies of rural urban 
migration or mobility between industries in Indonesia. It will 
be much more relevant to derive measures of wages which apply 
to particular segments of manufacturing (or of the urban sector) 
and to study labour flows in response to these wage rates.
For example, high foreign sector wages are relevant to the 
supply response of particular groups (for example, educated,
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urban males) of job seekers only; aggregate measures of 
manufacturing wages will not be able to identify the relationship 
between high wages in these firms and the job search process 
of different groups of workers.
How are these research results for Indonesia related to 
studies of the causes and consequences of wage differentials 
in other economic environments? The study confirms the 
findings of research in other countries which suggests that 
wage differentials are the consequence of relatively rational 
behaviour of different groups of firms reacting to quite 
distinct economic pressures. High wages in capital intensive 
firms are partly a result of internal market considerations 
concerning the appropriate means of maximising labour 
productivity. In this respect capital intensive firms in 
Indonesia react in a similar way to those in Japan or United 
States. However, the relationships between new technology, 
certain labour management objectives, wages and human capital 
varies according to contrasting business practices in different 
countries. Internal markets are not nearly as strong in 
Indonesia today as they were in Japan several decades ago. 
Moreover, foreign investment plays a central part in introducing 
new systems of labour management with the new technology in 
Indonesia.
Nevertheless, despite the huge differences in the labour 
markets and broad institutional environment in which firms 
operated in Japan, North America and Indonesia, there are 
some major similarities in the way in which wages are determined 
in certain segments of the labour market in each country.
A major challenge of future research on labour markets (especially 
in labour surplus LDCs) is to identify the extent to which 
some of the broader influences or wage differentials found in 
this study are also common in other similar economic environments.
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APPENDIX 4.1 A Note on Secondary Sources of Wage Data^
Owing to the variety of sources of data on wages in 
Indonesia (and specifically on manufacturing in Java), and 
their varying coverage and reliability, any survey of the wage 
structure is likely to be a confusing operation. Since there 
is no one major source of data and since all have quite major 
shortcomings, it will be useful to summarise the information 
provided by the major sources, the samples covered and pitfalls 
involved in using the data collected in various surveys and 
series. We will divide the sources into three major groups: 
data collected by the Department of Manpower (Departemen 
Tenaga Kerja or DEPNAKER), by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(BPS) and that collected by other government departments.
Department of Manpower Sources
The Department of Manpower collects data from special 
surveys and also from regular quarterly reports from provincial 
offices. Three major surveys provide wage data from a wide 
range of sectors and regions:
1. Laporan Hasil Survey Upah dan Gaji Penelitian Tenaga Kerja 
Persiapan Pembentukan REPELITA Tl [Report of the results 
of the wage and salary survey for the preparation of The 
Second Five Year Plan] Indonesia, Dept, of Manpower, Jakarta, 
1973 .
This survey covered 1,278 firms in 13 major cities in Indonesia 
(including seven in Java) and was conducted in late 1971. The 
data are presented in a large number of appendix tables by 
region, sector and type of firm (government owned, foreign or 
domestic private). Although it is now a little out of date, 
the survey still was the most detailed source of wage data 
available in Indonesia to the end of 1976. Most of this data 
has not been analysed except for a rather superficial coverage
1 This note covers the results of all major surveys published 
to the end of 1976.-
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in the main report. It is especially useful because all wage 
data is broken down by occupation giving average, minimum and 
maximum wages of each group of firms in particular ownership 
groups, in each industry and location. The section on wages 
in the 1972 ARTEP (Asian Regional Training and Employment 
Programme) report (ILO, Bangkok) on manpower in Indonesia 
was largely based on the preliminary findings of this survey.
The major shortcomings of this study are:
(1) There is no analysis by firm characteristics except 
for ownership, and no data on the average size of 
firms included in the survey. This is a major 
problem since there is a wide range in the number 
of employees (5-2000) in various firms included
in particular ownership categories (especially 
domestic private firms).
(2) Quite a wide range in wages for the same occupation 
in the same industry, location and ownership group 
suggest that in several cases the data is not 
reliable. These variations were especially large 
for professional employees (managers, secretaries, 
accountants and production managers) which suggests 
that firms were not always prepared to give accurate 
data on wages in these occupations. (Some examples 
of the variations between wages of these senior 
employees in Jakarta include (i) a range of
Rp 4,400-43,200 for directors' secretaries in 
domestic owned foodstuffs firms, (ii) a range of 
Rp 7,500-162,000 for directors' salaries in domestic 
owned firms in printing and (iii) a range of 
Rp 10,000-300,000 for directors' salaries in domestic 
owned chemical firms.)
2. Survey Pengupahan dan Household Budget [A survey of wages 
and household budgets] Indonesia, Dept, of Manpower, 
Jakarta, 1975 .
This survey covered a sample of 971 firms in thirteen provinces 
and in all major sectors in each province. The survey was
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conducted in 1974 and aimed to provide information to the 
National Wages Board for minimum wage legislation. Published 
data include minimum wages paid by firms in each region, 
average wages paid to staff, monthly and daily employees in 
each region and sector, and the costs of health care and 
social contributions by sector and region.
There is no published information on the sampling methods 
used in this survey or on the size and ownership of firms 
included in the survey; sampling seems to have been at the 
discretion of provincial manpower officials who supervised 
the survey in different regions."*" Other shortcomings of the 
survey include:
(1) Average wages by sector and region that are quoted 
in the report of the survey are misleading because 
they take no account of the number of employees in 
each skill category (staff, monthly and daily 
employees were given the same weight in overall 
averages) ;
(2) Although the report does indicate the variation in 
wages between regions and sectors, some of these 
differences are so large as to seriously question 
the reliability of the data (for example, average 
wages in manufacturing in Central Java and Yogyakarta 
were recorded as approximately Rp 13,000 and
Rp 12,000 respectively whereas in East Java they 
were recorded at Rp 29,000).
3. Report on Employment and Training Patterns, Problems and 
Requirements in the Manufacturing Sector in Indonesia
Indonesia, Dept, of Manpower and ILO, 2 Vol., 1975 .
This survey was conducted in November-December 1973 and 
covered 183 large and medium enterprises (approximately a
In Jakarta only seven of the 71 manufacturing establishments 
employed more than 100 workers and none employed more than 
250; the mean number of workers was 44, well below the mean 
for all large and medium sized firms recorded in the 1974-75 
Industrial Census.
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10 percent sample of all large and medium enterprises in
*Indonesia) in a range of manufacturing industries in all 
provinces in Java and in the other major islands (Sumatra, 
Sulawesi and Kalimantan); sampling was conducted on a random 
basis in selected industries and regions. Wage data cover 
maximum and minimum wages and the number of firms giving 
fringe benefits for nine occupations in each region. One 
advantage of this survey over several other sources of data 
on wages is that it covers a range of occupational groups. 
Because the survey did not collect data on average wages 
of different occupations it is not comparable with several 
other wage surveys. Other data problems include:
(1) There is no breakdown in published data of 
interindustry or interfirm wage differentials; 
all data are aggregated by region;
(2) There is some data on the size of establishments 
included in the survey but no data analysis on 
wage differentials is conducted according to
this variable. The survey provides no information 
on other firm characteristics such as ownership 
or capital intensity of the sample.
In addition to these reports the provincial manpower 
offices collect wage data (including maximum and minimum 
wages and payments in kind per enterprise) on a quarterly 
basis from a sample of major firms in their region. The 
data is of limited usefulness because in most cases there 
is no breakdown by occupation. Moreover the huge variations 
in wages reported by different firms suggests that the data 
are rather unreliable. The Nota Keuangan (Financial Notes) 
accompanying the Indonesian annual budget regularly publishes 
similar data collected by the Dept, of Manpower for a sample 
of large scale firms in various regions of Indonesia. This 
data is in no way representative of wages in each sector and 
for the economy as a whole.
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Data Collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics BPS-
1. Daily wages by occupation in estates in various regions 
in Indonesia is the most comprehensive source of wage data 
collected by BPS. This data is collected annually and goes 
back to the early 1950s. Although extremely useful for time- 
series analysis, it has not been an important source of data 
for this study which concentrates on interfirm and 
interindustry differentials especially in manufacturing.
Statistik Industri [ Industrial Statistics] BPS, Jakarta.
2. The annual survey of industrial establishments was first 
conducted in 1970 and collects data on wage expenditure by 
industry group for all Indonesia. It covers large and medium 
establishments and since 1975 has been a census of these 
establishments. To 1971 the data was broken down by large 
and medium groups and included data on male and female 
employees. In the first year (1970) wage data was also 
broken down by cash and kind components. This series suffers 
from various irregularities and as a result is much less 
useful for time series than for cross-sectional analysis.
The data is also of limited usefulness for any in-depth 
analysis of wages because they do not include any breakdown 
by skill categories. Data on other firm characteristics 
(electricity and other inputs consumed and purchased, value 
of output and value added) may permit some analysis of the 
causes of wage differentials but because of the unreliability 
of much of this data any slightly sophisticated statistical 
analysis (e.g. regression) is of limited usefulness.
Industrial Censuses (1964, 1974-75) BPS, Jakarta .
3. This data is presented by sector and by region and in 
1974-75 included a breakdown of wages for overtime, annual 
bonuses, contributions to pension and other funds, gifts and 
other expenditures. This data is also presented for firms 
with different ownership patterns (foreign, government owned 
and domestic private). Collection of similar data to the 
annual surveys of industrial establishments also permits some
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analysis of the causes of interindustry wage differentials.
But because of anomalies in much of this data (and rather 
crude indicators of variables such as capital intensity) such 
exercises suffer from the same problems as analysis of the 
annual industrial statistics data.
The Intercensal Survey 1976 (SUPAS) and the National Labour 
Force Survey, 1976 (SAKERNAS).
4. Both provide data on the distribution of incomes of wage 
and salary earners broken down by sex and rural urban location. 
The SUPAS data are cross-tabulated by sector (including 
manufacturing) and the SAKERNAS data provide cross-tabulations by 
province. The survey also collects data on hours of work by 
sector (SUPAS) and province (SAKERNAS). Although wages are
only one component of income, these surveys are a useful 
approximation of rural urban and male-female wage differentials.
5. Over the period 1972-74 BPS published wage data from 
selected medium and large scale enterprises in Java on a 
quarterly basis, and also collected data on wages of various 
skill groups in the construction sector in different regions 
(1973-74).
Wage Data Collected by other Government Departments
1. Daily wage rates of construction workers in INPRES projects 
1971/72-1977/78 (BAPPENAS, Jakarta).
This data is collected for various occupations by kabupaten
throughout Indonesia. It is probably the most comprehensive
source of regional wage differentials collected in Indonesia.
2. Daily Wage Rates of Employees on Department of Public 
Works Projects in Various Provinces in Indonesia, 
various years (PUTL, Jakarta).
This data collected by the Department of Public Works is very 
similar to that also collected by BAPPENAS but is a little less 
comprehensive in its coverage.
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Appendix Table 4.3: Payments in kind as 
in manufacturing,
a percentage of wages 
large and medium firms,
all. Indonesia, 1970 ,r
Number of Average number Average Percentage
employees
(000)
of employees/ 
f irm
wage
(Rp/month)
wages in 
kind
Cement
Mon-metallic
3.6 1217 16,400 53
minerals 
Paper and paper
0.8 71 8,300 44
prods.
Rubber and rubber
4.7 53 5,200 38
prods. 115.6 177 3,800 32
Foodstuffs 270.6 36 3,300 29
Plastics 6.4 33 4,000 25
Sub total 401.7 62 6/000
(3,600;
39
Eeverages 5.2 30 5,600 21
Printing 15.1 29 4,500 21
Other industries 7.6 39 2,000 21
Other chemicals 22.0 57 6,300 19
Textiles 165.7 35 3,100 18
Wearing apparel 4.9 36 9,100 17
Sub total 220.5 36 5,100
(3,600r
20
Leather products 2.0 32 3,700 16
Glass
Electrical
3.2 70 3,600 13
machinery 3.5 63 4,700 12
Footwear 
Other non-
3.7 59 5,900 10
metallic min. 
Wood and wood
2.9 16 2,300 9
prods. 10.3 15 3,500 9
Sub total 25.6 21 4,000 
(3,900)^
12
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Appendix Table 4.3 (Continued)
Number of 
employees 
(000)
Average number 
of employees/ 
f irm
Average
wage
(Rp/month)
Percentage 
wages in 
kind
Furniture
Transport
4.3 20 3,300 8
machinery 7.1 24 5,000 8
Metals 16.7 31 4,700 8
Tobacco
Basic
173.4 169 1,900 6
chemicals 5.4 62 6,700 6
Machinery 4.8 45 5,100 5
Sub total 211.7 89 4,500
(2,400)2
7
All firms 859.5 51 5,100 
(3,300) 2
19.5 
( 2 2 . I ) 3
Includes all non mechanised firms with 10 or more employees 
and all mechanised firms with five or more employees.
Weighted by number of employees.
Weighted by total value of wage payments.
Source: Indonesia, Industrial Statistics, 1970
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Appendix Table 5.1: Minimum physical requirements (KFM), areas
of Indonesia/ average for 1974
Region
Average
Worker
only
for 1974
Married 
worker + two 
children
Jakarta 11.8 927.0
West Java - Bandung 11.7 29 . 3
Bogor 9 . 4 24.5
Cirebon 6.9 21.2
Central Java - Semarang 7.5 722.5
Yogyakarta 7.7 20.6
East Java - Surabaya 7.8 22 . Q 1
Malang 6.3 18.0
Kediri 5.5 18.0^
Sumatra - Banda Aceh 11.9 30 . S 1
Medan 8.9 21.3
Padang 9 . 7 24.6
Jambi 10.4 30.5^
Pakanbaru 13.3 31.8
Palembang 11.7 31.8
Lampung 9 . 3 25.0
Sulawesi - Menado 8.9 24.9
Ujung Pandang 8.2 23.3
Kalimantan - Banjarmasin 9 . 3 25.1
East Indonesia - Bali 10.4 22.6
Mataram 8.2 20.9 1
Jayapura 16.2 41.6
Less than 12 months
2 South Jakarta only
Source: Indonesia, Dept, of Manpower, Unpublished data.
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Appendix Table 6.1: Wages, and annual bonuses in negotiated
labour agreements, Kotamadya Bandung,
1968-77
Year
Minimum wages(Rp/day) Price of rice
Bandung Rural Java
Daily Piece 1 Monthly (Rp/litre) (Rp/kg)
1968 352 - 1,000 363 40
1970 60 90 2,500 39 43
1972 75 115 3,250 46 50
19754 180 225 6,250 90 93
19774 360 385 12,500 123 152
Percentage
increase 928 327 1,100 241 253
Minimum earnings of loom operators 
Includes a premi of Rp 10.
No data available for 1968, figure refers to 1969.
Applied to both kotamadya and kabupaten of Bandung.
Source: Wage Agreements, 1968-77; Statistical Procketbooks,
various years.
3
4
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Appendix Table 6.2: Real wages in the kretek industry in
Kudus 1951-77
Year Daily(Rp)
Piece
(Rp/1000
cigs)
Rp/Litre
rice
(Semarang)
Value of wage in 
litres of rice
Daily Piece
1951 3.5 2.8 1.7 2.1 1.6
1955 3.5 3.3 2.2 1.6 1.5
1960 6.5 4.2 3.7 1.1 0.7
1964 125.0 70.0 120.0 1.0 0.6
1970 43.0 24 37 1.1 0.6
1975 125.0 60 84 1.5 0.7
1976 170.0 70 107 1.6 0.7
Source: Castles (1967:148- 9). Statistical Pocketbook,
various years, Wage Agreements between PPRK
(Kudus :Kretek Manufacturers) and Labour Unions,
1970-76.
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APPENDIX 7.1 The Field Survey
The field survey was conducted from December 1975 to 
August 1976. Data was collected from individual establishments 
through interviews based on a structured questionnaire. Here 
we briefly describe the sampling procedure, major methods of 
data collection and problems encountered in the field survey.
1. Sampling procedure
A stratified random sample was chosen from the three 
industries. Four criteria were used to randomly stratify the 
three industries (weaving, kretek and cigarettes). These 
were: location, size of firm, mechanisation and ownership
(Table 7.1A). Firms were chosen from several of the major 
producing areas of each industry (weaving in Jakarta, Bandung/ 
Majalaya and Solo/Pedan; kretek in Kudus and Malang/Kadiri; 
cigarettes in Jakarta, Central Java and Malang). The sample 
was selected from three size groups, from among mechanised and 
non-mechanised firms in weaving and on the basis of ownership 
in weaving and cigarettes. Interviews were requested from 104 
firms. Sixteen firms refused and another five were excluded 
due to inaccurate or incompelte data.
2. Data collection
I collected all the data directly from interviews based 
on a pretested questionnaire.1 To facilitate interviewing, a 
summary checklist of the questions included in the interview 
schedule was drawn up. This list (which excluded some of the 
more sensitive questions on the interview schedule) was 
presented prior to interviews. Owing to the wide range in 
the forms in which data was provided and the unreliability 
of many answers, few questionnaires were filled in during the 
interviews.
The data obtained from individual firms differed enormously 
in reliability and comprehensiveness. The success of
1 A summary of the questions included in the questionnaire 
is provided in Appendix 7.2.
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Table 7.1A: Criteria used for selecting
sample of firms
1. Industry: Weaving Kretek Cigarettes
2. Location Jakarta Kudus/Malang Jakarta,
Bandung/Majalaya (Kediri) Semarang,
Solo/Pedan Solo Malang
3. Size^ t---------- Large, medium, small-------- >
4. Technology Mechanised/ _ __
Non-mechanised
5. Ownership Foreign, State, — Foreign/
Domestic Domestic
Large >500 employees, medium 100-499 employees, small 
<100 employees.
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interviews depended on a variety of factors: the willingness
of management to provide time and access to hard data in 
company records, the level and ability of personnel entrusted 
with the task of providing data, and the completeness of 
company recording systems. The approach taken was to collect 
as detailed data as possible in interviews with cooperative 
and knowledgeable respondents and from firms with relatively 
complete records. Details obtained in these interviews helped 
considerably in checking and making estimates of data which I 
was unable to obtain (or which was obviously incorrect) from 
other firms. One can gain some idea of the variations in the 
quality and quantity of data obtained from different firms from 
an estimate of the duration of interviews. For about 30 percent 
of firms I made three to five visits covering durations of 
interviewing and data collection of 10-20 hours; two to three 
visits were made to about half the sample for durations of 
five to 10 hours and I made only one visit to the remaining 
20 percent of firms.
The precision and reliability of information obtained 
from different questions on the interview schedule also varied 
considerably. The kinds of data obtained in major sections 
of the questionnaire are summarised below
(i) Production data: With the exception of foreign
cigarette and some large kretek factories, I
was able to obtain relatively accurate information 
from firms on present production, seasonal 
variations and capacity utilisation. For a small 
number of firms I made estimates of production 
based on the number and quality of machines and 
in kretek factories on the number of employees 
involved in rolling cigarettes.
(ii) Investment data: This was the most difficult data
to obtain accurately. In each firm I attempted to 
get detailed listing of capital equipment and to 
obtain estimates of the present value of capital 
equipment based on current market prices. In
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(iii)
(iv)
larger, more recent firms whose equipment did not 
have a price in second hand capital markets, the 
present value of capital equipment was obtained from 
standard depreciation calculations applied to the 
initial value of investments.
Characteristics of employees: Data on age,
education, marital status, present residence, years 
of service and job experience were probably the 
least precise of all the information collected. A 
few larger companies had data on education and years 
of service of employees but almost none had records 
of age, marital status and employment experience. 
Therefore this data were based on estimates of 
personnel managers, managers and foremen. My only 
means of checking was through visual impressions 
and questions to workers during visits to the 
factory. Despite these problems, the data do give 
us a fairly clear picture of differences in socio­
economic status of employees in different kinds of 
firms, industries and regions.
Wages and wage components: As this comprised the
key data required in the survey, I spent a 
considerable amount of time obtaining accurate 
information. Most of this data were obtained from 
wage sheets for the previous month or week and for 
piece rate workers for different periods of the year. 
Wherever possible I noted down the real wages of a 
sample of employees in different occupations, noting 
maximum and minimum wage levels and linking these to 
seniority and years of service. For 20 percent of 
firms, wage data were given orally by the manager.'*'
In other cases they were taken from wage sheets. 
Almost no firms provided 'hard' data on professional 
and staff salaries. But about half the firms were
1 I was able to cross-check this data by questioning foremen, 
workers and some competitors.
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remarkably honest about these (a further 10-20 
percent understated salaries of upper level 
personnel by 100-400 percent). Most however did 
provide data on the wage bill for various 
categories of employees. Almost all were willing to 
give information on wage increases, annual bonuses 
and fringe benefits for employees at all levels. I 
was able to check the data provided by managers 
during short visits to the factory and to rely on 
estimates to adjust data which were obviously 
incorrect.
(v) Labour Management: This comprised information on
labour turnover, absenteeism, training and recruiting. 
Data on labour turnover were least complete, a large 
number of firms being able to only give rough 
estimates for the past year. Information on 
absenteeism was easy to obtain but in a variety of 
forms - in some firms data were for a sample of 
employees for a couple of weeks with estimates of 
seasonal variations; in others they pertained to
all employees for periods of up to a year. No 
problems were encountered in obtaining information 
on training programs for employees or on recruiting 
procedures (although 'irregular' procedures for 
selection of personnel in high wage companies were 
hard to investigate).
(vi) Institutional influences on wages: Data on this
subject were difficult to obtain owing to the 
relatively sensitive nature of trade union 
activities in Indonesia. Few managers were prepared 
to provide detailed information on the activities
of enterprise unions and their membership. Data on 
trade union activities were consequently incomplete 
(the large sample size prevented a more in-depth 
study of this subject). Since the majority of firms 
had no enterprise union, the lack of detailed data
438
on trade union activities should not affect the 
overall findings of the survey.
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APPENDIX 7.2 Abbreviated English Translation of Firm 
Questionnaire
A. Basic Data on Production
1.
2 . 
3. 
4 .
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
9.
10.
Year began operations.
Production operations (various stages).
Type and quality of output and percentage sold.
(Weaving only)
Type of thread.
Number of factories: comparison of investment, employment 
and production in this factory compared with all other 
factories.
Value of investment in land and buildings/ machinery, 
and other equipment (present value and value at the time 
the firm began operations).
Electricity required and used last month and a normal 
month.
(Weaving/Cigarettes only)
Number of machines (looms); number operating last month 
and normal month; production per machine, operators per 
machine; value of machines (at time of purchase and present 
value).
Production last week/month (total volume and value of 
production).
(i) Production, employment and value of sales 
throughout 1975 (normal month, maximum month, 
minimum month); reasons for variations.
(ii) Number of shifts, average hours and days of work a 
week last month, normal month, maximum (production) 
month, minimum (production) month.
(iii) Alternative source of income of majority of 
employees besides earnings from the factory.
Nature of jobs taken, regular or seasonal, number
of months, hours and days worked, estimated earnings.
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B . Employment
11. (i) Number of employees male and female according to
system of wage payment: daily (permanent and
casual) piece rate, monthly (permanent and contract). 
Reason for choosing different wage systems.
(ii) Major and minor reasons for choosing mainly male 
or female workers.
12. Number of workers by occupation and system of wage 
payment.
13. (i) Fixed salary scale and groups of workers (daily and
monthly, only monthly) to which it applies.
(ii) Wage group, system of wages, minimum educational and 
age requirements of each group, maximum, minimum 
and average (mode) wages for each group, occupations 
included in each group.
14. Data on basic wages, age, education, marital status,
years of service and external experience for a range of 
occupations. Includes maximum, minimum and average (mode) 
wages and minimum and average (mode) age, education etc. 
for each occupation. Occupations include: unskilled
workers, machine operators, foremen, supervisors, clerical 
staff, secretaries, machine mechanics, engineers, 
accountants and managers.
C. Wage Components
15. Collective labour agreements or work agreements with 
workers (annual renewal of agreement, frequency of 
renewels, number of years for which present agreement 
has existed).
16. Value of regular wage components for daily, piece and 
monthly workers (meals, meal allowances, transport 
allowance, attendance allowances, payments in kind).
17. Value of family allowances (for wife and children); wage 
groups or occupations which do not receive family 
allowances.
441
18. Cost of living allowances, occupations which do not 
receive cost of living allowances.
19. Overtime: wage components included in overtime and
system of calculating overtime for daily, piece and 
monthly workers. Occupations that often receive overtime 
and value of payments per month.
20. (i) Loans or credit provided by the firm: value of
loans to different groups of workers, reasons for 
giving loans and methods of repayment.
(ii) Value of social contributions (marriage, death, 
circumcision) to employees. Value of clothing 
allowance.
21. Value of Hari Raya bonus and other bonuses given in the 
last year to daily, piece and monthly employees.
22. Value of housing facilities and housing allowances
provided by the firm: number of employees provided with
housing and criteria for allocating housing to certain 
groups of workers.
23. Medical facilities provided by the firm: maximum limit
to monthly expenditures; coverage of family for medicine, 
doctor's fees and hospital fees; mean annual 
expenditure per worker on health care of workers.
24. Transport provided for workers: Number of workers taken
to work in company vehicles; number provided with their 
own vehicle; criteria for providing transport for certain 
groups of workers.
D. V7age Bill
25. Total expenditure last week/month on basic wages of daily 
piece and monthly (staff and other monthly employees) 
employees. Value of expenditure on major wage bill items 
last week/last month (overtime, payments in kind, family 
allowances, cost of living allowances, social contributions, 
medical expenses, housing, transport and other items).
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26. Expenditure in the last year on training, recruiting, 
bonuses, clothing and other items.
27. Wages as a percentage of total costs.
E. Labour Management
28. General problems of labour management.
29. Recruitment
(i) area of recruitment, distance from factory and 
reasons for recruiting labour from other regions.
(ii) major methods of recruitment for selected 
occupations.
(iii) recruitment direct from educational institutes.
(iv) jobs which are easiest and most difficult to fill.
30. Training: Type of courses or training provided by the
firm; place of training, duration of training; and 
number of employees receiving training over the past 
three years.
31. Turnover: Number of employees in major occupational
categories leaving the firm over the past year (1975) 
and major reasons for separation; comparison of 
separation rates with the previous two years and major 
reasons for changes in rates compared with the previous 
two years.
32. Absenteeism: Absenteeism rates of machine operators
(operator 1 and 2) last month and in a normal month; major 
reasons for absenteeism (sickness, menstruation leave, 
special leave); monthly variations in absenteeism over the 
past year and major reasons for fluctuations in absenteeism.
33. Wage Increases: Major reasons for wage increases over the
past three years and size of wage increases for daily, 
monthly and piece employees; minimum wage increases over 
the past year for various wage groups; occupations in 
which wage increases were largest in past three years; role 
of trade unions in wage demands over the past three years; 
role of the government in wage changes over the past three 
years; changes in the value of major wage components over 
the past three years.
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34. Comparison of the firm's wages with firms of the same 
size in the same industry, with large and smaller firms 
and with government wages.
35. Role that wages and labour supply played in determining 
the location of the factory.
36. Major factors influencing the choice of wage rates when 
the factory first opened.
37. (For foreign firms only)
How does the level of wages, their composition and 
various factors influencing wages compare with other 
countries in ASEAN.
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Appendix Table 7.2: Regression equations for hourly earnings
by worker characteristics, various 
occupations
1. Operator 2 
log y2 = 1.21 + 0.075X7* + 0.028Xg - 0.002X10** + 0.11X1;L
(0.024) (0.015) (0.001) (0.062)
R- = 0.59*
2. Unskilled
log y0 =? 0.84 + 0.13*X7 +
(0.02)
0.026X * 
(0.01)
R2 = 0.37*
3. Mechanics
log y4 = 1.77 + 0.030*X7 + 0.009Xg - 0.053Xg
(0.01) (0.01) (0.042)
R2 = 0.20*
4. Clerks
y5 = 2.43 + 7.04X7 + 9.51Xg* + 0.26X10
(9.49) (3.23) (0.23)
R- = 0.11**
5. Foremen
log y6 = 1.31 + 0.071X?* + 0.01Xg
(0.009) (0.007)
R2 = 0.41*
x7
X8
X9
= hourly earnings of each occupational category 
= mean years of schooling 
= mean years of service
= more than 50% of employees with external experience 
(dummy variable)
X^q = percentage of employees female
X-j^  = more than 75% of employees live in urban areas
(dummy variable)
Note: Age was not significant in any of the equations and was
excluded from all. Data on external experience was only 
collected for machine mechanics. Sex of employees was 
only included in the equations for operator 2 and 
clerks since almost all employees in the other 
occupations were male. Residence was only included 
in the equation for operator 2 because employees in 
the other occupations almost all lived in urban areas.
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APPENDIX TABLE 8.1: Coefficients of firm variables in
regression equation with value of 
fringe benefits, percentage of wage 
bill devoted to fringe benefits and 
total wage bill excluding fringe 
benefits
Dependent variables
Explanatory
variables
fl
(Fringe Ben 
Per worker 
RpOOO/mth)
(1)
f 2
. (Av. Wages
excl.
Fringe Ben. 
RP000/mth) 
(2)
f 3
(Fringe Ben.
as % of 
Wages Bill)
(3)
Dixi (Mech, high K/L) Dummy
5.05*
(1.40)
10.20*
(1.89)
10.15*
(3.82)
°2X1 (Mech, low K/L) Dummy
0.81
(1.04)
6.20*
(1.40)
3.76
(2.84)
°1X2 (Foreign) Dummy 5.82*(1.30)
9.3*
(1.75)
8.12** 
(3.54)
D2X2 (State/Coop)Dummy
9.87
(1.56)
0.74
(2.10)
33.90*
(4.26)
X3 (No. of employees) (000)
0.04
(0.16)
0.16
(0.22)
-0.19
(0.46)
°1X4 (Cigarettes)Dummy
+3.63**
(1.43)
6.52*
(1.93)
6.52* 
( . 390)
D2X4 (Kretek) Dummy + 1.02 (1.17)
1.48
(1.57)
11.19*
(3.19)
°1X5 (Jakarta) Dummy 3.61*(1.06)
1.71
(1.43)
13.42*
(2.90)
°2X5 (Bandung) Dummy 1.25(1.09)
1.86
(1.45)
8.22
(2.97)
°1X6 (^ 5 yrs operation) Dummy
-1.42
(0.84)
-3.38*
(1.13)
-2.06
(2.29)
Intercept 3.97 10.84 13.27
R2 0.74* 0.76* 0.65*
Mean 4.3 11.2 20.5
SD 5.7 8.0 13.3
★ significant at 1 percent level
* * significant at 5 percent level
Source: Java Wages Survey, 1975-76
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Notes to Appendix Table 8.1
The regression equations for each dependent variable included
the same explanatory variables:
f, (f0,f~) = a + b,X, = b~X~ = b.X. + bt-Xj. + b^ X,.1 Z J 1 1  Z Z  4 4  5 5 D O
where = value of fringe benefits per worker
= average earnings excluding fringe benefits (all 
employees)
= fringe benfits as a percentage of the total wage 
bill
= capital intensity 
= ownership
= size of firm (number of employees)
= industry 
= location
= years of operation.
As in equation (1), Chapter Seven, X^ was a continuous 
variable and X,jX^rX.-X,- were represented by dummy variables 
where:
D^X^ = 1 if the K/L ratio was > Rp 1.5m and the firm was 
mechanised, 0 if otherwise.
D X2 1 = 1 if the K/L ratio was  ^ Rp 1.5m and the firm was 
mechanised, 0 if otherwise.
D1X2 = 1 if the fi-rm was foreign owned, 0 if otherwise.
^2^2 = 1 if the firm was state/coop, owned, 0 if otherwise.
DxX4 = 1 if the firm was in the cigarette industry 0 if
otherwise.
D2X4 = 1 if the firm was in the kretek industry, 0 if 
otherwise.
D1X5 = t if the firm was located in Jakarta, 0 if 
otherwise.
D2X5 = 1 if the firm was located in Bandung, 0 if 
otherwise.
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D,X, = 1 if the firm had operated more than five years, 
0 if otherwise.
The results of the regression equation are presented 
below.
